Census 2021 data on religion by highest qualification level, by sex, by age, England and Wales combined. This dataset provides Census 2021 estimates that classify usual residents in England and Wales by ethnic group. The estimates are as at Census Day, 21 March 2021.

The religion people connect or identify with (their religious affiliation), whether or not they practise or have belief in it.
This question was voluntary and the variable includes people who answered the question, including “No religion”, alongside those who chose not to answer this question.

Total counts for some population groups may not match between published tables. This is to protect the confidentiality of individuals' data. Population counts have been rounded to the nearest 5 and any counts below 10 are suppressed, this is signified by a 'c' in the data tables.

This dataset shows population counts for usual residents aged 16 years and over. Some people aged 16 years old will not have completed key stage 4 yet on census day, and so did not have the opportunity to record any qualifications on the census.

These estimates are not comparable to Department of Education figures on highest level of attainment because they include qualifications obtained outside England and Wales.

Quality notes can be found here

Quality information about Education can be found here

Religion

The 8 ‘tickbox’ religious groups are as follows:

• Buddhist
• Christian
• Hindu
• Jewish
• Muslim
• No religion
• Sikh
• Other religion

No qualifications

No qualifications

Level 1

Level 1 and entry level qualifications: 1 to 4 GCSEs grade A* to C , Any GCSEs at other grades, O levels or CSEs (any grades), 1 AS level, NVQ level 1, Foundation GNVQ, Basic or Essential Skills

Level 2

5 or more GCSEs (A* to C or 9 to 4), O levels (passes), CSEs (grade 1), School Certification, 1 A level, 2 to 3 AS levels, VCEs, Intermediate or Higher Diploma, Welsh Baccalaureate Intermediate Diploma, NVQ level 2, Intermediate GNVQ, City and Guilds Craft, BTEC First or General Diploma, RSA Diploma

Apprenticeship

Apprenticeship

Level 3

2 or more A levels or VCEs, 4 or more AS levels, Higher School Certificate, Progression or Advanced Diploma, Welsh Baccalaureate Advance Diploma, NVQ level 3; Advanced GNVQ, City and Guilds Advanced Craft, ONC, OND, BTEC National, RSA Advanced Diploma

Level 4 +

Degree (BA, BSc), higher degree (MA, PhD, PGCE), NVQ level 4 to 5, HNC, HND, RSA Higher Diploma, BTEC Higher level, professional qualifications (for example, teaching, nursing, accountancy)

Other

Vocational or work-related qualifications, other qualifications achieved in England or Wales, qualifications achieved outside England or Wales (equivalent not stated or unknown)

The latest population figures produced by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) on 28 June 2018 show that an estimated 534,800 people live in Bradford District – an increase of 2,300 people (0.4%) since the previous year.

Bradford District is the fifth largest metropolitan district (in terms of population) in England, after Birmingham, Leeds, Sheffield and Manchester although the District’s population growth is lower than other major cities.

The increase in the District’s population is largely due to “natural change”- there have been around 3,300 more births than deaths, although this has been balanced by a larger number of people leaving Bradford to live in other parts of the UK than coming to live here and a lower number of international migrants. In 2016/17 the net internal migration was -2,700 and the net international migration was 1,700.

A large proportion of Bradford’s population is dominated by the younger age groups. More than one-quarter (29%) of the District’s population is aged less than 20 and nearly seven in ten people are aged less than 50. Bradford has the highest percentage of the under 16 population in England after the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham, Slough Borough Council and Luton Borough Council.

The population of Bradford is ethnically diverse. The largest proportion of the district’s population (63.9%) identifies themselves as White British. The district has the largest proportion of people of Pakistani ethnic origin (20.3%) in England.

The largest religious group in Bradford is Christian (45.9% of the population). Nearly one quarter of the population (24.7%) are Muslim. Just over one fifth of the district’s population (20.7%) stated that they had no religion.

There are 216,813 households in the Bradford district. Most households own their own home (29.3% outright and 35.7% with a mortgage). The percentage of privately rented households is 18.1%. 29.6% of households were single person households.

