What are the effects of a higher central bank inflation target on the burden of real public debt? Several recent proposals have suggested that even a moderate increase in the inflation target can have a pronounced effect on real public debt. We consider this question in a New Keynesian model with a maturity structure of public debt and an imperfectly observed inflation target. We find that moderate changes in the inflation target only have significant effects on real public debt if they are essentially permanent. Moreover, the additional benefits of not communicating a change in the inflation target are minor.

For more than half of Canadians interviewed by the Leger Institute in March 2022, inflation had an impact on household debt. Conversely, according to one person in five, this phenomenon had no impact on their household debt. At the end of 2021, the cost of living and inflation were the first things Canadians mentioned when asked what the next government's priority should be.

This study examined the relationship between debt servicing and foreign exchange rate unification in Nigeria from 1995 to 2023, hypothesizing that a unified exchange rate policy would significantly impact the country's debt service-to-revenue ratio. Using annual time series data from sources such as the International Monetary Fund and World Development Indicators, the study employed an Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model to analyze the relationship between the debt service-to-revenue ratio and factors including the official foreign exchange rate, GDP growth rate, inflation rate, and oil prices. The findings revealed several notable insights. Exchange rate unification was found to have a significant negative effect on the debt service-to-revenue ratio, suggesting that a unified exchange rate policy could help reduce Nigeria's debt service burden. Both current and lagged inflation rates showed a significant negative impact on the debt service-to-revenue ratio, indicating that higher inflation might be eroding the real value of debt or increasing nominal revenues faster than debt servicing costs. Lagged exchange rates were found to negatively affect the debt service-to-revenue ratio, implying that higher exchange rates in the previous period decrease the current ratio. Oil prices demonstrated mixed effects, with current prices positively impacting the debt service-to-revenue ratio while lagged prices had a negative effect. The study also revealed strong persistence in debt servicing behavior over time, as evidenced by the significant positive correlation between current and previous year's debt service ratios. These results offer significant implications for policymakers. The negative effect of exchange rate unification on the debt service-to-revenue ratio suggests that such a policy could improve efficiency in forex markets and reduce arbitrage opportunities, ultimately helping to reduce the debt service burden. The negative relationship between inflation and the debt service-to-revenue ratio indicates that higher inflation might be beneficial for debt servicing in the short term, though this should be interpreted cautiously given the potential negative consequences of high inflation. The mixed impact of oil prices reflects the complexity of Nigeria's oil-dependent economy, highlighting the need for economic diversification. The strong persistence in debt servicing commitments points to potential structural issues in debt management or lack of fiscal flexibility. Policymakers can use these findings to inform strategies for managing Nigeria's debt burden. The results suggest that pursuing exchange rate unification, carefully managing inflation, diversifying the economy to reduce oil dependence, and improving fiscal discipline could all contribute to better management of debt servicing costs. However, it's crucial to consider the lagged effects of economic variables on debt servicing when formulating long-term fiscal strategies.

In 2024, Japan had an average inflation rate estimated at 2.74 percent, marking the highest rate of inflation in Japan in almost a decade. However, this figure was still very low compared to most other major economies, such as Japan's fellow G7 members, four of which had inflation rates around six or seven percent in 2023 due to the global inflation crisis. Why is Japan's inflation rate lower? There are a number of contributing factors to Japan's relatively low inflation rate, even during economic crises. Japan eased its Covid restrictions more slowly than most other major economies, this prevented post-pandemic consumer spending that may have driven inflation through supply chain issues caused by higher demand. As the majority of Japan's food and energy comes from overseas, and has done so for decades, the government has mechanisms in place to prevent energy and wheat prices from rising too quickly. Because of this, Japan was able to shield its private sector from many of the negative knock on effects from Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which had a significant impact on both sectors globally. Persistent deflation and national debt An additional factor that has eased the impact of inflation on Japan's economy is the fact that it experienced deflation before the pandemic. Deflation has been a persistent problem in Japan since the asset price bubble burst in 1992, and has been symptomatic of Japan's staggering national debt thereafter. For almost 30 years, a combination of quantitative easing, low interest rates (below 0.5 percent since 1995, and at -0.1% since 2016), and a lack of spending due to low wages and an aging population have combined to give Japan the highest national debt in the world in absolute terms, and second-highest debt in relation to its GDP, after Venezuela. Despite this soaring debt, Japan remains the fourth-largest economy in the world, behind the U.S., China, and Germany.

