India's Purchasing Managers Index (PMI) data - current and historical values for composite, manufacturing and services index, in addition to expert analysis.

This dataset provides values for MANUFACTURING PMI reported in several countries. The data includes current values, previous releases, historical highs and record lows, release frequency, reported unit and currency.

In January 2022, the manufacturing PLI in India was **. By contrast, April 2020 saw a PLI of ****. This can be attributed to the COVID-19 pandemic during which the country was under lockdown.

In March 2023, the Nikkei India services purchasing managers index (PMI) in India was ****. Comparatively, January 2022 saw a PMI of ****. The Nikkei India services PMI collects monthly data from purchasing executives of private sector companies.

This dataset provides values for COMPOSITE PMI reported in several countries. The data includes current values, previous releases, historical highs and record lows, release frequency, reported unit and currency.

In January 2022, the services PLI in India was ****. By contrast, the index in April 2020 amounted to ***. This decline can be attributed to the COVID-19 pandemic, during which the country was in lockdown.

Subscribers can find out export and import data of 23 countries by HS code or product’s name. This demo is helpful for market analysis.

Subscribers can find out export and import data of 23 countries by HS code or product’s name. This demo is helpful for market analysis.

In October 2024, in Asia, the manufacturing purchasing leaders' index (PLI) in India was ****. In comparison, South Korea's manufacturing PLI at that time was ****.

35 India export shipment records of Pmi and HSN Code 8471 with prices, volume & current Buyer's suppliers relationships based on actual India export trade database.

55 Global export shipment records of Pmi with prices, volume & current Buyer's suppliers relationships based on actual Global export trade database.

El PMI Compuesto de Markit es un informe mensual resumido que abarca los cambios en las condiciones de trabajo de las empresas privadas en los sectores de la industria y los servicios de la India. Se

526 India import shipment records of Pmi and HSN Code 8504 with prices, volume & current Buyer’s suppliers relationships based on actual India import trade database.

96 India export shipment records of Pmi and HSN Code 7307 with prices, volume & current Buyer's suppliers relationships based on actual India export trade database.

CODE.PY OUTPUT

Institutional Benchmarking and Regression Results

To contextualize institutional performance, we first compare India and Pakistan against the global mean of common-law economies on three governance indicators: Protecting Minority Investors (PMI), Enforcing Contracts (EC), and a composite index of the Legal-Political Environment. The global averages for common-law countries are:

• PMI: 18.6

• EC: 37.9

• Legal-Political Environment: 7.44 (on a 0–10 scale)

Relative to these benchmarks:

• India outperforms the PMI average by 5.6 ranks, but underperforms EC by 125.1 ranks and legal-political environment by 2.74 points.

• Pakistan underperforms on all three: +9.4 ranks in PMI (worse), +118.1 ranks in EC, and –4.24 points on legal-political environment.

These gaps suggest that formal investor protections (PMI) are stronger in India, but contract enforcement and broader institutional trust lag significantly in both countries.

Regression Analysis: Institutional Predictors of Governance Outcomes

We ran robust Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions with Control of Corruption (cc), Rule of Law (rl), and Political Stability (pv) (from the Worldwide Governance Indicators) as predictors of country performance in both PMI and EC.

✅ Protecting Minority Investors (PMI)

• Model Fit: R² = 0.364; F(3, 182) = 46.91; p < 0.001

• Significant predictors:

  • Rule of Law (β = –62.74, p < 0.001): Strong negative relationship, consistent with countries with weaker rule of law having higher PMI ranks (i.e., worse protections).

  • Political Stability (β = +22.28, p < 0.001): Higher stability is associated with better (lower) PMI rank.

  • Control of Corruption (β = +15.91, p = 0.078): Marginally significant.

✅ Enforcing Contracts (EC)

• Model Fit: R² = 0.389; F(3, 182) = 52.32; p < 0.001

• Significant predictors:

  • Rule of Law (β = –47.55, p < 0.001): Again, weak rule of law predicts poor performance.

  • Political Stability (β = +11.27, p = 0.029): More stable environments enforce contracts more efficiently.

  • Control of Corruption was not significant (p = 0.61).

These results underscore the salience of Rule of Law and Political Stability in explaining variation in corporate governance effectiveness across countries.

