The number of flights performed globally by the airline industry has increased steadily since the early 2000s and reached 38.9 million in 2019. However, due to the coronavirus pandemic, the number of flights dropped to 18.3 million in 2020. The flight volume increased again in the following years and was forecasted to reach 38.7 million in 2024. The global airline industry The number of flights performed increased year-on-year continuously to transport both passengers and freight. The industry’s recent growth can be attributed to a combination of increasing living standards and decreasing costs of air travel. While North American and European airlines currently dominate in terms of both revenue and passengers flown, it is predicted that future growth will be highest in markets of Asia.

In 2023, the estimated number of scheduled passengers boarded by the global airline industry amounted to approximately 4.5 billion people. This represents a significant increase compared to the previous year since the pandemic started and the positive trend was forecast to continue in 2024, with the scheduled passenger volume reaching just below five billion travelers. Airline passenger traffic The number of scheduled passengers handled by the global airline industry has increased in all but one of the last decade. Scheduled passengers refer to the number of passengers who have booked a flight with a commercial airline. Excluded are passengers on charter flights, whereby an entire plane is booked by a private group. In 2023, the Asia Pacific region had the highest share of airline passenger traffic, accounting for one third of the global total.

Passengers enplaned and deplaned at Canadian airports, annual.

As a result of the continued annual growth in global air traffic passenger demand, the number of airplanes that were involved in accidents is on the increase. Although the United States is ranked among the 20 countries with the highest quality of air infrastructure, the U.S. reports the highest number of civil airliner accidents worldwide. 2020 was the year with more plane crashes victims, despite fewer flights The number of people killed in accidents involving large commercial aircraft has risen globally in 2020, even though the number of commercial flights performed last year dropped by 57 percent to 16.4 million. More than half of the total number of deaths were recorded in January 2020, when an Ukrainian plane was shot down in Iranian airspace, a tragedy that killed 176 people. The second fatal incident took place in May, when a Pakistani airliner crashed, killing 97 people. Changes in aviation safety In terms of fatal accidents, it seems that aviation safety experienced some decline on a couple of parameters. For example, there were 0.37 jet hull losses per one million flights in 2016. In 2017, passenger flights recorded the safest year in world history, with only 0.11 jet hull losses per one million flights. In 2020, the region with the highest hull loss rate was the Commonwealth of Independent States. These figures do not take into account accidents involving military, training, private, cargo and helicopter flights.

India All Scheduled Airlines: International: Number of Flight data was reported at 18,574.000 Unit in Jan 2025. This records an increase from the previous number of 18,324.000 Unit for Dec 2024. India All Scheduled Airlines: International: Number of Flight data is updated monthly, averaging 7,783.000 Unit from Apr 2001 (Median) to Jan 2025, with 281 observations. The data reached an all-time high of 18,574.000 Unit in Jan 2025 and a record low of 273.000 Unit in May 2020. India All Scheduled Airlines: International: Number of Flight data remains active status in CEIC and is reported by Directorate General of Civil Aviation. The data is categorized under India Premium Database’s Transportation, Post and Telecom Sector – Table IN.TA019: Airline Statistics: All Scheduled Airlines.

China Air: Passenger Traffic: Domestic data was reported at 664.657 Person mn in 2024. This records an increase from the previous number of 590.516 Person mn for 2023. China Air: Passenger Traffic: Domestic data is updated yearly, averaging 95.618 Person mn from Dec 1970 (Median) to 2024, with 42 observations. The data reached an all-time high of 664.657 Person mn in 2024 and a record low of 0.210 Person mn in 1970. China Air: Passenger Traffic: Domestic data remains active status in CEIC and is reported by Civil Aviation Administration of China. The data is categorized under China Premium Database’s Transportation and Storage Sector – Table CN.TI: Air: Passenger Traffic.