This paper studies how a large increase in the price level is transmitted to the real economy through firm balance sheets. Using newly digitized macro- and micro-level data from the German inflation of 1919-1923, we show that inflation led to a large reduction in real debt burdens and bankruptcies. Firms with higher nominal liabilities at the onset of inflation experienced a larger decline in interest expenses, a relative increase in their equity values, and higher employment during the inflation. The results are consistent with real effects of a debt-inflation channel that operates even when prices and wages are flexible.

The Federal Reserve's balance sheet has undergone significant changes since 2007, reflecting its response to major economic crises. From a modest *** trillion U.S. dollars at the end of 2007, it ballooned to approximately **** trillion U.S. dollars by May 2025. This dramatic expansion, particularly during the 2008 financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic - both of which resulted in negative annual GDP growth in the U.S. - showcases the Fed's crucial role in stabilizing the economy through expansionary monetary policies. Impact on inflation and interest rates The Fed's expansionary measures, while aimed at stimulating economic growth, have had notable effects on inflation and interest rates. Following the quantitative easing in 2020, inflation in the United States reached * percent in 2022, the highest since 1991. However, by *************, inflation had declined to *** percent. Concurrently, the Federal Reserve implemented a series of interest rate hikes, with the rate peaking at **** percent in ***********, before the first rate cut since ************** occurred in **************. Financial implications for the Federal Reserve The expansion of the Fed's balance sheet and subsequent interest rate hikes have had significant financial implications. In 2023, the Fed reported a negative net income of ***** billion U.S. dollars, a stark contrast to the ***** billion U.S. dollars profit in 2022. This unprecedented shift was primarily due to rapidly rising interest rates, which caused the Fed's interest expenses to soar to over *** billion U.S. dollars in 2023. Despite this, the Fed's net interest income on securities acquired through open market operations reached a record high of ****** billion U.S. dollars in the same year.

Abstract of associated article: Increasing the independence of a central bank from political influence, although ex-ante socially beneficial and initially successful in reducing inflation, would ultimately fail to lower inflation permanently. The smaller anticipated policy distortions implemented by a more independent central bank would induce the fiscal authority to decrease current distortions by increasing the deficit. Over time, inflation would increase to accommodate a higher public debt. By contrast, imposing a strict inflation target would lower inflation permanently and insulate the primary deficit from political distortions.

Inflation in Argentina was 54 percent in 2019, before falling to 42 percent in 2020. Despite Argentina's fluctuating economic instability over the twentieth century, the largest factor in its current economic status is the legacy of poor fiscal discipline left by the economic depression from 1998 to 2002. Although data is not available from 2014 to 2016, Argentina's inflation rate has been among the highest in the world for the past five years.

What causes inflation?

Inflation is a rise in price levels for all goods. Major causes of inflation include an increase in money supply, low central bank interest rates, and expectation of inflation. In a country such as Argentina, the expectation can be one of the biggest obstacles. People expect inflation to be high and demand increasing wages, and firms continue raising prices because they expect the costs of inputs to increase. Banks follow suit, charging high interest rates on fixed deposits.

Effects of inflation

Inflation negatively affects savers. 100 Argentinian pesos in 2018 was worth just under 75 pesos in 2019, after adjusting for the 34 percent inflation rate. Similarly, frequently changing prices has its own inherent cost, called “menu cost” after the price of printing new menus. Inflation will also have a positive effect on national debt when that debt is denominated in Argentinian pesos, because the pesos will be cheaper when the loan matures. However, the majority of Argentina’s debts are in foreign currency, which means that inflation will make these debts larger in peso terms.

The United States recorded a Government Debt to GDP of 124.30 percent of the country's Gross Domestic Product in 2024. This dataset provides - United States Government Debt To GDP - actual values, historical data, forecast, chart, statistics, economic calendar and news.

Graph and download economic data for Federal Debt: Total Public Debt (GFDEBTN) from Q1 1966 to Q1 2025 about public, debt, federal, government, and USA.