Peer-Adjusted Z-Scores: Rule of Law and Judicial Independence

To further refine the comparison, we standardized India and Pakistan’s scores relative to global peers using z-scores:

• India: Judicial Independence z = +1.39, Rule of Law z = +1.28

• Pakistan: Judicial Independence z = +0.25, Rule of Law z = –0.95

This highlights India’s relative institutional strength in legal capacity, while Pakistan falls below global norms, particularly on rule of law.

CODE2.PY OUTPUT

Summary Statistics and Cross-National Comparison

We begin by comparing key governance indicators for India and Pakistan over the 1996–2020 period using data from the V-Dem dataset. Table X reports descriptive statistics for six core institutional quality variables:

• v2x_rule: Rule of Law

• v2x_jucon: Judicial Constraints on the Executive

• v2xlg_legcon: Legislative Constraints

• v2x_freexp: Freedom of Expression

• v2x_polyarchy: Electoral Democracy Index

• v2x_corr: Control of Corruption

Key Observations from the 23-year panel:

• Rule of Law (v2x_rule): India displays a high mean score of 0.579 (SD = 0.029), while Pakistan lags significantly behind at 0.237 (SD = 0.023).

• Judicial Constraints (v2x_jucon): India again leads with a mean of 0.814, compared to 0.537 for Pakistan.

• Control of Corruption (v2x_corr): Interestingly, Pakistan scores higher (0.868) than India (0.566), suggesting a potential data artifact or performative anti-corruption signaling.

These descriptive statistics show a consistent pattern of stronger rule-of-law institutions in India. However, India’s governance edge does not hold across all indicators—especially corruption control, which exhibits counterintuitive results.

T-Test Results: India vs. Pakistan

We formally test whether the differences in means between India and Pakistan are statistically significant using two-sample t-tests:

The highly significant differences in nearly all variables confirm that India and Pakistan follow distinct institutional trajectories—though India’s relative weakness in corruption control invites further scrutiny under the CMF framework.

Structural Breaks in India’s Democratic Governance

Using the ruptures package and a rolling t-test approach, we detect structural breakpoints in India’s democratic trajectory:

• Based on v2x_polyarchy, break years are identified at 2011, 2016, and 2021.

• The rolling t-test method suggests more granular shifts starting as early as 2001, with notable accelerations around 2011–2019.

These breakpoints align with major political and constitutional developments in India and support the CMF argument that formal continuity in legal benchmarks may obscure deeper institutional volatility.

CODE3.PY OUTPUT

Summary Statistics and Institutional Quality Comparison: India vs. Pakistan

We begin by reporting descriptive statistics for two core institutional variables—Control of Corruption (v2x_corr) and Judicial Constraints on the Executive (v2x_jucon)—drawn from the V-Dem dataset for the years 1996–2020:

• Control of Corruption (v2x_corr):

  • India: Mean = 0.566, SD = 0.027, indicating relatively consistent performance with moderate corruption control.

  • Pakistan: Mean = 0.868, SD = 0.051, suggesting surprisingly strong corruption scores, but with greater variability. This may reflect methodological distortions or performative anti-corruption institutions that lack substantive checks—a key focus of our Critical Macro-Finance (CMF) interpretation.

• Judicial Constraints (v2x_jucon):

  • India: Mean = 0.814, SD = 0.013, indicating strong and stable judicial oversight over executive actions.

  • Pakistan: Mean = 0.537, SD = 0.140, reflecting weaker, more volatile institutional constraints.

T-Test Results: Are India and Pakistan Statistically Different?

Two-sample t-tests confirm that these differences are highly statistically significant:

These results validate the hypothesis that India and Pakistan exhibit substantially divergent institutional trajectories—though not always in expected directions. India shows stronger judicial oversight, while Pakistan appears to outperform in corruption metrics, warranting

Positive Material Identification (PMI) Market Outlook

The global Positive Material Identification (PMI) market size was valued at $2.1 billion in 2023, and it is projected to reach $4.8 billion by 2032, growing at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 9.5% during the forecast period. The PMI market is experiencing robust growth driven by the increasing need for material verification and alloy identification across various industries, stringent safety regulations, and the rising adoption of PMI techniques in quality control and inspection processes.

One of the primary growth factors for the PMI market is the rising demand for quality assurance and control in manufacturing industries. As industries become more digitized and integrated, ensuring the correct composition of materials used in production processes is crucial to maintaining product integrity and safety. PMI techniques like X-ray fluorescence (XRF) and optical emission spectroscopy (OES) provide accurate and non-destructive analysis of materials, enabling manufacturers to meet stringent regulatory compliances and avoid costly recalls or failures. This growing emphasis on quality control is significantly propelling the adoption of PMI technologies across various sectors.

