During the period beginning roughly in the mid-1980s until the Global Financial Crisis (2007-2008), the U.S. economy experienced a time of relative economic calm, with low inflation and consistent GDP growth. Compared with the turbulent economic era which had preceded it in the 1970s and the early 1980s, the lack of extreme fluctuations in the business cycle led some commentators to suggest that macroeconomic issues such as high inflation, long-term unemployment and financial crises were a thing of the past. Indeed, the President of the American Economic Association, Professor Robert Lucas, famously proclaimed in 2003 that "central problem of depression prevention has been solved, for all practical purposes". Ben Bernanke, the future chairman of the Federal Reserve during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and 2022 Nobel Prize in Economics recipient, coined the term 'the Great Moderation' to describe this era of newfound economic confidence. The era came to an abrupt end with the outbreak of the GFC in the Summer of 2007, as the U.S. financial system began to crash due to a downturn in the real estate market.

Causes of the Great Moderation, and its downfall

A number of factors have been cited as contributing to the Great Moderation including central bank monetary policies, the shift from manufacturing to services in the economy, improvements in information technology and management practices, as well as reduced energy prices. The period coincided with the term of Fed chairman Alan Greenspan (1987-2006), famous for the 'Greenspan put', a policy which meant that the Fed would proactively address downturns in the stock market using its monetary policy tools. These economic factors came to prominence at the same time as the end of the Cold War (1947-1991), with the U.S. attaining a new level of hegemony in global politics, as its main geopolitical rival, the Soviet Union, no longer existed. During the Great Moderation, the U.S. experienced a recession twice, between July 1990 and March 1991, and again from March 2001 tom November 2001, however, these relatively short recessions did not knock the U.S. off its growth path. The build up of household and corporate debt over the early 2000s eventually led to the Global Financial Crisis, as the bursting of the U.S. housing bubble in 2007 reverberated across the financial system, with a subsequent credit freeze and mass defaults.

The Volcker Shock was a period of historically high interest rates precipitated by Federal Reserve Chairperson Paul Volcker's decision to raise the central bank's key interest rate, the Fed funds effective rate, during the first three years of his term. Volcker was appointed chairperson of the Fed in August 1979 by President Jimmy Carter, as replacement for William Miller, who Carter had made his treasury secretary. Volcker was one of the most hawkish (supportive of tighter monetary policy to stem inflation) members of the Federal Reserve's committee, and quickly set about changing the course of monetary policy in the U.S. in order to quell inflation. The Volcker Shock is remembered for bringing an end to over a decade of high inflation in the United States, prompting a deep recession and high unemployment, and for spurring on debt defaults among developing countries in Latin America who had borrowed in U.S. dollars.

Monetary tightening and the recessions of the early '80s

Beginning in October 1979, Volcker's Fed tightened monetary policy by raising interest rates. This decision had the effect of depressing demand and slowing down the U.S. economy, as credit became more expensive for households and businesses. The Fed funds rate, the key overnight rate at which banks lend their excess reserves to each other, rose as high as 17.6 percent in early 1980. The rate was allowed to fall back below 10 percent following this first peak, however, due to worries that inflation was not falling fast enough, a second cycle of monetary tightening was embarked upon starting in August of 1980. The rate would reach its all-time peak in June of 1981, at 19.1 percent. The second recession sparked by these hikes was far deeper than the 1980 recession, with unemployment peaking at 10.8 percent in December 1980, the highest level since The Great Depression. This recession would drive inflation to a low point during Volcker's terms of 2.5 percent in August 1983.

The legacy of the Volcker Shock

By the end of Volcker's terms as Fed Chair, inflation was at a manageable rate of around four percent, while unemployment had fallen under six percent, as the economy grew and business confidence returned. While supporters of Volcker's actions point to these numbers as proof of the efficacy of his actions, critics have claimed that there were less harmful ways that inflation could have been brought under control. The recessions of the early 1980s are cited as accelerating deindustrialization in the U.S., as manufacturing jobs lost in 'rust belt' states such as Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania never returned during the years of recovery. The Volcker Shock was also a driving factor behind the Latin American debt crises of the 1980s, as governments in the region defaulted on debts which they had incurred in U.S. dollars. Debates about the validity of using interest rate hikes to get inflation under control have recently re-emerged due to the inflationary pressures facing the U.S. following the Coronavirus pandemic and the Federal Reserve's subsequent decision to embark on a course of monetary tightening.