Inflation rates in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) ranged from ** percent inflation in Myanmar to **** percent inflation in Thailand in 2025. Only a few countries are in the 2 to 6 percent range that many economists view as optimal for emerging economies. Effects of high inflation High inflation is generally detrimental to the economy. Prices tend to rise faster than wages, meaning that people and firms have less purchasing power. This in turn leads to slower growth in the gross domestic product (GDP). It also leads to a weaker currency. For countries with a positive trade balance this can be beneficial, because exports are relatively cheaper to foreign buyers. Through the same mechanism, net importers suffer from a weaker currency. Additionally, inflation makes a country’s national debt less expensive if the debt is denominated in the local currency. However, most of this debt is in U.S. dollars, so inflation makes the debt more difficult to service and repay. Risks of deflation With deflation, consumers and firms delay investments because they expect prices to be lower in the future. This slows consumption and investment, two major components of GDP growth. The most common example of this is Japan, where the GDP growth rate has been low for a long time due, in large part, to deflation. For this reason, countries like Brunei would rather see low and stable inflation than slight deflation.

Pearson correlations matrix and variance inflation factor.

Abstract This paper aims to discuss the connection between monetary policy and public debt in Brazil, highlighting the consequences. To do so, it begins with a historical resumption of the emergence of the market for public debt and the institutions responsible for its management. This is followed by an analysis of the data on the variables related to monetary policy and public debt between 1999 and 2016. From this analysis, we observed the existence of a problematic connection between two policies - monetary and fiscal - given by the Selic rate, which is both an instrument to control the inflation and the rate that remunerates a significant portion of public debt. The paper concludes that this link reduces the effectiveness of these policies, requiring actions such as the untying of monetary policy and public debt, the increase in the term and duration of debt, the change in composition and, particularly, a reduction of the Selic rate.

The Volcker Shock was a period of historically high interest rates precipitated by Federal Reserve Chairperson Paul Volcker's decision to raise the central bank's key interest rate, the Fed funds effective rate, during the first three years of his term. Volcker was appointed chairperson of the Fed in August 1979 by President Jimmy Carter, as replacement for William Miller, who Carter had made his treasury secretary. Volcker was one of the most hawkish (supportive of tighter monetary policy to stem inflation) members of the Federal Reserve's committee, and quickly set about changing the course of monetary policy in the U.S. in order to quell inflation. The Volcker Shock is remembered for bringing an end to over a decade of high inflation in the United States, prompting a deep recession and high unemployment, and for spurring on debt defaults among developing countries in Latin America who had borrowed in U.S. dollars.

Monetary tightening and the recessions of the early '80s

Beginning in October 1979, Volcker's Fed tightened monetary policy by raising interest rates. This decision had the effect of depressing demand and slowing down the U.S. economy, as credit became more expensive for households and businesses. The Fed funds rate, the key overnight rate at which banks lend their excess reserves to each other, rose as high as 17.6 percent in early 1980. The rate was allowed to fall back below 10 percent following this first peak, however, due to worries that inflation was not falling fast enough, a second cycle of monetary tightening was embarked upon starting in August of 1980. The rate would reach its all-time peak in June of 1981, at 19.1 percent. The second recession sparked by these hikes was far deeper than the 1980 recession, with unemployment peaking at 10.8 percent in December 1980, the highest level since The Great Depression. This recession would drive inflation to a low point during Volcker's terms of 2.5 percent in August 1983.

The legacy of the Volcker Shock

By the end of Volcker's terms as Fed Chair, inflation was at a manageable rate of around four percent, while unemployment had fallen under six percent, as the economy grew and business confidence returned. While supporters of Volcker's actions point to these numbers as proof of the efficacy of his actions, critics have claimed that there were less harmful ways that inflation could have been brought under control. The recessions of the early 1980s are cited as accelerating deindustrialization in the U.S., as manufacturing jobs lost in 'rust belt' states such as Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania never returned during the years of recovery. The Volcker Shock was also a driving factor behind the Latin American debt crises of the 1980s, as governments in the region defaulted on debts which they had incurred in U.S. dollars. Debates about the validity of using interest rate hikes to get inflation under control have recently re-emerged due to the inflationary pressures facing the U.S. following the Coronavirus pandemic and the Federal Reserve's subsequent decision to embark on a course of monetary tightening.

