Abstract (en): This research focuses on the longer-term monetary relationships in historical data. Charts describing the 10-year average growth rates in the M2 monetary aggregate, nominal GDP, real GDP, and inflation are used to show that there is a consistent longer-term correlation between M2 growth, nominal GDP growth, and inflation but not between such nominal variables and real GDP growth. The data reveal extremely long cycles in monetary growth and inflation, the most recent of which was the strong upward trend in M2 growth, nominal GDP growth, and inflation during the 1960s and 1970s, and the strong downward trend since then. Data going back to the 19th century show that the most recent inflation/disinflation cycle is a repetition of earlier long monetary growth and inflation cycles in the United States historical record. Also discussed is a measure of bond market inflation credibility, defined as the difference between averages in long-term bond rates and real GDP growth. By this measure, inflation credibility hovered close to zero during the 1950s and early 1960s, but then rose to a peak of about 10 percent in the early 1980s. During the 1990s, the bond market has yet to restore the low inflation credibility that existed before inflation turned up during the 1960s. The conclusion is that the risks of starting another costly inflation/disinflation cycle could be avoided by monitoring monetary growth and maintaining a sufficiently tight policy to keep inflation low. An environment of credible price stability would allow the economy to function unfettered by inflationary distortions, which is all that can reasonably be expected of monetary policy, and is precisely what should be expected. (1) The file submitted is the data file 9811WD.DAT. (2) These data are part of ICPSR's Publication-Related Archive and are distributed exactly as they arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigator(s) if further information is desired.

ECRI: Future Inflation Gauge Index data was reported at 111.900 NA in Nov 2018. This records a decrease from the previous number of 113.100 NA for Oct 2018. ECRI: Future Inflation Gauge Index data is updated monthly, averaging 110.500 NA from Jan 1994 (Median) to Nov 2018, with 299 observations. The data reached an all-time high of 126.200 NA in Oct 2005 and a record low of 77.600 NA in Apr 2009. ECRI: Future Inflation Gauge Index data remains active status in CEIC and is reported by Economic Cycle Research Institute. The data is categorized under Global Database’s United States – Table US.I042: Future Inflation Gauge Index.

During the period beginning roughly in the mid-1980s until the Global Financial Crisis (2007-2008), the U.S. economy experienced a time of relative economic calm, with low inflation and consistent GDP growth. Compared with the turbulent economic era which had preceded it in the 1970s and the early 1980s, the lack of extreme fluctuations in the business cycle led some commentators to suggest that macroeconomic issues such as high inflation, long-term unemployment and financial crises were a thing of the past. Indeed, the President of the American Economic Association, Professor Robert Lucas, famously proclaimed in 2003 that "central problem of depression prevention has been solved, for all practical purposes". Ben Bernanke, the future chairman of the Federal Reserve during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and 2022 Nobel Prize in Economics recipient, coined the term 'the Great Moderation' to describe this era of newfound economic confidence. The era came to an abrupt end with the outbreak of the GFC in the Summer of 2007, as the U.S. financial system began to crash due to a downturn in the real estate market.

Causes of the Great Moderation, and its downfall

A number of factors have been cited as contributing to the Great Moderation including central bank monetary policies, the shift from manufacturing to services in the economy, improvements in information technology and management practices, as well as reduced energy prices. The period coincided with the term of Fed chairman Alan Greenspan (1987-2006), famous for the 'Greenspan put', a policy which meant that the Fed would proactively address downturns in the stock market using its monetary policy tools. These economic factors came to prominence at the same time as the end of the Cold War (1947-1991), with the U.S. attaining a new level of hegemony in global politics, as its main geopolitical rival, the Soviet Union, no longer existed. During the Great Moderation, the U.S. experienced a recession twice, between July 1990 and March 1991, and again from March 2001 tom November 2001, however, these relatively short recessions did not knock the U.S. off its growth path. The build up of household and corporate debt over the early 2000s eventually led to the Global Financial Crisis, as the bursting of the U.S. housing bubble in 2007 reverberated across the financial system, with a subsequent credit freeze and mass defaults.

