People in Great Britain's experiences of and actions following increases in their costs of living, and how these differed by a range of personal characteristics.

Real household disposable income per person in the United Kingdom is expected to grow by 2.6 percent in 2024/25, with disposable income growth slowing from that point onwards. In 2022/23, disposable income fell by two percent, after falling by 0.1 percent in 2021/22, and 0.3 percent in 2020/21.

In a survey carried out in August 2023, about ** percent of respondents in the United Kingdom stated that they were eating less healthily to save money. More concretely, about ** percent stated they were eating more ready meals and processed foods.

In October 2025, 63 percent of households in Great Britain reported that their cost of living had increased in the previous month, compared with 72 percent in April. Although the share of people reporting a cost of living increase has generally been falling since August 2022, when 91 percent of households reported an increase, the most recent figures indicate that the Cost of Living Crisis is still ongoing for many households in the UK. Crisis ligers even as inflation falls Although various factors have been driving the Cost of Living Crisis in Britain, high inflation has undoubtedly been one of the main factors. After several years of relatively low inflation, the CPI inflation rate shot up from 2021 onwards, hitting a high of 11.1 percent in October 2022. In the months since that peak, inflation has fallen to more usual levels, and was 2.5 percent in December 2024, slightly up from 1.7 percent in September. Since June 2023, wages have also started to grow at a faster rate than inflation, albeit after a long period where average wages were falling relative to overall price increases. Economy continues to be the main issue for voters Ahead of the last UK general election, the economy was consistently selected as the main issue for voters for several months. Although the Conservative Party was seen by voters as the best party for handling the economy before October 2022, this perception collapsed following the market's reaction to Liz Truss' mini-budget. Even after changing their leader from Truss to Rishi Sunak, the Conservatives continued to fall in the polls, and would go onto lose the election decisively. Since the election, the economy remains the most important issue in the UK, although it was only slightly ahead of immigration and health as of January 2025.

Description and Purpose This data companion pack is a resource intended to frame and be read alongside the linked rapid review of evidence for interventions to address the cost of living crisis (available on the Institute of Health Equity website) . The resource provides intelligence and context on the cost of living crisis in London only, while the accompanying rapid review of evidence for interventions to mitigate the impacts of the rising cost of living on London, contains the recommendations for action.​ This pack is intended to provide a high-level overview of the impacts of the costs of living crisis on London and the need Londoners have for support to deal with the cost of living crisis through intelligence available in the public domain.  This pack identifies how certain groups in the population already experiencing health inequalities are at greatest risk of poverty and worsening health due to the cost of living crisis. Given there are significant gaps in intelligence available, this pack also highlights these gaps and limitations in our understanding. Audience It will be useful for health leaders, analysts, officers, and policy makers from local and regional government, integrated care systems, NHS, academia, VCS organisations and partners across London to support their work to address the costs of living crisis by​ Advocating for the need for action to address the rising cost of living given impacts on health and health inequalities ​ Framing the context for the interventions highlighted in the linked rapid review of interventions​ Engaging communities ​ ​Development of this resource The Institute of Health Equity (IHE), Greater London Authority (GLA) Health, GLA City Intelligence Unit, Office for Health Improvement and Disparities London (OHID), Association of Directors of Public Health London (ADPH), and NHSE have collaboratively produced this report, as part of the Building the Evidence (BTE) programme of work The sources of data available and topics included have been identified from existing published data, working in partnership through iterative discussion The resource is provided in PDF and PowerPoint format to support colleagues in their work to There is no current plan for periodic updates of this resource, though this will be discussed on completion of this programme of work

This statistic illustrates the impact of the ongoing cost of living crisis on UK consumers in 2023. According to the survey by We Are Social and Statista Q conducted in April 2023, around one-third of the consumers feel highly affected by the situation, whereas only 2 percent respondents don't feel affected by the cost of living crisis at all.