Graph and download economic data for Inflation, consumer prices for the United States (FPCPITOTLZGUSA) from 1960 to 2024 about consumer, CPI, inflation, price index, indexes, price, and USA.

Inflation is generally defined as the continued increase in the average prices of goods and services in a given region. Following the extremely high global inflation experienced in the 1980s and 1990s, global inflation has been relatively stable since the turn of the millennium, usually hovering between three and five percent per year. There was a sharp increase in 2008 due to the global financial crisis now known as the Great Recession, but inflation was fairly stable throughout the 2010s, before the current inflation crisis began in 2021. Recent years Despite the economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic, the global inflation rate fell to 3.26 percent in the pandemic's first year, before rising to 4.66 percent in 2021. This increase came as the impact of supply chain delays began to take more of an effect on consumer prices, before the Russia-Ukraine war exacerbated this further. A series of compounding issues such as rising energy and food prices, fiscal instability in the wake of the pandemic, and consumer insecurity have created a new global recession, and global inflation in 2024 is estimated to have reached 5.76 percent. This is the highest annual increase in inflation since 1996. Venezuela Venezuela is the country with the highest individual inflation rate in the world, forecast at around 200 percent in 2022. While this is figure is over 100 times larger than the global average in most years, it actually marks a decrease in Venezuela's inflation rate, which had peaked at over 65,000 percent in 2018. Between 2016 and 2021, Venezuela experienced hyperinflation due to the government's excessive spending and printing of money in an attempt to curve its already-high inflation rate, and the wave of migrants that left the country resulted in one of the largest refugee crises in recent years. In addition to its economic problems, political instability and foreign sanctions pose further long-term problems for Venezuela. While hyperinflation may be coming to an end, it remains to be seen how much of an impact this will have on the economy, how living standards will change, and how many refugees may return in the coming years.

Historical chart and dataset showing Japan inflation rate by year from 1960 to 2024.

This is the first paper documenting the frequency and size of price adjustments using micro data from both the high-inflation period in the 1970s and 1980s, and the period of low inflation since the early 1990s. When inflation is high and volatile, prices change more frequently and in smaller magnitudes. When inflation is low and stable, prices change less frequently but in larger magnitudes. The frequency of price changes is more important for the variation in inflation when inflation is high and volatile. When inflation is low and stable, the magnitude of the price changes is more important than the frequency.

Australia inflation rate for 2024 was 3.16%, a 2.44% decline from 2023.

<ul style='margin-top:20px;'>

<li>Australia inflation rate for 2023 was <strong>5.60%</strong>, a <strong>1% decline</strong> from 2022.</li>
<li>Australia inflation rate for 2022 was <strong>6.59%</strong>, a <strong>3.73% increase</strong> from 2021.</li>
<li>Australia inflation rate for 2021 was <strong>2.86%</strong>, a <strong>2.02% increase</strong> from 2020.</li>
</ul>Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be fixed or changed at specified intervals, such as yearly. The Laspeyres formula is generally used.

Graph and download economic data for Trimmed Mean PCE Inflation Rate (PCETRIM6M680SFRBDAL) from Jul 1977 to May 2025 about trimmed mean, average, PCE, consumption expenditures, consumption, personal, inflation, rate, and USA.

In 2023, the usual median hourly rate of a worker's wage in the United States was 19.24 U.S. dollars, a decrease from the previous year. Dollar value is based on 2023 U.S. dollars. In 1979, the median hourly earnings in the U.S. was 17.48 dollars.

Abstract This article is a survey about the consequences of the credibility of government policies, one of the main developments in macroeconomic theory in the 80s. New classical economists used it to explain why, in the long-run, government policies fail when they intend to increase the level of employment above the natural rate. Even in the short run, they only achieve their aims if it is possible to cheat the private sector. The result will be to lose credibility and inflationary pressures. Other authors developed it as a tool to understand the relationship between government, political parties and pressure groups with economic policy. Finally, we comment some papers about the Brazilian inflation based on distributive conflict and compare them with explanations from credibility of policies.