Another significant factor driving the PMI market is the strict regulatory landscape governing material safety and compliance. Industries such as oil & gas, aerospace & defense, and automotive are subject to rigorous standards and regulations that mandate the use of PMI for material verification. For instance, the oil & gas industry relies heavily on PMI to ensure the safety and integrity of pipelines, equipment, and infrastructure by verifying the chemical composition of metals and alloys used. The increasing enforcement of such regulations globally is creating a substantial demand for advanced PMI equipment and services.

The ongoing advancements in PMI technologies are also contributing to market growth. Innovations in PMI equipment, such as portable and handheld devices, have made material identification more accessible and convenient for on-site inspections. These advancements allow for real-time analysis and rapid decision-making, reducing downtime and improving operational efficiency. Additionally, the integration of PMI systems with digital platforms and IoT devices is enhancing data collection, storage, and analysis capabilities, further driving the adoption of PMI techniques across various industries.

On the regional front, North America dominated the PMI market in 2023, accounting for the largest share due to the presence of major industries such as aerospace, automotive, and oil & gas, which heavily rely on PMI for ensuring material compliance. The region's stringent regulatory environment and high adoption of advanced technologies also contribute to its market leadership. However, Asia Pacific is expected to witness the highest growth during the forecast period, driven by rapid industrialization, increasing investments in infrastructure development, and the growing emphasis on quality control and safety standards in emerging economies like China and India.

Offering Analysis

The PMI market is segmented by offering into equipment and services. The equipment segment includes various types of PMI devices, such as handheld, portable, and bench-top analyzers, which are extensively used for material verification and analysis. The growing demand for advanced and user-friendly PMI equipment is driving the growth of this segment. Manufacturers are focusing on developing innovative devices with improved accuracy, speed, and ease of use, which is further boosting the adoption of PMI equipment across various industries. The equipment segment is expected to continue its dominance in the PMI market during the forecast period.

Within the equipment segment, handheld and portable analyzers are witnessing significant growth due to their advantages in terms of mobility, ease of use, and real-time analysis capabilities. These devices are particularly popular in industries such as oil & gas, aerospace, and automotive, where on-site inspections and immediate results are crucial. The increasing demand for handheld and portable PMI devices is driving manufacturers to invest in research and development to enhance their features and performance, supporting the overall growth of the PMI market.

The services segment includes various types of PMI-related services, such as calibration, maintenance, training, and consulting. The growing need for regular maintenance and calibration of PMI equi

16 India export shipment records of Pmi and HSN Code 85045090 with prices, volume & current Buyer's suppliers relationships based on actual India export trade database.

CODE.PY OUTPUT

Institutional Benchmarking and Regression Results

To contextualize institutional performance, we first compare India and Pakistan against the global mean of common-law economies on three governance indicators: Protecting Minority Investors (PMI), Enforcing Contracts (EC), and a composite index of the Legal-Political Environment. The global averages for common-law countries are:

• PMI: 18.6

• EC: 37.9

• Legal-Political Environment: 7.44 (on a 0–10 scale)

Relative to these benchmarks:

• India outperforms the PMI average by 5.6 ranks, but underperforms EC by 125.1 ranks and legal-political environment by 2.74 points.

• Pakistan underperforms on all three: +9.4 ranks in PMI (worse), +118.1 ranks in EC, and –4.24 points on legal-political environment.

These gaps suggest that formal investor protections (PMI) are stronger in India, but contract enforcement and broader institutional trust lag significantly in both countries.

Regression Analysis: Institutional Predictors of Governance Outcomes

We ran robust Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions with Control of Corruption (cc), Rule of Law (rl), and Political Stability (pv) (from the Worldwide Governance Indicators) as predictors of country performance in both PMI and EC.

✅ Protecting Minority Investors (PMI)

• Model Fit: R² = 0.364; F(3, 182) = 46.91; p < 0.001

• Significant predictors:

  • Rule of Law (β = –62.74, p < 0.001): Strong negative relationship, consistent with countries with weaker rule of law having higher PMI ranks (i.e., worse protections).

  • Political Stability (β = +22.28, p < 0.001): Higher stability is associated with better (lower) PMI rank.

  • Control of Corruption (β = +15.91, p = 0.078): Marginally significant.

✅ Enforcing Contracts (EC)

• Model Fit: R² = 0.389; F(3, 182) = 52.32; p < 0.001

• Significant predictors:

  • Rule of Law (β = –47.55, p < 0.001): Again, weak rule of law predicts poor performance.