The Volcker Shock was a period of historically high interest rates precipitated by Federal Reserve Chairperson Paul Volcker's decision to raise the central bank's key interest rate, the Fed funds effective rate, during the first three years of his term. Volcker was appointed chairperson of the Fed in August 1979 by President Jimmy Carter, as replacement for William Miller, who Carter had made his treasury secretary. Volcker was one of the most hawkish (supportive of tighter monetary policy to stem inflation) members of the Federal Reserve's committee, and quickly set about changing the course of monetary policy in the U.S. in order to quell inflation. The Volcker Shock is remembered for bringing an end to over a decade of high inflation in the United States, prompting a deep recession and high unemployment, and for spurring on debt defaults among developing countries in Latin America who had borrowed in U.S. dollars.

Monetary tightening and the recessions of the early '80s

Beginning in October 1979, Volcker's Fed tightened monetary policy by raising interest rates. This decision had the effect of depressing demand and slowing down the U.S. economy, as credit became more expensive for households and businesses. The Fed funds rate, the key overnight rate at which banks lend their excess reserves to each other, rose as high as 17.6 percent in early 1980. The rate was allowed to fall back below 10 percent following this first peak, however, due to worries that inflation was not falling fast enough, a second cycle of monetary tightening was embarked upon starting in August of 1980. The rate would reach its all-time peak in June of 1981, at 19.1 percent. The second recession sparked by these hikes was far deeper than the 1980 recession, with unemployment peaking at 10.8 percent in December 1980, the highest level since The Great Depression. This recession would drive inflation to a low point during Volcker's terms of 2.5 percent in August 1983.

The legacy of the Volcker Shock

By the end of Volcker's terms as Fed Chair, inflation was at a manageable rate of around four percent, while unemployment had fallen under six percent, as the economy grew and business confidence returned. While supporters of Volcker's actions point to these numbers as proof of the efficacy of his actions, critics have claimed that there were less harmful ways that inflation could have been brought under control. The recessions of the early 1980s are cited as accelerating deindustrialization in the U.S., as manufacturing jobs lost in 'rust belt' states such as Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania never returned during the years of recovery. The Volcker Shock was also a driving factor behind the Latin American debt crises of the 1980s, as governments in the region defaulted on debts which they had incurred in U.S. dollars. Debates about the validity of using interest rate hikes to get inflation under control have recently re-emerged due to the inflationary pressures facing the U.S. following the Coronavirus pandemic and the Federal Reserve's subsequent decision to embark on a course of monetary tightening.

ABSTRACT This work analyzes how the recent Brazilian inflation responds to economic cycles and its inertial component considering different environments of forward-looking expectations in the framework of the Hybrid New-Keynesian Phillips Curve (HNKPC). To do this, use is made of monthly data from January 2002 to August 2015 and GMM-HAC estimates of the HNKPC. The results suggest that Brazilian inflation still has a strong inertial component and that in an environment of lower predictability of economic agents, inflation seems to be more sensitive to cyclical fluctuations in economic activity. Finally, it was observed a positive and significant pass-through exchange rate to inflation in Brazil.

United States PCE Inflation Nowcast: sa: Contribution: Business Cycle Indicator data was reported at 0.000 % in 12 May 2025. This stayed constant from the previous number of 0.000 % for 05 May 2025. United States PCE Inflation Nowcast: sa: Contribution: Business Cycle Indicator data is updated weekly, averaging 0.000 % from Apr 2019 (Median) to 12 May 2025, with 320 observations. The data reached an all-time high of 8.799 % in 15 Apr 2019 and a record low of 0.000 % in 12 May 2025. United States PCE Inflation Nowcast: sa: Contribution: Business Cycle Indicator data remains active status in CEIC and is reported by CEIC Data. The data is categorized under Global Database’s United States – Table US.CEIC.NC: CEIC Nowcast: Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE) Inflation: Headline.

Many business cycle models use a flat short-run Phillips curve, due to time-dependent pricing and strategic complementarities, to explain fluctuations in real output. But, in doing so, these models predict unrealistically high persistence and stability of US inflation in recent decades. We calculate "reset price inflation"—based on new prices chosen by the subsample of price changers—to dissect this discrepancy. We find that the models generate too much persistence and stability both in reset price inflation and in the way reset price inflation is converted into actual inflation. Our findings present a challenge to existing explanations for business cycles. (JEL E31, E52)

ABSTRACT This paper builds on the theory of regulation developed by Stigler and Peltzman. According to these authors, a regulator chooses his/her strategy seeking to maximize political support from consumers and producers, viewing welfare and efficiency as secondary issues. This process determines a regulated price that is between the competitive and monopolistic levels. Our paper develops a modified version of Peltzman’s model by considering the idea that the regulator’s behaviour might change with the proximity of elections. The addition of a timing dimension to the problem and its implication for consumers, producers and the regulator’s behavior suggest that the optimal strategy now implies in a price cycle in regulated industries. The regulator has incentives to impose higher prices when elections are relatively far ahead and lower (real) prices in periods that immediately precede an important election. We show that the Brazilian gasoline market between 1969-1984 supports our results.