Russia Number of Flights: Domestic data was reported at 67,658.000 Number in Feb 2022. This records a decrease from the previous number of 71,658.000 Number for Jan 2022. Russia Number of Flights: Domestic data is updated monthly, averaging 55,400.000 Number from Jan 2010 (Median) to Feb 2022, with 146 observations. The data reached an all-time high of 127,409.000 Number in Jul 2021 and a record low of 27,413.000 Number in Feb 2010. Russia Number of Flights: Domestic data remains active status in CEIC and is reported by Federal Agency for Air Transport. The data is categorized under Russia Premium Database’s Transport and Telecommunications Sector – Table RU.TE003: Airlines Statistics: Number of Airlines, Aircrafts, Airports and Flights. [COVID-19-IMPACT]

The National Security UAS Flight Restrictions in this dataset are currently pending and will become effective on November 07, 2019. The FAA, pursuant to Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) § 99.7, Special security instructions (SSI), has prohibited all UAS flight operations within the airspace defined under NOTAM FDC 7/7282 . Specific locations are described in the table and on the interactive map provided on this website. The TFRs extend from the surface up to 400 feet Above Ground Level (AGL), apply to all types and purposes of UAS flight operations, and remain in effect 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

WHAT UAS FLIGHT RESTRICTIONS HAVE BEEN PUT INTO PLACE?

At the request of and pursuant to agreements with the Department of Defense and U.S. Federal security and intelligence agencies (“sponsoring Federal agencies”), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has implemented Special Security Instructions for Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS), issued as temporary flight restrictions (TFR) over select national security sensitive facilities located throughout the U.S. These TFRs are established within the lateral boundaries of these facilities and extend from surface to 400 feet Above Ground Level (AGL). These TFRs apply to all UAS operations specifically including:

· Public aircraft operations conducted in accordance with a Certificate of Authorization or Waiver (COA).

· Civil aircraft operations (other than model aircraft), including those conducted in accordance with a COA and those conducted in accordance with the FAA’s small UAS Rule, 14 CFR Part 107.

· Model Aircraft operations conducted in accordance with 14 CFR Part 101, Subpart E.

UAS operators must comply with these flight restrictions in addition to all other applicable Federal Aviation Regulations, including but not limited to, requirements to secure an FAA airspace authorization and/or waiver prior to flying in the airspace where a TFR is in effect.

The information on this website complements Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) NOTAM FDC 7/7282, which generally notifies the public about these temporary flight restrictions (TFR). This website provides UAS operators with more detailed information about these TFRs, including:

· An explanation of what is restricted

· A table listing the selected facilities over which a TFR has been established

· An interactive map providing visual depictions and information about specific TFRs and geospatial (GIS) data that can be downloaded

· An explanation of which UAS operations may be able to access the airspace within a TFR, including instructions for submitting a request

· Reminders on other requirements for UAS operations

WHAT HAPPENS IF I VIOLATE A TEMPORARY FLIGHT RESTRICTION (TFR)?

The FAA classifies the airspace encompassed by these temporary flight restrictions (TFRs) as “national defense airspace” in accordance with Title 49 of the United States Code (USC) § 40103(b)(3). Violations of these TFRs may prompt the following enforcement actions:

A. The U.S. Government may pursue criminal charges, including charges under Title 49 U.S.C § 46307.

B. The FAA may take administrative action, including imposing civil penalties and the revoking FAA certificates and authorizations to operate UAS under Title 49 U.S.C. §§ 44709 and 46301.

WHAT ARE THE BASIC FLIGHT RESTRICTIONS?

The FAA, pursuant to Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) § 99.7, Special security instructions (SSI), has prohibited all UAS flight operations within the airspace defined under NOTAM FDC 7/7282. Specific locations are described in the table and on the interactive map provided on this website. The TFRs extend from the surface up to 400 feet Above Ground Level (AGL), apply to all types and purposes of UAS flight operations, and remain in effect 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

See the full text of NOTAM FDC 7/7282 here.

ARE THERE EXCEPTIONS FOR UAS OPERATIONS TO ACCESS A TFR?

The FAA has authorized UAS operations within the TFRs if those flights are in compliance with the applicable requirements listed below:

1) The UAS flight operation has been pre-approved by the designated facility contact based on criteria established by the sponsoring federal agency in coordination with the FAA. Note: UAS operators seeking approval to operate in one of the TFRs defined in this website under this provision must contact the facility’s designated point of contact identified in the table or interactive map, and secure permission to operate within the airspace prior to entry. Pre-approval from the facility or sponsoring agency does not substitute for compliance with FAA requirements. Depending on the nature of the proposed operation and Class of airspace, waiver or authorization may be needed from the FAA before flight. For more information visit our website at www.faa.gov/uas

2). The UAS flight operation is conducted in direct support of an active national defense, homeland security, law enforcement, firefighting, search and rescue, or disaster response mission, and prior notification has been provided to the designated facility contact. Note: UAS operators seeking approval to operate in one of the TFRs defined in this website under this provision must contact the facility’s designated point of contact identified in the table or interactive map, and provide notification prior to entering the airspace. These operators must make every effort to coordinate with the designated facility to deconflict the UAS flight operation with any safety or security concerns stated by the facility and/or sponsoring Federal agency.

