This data package includes the underlying data and files to replicate the calculations, charts, and tables presented in From Rapid Recovery to Slowdown: Why Recent Economic Growth in Latin America Has Been Slow, PIIE Policy Brief 15-6. If you use the data, please cite as: De Gregorio, José. (2015). From Rapid Recovery to Slowdown: Why Recent Economic Growth in Latin America Has Been Slow. PIIE Policy Brief 15-6. Peterson Institute for International Economics.

The weekly gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate fluctuated significantly in the United States between January 2021 and April 2023. Between January and April 2021, it increased sharply from ***** percent to ***** percent. From April 2021 onwards, it started to decrease drastically, with slight occasional increases, and reached its lowest value at negative **** percent in November 2022. After November 2022, the weekly GDP growth rate increased notably.

During the "Golden Age of Capitalism", from 1950 to 1973, GDP grew by annual averages of just under five percent in Western Europe*, four percent in the U.S., and ten percent in Japan. This period of prosperity came to an end with the recession of 1973-1975, however GDP growth rates did not return to their previous levels when the recession ended, as growth was fairly sporadic in the 1970s and then much slower throughout the 1980s. From 1973 to 1987, GDP grew annually at just two fifth of the Golden Age's rate in Europe and Japan, while the U.S.' annual rates were somewhat closer.

One major difference between the two given periods was that the U.S. was the dominant and most influential economy of all developed (non-communist) countries in the 1950s and 1960s, however, the 1970s and 1980s saw Japan and the European Communities (led by West Germany and France) emerge as major economic powers in their own right. While the U.S. remained the most powerful country in the world, other developed nations became more economically autonomous, and began asserting their own influence internationally.

This study examines the middle-income trap hypothesis, a concept widely debated in economic literature. It aims to systematize various definitions of the concept and assess how definitional differences influence conclusions about development paths and income group transitions. Econometric analysis reveals that these differences have minimal impact on transition probabilities, making discussions on the trap's formation factors largely definition-independent. Sharp economic slowdowns linked to the trap arise from factors distinct from those driving upward income transitions but may signal a long-term decline in the likelihood of such transitions. The definitional diversity complicates applying the hypothesis to specific countries.

We use the yield curve to predict future GDP growth and recession probabilities. The spread between short- and long-term rates typically correlates with economic growth. Predications are calculated using a model developed by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. Released monthly.

We solve the standard production function with constant elasticity of substitution (CES) for its labour augmenting technology term. We make capital stock data and insert them together with data from Penn World Tables (PWT9.1). This provides labour augmenting technology levels and growth rates for alternative elasticities of substitution for 70 countries, 1950‐2017. The percentage growth rates of labour‐augmenting technical change (LATC) are shown to fall over time (productivity slowdown) for all elasticity values in a panel data analysis. They converge to a panel average of 2.67% and 1% depending on the inclusion of human capital and the elasticity of substitution assumed. The standard growth result of a GDP growth rate equal to that of LATC and labour input holds only for LATC based on low elasticities of substitution indicating that the economies are not in steady‐states. The correlation of LATC growth rates with total factor productivity growth from PWT9.1 is strongest (0.893) for LATC data based on an elasticity of substitution of 0.8. Matching the labour/capital share ratios from CES functions with those of PWT9.1 reveals a range of elasticities of substitution for each country, mostly between 0.8 and 1.2 or somewhat lower for developing countries. If the MPL‐to‐wage ratio is 1.6, the elasticities of substitution vary around 0.8. Using the human‐capital corrected LATC growth with CES = 0.8, 13 of 69 countries have a productivity slowdown defined as growth rate below mean in the long run; the USA is not among them indicating that the US productivity slowdown is mainly one of human capital. Dynamics of coefficient of variation and kernel density distributions for LATC growth rates shows that there is neither technological convergence nor divergence.

