Blockchain data query: IMF Markets

We argue that governments allocate adjustment burdens strategically to protect their supporters, imposing adjustment costs upon the supporters of their opponents, who then protest in response. Using large-N micro-level survey data from three world regions and a global survey, it discusses the local political economy of International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending. It finds that opposition supporters in countries under an IMF structural adjustment program (SAP) are more likely to report that the IMF SAP increased economic hardships than government supporters and countries without IMF exposure. In addition, it finds that partisan gaps in IMF SAP evaluations widen in IMF program countries with an above-median number of conditions, suggesting that opposition supporters face heavier adjustment burdens, and that opposition supporters who think SAPs made their lives worse are more likely to protest.

Blockchain data query: IMF Token

Blockchain data query: IMF Collateral By Day

Though much research has been devoted to the socioeconomic and political consequences of International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs for recipient countries, little is known about the impacts of these programs on the level of respect for women’s rights. We postulate that IMF-induced policy reforms of privatization and public spending cuts, and the growing political repression and instability following the implementation of IMF programs, undermine the government’s ability and willingness to protect women’s economic and political rights. To substantiate the theoretical claims, we combine data on women’s political and economic rights with data on IMF programs for the years 1981–2004. Our findings suggest that IMF involvement is likely to deteriorate the level of respect for women’s economic rights while having no discernible effect on women’s political rights. The results further indicate that the effect of these programs is not conditioned by political regime type and economic wealth of recipient countries. One major policy implication of our findings is that the IMF should start to recognize that the conditions attached to lending programs might be implemented at the expense of women’s economic rights and that more explicit protections of women’s rights need to be included in program negotiations.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) database contains data on the value of merchandise exports and imports between each country and all its trading partners. Total bilateral and multilateral exports and imports are aggregated at national or regional group level. For each reporting country or group, all the trading partners are listed. The corresponding monetary values of total imports and total exports are then provided as time series for each country/trading partner pair. All exports are valued free on board (f.o.b.). Imports are usually reported cost including insurance and freight (c.i.f.), although a small number of countries report imports f.o.b.

Along with data from reporting countries, estimates are provided by partner countries for non-reporting countries or for those that are slow to report.

The period for which data are available varies from country to country, but data extends from 1948 to the present.

There can be inconsistencies between exports to a partner and the partner's recorded imports from a particular country, i.e. the exports from Country A to B do not always equal the imports of Country B from A. This is due to the different ways countries report their trade, i.e. differences in classification concepts and detail, time of recording, valuation, and coverage, as well as processing errors.

This database was first provided by UK Data Service in December 2003.

Blockchain data query: Cumulative Stats IMF

The Financial Soundness Indicators (FSIs), developed by the IMF together with the international community, are aimed at supporting macroprudential analysis - the surveillance and assessment of the strengths and vulnerabilities of financial systems. FSIs are macroprudential statistics aimed at filling the gap between macroeconomic statistics and micro-prudential data.

FSIs are compiled based on the FSI Compilation Guide (https://www.imf.org/en/Data/Statistics/FSI-guide). Please see also the Concepts and Definitions document. The FSI Compilation Guide is revised periodically to reflect new developments in the regulatory and accounting frameworks and in response to additional data need.

The data and programs replicate tables and figures from "The determinants of IMF fiscal conditionality: Economics or politics?", by Guimaraes and Ladeira. Please see the ReadMe file for additional details.

What explains the substantial variation in the conditionality of loans provided by the Inter- national Monetary Fund (IMF)? In this paper, we reassess the empirical findings of a significant recent contribution to this debate, Caraway, Rickard, and Anner’s article “International Nego- tiations and Domestic Politics: The Case of IMF Labor Market Conditionality” (International Organization, Winter 2012). We find that their model fails to deal appropriately with missing observations in their data set, with the consequence that it applies only to a small subset of relatively rich and democratic borrowers. To address this problem, we re-estimate the model using imputed data. Our results offer little support for their theory of IMF loan conditionality. Instead, we outline an alternative theoretical framework - fully consistent with our results - that conceptualizes conditionality as the outcome of a strategic interaction between borrowers and lenders within the organization.

A large literature has established that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is heavily politicized. We argue that this politicization has important consequences for international reserve accumulation and financial crises. The IMF generates moral hazard asymmetrically, reducing the expected costs of risky lending and policies for states that are politically influential vis-à-vis the institution. Using a panel data set covering 1980 to 2010, we show that proxies for political influence over the IMF are associated with outcomes indicative of moral hazard: lower international reserves and more frequent financial crises. We support our causal claims by applying the synthetic control method to Taiwan, which was expelled from the IMF in 1980. Consistent with our predictions, Taiwan's expulsion led to a sharp increase in precautionary international reserves and exceptionally conservative financial policies.

Can IMF lending improve natural resource governance in borrowing countries? While most IMF agreements mandate policy reforms in exchange for financial support, compliance with these reforms is mixed at best. The natural resource sector should be no exception. After all, resource windfalls enable short-term increases in discretionary spending, and office-seeking politicians are often unwilling to forgo this discretion by reforming the oil, gas, or mining sector. I investigate how and when borrowers go against their political interests and establish natural resource funds — a tool often promoted by the IMF — in the wake of a loan agreement. Using text analysis, statistical models, and qualitative evidence from natural resource policy and IMF conditionality for 74 countries between 1980 and 2019, I show that borrowers under an IMF agreement are more likely to create or regulate a resource fund, particularly if the agreement includes binding conditions that highlight the salience of natural resource reforms. This study contributes to extant research by proposing a new method to extract information from IMF conditions, by introducing a novel dataset on country-level natural resource policy, and by identifying under what circumstances international reform efforts can help combat the resource curse.