In July 2025, 95 percent of households in Great Britain that reported a cost of living increase in the previous month advised that that their food bills had increased, with 57 percent reporting increased gas or electricity bills.

According to an April 2023 survey conducted by We Are Social and Statista Q, about 68 percent of UK consumers spend less on non-essentials in reaction to the cost of living crisis, whereas 63 percent pay more attention to bargains, good deals, or offers (when shopping). Similarly, more than half of respondents use less gas and electricity in their homes to deal with the situation.

As of April 2022, approximately ** percent of UK respondents reported the cost of living crisis in the United Kingdom had an impact on their car purchasing intentions. The increased cost of energy bills was the second factor most impacting car buyers, with ** percent of respondents reporting this would make them delay their purchase, or buy a smaller or cheaper vehicle.

In an August 2025 survey on domestic travel in the United Kingdom, 22 percent of respondents planned to spend less on eating out during domestic overnight trips in the next six months due to the cost of living crisis. Choosing cheaper accommodation and looking for more free activities were other popular strategies planned by domestic travelers for saving money.

In 2018-19 the GLA first undertook a Survey of Londoners. At the time it provided vital evidence on Londoners that had never been collected before in such detail. In 2021-22, the GLA conducted another Survey of Londoners, following the same methodology as the Survey of Londoners 2018-19, an online and paper self-completion survey of adults aged 16 and over in London. The survey, which received responses from 8,630 Londoners, aimed to assess the impact of COVID-19 and associated restrictions on key social outcomes for Londoners, not available from other data sources. It is important to understand the context in which the Survey of Londoners 2021-22 took place. Survey fieldwork began in November 2021; so, up to that point, it had been four months since most legal limits on social contact had been removed. However, after fieldwork had started, some restrictions due to the emergence of the Omicron variant were introduced. This may or may not have had some effect on the data. Given these changing circumstances, caution should be applied when interpreting the results. The Survey of Londoners 2021-22 also took place just before the full effects of the cost-of-living crisis began to set in. It is highly likely that the situations of Londoners have changed while analysis was taking place. On this page there is a headline findings report, published on 30 September 2022, which provides descriptive results for the key headline measures and supporting demographic data collected by the survey. Accompanying this report are more detailed tables documenting the key results of the survey by a range of demographic and other characteristics, a short summary document presenting key findings from the survey, and a technical report for those interested in the survey’s methodology. Further to these, a series of pen portraits, providing snapshots of particular groups of Londoners, as captured at the time of the Survey of Londoners 2021-22, were first added on 31 October 2022. Also on this page, there is an initial findings report, that was published on 2 September 2022. This was published to provide timely evidence from the survey to support the case for further targeted support to help low-income Londoners with the cost-of-living crisis. We have launched an online explorer where users can interrogate the data collected from the two surveys, conducted in 2018-19 and 2021-22. This is the first iteration, so we welcome any feedback on it - GO TO THE EXPLORER The record-level Survey of Londoners dataset can be accessed via the UK Data Service, University of Essex. The dataset is available for not-for-profit educational and research purposes only. Finally, as the North East London (NEL) NHS funded a 'boost' in their sub-region to enable a more detailed analysis to be conducted within, they produced an analytical report in September 2022. This is also available for download from this page.

A May 2022 survey analyzed the impact of the rising cost of living on holidays by Britons. According to the study, ** percent of respondents in the UK claimed to have stopped spending money on vacations due to the increasing living costs. On the other hand, ** percent of surveyed Britons did not make any cutbacks on holidays.