This dataset is about books. It has 1 row and is filtered where the book is Input price shocks and the slowdown in economic growth. It features 7 columns including author, publication date, language, and book publisher.

Antolin-Diaz, Juan, Drechsel, Thomas, and Petrella, Ivan, (2017) “Tracking the Slowdown in Long-Run GDP Growth.” Review of Economics and Statistics 99:2, 343-356.

The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the United States expanded 3 percent in the second quarter of 2025 over the previous quarter. This dataset provides the latest reported value for - United States GDP Growth Rate - plus previous releases, historical high and low, short-term forecast and long-term prediction, economic calendar, survey consensus and news.

From the Summer of 2007 until the end of 2009 (at least), the world was gripped by a series of economic crises commonly known as the Global Financial Crisis (2007-2008) and the Great Recession (2008-2009). The financial crisis was triggered by the collapse of the U.S. housing market, which caused panic on Wall Street, the center of global finance in New York. Due to the outsized nature of the U.S. economy compared to other countries and particularly the centrality of U.S. finance for the world economy, the crisis spread quickly to other countries, affecting most regions across the globe. By 2009, global GDP growth was in negative territory, with international credit markets frozen, international trade contracting, and tens of millions of workers being made unemployed.

Global similarities, global differences

Since the 1980s, the world economy had entered a period of integration and globalization. This process particularly accelerated after the collapse of the Soviet Union ended the Cold War (1947-1991). This was the period of the 'Washington Consensus', whereby the U.S. and international institutions such as the World Bank and IMF promoted policies of economic liberalization across the globe. This increasing interdependence and openness to the global economy meant that when the crisis hit in 2007, many countries experienced the same issues. This is particularly evident in the synchronization of the recessions in the most advanced economies of the G7. Nevertheless, the aggregate global GDP number masks the important regional differences which occurred during the recession. While the more advanced economies of North America, Western Europe, and Japan were all hit hard, along with countries who are reliant on them for trade or finance, large emerging economies such as India and China bucked this trend. In particular, China's huge fiscal stimulus in 2008-2009 likely did much to prevent the global economy from sliding further into a depression. In 2009, while the United States' GDP sank to -2.6 percent, China's GDP, as reported by national authorities, was almost 10 percent.

We solve the standard production function with constant elasticity of substitution (CES) for its labour augmenting technology term. We make capital stock data and insert them together with data from Penn World Tables (PWT9.1). This provides labour augmenting technology levels and growth rates for alternative elasticities of substitution for 70 countries, 1950‐2017. The percentage growth rates of labour‐augmenting technical change (LATC) are shown to fall over time (productivity slowdown) for all elasticity values in a panel data analysis. They converge to a panel average of 2.67% and 1% depending on the inclusion of human capital and the elasticity of substitution assumed. The standard growth result of a GDP growth rate equal to that of LATC and labour input holds only for LATC based on low elasticities of substitution indicating that the economies are not in steady‐states. The correlation of LATC growth rates with total factor productivity growth from PWT9.1 is strongest (0.893) for LATC data based on an elasticity of substitution of 0.8. Matching the labour/capital share ratios from CES functions with those of PWT9.1 reveals a range of elasticities of substitution for each country, mostly between 0.8 and 1.2 or somewhat lower for developing countries. If the MPL‐to‐wage ratio is 1.6, the elasticities of substitution vary around 0.8. Using the human‐capital corrected LATC growth with CES = 0.8, 13 of 69 countries have a productivity slowdown defined as growth rate below mean in the long run; the USA is not among them indicating that the US productivity slowdown is mainly one of human capital. Dynamics of coefficient of variation and kernel density distributions for LATC growth rates shows that there is neither technological convergence nor divergence.

The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Turkey expanded 2 percent in the first quarter of 2025 over the same quarter of the previous year. This dataset provides the latest reported value for - Turkey GDP Annual Growth Rate - plus previous releases, historical high and low, short-term forecast and long-term prediction, economic calendar, survey consensus and news.