The industry is composed of non-depository institutions that conduct primary and secondary market lending. Operators in this industry include government agencies in addition to non-agency issuers of mortgage-related securities. Through 2025, rising per capita disposable income and low levels of unemployment helped fuel the increase in primary and secondary market sales of collateralized debt. Nonetheless, due to the pandemic and the sharp contraction in economic activity in 2020, revenue gains were limited, but have climbed as the economy has normalized and interest rates shot up to tackle rampant inflation. However, in 2024 the Federal Reserve cut interest rates as inflationary pressures eased and is expected to be cut further in 2025. Overall, these trends, along with volatility in the real estate market, have caused revenue to slump at a CAGR of 1.5% to $485.0 billion over the past five years, including an expected decline of 1.1% in 2025 alone. The high interest rate environment has hindered real estate loan demand and caused industry profit to shrink to 11.6% of revenue in 2025. Higher access to credit and higher disposable income have fueled primary market lending over much of the past five years, increasing the variety and volume of loans to be securitized and sold in secondary markets. An additional boon for institutions has been an increase in interest rates in the latter part of the period, which raised interest income as the spread between short- and long-term interest rates increased. These macroeconomic factors, combined with changing risk appetite and regulation in the secondary markets, have resurrected collateralized debt trading since the middle of the period. Although the FED cut interest rates in 2024, this will reduce interest income for the industry but increase loan demand. Although institutions are poised to benefit from a strong economic recovery as inflationary pressures ease, relatively steady rates of homeownership, coupled with declines in the 30-year mortgage rate, are expected to damage the primary market through 2030. Shaky demand from commercial banking and uncertainty surrounding inflationary pressures will influence institutions' decisions on whether or not to sell mortgage-backed securities and commercial loans to secondary markets. These trends are expected to cause revenue to decline at a CAGR of 0.8% to $466.9 billion over the five years to 2030.

The debt financing solutions market, currently valued at XXX million with a CAGR of XX%, is experiencing robust growth driven by several key factors. Increased demand for capital investments across various sectors, particularly in infrastructure development, real estate, and technology, fuels the need for diverse debt financing options. Favorable macroeconomic conditions in certain regions, coupled with relatively low interest rates (though this is subject to change), have encouraged businesses and individuals to leverage debt financing. Furthermore, the increasing availability and sophistication of fintech platforms are streamlining the lending process, making debt financing more accessible to a wider range of borrowers. Key trends include the rise of alternative lending platforms offering faster approval times and potentially more flexible terms compared to traditional banks, the increasing use of data analytics to assess creditworthiness and mitigate risk, and a growing focus on sustainable and responsible lending practices. However, significant restraints persist. Economic downturns and rising inflation directly impact borrower solvency and lender risk appetite. Furthermore, regulatory changes and stringent compliance requirements can increase the cost and complexity of debt financing for both providers and borrowers. Market segmentation reveals strong demand across various loan types, including installment loans, revolving credit, and cash flow loans, with bank loans and bonds dominating the application segment. Geographical distribution shows North America and Europe currently hold significant market shares, but the Asia-Pacific region is expected to experience substantial growth due to rapid economic expansion and rising infrastructure investment. The competitive landscape is intensely dynamic, with a mix of large multinational banks (Bank of America, Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase) and specialized financial institutions (Hercules Capital, Silicon Valley Bank) vying for market share. These institutions are continuously adapting their offerings to cater to evolving borrower needs and technological advancements. The presence of both traditional banking giants and emerging fintech lenders fosters competition, driving innovation and potentially improving the overall borrower experience. Future growth will likely be shaped by factors including evolving interest rate environments, global economic stability, technological disruptions in financial services, and the impact of regulatory frameworks on responsible lending practices. Regional variations in economic development and regulatory landscapes will continue to influence market dynamics, with emerging markets presenting significant opportunities for expansion but also higher levels of risk. The forecast period (2025-2033) anticipates continued growth, though the rate may fluctuate based on macroeconomic conditions and the ongoing evolution of the financial technology landscape. Analyzing specific regional data – North America's established markets versus the high-growth potential of Asia Pacific – will be crucial for investors and businesses operating within the debt financing sector.