This paper uses a dynamic factor model for the quarterly changes in consumption goods’ prices to separate them into three components: idiosyncratic relative-price changes, aggregate relative-price changes, and changes in the unit of account. The model identifies a measure of “pure” inflation: the common component in goods’ inflation rates that has an equiproportional effect on all prices and is uncorrelated with relative price changes at all dates. The estimates of pure inflation and of the aggregate relative-price components allow us to re-examine three classic macro-correlations. First, we find that pure inflation accounts for 15-20% of the variability in overall inflation, so that most changes in inflation are associated with changes in goods’ relative prices. Second, we find that the Phillips correlation between inflation and measures of real activity essentially disappears once we control for goods’ relative-price changes. Third, we find that, at business-cycle frequencies, the correlation between inflation and money is close to zero, while the correlation with nominal interest rates is around 0.5, confirming previous findings on the link between monetary policy and inflation.

These codes help to replicate all the empirical analysis in the article: “What explains monetary policy rate uncertainty? Evidence from the Americas”, Applied Economics Letters (revise and resubmit), authored by Ana Aguilar, Carlos Madeira, Alejandro Parada, Christian Upper (Bank for International Settlements).

The Stata codes use Consensus Economics monthly survey reports with forecasts for countries in the Americas. These forecasts were collected as a Stata dataset, but the files cannot be shared due to copyright concerns. Future users must collect their own Consensus Forecasts data and then use these codes to replicate the empirical analysis of the article.

The data also includes an online appendix with robustness exercises to the main article. These robustness exercises estimate the same uncertainty models, but without the past quarter's inflation rate and GDP growth as additional controls. The results are qualitatively similar to the main article.

Graph and download economic data for Personal Consumption Expenditures Excluding Food and Energy (Chain-Type Price Index) (BPCCRO1Q156NBEA) from Q1 1960 to Q2 2025 about core, chained, PCE, consumption expenditures, consumption, personal, GDP, inflation, rate, price index, indexes, price, and USA.

Canada's inflation rate experienced significant fluctuations from 2018 to 2025. Inflation peaked at *** percent in June 2022 before steadily declining to *** percent by December 2024. In early 2025, inflation began to increase again, rising to *** percent in February, and dropping to *** percent in March. In response to rising inflation between 2020 and 2022, the Bank of Canada implemented aggressive interest rate hikes. The bank rate reached a maximum of **** percent in July 2023 and remained stable until June 2024. As inflationary pressures eased in the second half of 2024, the central bank reduced interest rates to *** percent in December 2024. In 2025, the bank rate witnessed two cuts, standing at ***** percent in June 2025. This pattern reflected broader global economic trends, with most advanced and emerging economies experiencing similar inflationary challenges and monetary policy adjustments. Global context of inflation and interest rates The Canadian experience aligns with the broader international trend of central banks raising policy rates to combat inflation. Between 2021 and 2023, nearly all advanced and emerging economies increased their central bank rates. However, a shift occurred in the latter half of 2024, with many countries, including Canada, beginning to lower rates. This change suggests a new phase in the global economic cycle and monetary policy approach. Notably, among surveyed countries, Russia maintained the highest interest rate in early 2025, while Japan had the lowest rate. Comparison with the United States The United States experienced a similar trajectory in inflation and interest rates. U.S. inflation peaked at *** percent in June 2022, slightly higher than Canada's peak. The Federal Reserve responded with a series of rate hikes, reaching **** percent in August 2023. This rate remained unchanged until September 2024, when the first cut since September 2021 was implemented. In contrast, Canada's bank rate peaked at **** percent and began decreasing earlier, with cuts in June and July 2024. These differences highlight the nuanced approaches of central banks in managing their respective economies amid global inflationary pressures.

