Denmark is the European country with the highest top statutory income tax rate as of 2024, with the Nordic country having a top taxation band of **** percent. Other countries with high taxes on top earners included France, with a top rate of **** percent, Austria, with a top rate of ** percent, and Spain, with a top rate of ** percent. Many countries in Europe have relatively high top income tax rates when compared with other regions globally, as these countries have relatively generous social systems funded by tax incomes. This is particularly the case in Western, Northern, and Central Europe, where the social state is generally stronger. On the other hand, formerly communist countries in the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) region tend to have lower top income tax rates, with Romania and Bulgaria having the lowest rates in Europe in 2024, with their top income tax brackets both being only ** percent. These countries often have less well-developed social systems, as well as the fact that they must compete to retain their workers against other European countries with higher average wages. In spite of low-income taxes, these countries may take other deductions from employee's wages such as pension and healthcare payments, which may not be included in income taxation as in other European countries.

This dataset provides values for CORPORATE TAX RATE reported in several countries. The data includes current values, previous releases, historical highs and record lows, release frequency, reported unit and currency.

The Personal Income Tax Rate in European Union stands at 29.90 percent. This dataset provides - European Union Personal Income Tax Rate- actual values, historical data, forecast, chart, statistics, economic calendar and news.

When analyzing the historical PIT rates, it should be noted that in 2000 the average rate was almost 45%. The highest income tax (approx. 60%) was imposed in Belgium, Denmark, as well as in the Netherlands and France. On the other hand, the lowest (25%) rates were recorded in Estonia and Latvia, which were not yet members of the European Union. In the following years, most EU countries rather lowered PIT rates, and the average of this tax in EU countries is 38.6%. The most significant reductions were introduced by Bulgaria, Lithuania, Romania and also Hungary. The PIT tax burden differs significantly in the EU countries, as some countries have relatively low rates, but in Denmark, Portugal and Sweden, the PIT tax exceeds 50%.

The Corporate Tax Rate in European Union stands at 17.50 percent. This dataset provides - European Union Corporate Tax Rate- actual values, historical data, forecast, chart, statistics, economic calendar and news.

This dataset provides values for SALES TAX RATE reported in several countries. The data includes current values, previous releases, historical highs and record lows, release frequency, reported unit and currency.

This dataset provides values for CORPORATE TAX RATE reported in several countries. The data includes current values, previous releases, historical highs and record lows, release frequency, reported unit and currency.

The average for 2019 based on 43 countries was 37.76 percent. The highest value was in France: 60.7 percent and the lowest value was in North Macedonia: 13 percent. The indicator is available from 2005 to 2019. Below is a chart for all countries where data are available.

Finland had the highest tax on spirits of all alchol volumes in the European Union as of June 2024. One *** liter bottle of spirits with an alcohol volume of ** percent was taxed at ***** euros in Finland. In contrast, the same bottle of spirits would be taxed at just **** euros in Bulgaria.

The Corporate Tax Rate In the Euro Area stands at 22.20 percent. This dataset provides the latest reported value for - Euro area Corporate Tax Rate - plus previous releases, historical high and low, short-term forecast and long-term prediction, economic calendar, survey consensus and news.

This data shows the number of income earners by income tax rate each year from 2004 to 2018. It shows for each year the number of income earners who are exempt, on Marginal Relief or on the Standard or Higher income tax rate.

This horizontal bar chart displays tax revenue (% of GDP) by region using the aggregation average, weighted by gdp in Europe. The data is about countries.

One of the major challenges of empirical tax research is the identification and calculation of appropriate tax data. While there is consensus that average marginal tax rates are most suitable for studying the effects of tax policy on economic growth, because of data limitations the calculation of marginal tax rates has been limited to the USA and the UK. This paper provides calculations of average marginal tax rates for the four Scandinavian countries using the methodologies of Seater (1982, 1985) and Barro and Sahasakul (1983, 1986). Then, by pooling the newly calculated tax rates for the Scandinavian countries with the data for the USA and the UK, we investigate the effects of tax policy shocks on the per capita GDP growth rate. Our results suggest that an increase in average marginal tax rates has a negative impact on economic growth. Employing additive mixed panel models with penalized splines as estimation approach, we show that changes in tax rates have nonlinear effects. Increasing average marginal tax rates turn out to be the most distorting at relatively moderate tax rates.

Analysis of ‘Tax rate on low wage earners - Unemployment trap’ provided by Analyst-2 (analyst-2.ai), based on source dataset retrieved from https://data.europa.eu/data/datasets/29rqta57aajujyiwc8yffq on 30 September 2021.

--- Dataset description provided by original source is as follows ---

The 'unemployment trap' measures what percentage of the gross earnings (after moving into employment) is 'taxed away' by the combined effects of the withdrawal of benefits and higher tax and social security contributions.

--- Original source retains full ownership of the source dataset ---

The average for 2021 based on 41 countries was 28.37 percent. The highest value was in Ireland: 53.03 percent and the lowest value was in Russia: 4.32 percent. The indicator is available from 1972 to 2022. Below is a chart for all countries where data are available.

Boundless, the fully compliant Employer of Record platform, compiled and analysed the employment costs in 32 countries within Europe, including gross salary, social and health insurance contributions, income taxes, net pay and more.

To collect this data, Boundless leveraged their internal salary calculators, a resource developed and used by the Boundless Payroll team in collaboration with local payroll partners in each country. This approach enabled Boundless to capture the true costs associated with employing staff in each of the 32 countries, taking into account all applicable regional nuances, and ensure that the findings reflect the latest legal and economic conditions.

******* was the European country which collected the greatest total tax revenues (including social security revenues), with the country collecting *** trillion euros of taxes in 2023. France was the country in Europe with the second-largest tax base in 2023, with *** trillion Euros of taxes collected, while Italy collected *** billion euros. The small island nation of Malta collected the least tax revenue in 2023, with only *** billion euros of revenues.