Evrensel, A., Turan, T., Yanikkaya, H. (2023). Compliance with IMF conditions and economic growth, under review.

As a natural gas pipeline approaches the end of its service life, the integrity of the pipeline starts failing because of corrosion or cracks. These and other defects affect the normal production and operation of the pipeline. Therefore, the identification of pipeline defects is critical to ensure the normal, safe, and efficient operation of these pipelines. In this study, a combination of adaptive adjustment based on conversion probability and Gaussian mutation strategy was used to improve the flower pollination algorithm (FPA) and enhance the search ability of traditional flower pollination. The adaptive adjustment of the transition probability effectively balances the development and exploration abilities of the algorithm. The improved flower pollination algorithm (IFPA) outperformed six classical benchmark functions that were used to verify the superiority of the improved algorithm. A Gaussian mutation strategy was integrated with IFPA to optimise the initial input weights and thresholds of the extreme learning machine (ELM), improve the balance and exploration ability of the algorithm, and increase the efficiency and accuracy for identifying pipeline defects. The proposed IFPA-ELM model for pipeline defect identification effectively overcomes the tendency of FPA to converge to local optima and that of ELM to engage in overfitting, which cause poor recognition accuracy. The identification rates of various pipeline defects by the IFPA-ELM algorithm are 97% and 96%, which are 34% and 13% higher, respectively, than those of FPA and FPA-ELM. The IFPA-ELM model may be used in the intelligent diagnosis of pipeline defects to solve practical engineering problems. Additionally, IFPA could be further optimised with respect to the time dimension, parameter settings, and general adaptation for application to complex engineering optimisation problems in various fields.

Blockchain data query: IMF Vault Fees

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has recently expanded its policy scope to include a broader set of policies to promote green, inclusive, and resilient growth. How does this expansion affect the support for the IMF and its loans among the populations of borrowing countries? We conducted a pre-registered survey experiment with 2,694 respondents from three borrower countries—Argentina, Kenya, and Pakistan. We show that support for IMF programs increases by approximately 24 percent compared to traditional programs when the IMF includes good governance, anti-poverty, climate change, and gender equality measures in its programs. Our results imply that people do not uniformly reject the imposition of policies of global governance institutions but have well-defined preferences over policy measures. Our findings contribute to debates on the backlash against international institutions by highlighting that citizens are willing to accept sovereignty intrusion when they push for policy goals aligned with their policy preferences.

When do overlapping international organizations (IOs) become credible outside options for states seeking forum shopping opportunities? Utilizing an original dataset on cooperation among emergency lending IOs, I find that exit options boost states' bargaining leverage only when IOs compete as opposed to cooperate with one another. While the literature frames the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a monopoly organization, I show that it increasingly competes with Regional Financing Arrangements (RFAs). When RFAs compete with the IMF, they become credible exit options that member states can leverage in negotiations over conditional lending at the Fund. I first offer original descriptive analysis of patterns of cooperation among these IOs. I then hypothesize that members of IOs that compete with the IMF, but not members of cooperative institutions, ought to receive less intrusive conditionality from the Fund. A series of regressions lend support for my theory, as do supplemental interviews and text analysis.

Data from: IMF control of electron aurora across Mars' crustal magnetic fields: Insights into electron sources

Dataset DOI: 10.5061/dryad.vt4b8gv4x

Description of the data and file structure

The 3D MHD simulation outputs span from 07:00 to 07:20 UT on November 15, 2022, with files saved at one-minute intervals.

Each file name encodes the time information in the format:
t000hhmm00_nxxxxxxx.dat.gz

The outputs are stored in ascii format, and each file contains the following plasma variables in order:

"X [R]" "Y [R]" "Z [R]" "B_x [nT]" "B_y [nT]" "B_z [nT]" "B1_x [nT]" "B1_y [nT]" "B1_z [nT]"

Of those variables, X, Y, Z: location in MSO coordinate; B_x, B_y, B_z: total magnetic field vector in MSO, and B1_x, B1_y, B1_z: induced magnetic field in MSO. The crustal magnetic field is given by the vector subtraction of the induced field from the total field.

• 3d_ful_1_t00070000_n1745129_B.dat.gz
• 3d_ful_1_t00070100_n1748841_B.dat.gz *...

Blockchain data query: Cumulative IMF USDS

This study examines the relationship between policy interventions by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and de jure labor rights. Combining two novel datasets with unprecedented country-year coverage—leximetric data on labor laws and disaggregated data on IMF conditionality—our analysis of up to 70 developing countries from 1980 to 2014 demonstrates that IMF-mandated labor market policy measures significantly reduce both individual and collective labor rights. Once we control for the effect of labor market policy measures, however, we find that collective labor rights increase in the wake of IMF programs. We argue that this result is explained by the impact of union pressure on governments which, in such a context, are imbued with the policy space to respond to domestic interest groups. The study has broader theoretical implications as to when international organizations are effective in constraining governments’ choices.