Greece recorded a Government Debt to GDP of 161.90 percent of the country's Gross Domestic Product in 2023. This dataset provides the latest reported value for - Greece Government Debt to GDP - plus previous releases, historical high and low, short-term forecast and long-term prediction, economic calendar, survey consensus and news.

Government Debt in Greece decreased to 554311.58 EUR Million in the third quarter of 2024 from 554589.54 EUR Million in the second quarter of 2024. This dataset provides the latest reported value for - Greece Central Government Debt - plus previous releases, historical high and low, short-term forecast and long-term prediction, economic calendar, survey consensus and news.

This data package includes the underlying data and files to replicate the calculations, charts, and tables presented in Does Greece Need More Official Debt Relief? If So, How Much?, PIIE Working Paper 17-6. If you use the data, please cite as: Zettelmeyer, Jeromin, Eike Kreplin, and Ugo Panizza. (2017). Does Greece Need More Official Debt Relief? If So, How Much?. PIIE Working Paper 17-6. Peterson Institute for International Economics.

This data package includes the underlying data and files to replicate the calculations, charts, and tables presented in How to Solve the Greek Debt Problem, PIIE Policy Brief 18-10. If you use the data, please cite as: Zettelmeyer, Jeromin, Emilios Avgouleas, Barry Eichengreen, Miguel Poiares Maduro, Ugo Panizza, Richard Portes, Beatrice Weder di Mauro, and Charles Wyplosz. (2018). How to Solve the Greek Debt Problem. PIIE Policy Brief 18-10. Peterson Institute for International Economics.

Households Debt in Greece decreased to 39.30 percent of GDP in the third quarter of 2024 from 39.80 percent of GDP in the second quarter of 2024. This dataset provides - Greece Households Debt To Gdp- actual values, historical data, forecast, chart, statistics, economic calendar and news.

Private Debt to GDP in Greece decreased to 116.80 percent in 2023 from 123.40 percent in 2022. Greece Private Debt to GDP - values, historical data, forecasts and news - updated on March of 2025.

This paper uses Bayesian methods to estimate a real business cycle model that allows for interactions among fiscal policy instruments, the stochastic fiscal limit and sovereign default. Using the particle filter to perform likelihood-based inference, we estimate the full nonlinear model with post-EMU data until 2010:Q4. We find that (i) the probability of default on Greek debt was in the range of 5-10% in 2010:Q4 and (ii) the 2011 surge in the Greek real interest rate is within model forecast bands. The results suggest that a nonlinear rational expectations environment can account for the Greek interest rate path.

These data and syntax files can be used to replicate the published Paper in the Journal of European Union Politics by Katsanidou and Otjes "How the European debt crisis reshaped national political space: the case of Greece". The data come from the following sources: 1. CSES (2015) CSES Module 4: 2011-2016. DOI: 10.7804/cses.module4.2015-03-20 2. Preference Matcher’ consortium (www.preferencematcher.org) Gemenis K. and Triga V., data set Voting Advice Application for the Greece Parliamentary Elections May 2012, file: Greece_clean_parl_may.csv The Abstract of the article: Where Mair (2000) saw a limited impact of Europeanisation on national party politics, other authors (e.g. Kriesi et al. 2008) proposed that in addition to the pre-existing economic left-right dimension a separate EU dimension structures the national political space. This article looks at the Greek bail-out during the European sovereign debt crisis to examine how Europeanisation can change the national political space. The bail-out came with memoranda that set the main lines of Greek economic policy for the coming years. Accepting these policies was connected with remaining in the eurozone. This restructured the political space: the economic and European integration form one dimension. A second relevant dimension focuses on cultural issues. The economic/European dimension is a stronger predictor of vote choice than the cultural dimension.

Greece 10Y Bond Yield was 3.60 percent on Wednesday March 26, according to over-the-counter interbank yield quotes for this government bond maturity. Greece 10-Year Government Bond Yield - values, historical data, forecasts and news - updated on March of 2025.

Greece GR: Expenditure: Interest Payments data was reported at 5,651.000 EUR mn in 2016. This records a decrease from the previous number of 6,319.000 EUR mn for 2015. Greece GR: Expenditure: Interest Payments data is updated yearly, averaging 6,319.000 EUR mn from Dec 1972 (Median) to 2016, with 41 observations. The data reached an all-time high of 14,969.000 EUR mn in 2011 and a record low of 13.793 EUR mn in 1972. Greece GR: Expenditure: Interest Payments data remains active status in CEIC and is reported by World Bank. The data is categorized under Global Database’s Greece – Table GR.World Bank.WDI: Government Revenue, Expenditure and Finance. Interest payments include interest payments on government debt--including long-term bonds, long-term loans, and other debt instruments--to domestic and foreign residents.; ; International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook and data files.; ;

With the collapse of the U.S. housing market and the subsequent financial crisis on Wall Street in 2007 and 2008, economies across the globe began to enter into deep recessions. What had started out as a crisis centered on the United States quickly became global in nature, as it became apparent that not only had the economies of other advanced countries (grouped together as the G7) become intimately tied to the U.S. financial system, but that many of them had experienced housing and asset price bubbles similar to that in the U.S.. The United Kingdom had experienced a huge inflation of housing prices since the 1990s, while Eurozone members (such as Germany, France and Italy) had financial sectors which had become involved in reckless lending to economies on the periphery of the EU, such as Greece, Ireland and Portugal. Other countries, such as Japan, were hit heavily due their export-led growth models which suffered from the decline in international trade. Unemployment during the Great Recession As business and consumer confidence crashed, credit markets froze, and international trade contracted, the unemployment rate in the most advanced economies shot up. While four to five percent is generally considered to be a healthy unemployment rate, nearing full employment in the economy (when any remaining unemployment is not related to a lack of consumer demand), many of these countries experienced rates at least double that, with unemployment in the United States peaking at almost 10 percent in 2010. In large countries, unemployment rates of this level meant millions or tens of millions of people being out of work, which led to political pressures to stimulate economies and create jobs. By 2012, many of these countries were seeing declining unemployment rates, however, in France and Italy rates of joblessness continued to increase as the Euro crisis took hold. These countries suffered from having a monetary policy which was too tight for their economies (due to the ECB controlling interest rates) and fiscal policy which was constrained by EU debt rules. Left with the option of deregulating their labor markets and pursuing austerity policies, their unemployment rates remained over 10 percent well into the 2010s. Differences in labor markets The differences in unemployment rates at the peak of the crisis (2009-2010) reflect not only the differences in how economies were affected by the downturn, but also the differing labor market institutions and programs in the various countries. Countries with more 'liberalized' labor markets, such as the United States and United Kingdom experienced sharp jumps in their unemployment rate due to the ease at which employers can lay off workers in these countries. When the crisis subsided in these countries, however, their unemployment rates quickly began to drop below those of the other countries, due to their more dynamic labor markets which make it easier to hire workers when the economy is doing well. On the other hand, countries with more 'coordinated' labor market institutions, such as Germany and Japan, experiences lower rates of unemployment during the crisis, as programs such as short-time work, job sharing, and wage restraint agreements were used to keep workers in their jobs. While these countries are less likely to experience spikes in unemployment during crises, the highly regulated nature of their labor markets mean that they are slower to add jobs during periods of economic prosperity.