Purpose: The relative income hypothesis theorises that one’s earnings relative to others exert a greater influence on subjective wellbeing than absolute income. Understanding the relationship between relative income and mental health could contribute to employee wellbeing. This review aimed to summarise the defining features of relative income in relation to mental health and how it is measured in the literature. In addition, it aimed to explore the relationship between relative income and mental health in those currently employed in the UK. Methods: Nine electronic databases were searched using a pre-defined search strategy: PubMed (including MEDLINE and PubMed Central), PsycINFO, Scopus, Web of Science, Global Health, JSTOR, Business Source Complete (EBSCO), ScienceDirect and Emerald. The protocol was pre-registered on PROSPERO (CRD42023408657). Quantitative and qualitative studies and grey literature, which described the defining features and measurement of relative income and its impact on mental health among UK employees, were included. Results: After screening, 13 studies were included in the review. A conceptualisation of relative income revealed that an income comparison is either researcher-defined using averages or self-assessed based on a person’s perception. Having a lower income than the reference group was commonly associated with diminished wellbeing, though moderating factors (gender, income inequality and composition of reference group) were identified. Conclusions: Having a lower income than the reference group is associated with poorer wellbeing. Implications for practice and policy are considered amidst the UK’s ‘cost of living crisis’ and ongoing pay disputes in various sectors.

Our data takes the form of in-depth interview transcripts discussing the relationship between local independent businesses and Cambridge as a place. The first round of data collection took place in 2017 to discover, explore and evaluate the relationship between small and medium-sized businesses and community development within Cambridge. At the time of rapid change and a turbulent economic environment it was important to understand how local independent businesses interact with, and rely on, the locale and community in which they are based.

Leading on from the first phase, this project and a second round of data collection was employed to return to Cambridge in 2022 to further investigate how the implementation of Brexit and the arrival of the pandemic has impacted upon local independent businesses and the original issues uncovered. The aim is to drive debate and discussion towards a more diverse local business environment. This is of key significance given micro, small, and medium sized firms (SMEs) are most at risk of failure post-pandemic and in the escalating energy crisis. Such SMEs are not just important local employers but are also the main way to increase regional resilience and make Cambridge feel like a ‘home town’ with distinctive independent retailers as opposed to how the New Economics Foundation refers to the city as a ‘clone town’ full of national chain stores and devoid of local character. Topics covered included local networking, local enterprise support, belonging, power, community development and inequality.

Our recent research found that such businesses agreed that without the University of Cambridge, its unique communication channel and supply of labour, the city would be much less successful as it finds itself today. However, many businesses also felt the increased growth has led to increased pressures within the city due to constrained land supply and a tightly-drawn green belt. This, coupled with the current cost of living crisis, has seen business costs rise excessively increasing demands on already stretched independent businesses.

A recurring theme throughout our study, therefore, was ‘them versus us’ regarding the power dynamic between local independent businesses (who form an integral part of the local economy) and the key stakeholders and policy makers within Cambridge. While some firms may find they succeed, it appears to be the smaller independent businesses who struggle the most within the city as they may not have sufficient footfall, nor the capital reserves required to loudly market themselves and/or overcome the high costs associated with being located within Cambridge. As such, many of these independent businesses felt unappreciated, overlooked, and under-supported.

Is entrepreneurship a matter of place? This was the question that my PhD research undertaken across four case studies in East Anglia, UK (Cambridge, Great Yarmouth, Ipswich, Norwich) answered, showing how, when and where everyday entrepreneurship occurs and the different mechanisms of entrepreneurial attachment to place in terms of individual entrepreneurs' temporal orientations: place as it was, place as it is, and place as it could be. It is the notion of 'evolving places' that goes hand-in-hand with the societal struggles for power and the distribution of resources and opportunities in shaping the policy need to think about maintenance of entrepreneurial attachment if we want places to be cared for by their people and to influence change, bridging the gaps between 'unequal' stakeholders. This has become increasingly pertinent within a post-Brexit, Covid-19, reduced migratory context - the emphasis is now firmly placed on local contexts and how they perform, driving the proposed PDF.