  • Political Stability (β = +11.27, p = 0.029): More stable environments enforce contracts more efficiently.

  • Control of Corruption was not significant (p = 0.61).

These results underscore the salience of Rule of Law and Political Stability in explaining variation in corporate governance effectiveness across countries.

Peer-Adjusted Z-Scores: Rule of Law and Judicial Independence

To further refine the comparison, we standardized India and Pakistan’s scores relative to global peers using z-scores:

• India: Judicial Independence z = +1.39, Rule of Law z = +1.28

• Pakistan: Judicial Independence z = +0.25, Rule of Law z = –0.95

This highlights India’s relative institutional strength in legal capacity, while Pakistan falls below global norms, particularly on rule of law.

CODE2.PY OUTPUT

Summary Statistics and Cross-National Comparison

We begin by comparing key governance indicators for India and Pakistan over the 1996–2020 period using data from the V-Dem dataset. Table X reports descriptive statistics for six core institutional quality variables:

• v2x_rule: Rule of Law

• v2x_jucon: Judicial Constraints on the Executive

• v2xlg_legcon: Legislative Constraints

• v2x_freexp: Freedom of Expression

• v2x_polyarchy: Electoral Democracy Index

• v2x_corr: Control of Corruption

Key Observations from the 23-year panel:

• Rule of Law (v2x_rule): India displays a high mean score of 0.579 (SD = 0.029), while Pakistan lags significantly behind at 0.237 (SD = 0.023).

• Judicial Constraints (v2x_jucon): India again leads with a mean of 0.814, compared to 0.537 for Pakistan.

• Control of Corruption (v2x_corr): Interestingly, Pakistan scores higher (0.868) than India (0.566), suggesting a potential data artifact or performative anti-corruption signaling.

These descriptive statistics show a consistent pattern of stronger rule-of-law institutions in India. However, India’s governance edge does not hold across all indicators—especially corruption control, which exhibits counterintuitive results.

T-Test Results: India vs. Pakistan

We formally test whether the differences in means between India and Pakistan are statistically significant using two-sample t-tests:

The highly significant differences in nearly all variables confirm that India and Pakistan follow distinct institutional trajectories—though India’s relative weakness in corruption control invites further scrutiny under the CMF framework.

Structural Breaks in India’s Democratic Governance

Using the ruptures package and a rolling t-test approach, we detect structural breakpoints in India’s democratic trajectory:

• Based on v2x_polyarchy, break years are identified at 2011, 2016, and 2021.

• The rolling t-test method suggests more granular shifts starting as early as 2001, with notable accelerations around 2011–2019.

These breakpoints align with major political and constitutional developments in India and support the CMF argument that formal continuity in legal benchmarks may obscure deeper institutional volatility.

CODE3.PY OUTPUT

Summary Statistics and Institutional Quality Comparison: India vs. Pakistan

We begin by reporting descriptive statistics for two core institutional variables—Control of Corruption (v2x_corr) and Judicial Constraints on the Executive (v2x_jucon)—drawn from the V-Dem dataset for the years 1996–2020:

• Control of Corruption (v2x_corr):

  • India: Mean = 0.566, SD = 0.027, indicating relatively consistent performance with moderate corruption control.

  • Pakistan: Mean = 0.868, SD = 0.051, suggesting surprisingly strong corruption scores, but with greater variability. This may reflect methodological distortions or performative anti-corruption institutions that lack substantive checks—a key focus of our Critical Macro-Finance (CMF) interpretation.

• Judicial Constraints (v2x_jucon):

  • India: Mean = 0.814, SD = 0.013, indicating strong and stable judicial oversight over executive actions.

  • Pakistan: Mean = 0.537, SD = 0.140, reflecting weaker, more volatile institutional constraints.

T-Test Results: Are India and Pakistan Statistically Different?

Two-sample t-tests confirm that these differences are highly statistically significant:

These results validate the hypothesis that India and Pakistan exhibit substantially divergent institutional trajectories—though not always in expected directions. India shows stronger judicial oversight, while Pakistan appears to outperform in corruption metrics, warranting

Markit Manufacturing PMI est un indicateur de la conjoncture en Inde, calculé par IHS Markit sur la base denquêtes mensuelles auprès des directeurs dachat. Lindice fournit des informations

Subscribers can find out export and import data of 23 countries by HS code or product’s name. This demo is helpful for market analysis.