The Global Financial Crisis (2007-2008), which began due to the collapse of the U.S. housing market, had a negative effect in many regions across the globe. The global recession which followed the crisis in 2008 and 2009 showed how interdependent and synchronized many of the world's economies had become, with the largest advanced economies showing very similar patterns of negative GDP growth during the crisis. Among the largest emerging economies (commonly referred to as the 'E7'), however, a different pattern emerged, with some countries avoiding a recession altogether. Some commentators have particularly pointed to 2008-2009 as the moment in which China emerged on the world stage as an economic superpower and a key driver of global economic growth. The Great Recession in the developing world While some countries, such as Russia, Mexico, and Turkey, experienced severe recessions due to their connections to the United States and Europe, others such as China, India, and Indonesia managed to record significant economic growth during the period. This can be partly explained by the decoupling from western financial systems which these countries undertook following the Asian financial crises of 1997, making many Asian nations more wary of opening their countries to 'hot money' from other countries. Other likely explanations of this trend are that these countries have large domestic economies which are not entirely reliant on the advanced economies, that their export sectors produce goods which are inelastic (meaning they are still bought during recessions), and that the Chinese economic stimulus worth almost 600 billion U.S. dollars in 2008/2009 increased growth in the region.

Since the late 1990s, the United States has received large capital flows from developing countries - a phenomenon known as the global saving glut - and experienced a productivity growth slowdown. Motivated by these facts, we provide a model connecting international financial integration and global productivity growth. The key feature is that the tradable sector is the engine of growth of the economy. Capital flows from developing countries to the United States boost demand for U.S. non-tradable goods, inducing a reallocation of U.S. economic activity from the tradable sector to the non-tradable one. In turn, lower profits in the tradable sector lead firms to cut back investment in innovation. Since innovation in the United States determines the evolution of the world technological frontier, the result is a drop in global productivity growth. This effect, which we dub the global financial resource curse, can help explain why the global saving glut has been accompanied by subdued investment and growth, in spite of low global interest rates.

The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in China expanded 5.20 percent in the second quarter of 2025 over the same quarter of the previous year. This dataset provides - China GDP Annual Growth Rate - actual values, historical data, forecast, chart, statistics, economic calendar and news.

The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in India expanded 7.40 percent in the first quarter of 2025 over the same quarter of the previous year. This dataset provides - India GDP Annual Growth Rate - actual values, historical data, forecast, chart, statistics, economic calendar and news.

Mozambique has experienced rapid growth for over two decades. Growth accelerated remarkably following the end of the civil war, averaging 7.9 percent over 1993-2015, among the highest in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). However, growth decelerated sharply following the hidden debt crisis in 2016, which led to a crisis of economic governance and a protracted economic slowdown, with growth falling to 3 percent in 2016-2019. The growth slowdown has been further exacerbated by the natural disasters in 2019, the insurgency in Northern Mozambique, escalating since 2017, and the global pandemic since 2020. Mozambique’s existing growth strategy has been limited in its capacity to generate productive jobs and support accelerated poverty reduction. However, the discovery of some of the largest natural gas (LNG) reserves in the world is expected to provide Mozambique with a transformative opportunity for sustained and inclusive growth. The Mozambique Country Economic Memorandum (CEM) assesses Mozambique’s current growth model and presents a set of recommendations to: (i) make the best use of the non-renewable natural resource revenues, which includes putting in place an adequate policy and institutional framework well ahead of the revenue windfalls from the LNG sector; and (ii) promote growth in non-extractive sectors, accompanied by spatial transformation, and improved agricultural productivity. The report consists of five chapters. Chapter one provides an overview of Mozambique’s current growth model, asking what’s driving growth and outlining why this model needs rethinking. Chapter two provides analysis of the potential impact of Mozambique’s resource boom on GDP, exports, revenue, and employment, and discusses how to make good use of the opportunities and manage the associated risks. Chapter three tells Mozambique’s growth story from a spatial perspective. It constructs a unique district-by-district sectoral GDP database to identify the main growth nodes in Mozambique and understand why there is a weak link between growth and poverty reduction. The services sector is the subject of chapter four, exploring how to overcome bottlenecks to deliver on its potential to drive growth in Mozambique. Chapter five continues this theme, examining the challenges posed to private sector growth by weak governance and rising corruption. All five chapters make policy recommendations for the way forward.