Drawing on my PhD's work and returning to one of my case studies with the PDF objectives in mind, I plan to publish about entrepreneurial (im)mobility in both prosperous and depleted places, whilst arguing towards a 'place-based' understanding of policy and more contextually relevant use of public spending. This counters mounting criticism of scholarly work paying insufficient attention to spatial and contextual factors when examining entrepreneurial phenomena (Welter et al 2019) and is particularly fitting in Covid-19 times with the pandemic unfolding unevenly across different socioeconomic groups, geographical areas and localities in the UK (Dorling 2020). Indeed, with reports in a surge of would-be homebuyers moving out of cities to smaller places as people conclude that home working is here to stay (Jones 2020), spatially discriminatory inequalities come to the forefront especially when the pandemic itself can be considered racist (Channel 4 Documentary 2020). Empirically examining evolving places for everyday entrepreneurship in this manner is crucial from a policy perspective to mitigate the uneven spatial impact of the crisis on the economy and create (or sustain) local jobs. Given that the UK is already one of the most inter-regionally unequal countries in the developed world (McCann 2020) and the 'levelling-up' mantra is now even harder to achieve due to Covid-19 (Brown and Cowling 2021), there is increased need for targeted, contextualised regional policy (less spatially blind) to alleviate the territorial dimensions of inequality and social exclusion and overcome the pandemic's scarring socioeconomic effects.

Complementing the academic impact of publishing, presenting and disseminating the above research with non-academic audiences is a key feature of the PDF. High impact value initiatives such as a stakeholder workshop generating debate about the spatial dimension of social exclusion, patterns of spatial segregation, and how urban disadvantage can impact localised (self)employability extends the reach of the proposed body of work, ensuring an accessible way for important local stakeholder groups to connect anew and benefit from the PDF's impact as the starting point for a wider, less power-driven, conversation. Redressing the, now increasingly severe, spatially expressed inequalities heeds recommendations to map social exclusion at a lower level to tailor the need for political counter action (Talbot et al 2015). Invited stakeholders will include business associations, tourism boards, chambers of commerce, HAs, guilds, business forums, business support organisations, Cambridge [University] Hub and local councils amongst others. In doing so, this can turn potentially negative personal relationships with place into a positive; countering the frequently made claim 'there's nothing here for us' instead giving hope through bridging societal struggles for power and embracing the positive available aspects of 'evolving places'.

A weak spending environment amid economic headwinds casts a shadow over industry performance. Squeezed budgets amid the cost-of-living crisis were a double-edged sword for takeaways and fast-food restaurants over the two years through 2023-24: some consumers cut back on takeaways, while others traded down from full-service restaurants to takeaways and fast food. Inflationary pressures resulted in hikes in labour, energy and sourcing costs, straining profitability. Those with higher disposable incomes have been less impacted, demanding higher quality and healthier options, typically with a higher price tag. Persisting inflation and economic uncertainty weaken consumer confidence and spending in the two years through 2025-26. Revenue is projected to inch upward at a compound annual rate of 0.6% over the five years through 2025-26, including a 0.2% hike in 2025-26. The subdued rate of growth reflects ongoing challenges. The surge of online food ordering has fuelled revenue growth. While online sales peaked during the pandemic, consumers drawn to convenience have become accustomed to ordering takeaways and fast food online. The development of state-of-the-art online platforms and third-party online ordering platforms like Deliveroo and Uber Eats are becoming the bread and butter for takeaway and fast-food outlets, encouraging new players into the industry. Britons' growing health and sustainability consciousness presents an opportunity for takeaway and fast-food businesses to introduce more expensive organic and meat-free menu items to boost revenue and profit. Britons’ tastes for healthy and sustainable takeaway options will continue to climb. Stricter legislation regarding the adverse effects of consuming junk food will promote product development innovation and healthy fast-food alternatives, driving additional revenue streams. As workers return to the office more permanently, demand for takeaway lunch options will swell. Fast food chains will invest heavily in aggressive expansion plans to secure market share and reduce costs. Investment in marketing is likely to increase as operators turn to social media and online advertising to attract younger consumers and secure long-term revenue. Spending on innovation will persist as major players leverage AI and technological advancements to differentiate themselves from competitors and meet growing demand. Revenue is forecast to climb at a compound annual rate of 3.1% to £27.5 billion over the years through 2030-31.