We study the cyclical properties of sales, regular price changes, and average prices paid by consumers ("effective" prices) using data on prices and quantities sold for numerous retailers across many US metropolitan areas. Inflation in the effective prices paid by consumers declines significantly with higher unemployment while little change occurs in the inflation rate of prices posted by retailers. This difference reflects the reallocation of household expenditures across retailers, a feature of the data which we document and quantify, rather than sales. We propose a simple model with household store-switching and assess its implications for business cycles and policymakers. (JEL D12, E31, E32, L25, L81)

Inflation Rate in India decreased to 1.55 percent in July from 2.10 percent in June of 2025. This dataset provides - India Inflation Rate - actual values, historical data, forecast, chart, statistics, economic calendar and news.

Inflation Rate in Russia decreased to 8.80 percent in July from 9.40 percent in June of 2025. This dataset provides - Russia Inflation Rate - actual values, historical data, forecast, chart, statistics, economic calendar and news.

This is not going to be an article or Op-Ed about Michael Jordan. Since 2009 we've been in the longest bull-market in history, that's 11 years and counting. However a few metrics like the stock market P/E, the call to put ratio and of course the Shiller P/E suggest a great crash is coming in-between the levels of 1929 and the dot.com bubble. Mean reversion historically is inevitable and the Fed's printing money experiment could end in disaster for the stock market in late 2021 or 2022. You can read Jeremy Grantham's Last Dance article here. You are likely well aware of Michael Burry's predicament as well. It's easier for you just to skim through two related videos on this topic of a stock market crash. Michael Burry's Warning see this YouTube. Jeremy Grantham's Warning See this YouTube. Typically when there is a major event in the world, there is a crash and then a bear market and a recovery that takes many many months. In March, 2020 that's not what we saw since the Fed did some astonishing things that means a liquidity sloth and the risk of a major inflation event. The pandemic represented the quickest decline of at least 30% in the history of the benchmark S&P 500, but the recovery was not correlated to anything but Fed intervention. Since the pandemic clearly isn't disappearing and many sectors such as travel, business travel, tourism and supply chain disruptions appear significantly disrupted - the so-called economic recovery isn't so great. And there's this little problem at the heart of global capitalism today, the stock market just keeps going up. Crashes and corrections typically occur frequently in a normal market. But the Fed liquidity and irresponsible printing of money is creating a scenario where normal behavior isn't occurring on the markets. According to data provided by market analytics firm Yardeni Research, the benchmark index has undergone 38 declines of at least 10% since the beginning of 1950. Since March, 2020 we've barely seen a down month. September, 2020 was flat-ish. The S&P 500 has more than doubled since those lows. Look at the angle of the curve: The S&P 500 was 735 at the low in 2009, so in this bull market alone it has gone up 6x in valuation. That's not a normal cycle and it could mean we are due for an epic correction. I have to agree with the analysts who claim that the long, long bull market since 2009 has finally matured into a fully-fledged epic bubble. There is a complacency, buy-the dip frenzy and general meme environment to what BigTech can do in such an environment. The weight of Apple, Amazon, Alphabet, Microsoft, Facebook, Nvidia and Tesla together in the S&P and Nasdaq is approach a ridiculous weighting. When these stocks are seen both as growth, value and companies with unbeatable moats the entire dynamics of the stock market begin to break down. Check out FANG during the pandemic. BigTech is Seen as Bullet-Proof me valuations and a hysterical speculative behavior leads to even higher highs, even as 2020 offered many younger people an on-ramp into investing for the first time. Some analysts at JP Morgan are even saying that until retail investors stop charging into stocks, markets probably don’t have too much to worry about. Hedge funds with payment for order flows can predict exactly how these retail investors are behaving and monetize them. PFOF might even have to be banned by the SEC. The risk-on market theoretically just keeps going up until the Fed raises interest rates, which could be in 2023! For some context, we're more than 1.4 years removed from the bear-market bottom of the coronavirus crash and haven't had even a 5% correction in nine months. This is the most over-priced the market has likely ever been. At the night of the dot-com bubble the S&P 500 was only 1,400. Today it is 4,500, not so many years after. Clearly something is not quite right if you look at history and the P/E ratios. A market pumped with liquidity produces higher earnings with historically low interest rates, it's an environment where dangerous things can occur. In late 1997, as the S&P 500 passed its previous 1929 peak of 21x earnings, that seemed like a lot, but nothing compared to today. For some context, the S&P 500 Shiller P/E closed last week at 38.58, which is nearly a two-decade high. It's also well over double the average Shiller P/E of 16.84, dating back 151 years. So the stock market is likely around 2x over-valued. Try to think rationally about what this means for valuations today and your favorite stock prices, what should they be in historical terms? The S&P 500 is up 31% in the