In 2023, it was estimated that over 161 million Americans were in some form of employment, while 3.64 percent of the total workforce was unemployed. This was the lowest unemployment rate since the 1950s, although these figures are expected to rise in 2023 and beyond. 1980s-2010s Since the 1980s, the total United States labor force has generally risen as the population has grown, however, the annual average unemployment rate has fluctuated significantly, usually increasing in times of crisis, before falling more slowly during periods of recovery and economic stability. For example, unemployment peaked at 9.7 percent during the early 1980s recession, which was largely caused by the ripple effects of the Iranian Revolution on global oil prices and inflation. Other notable spikes came during the early 1990s; again, largely due to inflation caused by another oil shock, and during the early 2000s recession. The Great Recession then saw the U.S. unemployment rate soar to 9.6 percent, following the collapse of the U.S. housing market and its impact on the banking sector, and it was not until 2016 that unemployment returned to pre-recession levels. 2020s 2019 had marked a decade-long low in unemployment, before the economic impact of the Covid-19 pandemic saw the sharpest year-on-year increase in unemployment since the Great Depression, and the total number of workers fell by almost 10 million people. Despite the continuation of the pandemic in the years that followed, alongside the associated supply-chain issues and onset of the inflation crisis, unemployment reached just 3.67 percent in 2022 - current projections are for this figure to rise in 2023 and the years that follow, although these forecasts are subject to change if recent years are anything to go by.

This dataset contains replication files for "The Fading American Dream: Trends in Absolute Income Mobility Since 1940" by Raj Chetty, David Grusky, Maximilian Hell, Nathaniel Hendren, Robert Manduca, and Jimmy Narang. For more information, see https://opportunityinsights.org/paper/the-fading-american-dream/. A summary of the related publication follows. One of the defining features of the “American Dream” is the ideal that children have a higher standard of living than their parents. We assess whether the U.S. is living up to this ideal by estimating rates of “absolute income mobility” – the fraction of children who earn more than their parents – since 1940. We measure absolute mobility by comparing children’s household incomes at age 30 (adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index) with their parents’ household incomes at age 30. We find that rates of absolute mobility have fallen from approximately 90% for children born in 1940 to 50% for children born in the 1980s. Absolute income mobility has fallen across the entire income distribution, with the largest declines for families in the middle class. These findings are unaffected by using alternative price indices to adjust for inflation, accounting for taxes and transfers, measuring income at later ages, and adjusting for changes in household size. Absolute mobility fell in all 50 states, although the rate of decline varied, with the largest declines concentrated in states in the industrial Midwest, such as Michigan and Illinois. The decline in absolute mobility is especially steep – from 95% for children born in 1940 to 41% for children born in 1984 – when we compare the sons’ earnings to their fathers’ earnings. Why have rates of upward income mobility fallen so sharply over the past half-century? There have been two important trends that have affected the incomes of children born in the 1980s relative to those born in the 1940s and 1950s: lower Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates and greater inequality in the distribution of growth. We find that most of the decline in absolute mobility is driven by the more unequal distribution of economic growth rather than the slowdown in aggregate growth rates. When we simulate an economy that restores GDP growth to the levels experienced in the 1940s and 1950s but distributes that growth across income groups as it is distributed today, absolute mobility only increases to 62%. In contrast, maintaining GDP at its current level but distributing it more broadly across income groups – at it was distributed for children born in the 1940s – would increase absolute mobility to 80%, thereby reversing more than two-thirds of the decline in absolute mobility. These findings show that higher growth rates alone are insufficient to restore absolute mobility to the levels experienced in mid-century America. Under the current distribution of GDP, we would need real GDP growth rates above 6% per year to return to rates of absolute mobility in the 1940s. Intuitively, because a large fraction of GDP goes to a small fraction of high-income households today, higher GDP growth does not substantially increase the number of children who earn more than their parents. Of course, this does not mean that GDP growth does not matter: changing the distribution of growth naturally has smaller effects on absolute mobility when there is very little growth to be distributed. The key point is that increasing absolute mobility substantially would require more broad-based economic growth. We conclude that absolute mobility has declined sharply in America over the past half-century primarily because of the growth in inequality. If one wants to revive the “American Dream” of high rates of absolute mobility, one must have an interest in growth that is shared more broadly across the income distribution.