According to a December 2023 study, roughly eight in ten surveyed Britons believed that the rising cost of living might impact their vacation plans. While ** percent of respondents aged 35 to 44 reported thinking that inflation could influence holiday planning, around ** percent of interviewed Britons aged 45 to 54 stated the same.

Retirement homes depend on self-funders or local council funding that covers the retirement needs of people who satisfy financial assessment means tests. Tightening government budgets have meant publicly funded fees have failed to cover providers’ operating costs, forcing retirement homes to cross-subsidise local authority beds with fees from self-funded residents. Revenue is anticipated to climb at a compound annual rate of 3.2% over the five years through 2025-26 to £12.0 billion, and it’s set to rise by 0.8% in 2025-26. Much of this is down to care homes' fees mounting to cover costs and being paid for by self-funders, who are saw their disposable income tick upwards in 2024-25, lifting industry revenue. Although the ageing population supports revenue growth, constrained government spending, delayed reform changes and rising costs (particularly for labour) have put pressure on profit. Demand for beds far outstrips the supply, which is driving investment into the industry. Mounting demand from residents who had delayed joining a retirement home during the pandemic contributed to strong growth in revenue in 2021-22. Care homes' fees then edged up in the three years through 2024-25 to cope with enhanced staffing costs, mounting mortgage payments and heightened energy costs – these were all the result of high inflation. This has been to the dismay of many retirees whose purse strings have tightened thanks to the cost-of-living crisis, making hit harder for them to afford to move into retirement homes. Higher fees have therefore dampened some of demand for beds, but they’ve also increased the sales value of care homes, supporting revenue. Retirement home revenue is expected to rise at a compound annual rate of 1.5% over the five years through 2030-31 to £12.9 billion, driven by an ageing population. By 2036, the number of people aged 85 and over will hit 2.6 million, representing 3.5% of the UK population, according to the Office for National Statistics. However, medical advances will make an older population healthier, allowing people to live independently for longer, dampening growth. Sustainable initiatives will be incorporated into the designs of new homes, helping reduce operational costs for retirement homes and supporting profitability. As real disposable income rises, there will be greater demand for luxury retirement homes, driving sales value and supporting industry revenue growth.

BackgroundSmoking and excessive drinking place a strain on household budgets. We aimed to examine the impact of the cost-of-living crisis in Great Britain on the nature of smoking cessation and alcohol reduction attempts, and explore changes in health professionals offering support.MethodsData were from 14,567 past-year smokers and high-risk drinkers (AUDIT-C ≥5) participating in monthly representative surveys, January-2021 through December-2022. We estimated time trends in cost as a motive driving the most recent (smoking cessation/alcohol reduction) attempt, use of paid or evidence-based support, and receipt of GP offer of support for smoking cessation or alcohol reduction, and tested for moderation by occupational social grade.ResultsThe proportion of attempts motivated by cost did not change significantly over time among smokers (25.4% [95%CI = 23.8–26.9%]), but increased between December-2021 and December-2022 among high-risk drinkers from less advantaged social grades (from 15.3% [95%CI 12.1–19.3] to 29.7% [20.1–44.1]). The only change in support use was an increase in smokers using paid support, specifically e-cigarettes (from 28.1% [23.7–33.3] to 38.2% [33.0–44.4]). Among those visiting their GP, the proportion who received an offer of support was similar over time among smokers (27.0% [25.7–28.2]) and high-risk drinkers (1.4% [1.1–1.6%]).ConclusionsThere is limited evidence that the 2021/22 cost-of-living crisis affected the nature of attempts to stop smoking and reduce alcohol consumption, or receipt of GP offer of support. It is encouraging that use of evidence-based support has not declined and that use of e-cigarettes in quit attempts has increased. However, cost is increasingly motivating alcohol reduction attempts among less advantaged drinkers, and rates of GPs offering support, especially for alcohol reduction, remain very low.