The statistic shows the inflation rate in France from 1987 to 2024, with projections up until 2030. The inflation rate is calculated using the price increase of a defined product basket. This product basket contains products and services on which the average consumer spends money throughout the year. They include expenses for groceries, clothes, rent, power, telecommunications, recreational activities, and raw materials (e.g. gas, oil), as well as federal fees and taxes. In 2024, the inflation rate in France was at about 2.32 percent compared to the previous year. The economy of France France is among the top six countries with the largest gross domestic product worldwide, behind the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, China, and the United States. It is thus one of the leading economies worldwide. Its economy mostly relies on the services sector with almost 80 percent, agriculture making up only 1 percent of the economy and the industry sector the rest. These three sectors are typically seen as the main pillars of a country’s economy. France is also among the leading exporting countries worldwide and the leading importing countries worldwide. Both France’s exports and imports have increased over the last few years. Its trade balance (a country’s exports minus its imports) has been decreasing significantly over the last decade, which means the value of France’s exports was considerably lower than the value of its imports. France’s main exports include wine, meat, and other food products. Its main imports are manufactured goods, among other products. As for the national finances, the national debt of France has been rising steadily and it is thus counted among the countries with the highest public debt, albeit lower in the ranking. Nevertheless, the standard of living in France is quite high, its life expectancy is among the highest in the world, and the employment rate has been steady, or even rising slightly, since 2009.

The statistic shows the inflation rate in the European Union and the Euro area from 2019 to 2022, with projections up until 2029. The term inflation, also known as currency devaluation (drop in the value of money), is characterized by a steady rise in prices for finished products (consumer goods, capital goods). The consumer price index tracks price trends of private consumption expenditure, and shows an increase in the index's current level of inflation. In 2022, the inflation rate in the EU was about 9.32 percent compared to the previous year. The economic situation in the European Union and the euro area The ongoing Eurozone crisis, which initially emerged in 2009, has dramatically affected most countries in the European Union. The crisis primarily prevented many countries from refinancing their debt without help from a third party and slowed economic growth throughout the entire EU. As a result, general gross debt escalated annually in the euro area and more prominently in the EU. The collective sum of debt is most likely going to continue, given the current global economic situation as well as Europe’s recovering, however struggling economy. Struggles are primarily evident in the EU’s budget balance, which saw itself in the negative every year over the same timeframe as the eurozone crisis, although the balances improved on a yearly basis. Despite economical struggles, the EU still grew in population almost every year over the past decade, primarily due to a high standard of living and job opportunities, compared to many of its surrounding neighbors.

The evolution of debt-income ratios over time depends on income growth, inflation, and interest rates, independent of any changes in borrowing. We examine the effect of these "Fisher dynamics" on household debt-income ratios in the United States over the period 1929–2011. Adapting a standard decomposition of public debt to household sector debt, we show that these factors explain, in accounting terms, a large fraction of the changes in household debt-income ratios observed historically. More recently, debt defaults have also been important. Changes in household debt-income ratios over time cannot be straightforwardly interpreted as reflecting shifts in the supply and demand of household credit.

This paper quantifies the economic impact of regime changes and macroeconomic indicators on debt stress in Zambia using the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) Bounds test. A 1% short run increase in gross domestic products (GDP) increases debt stress by 3.16% and in the subsequent year lowers it by 7.21%; in the long-run the 1% GDP increases lowers debt stress by 22%. In the long-run, a 1% rise in inflation and the lending rate negatively and positively impacted debt stress levels by -1.52% and 3.90%, respectively. Short-run shocks culminated regime change had short-run adverse impact on debt stress by 3.45% in one year and in the subsequent year by -10.35%, with the variables adjusting to long-run equilibrium at a speed of 71.5%. This is the first paper to quantify the empirical effect of macroeconomic indicators and change in Presidents on debt stress, especially in Africa were the problem of the debt trap is perpetuated. The results from the study implies that to deescalate the impact of debt stress on the economy, the electorate should vote in governments that will not fall short on growth driven macroeconomic policies, making it possible for economic sustainability to prevail; and paper seeks to promote good governance and good economic policies as a premise for sustained macroeconomic stability and development.