Information from the Annual Population Survey in December 2017 found that Bradford has 228,100 people aged 16-64 in employment. At 68% this is significantly lower than the national rate (74.9%). 91,100 (around 1 in 3 people) aged 16-64, are not in work. The claimant count rate is 2.9% which is higher than the regional and national averages.

Skill levels are improving with 26.5% of 16 to 74 year olds educated to degree level. 18% of the district’s employed residents work in retail/wholesale. The percentage of people working in manufacturing has continued to decrease from 13.4% in 2009 to 11.9% in 2016. This is still higher than the average for Great Britain (8.1%).

Census 2021 data on religion by economic activity status, by sex, by age, and religion by occupation, by sex, by age, England and Wales combined. This dataset provides Census 2021 estimates that classify usual residents in England and Wales by ethnic group. The estimates are as at Census Day, 21 March 2021.

The religion people connect or identify with (their religious affiliation), whether or not they practise or have belief in it.
This question was voluntary and the variable includes people who answered the question, including “No religion”, alongside those who chose not to answer this question.

Total counts for some population groups may not match between published tables. This is to protect the confidentiality of individuals' data. Population counts have been rounded to the nearest 5 and any counts below 10 are suppressed, this is signified by a 'c' in the data tables.

This dataset shows population counts for usual residents aged between 16 to 64 years old only. This is to focus on religious affiliation differences among the working age. Population counts in these tables may be different from other publications which use different age breakdowns.

Quality notes can be found here

Quality information about Labour Market can be found here

The Standard Occupation Classification 2020 code used can be found here

Religion

The 8 ‘tickbox’ religious groups are as follows:

• Buddhist
• Christian
• Hindu
• Jewish
• Muslim
• No religion
• Sikh
• Other religion

Census 2021 data on religion by general health, by sex, by age; religion by disability, by sex, by age; and, religion by unpaid care, by sex, by age; England and Wales combined. This dataset provides Census 2021 estimates that classify usual residents in England and Wales by ethnic group. The estimates are as at Census Day, 21 March 2021.

The religion people connect or identify with (their religious affiliation), whether or not they practise or have belief in it.
This question was voluntary and the variable includes people who answered the question, including “No religion”, alongside those who chose not to answer this question.

Total counts for some population groups may not match between published tables. This is to protect the confidentiality of individuals' data. Population counts have been rounded to the nearest 5 and any counts below 10 are suppressed, this is signified by a 'c' in the data tables.

The population base for unpaid care is usual residents aged 5 years and above. We have used 5-year age bands for the majority of analysis; however, age groups "5 to 17" and "18 to 24" have been used to allow commentary on young carers and young working age carers.

Quality notes can be found here

Religion

The 8 ‘tickbox’ religious groups are as follows:

• Buddhist
• Christian
• Hindu
• Jewish
• Muslim
• No religion
• Sikh
• Other religion

General health

A person's assessment of the general state of their health from very good to very bad. This assessment is not based on a person's health over any specified period of time.

Disability

The definition of disability used in the 2021 Census is aligned with the definition of disability under the Equality Act (2010). A person is considered disabled if they self-report having a physical or mental health condition or illness that has lasted or is expected to last 12 months or more, and that this reduces their ability to carry out day-to-day activities.

Unpaid care

An unpaid carer may look after, give help or support to anyone who has long-term physical or mental ill-health conditions, illness or problems related to old age. This does not include any activities as part of paid employment. This help can be within or outside of the carer's household.

The project had two main dimensions: the first is theoretical and the second is empirical, focusing on three case studies (Moscow, Tatarstan and Dagestan). The theoretical aspect of the project examines two main sets of questions: First, how the general concepts of extremism and moderation, and the associated concept of radicalization, are understood in the Russian context. How is radicalization linked to identity politics(ethnicity, nationalism and religion) and radical ideological movements? Second, how these concepts - moderation, extremism, and radicalization- applied in discourses and policies towards Muslim communities in Russia? What are the presumed internal and external influences? What are the comparisons and links with elite discourse in other European countries with significant Muslim communities, such as UK and France?