This dataset contains replication files for "The Fading American Dream: Trends in Absolute Income Mobility Since 1940" by Raj Chetty, David Grusky, Maximilian Hell, Nathaniel Hendren, Robert Manduca, and Jimmy Narang. For more information, see https://opportunityinsights.org/paper/the-fading-american-dream/. A summary of the related publication follows. One of the defining features of the “American Dream” is the ideal that children have a higher standard of living than their parents. We assess whether the U.S. is living up to this ideal by estimating rates of “absolute income mobility” – the fraction of children who earn more than their parents – since 1940. We measure absolute mobility by comparing children’s household incomes at age 30 (adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index) with their parents’ household incomes at age 30. We find that rates of absolute mobility have fallen from approximately 90% for children born in 1940 to 50% for children born in the 1980s. Absolute income mobility has fallen across the entire income distribution, with the largest declines for families in the middle class. These findings are unaffected by using alternative price indices to adjust for inflation, accounting for taxes and transfers, measuring income at later ages, and adjusting for changes in household size. Absolute mobility fell in all 50 states, although the rate of decline varied, with the largest declines concentrated in states in the industrial Midwest, such as Michigan and Illinois. The decline in absolute mobility is especially steep – from 95% for children born in 1940 to 41% for children born in 1984 – when we compare the sons’ earnings to their fathers’ earnings. Why have rates of upward income mobility fallen so sharply over the past half-century? There have been two important trends that have affected the incomes of children born in the 1980s relative to those born in the 1940s and 1950s: lower Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates and greater inequality in the distribution of growth. We find that most of the decline in absolute mobility is driven by the more unequal distribution of economic growth rather than the slowdown in aggregate growth rates. When we simulate an economy that restores GDP growth to the levels experienced in the 1940s and 1950s but distributes that growth across income groups as it is distributed today, absolute mobility only increases to 62%. In contrast, maintaining GDP at its current level but distributing it more broadly across income groups – at it was distributed for children born in the 1940s – would increase absolute mobility to 80%, thereby reversing more than two-thirds of the decline in absolute mobility. These findings show that higher growth rates alone are insufficient to restore absolute mobility to the levels experienced in mid-century America. Under the current distribution of GDP, we would need real GDP growth rates above 6% per year to return to rates of absolute mobility in the 1940s. Intuitively, because a large fraction of GDP goes to a small fraction of high-income households today, higher GDP growth does not substantially increase the number of children who earn more than their parents. Of course, this does not mean that GDP growth does not matter: changing the distribution of growth naturally has smaller effects on absolute mobility when there is very little growth to be distributed. The key point is that increasing absolute mobility substantially would require more broad-based economic growth. We conclude that absolute mobility has declined sharply in America over the past half-century primarily because of the growth in inequality. If one wants to revive the “American Dream” of high rates of absolute mobility, one must have an interest in growth that is shared more broadly across the income distribution.

Replication codes for Toni, Emiliano and Paniagua, Pablo and Ordenes, Patricio, Policy Changes and Growth Slowdown: Assessing the Lost Decade of the Latin American Miracle (2024). Preliminary version.

The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Italy expanded 0.40 percent in the second quarter of 2025 over the same quarter of the previous year. This dataset provides the latest reported value for - Italy GDP Annual Growth Rate - plus previous releases, historical high and low, short-term forecast and long-term prediction, economic calendar, survey consensus and news.