3). The UAS flight operation is conducted in direct support of a significant and urgent governmental interest and is approved by the FAA’s System Operations Support Center (SOSC) in advance of entering the TFR. Note: UAS operators, that meet the criteria for thisprovision , may also qualify for access under provision 2 outlined above and are encouraged to coordinate directly with the facility’s designated point of contact identified in the table or interactive map, by providing notification prior to entering the airspace and taking into consideration any safety or security concerns stated by the facility and/or sponsoring Federal agency.

For urgent and time sensitive requests, contact the FAA’s SOSC at (202) 267-8276 for expedited assistance. The FAA’s SOSC will coordinate with the facility and/or sponsoring Federal agency as appropriate.

ARE THERE OTHER REQUIREMENTS TO OPERATE IN A TFR IN ADDITION TO THE EXCEPTIONS?

Separate and distinct from any of the conditions cited above used to gain access to a TFR defined by NOTAM FDC 7/7282 and described in this website, UAS operators must comply with all applicable Federal Aviation Regulations. For example:

For Model Aircraft:

· Comply with 14 CFR Part 101, Subpart E

NOTE: These provisions require model aircraft operators to notify any airport operator and air traffic control tower within 5 miles of the intended area of flight.

For All Other UAS Operators:

· Comply with a Public Aircraft Certificate of Authorization or Waiver (COA), or

· Comply with 14 CFR Part107, Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, or

· Comply with Section 333 Exemption and a Certificate of Authorization or Waiver (COA)

NOTE: Public and civil UAS operators flying under the provisions of a COA or 14 CFR Part 107 may need to secure further airspace authorizations or waivers in order to conduct the proposed flight operation in controlled airspace, which may overlap with one of the TFRs defined by NOTAM FDC 7/7282 and this website. In those cases, these operators should follow the pre-existing procedures outlined below.

A. Non-emergency requests for UAS airspace authorizations and waivers must be submitted using the regular process as follows:

· 14 CFR Part 107 requests for airspace authorizations and waivers must be submitted to the FAA athttps://www.faa.gov/uas/request_waiver/

·
Section 333 Exemption holders may request a site specific COA at https://oeaaa.faa.gov/oeaaa/external/uas/portal.jsp

· Public aircraft operators without an existing authorization to operate must secure a public COA athttps://ioeaaa.faa.gov/oeaaa/Welcome.jsp

B. Emergency requests for UAS authorizations/waivers for missions that directly support significant and urgent governmental interests (e.g., active national defense, homeland security, law enforcement, and emergency operations missions), which cannot be supported by the FAA’s routine authorization/waiver processes should be referred to the SOSC at (202) 267-8276

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS?

If you have any general questions regarding UAS operations, please refer to the following FAA webpage: https://www.faa.gov/uas/ , or contact the FAA by email at uashelp@faa.gov or by phone at (844) FLY-MY-UA.

If you have any additional questions regarding the TFRs defined by NOTAM FDC 7/7282 and this website, please contact the FAA SOSC at (202) 267-8276.

Disclaimers

The restrictions depicted on this site reflect temporary flight restrictions issued for national security reasons at select U.S. Federal facilities. There may be additional temporary flight restrictions that prohibit UAS and manned flight in effect in your area. Seehttp://tfr.faa.gov/tfr2/list.html for additional information on flight restrictions that may be in effect in your area before operating your UAS.