The Covid-19 pandemic saw growth fall by 2.2 percent, compared with an increase of 2.5 percent the year before. The last time the real GDP growth rates fell by a similar level was during the Great Recession in 2009, and the only other time since the Second World War where real GDP fell by more than one percent was in the early 1980s recession. The given records began following the Wall Street Crash in 1929, and GDP growth fluctuated greatly between the Great Depression and the 1950s, before growth became more consistent.

Monetary policy, the yield curve and the private sector behaviour of the US economy are modelled as a time-varying structural vector autoregression. The monetary policy shocks of the early 1980s explain a large portion of the persistence of inflation and the level of the term structure. Changes in inflation expectations implied by the yield curve account for the persistence of the federal funds rate. Failures of the expectations hypothesis are rare, and coincided with the credibility building of Paul Volcker's Fed tenure at the beginning of the 1980s and the sequence of consecutive policy rate cuts around the time of the early 1990s recession.

In Europe in either half of the 1980s, average annual private consumption (i.e. the total amount spent by consumers) increased from an average of 1.2 percent each year, to 3.4 percent. Consumerism increased in Southern Europe at a much higher rate than Western Europe, with the annual average in the second half of the decade larger than the earlier period by a factor of six.

Although consumerism did rise gradually in the second half of the century, the differences between either half of the 1980s were largely due to the recessions and economic instability caused by the oil shocks of the Middle East. By the second half of the 1980s, oil prices had recovered (from 36 U.S. dollars per barrel in 1981 to 11 dollars in 1986), and consumer price inflation dropped from approximately 10 to 14 percent in the early eighties to between three and five percent in later years.

The period between 1950 and 1973, known as the "Golden Age of capitalism" in the west, was the most prosperous period in Europe's modern history. The economic boom in the post-war period saw GDP grow by an average of almost four percent in Western and Eastern Europe, and almost five percent in the south. Although the west was the most technologically advanced of the three, this period did see a significant amount of catching up in the other two regions, whose rapid industrialization and urbanization changed the lives of its citizens forever. Recession hits the west The recession of 1973-1975 brought this economic and industrial growth to an end, however, as conflict in the Middle East saw oil prices skyrocket. Virtually all of Western Europe's industrial powers went into recession, and this had a detrimental knock-on effect in Poland and Romania due to their indebtedness to the west. While the recession ended in most countries by 1976, factors such as unemployment, inflation, and industrial output often remained high until the 1980s. The 1980s and 1990s also saw the rapid economic growth of countries such as Ireland and Finland. However, growth was much slower in these decades for most western economies than it had been in the 1950s and1960s. Collapse of communism The 1970s marked the beginning of the economic decline in Eastern Europe, as the command economies of the East Bloc could not maintain pace with the capitalist west and failed to adapt to the challenges that emerged in this period. Communism in Eastern Europe eventually ended around the early 1990s, and the largest power, the Soviet Union, was dissolved. This resulted in severe economic hardships in the former communist states, and recovery in the former-Soviet states did not begin until the late 1990s. The effects of communism's collapse in Europe was so severe that GDP in the east actually fell by an average of 0.9 percent per year between 1973 and 1998

Employment in Western Europe* between the 1960s and early 1970s grew by approximately 0.3 percent, building on the rapid growth that was experienced in the previous decade; although growth was considerably lower due to the fact that overall employment was so high. Growth rates continued to fall throughout the 1970s, before the early 1980s saw negative growth (i.e. a rise in unemployment), following a series of economic crises in the Middle East that led to global recessions. The 1980s also saw governments implement stricter policies that prioritized stable employment and inflation rates, though these were often restricted economic growth when compared to the consistent growth experienced in the 1950s and 1960s; as a result of these policies, employment rates rose once again in the second half of the 1980s.

In the 1960s, Japan's GDP grew by an average of almost 11 percent per year, outpacing all of the major developed economies of Europe, as well as the United States - although, virtually all developed economies saw significant growth in this decade. The recession of 1973-1975 brought this to an end, and growth fluctuated throughout the decade. GDP growth rates fell in most countries again in the 1980s; however, rates were much more stagnant as countries implemented financial policies that stabilized inflation and unemployment.