The UK inflation rate was 3.8 percent in September 2025, unchanged from the previous two months, and the fastest rate of inflation since January 2024. Between September 2022 and March 2023, the UK experienced seven months of double-digit inflation, which peaked at 11.1 percent in October 2022. Due to this long period of high inflation, UK consumer prices have increased by over 20 percent in the last three years. As of the most recent month, prices were rising fastest in the education sector, at 7.5 percent, with prices increasing at the slowest rate in the clothing and footwear sector. The Cost of Living Crisis High inflation is one of the main factors behind the ongoing Cost of Living Crisis in the UK, which, despite subsiding somewhat in 2024, is still impacting households going into 2025. In December 2024, for example, 56 percent of UK households reported their cost of living was increasing compared with the previous month, up from 45 percent in July, but far lower than at the height of the crisis in 2022. After global energy prices spiraled that year, the UK's energy price cap increased substantially. The cap, which limits what suppliers can charge consumers, reached 3,549 British pounds per year in October 2022, compared with 1,277 pounds a year earlier. Along with soaring food costs, high-energy bills have hit UK households hard, especially lower income ones that spend more of their earnings on housing costs. As a result of these factors, UK households experienced their biggest fall in living standards in decades in 2022/23. Global inflation crisis causes rapid surge in prices The UK's high inflation, and cost of living crisis in 2022 had its origins in the COVID-19 pandemic. Following the initial waves of the virus, global supply chains struggled to meet the renewed demand for goods and services. Food and energy prices, which were already high, increased further in 2022. Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 brought an end to the era of cheap gas flowing to European markets from Russia. The war also disrupted global food markets, as both Russia and Ukraine are major exporters of cereal crops. As a result of these factors, inflation surged across Europe and in other parts of the world, but typically declined in 2023, and approached more usual levels by 2024.

Budget airlines have benefitted from consumers increasingly seeking value for money. The industry is highly concentrated, consisting of only four airlines. External factors, including business and consumer confidence, household disposable income and outbound and international tourist numbers, determine demand for budget airlines. Shocks like natural disasters, terrorist attacks and disease outbreaks also impact demand. Revenue is expected to soar at a compound annual rate of 38.1% over the five years through 2025-26 to £12.8 billion, including growth of 5.3% in 2025-26. This rate of growth is skewed due to the base year of 2020-21 being severely low due to the significant impact of the pandemic on the tourism industry. Performance across the industry has sharply rebounded since the pandemic shocks toppled operators like Flybe and Norwegian Air UK. As travel restrictions lifted, passenger numbers have climbed year after year, boosting revenue recovery for budget airlines. Budget carriers swiftly capitalised on returning confidence and shifting consumer priorities, raising ticket prices to capture burgeoning demand. Yet, this bounce has been tempered by the cost-of-living crisis, with high inflation and economic uncertainty constraining consumer finances and spending since 2022-23. Nonetheless, these conditions have also encouraged more consumers to seek cheap ticket fares offered by budget airlines. Intense competition and elevated operating costs, including volatile fuel prices, have weighed on profit growth. Airlines have focused on technological innovation and improved customer service to enhance travellers’ experience and retain passengers. Revenue is forecast to expand at a compound annual rate of 4.2% over the five years through 2030-31 to £15.7 billion, driven by more robust demand for air travel, particularly low-cost flights. Budget airlines' expansion of fleets and operating bases will also fuel growth, with companies seeking to boost capacity and meet expanding passenger volumes. Carriers will invest heavily in new, more efficient fleets to boost capacity and comply with tightening environmental mandates, though these efforts bring significant capital and compliance costs. Investment in aircraft and competitive pressures will likely weigh on the profit margin. Budget airlines will have to innovate and improve their offerings to enhance the customer experience and stand out, with traditional airlines intensifying competition.