The German Internet Panel (GIP) is an infrastructure project. The GIP serves to collect data about individual attitudes and preferences which are relevant for political and economic decision-making processes.

The questionnaire contains numerous experimental variations in the survey instruments. For further information, please refer to the study documentation.

Topics: European Union: opinion on gridlock compromise of the EU; internal political efficacy of the EU (good understanding and assessment of important EU political issues); external political efficacy of the EU (EU politicians care what ordinary people think); European Parliament Election vote intention; self-placement on European unification; placement of different parties on European unification (CDU/CSU, SPD, AfD, FDP, Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen, Die Linke); demand for abolition of the EU in case of lack of support for EU decisions; satisfaction with the EU.

Most important topic (open) for Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen (Split: CDU/CSU) overall and in the last election campaign; satisfaction with different areas of life (work, family and private life as well as work-life balance); daily hours for work, apprenticeship, studies (including commuting) or for children and care.

Right working time reduction: opinion on the union IGMetall´s demand for a right to a working time reduction (with partial wage compensation); willingness to reduce working time (with partial wage compensation); reasons for willingness to reduce working time; reasons against working time reduction; responsibility for reconciling work and family life (employees, employers, bargaining parties, state); support of the employers´ view (demands of the unions for a reduction of working hours with proportional wage compensation by employers would put too much strain on the German economy); occupational activity; spending preference with regard to pensions (the state should spend more or less money on pensions); reasons for the change of opinion compared to the answer from wave 33; spending preference with regard to the unemployed (the state should spend more or less money on supporting the unemployed); reasons for the change of opinion compared to the answer from wave 33.

Tax system in Germany - income tax: difficulties in filling out tax declaration; call for simplification of the income tax system in Germany; income tax system in need for reform; fairer distribution of income through tax deductions and allowances versus high income earners profit more from these tax deductions and allowances; preferred measures to simplify income tax (tax system with a uniform tax rate for all taxpayers, but without tax deductions and allowances or while maintaining the current tax deductions and allowances, tax system with higher tax rates for higher earners without deductions and allowances, tax system with pre-filled tax declaration, no change, other measure); preference for tax deduction for care of relatives; preference for tax deduction for substantial donations for charitable purposes; preference for commuting allowance; repetition of the call for simplification of the tax system due to its complexity; self-used tax deductions and/or allowances (maintenance of two households, home office, commuting allowance, other job-related expenditures (income-related expenses), pension expenses, education cost, care of relatives and care insurance, child allowances and/or childcare costs, donations for charitable purposes or political parties, others, no reductions (only the basic allowance and the flat-rate deductions); debt brake: year from which the Federal Government and the federal states should be able to get by without new debts; evaluation of the debt brake; probability that the federal state of the main residence will adhere to the debt brake from 2020; assessment of adherence to the debt brake by the own federal state if others do not adhere to the debt brake; federal state of the main residence is donor or recipient state.

Political issues: Satisfaction with democracy; satisfaction with the performance of the Federal Government; satisfaction with the performance of the CDU/CSU in the Bundestag; satisfaction with the performance of Angela Merkel as Federal Chancellor; skalometer for Angela Merkel.

Demography: sex; age (year of birth, categorized); highest educational degree; highest professional qualification; marital status; household size; employment status; German citizenship; frequency of private Internet usage; federal state.

Additionally coded was: respondent ID; household ID, GIP; person ID (within household); year of recruitment (2012, 2014); interview date; current online status; experimental variable.

Questionnaire evaluation (interesting, varied, relevant, long, difficult, too personal); overall evaluation of the survey; respondent made further comments on the questionnaire.

As of 2020, Belgium was the country with the highest average tax revenue per motor vehicle in its fleet. This amount stood at some ***** euros per year per vehicle. Belgium was followed by Austria and Finland, both earning over ***** euros in annual fiscal income per vehicle in their fleet. By contrast, Greece and Spain taxed motor vehicles less, gaining ***** and ***** euros per vehicle respectively.

Building on arguments to political incomes, career concerns and elitist networks, this study assumes that an increasing percentage of highly incentivized former executive board members within the German Federal Government (1957–2012) will decrease the top earners’ average income tax rate during the subsequent year. Conversely, the percentage of lower incentivized former supervisory board members is assumed to increase the top earners’ average income tax rate. Both effects are assumed to be enforced if the ruling parties have strong support in the German Bundestag. The empirical results significantly confirm the unconditional effect for former executive board members and the conditional effect for former supervisory board members.

Corresponding to sociological findings (see Hartmann 2002, Der Mythos von den Leistungseliten. Frankfurt a.M., Campus) and building on Barro’s (1973, The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model. Public Choice 14(1): 19–42) approach to the selfish maximization of political income and arguments regarding career concerns from principal agent theory (see, e. g. Fama 1980, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm. Journal of Political Economy 88, 288–307), this study assumes a strong incentive for former executive board members in the German Federal Government (1957–2012) to maximize their political income by lowering the top earners’ average income tax rate (1958–2013) due to their social elitist homogeneity and career concerns in terms of future job opportunities in business corporations. Conversely, former supervisory board members are assumed to increase the top earners’ average income tax rate due to their differing social backgrounds. Despite possible career concerns, they are assumed to increase the top earners’ average income tax rate in order not to lose their previously gained ideological credibility. Both effects are assumed to be enforced if the ruling parties have more than or equal to 55 % of seats in the German Bundestag. By running OLS and Tobit regressions, the empirical results confirm an unconditional decreasing effect of a higher percentage of previous executive board members and a conditional increasing effect of a higher percentage of previous supervisory board members on the top earners’ average income tax rate.