past year. It will likely hit 5,000 before a correction given the amount of added liquidity to the system and the QE the Fed is using that's like a huge abuse of MMT, or Modern Monetary Theory. This has also lent to bubbles in the housing market, crypto and even commodities like Gold with long-term global GDP meeting many headwinds in the years ahead due to a demographic shift of an ageing population and significant technological automation. So if you think that stocks or equities or ETFs are the best place to put your money in 2022, you might want to think again. The crash of the OTC and small-cap market since February 2021 has been quite an indication of what a correction looks like. According to the Motley Fool what happens after major downturns in the market historically speaking? In each of the previous four instances that the S&P 500's Shiller P/E shot above and sustained 30, the index lost anywhere from 20% to 89% of its value. So what's what we too are due for, reversion to the mean will be realistically brutal after the Fed's hyper-extreme intervention has run its course. Of course what the Fed stimulus has really done is simply allowed the 1% to get a whole lot richer to the point of wealth inequality spiraling out of control in the decades ahead leading us likely to a dystopia in an unfair and unequal version of BigTech capitalism. This has also led to a trend of short squeeze to these tech stocks, as shown in recent years' data. Of course the Fed has to say that's its done all of these things for the people, employment numbers and the labor market. Women in the workplace have been set behind likely 15 years in social progress due to the pandemic and the Fed's response. While the 89% lost during the Great Depression would be virtually impossible today thanks to ongoing intervention from the Federal Reserve and Capitol Hill, a correction of 20% to 50% would be pretty fair and simply return the curve back to a normal trajectory as interest rates going back up eventually in the 2023 to 2025 period. It's very unlikely the market has taken Fed tapering into account (priced-in), since the euphoria of a can't miss market just keeps pushing the markets higher. But all good things must come to an end. Earlier this month, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics released inflation data from July. This report showed that the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers rose 5.2% over the past 12 months. While the Fed and economists promise us this inflation is temporary, others are not so certain. As you print so much money, the money you have is worth less and certain goods cost more. Wage gains in some industries cannot be taken back, they are permanent - in the service sector like restaurants, hospitality and travel that have been among the hardest hit. The pandemic has led to a paradigm shift in the future of work, and that too is not temporary. The Great Resignation means white collar jobs with be more WFM than ever before, with a new software revolution, different transport and energy behaviors and so forth. Climate change alone could slow down global GDP in the 21st century. How can inflation be temporary when so many trends don't appear to be temporary? Sure the price of lumber or used-cars could be temporary, but a global chip shortage is exasperating the automobile sector. The stock market isn't even behaving like it cares about anything other than the Fed, and its $billions of dollars of buying bonds each month. Some central banks will start to taper about December, 2021 (like the European). However Delta could further mutate into a variant that makes the first generation of vaccines less effective. Such a macro event could be enough to trigger the correction we've been speaking about. So stay safe, and keep your money safe. The Last Dance of the 2009 bull market could feel especially more painful because we've been spoiled for so long in the markets. We can barely remember what March, 2020 felt like. Some people sold their life savings simply due to scare tactics by the likes of Bill Ackman. His scare tactics on CNBC won him likely hundreds of millions as the stock market tanked. Hedge funds further gamed the Reddit and Gamestop movement, orchestrating them and leading the new retail investors into meme speculation and a whole bunch of other unsavory things like options trading at such scale we've never seen before. It's not just inflation and higher interest rates, it's how absurdly high valuations have become. Still correlation does not imply causation. Just because inflation has picked up, it doesn't guarantee that stocks will head lower. Nevertheless, weaker buying power associated with higher inflation can't be overlooked as a potential negative for the U.S. economy and equities. The current S&P500 10-year P/E Ratio is 38.7. This is 97% above the modern-era market average of 19.6, putting the current P/E 2.5 standard deviations above the modern-era average. This is just math, folks. History is saying the stock market is 2x its true value. So why and who would be full on the market or an asset class like crypto that is mostly speculative in nature to begin with? Study the following on a historical basis, and due your own due diligence as to the health of the markets: Debt-to-GDP ratio Call to put ratio

About this dataset

Context

The dataset illustrates the median household income in Utah, spanning the years from 2010 to 2021, with all figures adjusted to 2022 inflation-adjusted dollars. Based on the latest 2017-2021 5-Year Estimates from the American Community Survey, it displays how income varied over the last decade. The dataset can be utilized to gain insights into median household income trends and explore income variations.