Running trains kill birds, and this problem is foreseeable larger in high speed railways (HSRs). However, HSRs have been planned and built over years with scant knowledge of this impact, leading Environmental Impact Assessment and mitigation to be backed mainly on intuition or soft data. A special focus has been devoted to viaducts in valleys, where bird protection barriers are prescribed assuming without formal evaluation their high risk nature due to corridor effects and the elevated position of the railway there. Better knowledge of bird behavior around railways is thus needed to inform the environmental decisions for the expected increase in the extent and traffic of railways. In this context, we present results from a two-year study of bird flight patterns over an 8-km stretch and three viaducts (656m, 334m and 460m length) in the HSR line around León (NW Spain).The study is based on 10’ bird observation stations (N=2,342) devoted to the census of flying birds across 120m stretches of the railway (each flock or solitary bird denoted as a ‘crossing’). Since train-kill may happen when birds fly across the gap between the rail and the catenary, total frequency of bird crossings and the percentage of crossings through the risk area where our target variables. Our results show that bird crossing of the railway is frequent and rather dependent on very local conditions. Thus, in the study area bird flight across the viaduct over the Esla River (average 47.0 crossings/kmh) was less frequent than over other adjacent sections (69.6 crossing/kmh); and both these features much larger than those observed in the two viaducts over the Bernesga River (18.7 and 16.5 crossings/km*h) in the same railway. Regarding the proportion of flights across the risk area, it was higher where the railway runs over embankments (45.5%) than in any viaduct. The percentages of risk crossings were rather similar among these, though a bit lower (23.7%) in the one protected with 2m opaque screens than in the unprotected ones (32.2% and 27.5% respectively). Several common species (e.g. Columba palumbus, Fringillidae, Hirundinidae), but also others of more conservation concern (e.g. Milvusmigrans, Circus aeruginosus, Buteo buteo), were found to cross frequently through the risk area in both the viaducts (with or without barriers) and the flat sections of the railway. We conclude that (i) many birds cross routinely the railway under the risk of being killed and (ii) this situation is very dependent on local conditions, forcing a detailed analysis of future HSR lines during planning and the development of extensive bird studies in order to properly evaluate the environmental impacts and locate and design the mitigation measures. Moreover, (iii) viaducts may not be always the most risky sites for birds, and (iv) bird protection screens should be taller than those routinely used for noise protection, since they do not dissuade birds to cross the gap between the rail and the catenary. Extensive basic studies like this one are also needed due to the huge gap of knowledge existent on railway effects on wildlife.

Abstract: How is it possible to overcome the challenges of providing public goods that create significant negative local externalities? Sometimes called ‘public bads,’ these goods are characterized by the combination of dispersed benefits and concentrated costs, which often lead to high levels of civil society resistance. Deciding where to locate them and how to expand them can therefore be a difficult political issue. I investigate this theoretical problem through the specific case of airport development. Airports provide crucial transit connections and economic opportunities for cities while also creating additional noise pollution and traffic for nearby residents. They are notoriously difficult to build or expand, often plagued with indecision, delays, and cost overruns. Throughout three papers, my dissertation asks: what makes airport development difficult, and how can these impediments be overcome? Potential explanations I explore include variation in technical characteristics, institutions, levels of civil society resistance, and the political issue space. This dataset contains the replication data for the dissertation's second paper, “The (Non)-Impact of Institutions on Airport Development." This paper examines one possible explanation for difficulty in airport expansion: that institutional variation in airport administration and ownership affects the ease with which development can occur. It focuses on two theoretically-motivated institutional variables: an airport’s level of privatization and its level of government regulation. Using an original dataset of expansion outcomes at the busiest airports in the world in 2012, the paper employs multilevel modeling along with logistic and linear regression techniques to test for a relationship between the aforementioned institutional factors and airports’ runway capacity expansion. In contrast with theoretical expectations, the paper finds no discernible connection between these characteristics. The paper’s conclusions also highlight the need for more nuanced case study analysis of airport development projects. The dataset also contains the replication data for the media graphs in the dissertation's third paper, "London's Airport Capacity Problem." This paper looks at two cases of airport expansion in London between 2008 and 2018, one where party and legislative approval occurred and one where it did not, showing that the reorganization of the issue space caused by the surprise Brexit vote offered a new strategic opportunity to over- come entrenched gridlock by reframing the issue of expansion.

Annual data on civil aviation employment. Details on employment include the average number of employees, and wages and salaries expenses, by category of employment (total, average number of employees, pilots and co-pilots, other flight personnel, general management and administration employees, maintenance personnel, aircraft and traffic servicing personnel, and all other employees). Data are for Canadian air carriers, Levels I and II combined, Level III, and Levels I to III combined. Data on wages and salaries are expressed in thousands of dollars.