The empirical aspect of the project examines how these general concepts and approaches help to illuminate and explains developments in regions of Russian where there exist sizeable Muslim communities. The three case studies chosen include a) the city of Moscow, where it is estimated that there are 1-2 million Muslims, representing at least 10% of the population; b) Tatarstan, which has an ethnic Tatar Muslim plurality and which is often taken to be the best example of the influence of moderate Islam; c) Dagestan, which is regularly taken to be the region with the greatest potential danger, apart form Chechnya, of Islamic radicalization.

The dataset was originally intended to include transcriptions of elite interviews which would have been in the format of elite interview-audio files. However, as we warned might be the case, it did not prove possible to gain consent to recording the interviews.

This project investigates the causes of Islamic radicalisation within Russia and their consequences for Russia's relevant domestic policies (for example ethnic, regional, immigration policies, and domestic democratisation), as well as its foreign policy response towards the Muslim world in the context of the global 'War on Terror'. There are four principal research questions:(1) How Russian policy-making and academic elites conceptualise the idea of 'radicalisation' and political violence. (2) How these discourses are translated into state practice and policy. (3) How these state-driven practices feed or undermine underlying processes of radicalisation. (4) How Russia's domestic context of combating radicalisation drives its foreign policy. The project methodology includes a discourse analysis of academic and journalistic writings and three regional case studies of Russian state policy towards Islam (Moscow, Tatarstan and Dagestan). Each case study relies on discourse analysis of public and media approaches, content analysis of relevant legal and state policy documents, and semi-structured elite interviews. The project co-ordinators will work with local institutes in Russia and will invite scholars from these institutes to the UK as research fellows. The project findings will be disseminated by four journal articles, policy briefings and a co-authored monograph.

Replication data set (STATA format) and R code to reproduce analyses and figures in the paper. Abstract: What citizens think about Muslim immigrants is of great importance for some of the most pressing challenges facing Western democracies. To advance our understanding of what “Islamophobia” really is – i.e. whether it is a dislike based on immigrants` ethnic background, their religious identity or their specific religious behaviour – we fielded a representative online survey experiment in the UK in the summer 2015. Our results suggest that Muslims are not per se viewed more negatively than Christian immigrants. Instead, we provide evidence that citizens’ uneasiness with Muslim immigration is first and foremost the result of a rejection of fundamentalist forms of religiosity. This suggests that com-mon explanations, which are based on simple dichotomies between liberal supporters and conservative critics of immigration need to be re-evaluated. While the politically left and culturally liberal have more positive attitudes towards immigrants than right leaning and conservatives, they are also far more critical towards religious groups. We conclude that a large part of the current political controver-sy over Muslim immigration has to do with this double opposition. Importantly, the current political conflict over Muslim immigration is not so much about immigrants versus natives or even Muslim versus Christians as it is about political liberalism versus religious fundamentalism.

There is much interest in the potential for an alternative funding system for higher education students in England to support the spiritual and worldly needs of British Muslim students. At present those who wish to study in English universities and HE providers are still tied to a financial system that is contentious for many because it is predicated upon paying-back interest, known as riba. In this, the relationship between academic study and finance reveals tensions between Islam as a deeply-spiritual, faith-based way of life and the reality that this way of life is lived, materially, in a worldly existence. These interviews engage with this tension in relation to issues of retention in higher education, in the context of an Academic Innovation Project in one English university in the 2023/24 academic session. Focusing on the outcomes of in-depth interviews with 12 British Muslim undergraduate and postgraduate taught students, the argument highlights how the struggle between the spiritual deen and the worldly dunya of these students shaped complex ways in which individuals engage with student finance and realise their spiritual intentions. The interviews situate intentionality against retention, shaped against very deep layers of faith, commitment, drive and hope for the future. These are also moulded with family and in community, and reiterate a desire for institutional and sector leaders to recognise their struggle for recognition, and for an alternative finance system that respects faith-based identities