Key observations:

From 2010 to 2021, the median household income for Utah increased by $9,531 (12.54%), as per the American Community Survey estimates. In comparison, median household income for the United States increased by $4,559 (6.51%) between 2010 and 2021.

Analyzing the trend in median household income between the years 2010 and 2021, spanning 11 annual cycles, we observed that median household income, when adjusted for 2022 inflation using the Consumer Price Index retroactive series (R-CPI-U-RS), experienced growth year by year for 8 years and declined for 3 years.

https://i.neilsberg.com/ch/utah-median-household-income-trend.jpeg" alt="Utah median household income trend (2010-2021, in 2022 inflation-adjusted dollars)">

Content

When available, the data consists of estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau American Community Survey (ACS) 2017-2021 5-Year Estimates. All incomes have been adjusting for inflation and are presented in 2022-inflation-adjusted dollars.

Years for which data is available:

• 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021

Variables / Data Columns

• Year: This column presents the data year from 2010 to 2021
• Median Household Income: Median household income, in 2022 inflation-adjusted dollars for the specific year
• YOY Change($): Change in median household income between the current and the previous year, in 2022 inflation-adjusted dollars
• YOY Change(%): Percent change in median household income between current and the previous year

Good to know

Margin of Error

Data in the dataset are based on the estimates and are subject to sampling variability and thus a margin of error. Neilsberg Research recommends using caution when presening these estimates in your research.

Custom data

If you do need custom data for any of your research project, report or presentation, you can contact our research staff at research@neilsberg.com for a feasibility of a custom tabulation on a fee-for-service basis.

Inspiration

Neilsberg Research Team curates, analyze and publishes demographics and economic data from a variety of public and proprietary sources, each of which often includes multiple surveys and programs. The large majority of Neilsberg Research aggregated datasets and insights is made available for free download at https://www.neilsberg.com/research/.

Recommended for further research

This dataset is a part of the main dataset for Utah median household income. You can refer the same here

Between January 2018 and June 2025, the United Kingdom's consumer price inflation rate showed notable volatility. The rate hit its lowest point at *** percent in August 2020 and peaked at *** percent in October 2022. By September 2024, inflation had moderated to *** percent, but the following months saw inflation increase again, and it remained on a slightly upward trajectory in the first half of 2025. The Bank of England's interest rate policy closely tracked these inflationary trends. Rates remained low at -* percent until April 2020, when they were reduced to *** percent in response to economic challenges. A series of rate increases followed, reaching a peak of **** percent from August 2023 to July 2024. The central bank then initiated rate cuts in August and November 2024, lowering the rate to **** percent, signaling a potential shift in monetary policy. In February 2025, the Bank of England implemented another rate cut, setting the bank rate at *** percent, which was further reduced to **** percent in May 2025. Global context of inflation and interest rates The UK's experience reflects a broader international trend of rising inflation and subsequent central bank responses. From January 2022 to July 2024, advanced and emerging economies alike increased their policy rates to counter inflationary pressures. However, a shift began in late 2024, with many countries, including the UK, starting to lower rates. This change suggests a potential new phase in the global economic cycle and monetary policy approach. Comparison with other major economies The UK's monetary policy decisions align closely with those of other major economies. The United States, for instance, saw its federal funds rate peak at **** percent in August 2023, mirroring the UK's rate trajectory. Similarly, central bank rates in the EU all increased drastically between 2022 and 2024. These synchronized movements reflect the global nature of inflationary pressures and the coordinated efforts of central banks to maintain economic stability. As with the UK, both the U.S. and EU began considering rate cuts in late 2024, signaling a potential shift in the global economic landscape.

Cost of food in the United States increased 2.90 percent in July of 2025 over the same month in the previous year. This dataset provides the latest reported value for - United States Food Inflation - plus previous releases, historical high and low, short-term forecast and long-term prediction, economic calendar, survey consensus and news.

Inflation Rate in Vietnam decreased to 3.19 percent in July from 3.57 percent in June of 2025. This dataset provides the latest reported value for - Vietnam Inflation Rate - plus previous releases, historical high and low, short-term forecast and long-term prediction, economic calendar, survey consensus and news.