This dataset captures a flight test of the 2.4m wingspan Kitekraft kite, flown with ground station south of Oberbiberg, Germany. The entire system was operated automatically, only with operators giving high level commands such a launch/land. The kite was reeled out, performed trans-in, figure-8 flight, trans-out, hover-landing. A main goal of this flight was to perform this entire sequence, test new control software updates, and record anomalies that may occur. The kite and ground station were equipped with numerous sensors. The dataset includes a photograph and a README file with a detailed description of the data.

In financial year 2024, the total air passenger traffic in India reached more than 220 million passengers. It was a huge increase compared to the previous year. The domestic passenger traffic saw a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 9.7 percent from 2014 to 2024, while the international passenger traffic saw a 4.5 percent CAGR during the same period of time.

The volume of air-freight transport in the United Arab Emirates was forecast to decrease between 2024 and 2029 by in total 0.02 billion ton-kilometers. This overall decrease does not happen continuously, notably not in 2026 and 2027. The volume of air-freight transport is estimated to amount to 14 billion ton-kilometers in 2029. As defined by Worldbank, air freight refers to the summated volume of freight, express and diplomatic bags carried across the various flight stages (from takeoff to the next landing). The forecast has been adjusted for the expected impact of COVID-19.The shown data are an excerpt of Statista's Key Market Indicators (KMI). The KMI are a collection of primary and secondary indicators on the macro-economic, demographic and technological environment in more than 150 countries and regions worldwide. All input data are sourced from international institutions, national statistical offices, and trade associations. All data has been are processed to generate comparable datasets (see supplementary notes under details for more information).Find more key insights for the volume of air-freight transport in countries like Oman and Israel.

Data (part 1) underpinning "Smart wing rotation and trailing-edge vortices enable high frequency mosquito flight", Bomphrey et al, 2017.Stroke-averaged wing kinematics of a mosquito (M08). The data was generated from high-speed camera images by using an automated shape-carving algorithm, and was subsequently used for computational fluid dynamic analysis. Further information is available on request.Bomphrey et al. 2017 k1.xlsData (part 2) underpinning "Smart wing rotation and trailing-edge vortices enable high frequency mosquito flight", Bomphrey et al, 2017.Flow field from computational fluid dynamic analysis at a key instant, t1. The files are in Tecplot binary format, readable using flow visualization software such as Tecplot and Paraview. Further information is available on request.Bomphrey et al. 2017 f1.pltData (part 3) underpinning "Smart wing rotation and trailing-edge vortices enable high frequency mosquito flight", Bomphrey et al, 2017.Flow field from computational fluid dynami...

A large-scale aircraft campaign (on the German POLAR6 aircraft) took place in July 2014, based out of Resolute Bay, Nunavut, aimed to assess the different roles that oceanic input and long range transport from lower latitudes play in driving Arctic atmospheric composition. For five days in late July, the aircraft also sampled emissions from the Amundsen icebreaker, as a case study of how ship emissions may lead to effects on the Arctic atmosphere, including clouds. With large scale commercial shipping likely to occur in the Arctic with sea ice retreat, a firm understanding of the processes governing the impacts of ship emissions is needed. This campaign was a collaboration of NETCARE university scientists with Environment Canada, the Alfred Wegener Institute (AWI), Max Planck Institute at Mainz and the University of Mainz, which will all have instrumentation on the plane. LATMOS (France) provided forecasting support. The POLAR6 is a DC-3 (built in 1942 for wartime service) operated by AWI that has been entirely re-built and outfitted for polar studies Typical flight profiles during the four-week-long, 90-flight-hour NETCARE campaign included altitude profiles to 20,000 feet to assess vertical structure of the atmosphere and long range transport, spatial studies over ice and open water to assess biological sources of particles, and plume emission studies of the Amundsen icebreaker in Lancaster Sound. The campaign started with equipment integration in June 2014 and a test flight at Muskoka airport on June 27, with the first planned Arctic flight on July 3 from Resolute Bay, Nunavut. Flights finished on July 23, before flying back to Muskoka for de-integration of the equipment. Institutions Involved: ● Environment and Climate Change Canada ● University of Toronto ● University of British Columbia ● University of Calgary ● Alfred Wegener Institute ● University of Mainz ● Max Planck Institute ● LATMOS Data sets: ● Atmospheric gas phase species ● Atmospheric aerosol particle size and number density ● Atmospheric aerosol particle composition ● Numbers of liquid water cloud forming particles ● Aircraft data and meteorology