During the period beginning roughly in the mid-1980s until the Global Financial Crisis (2007-2008), the U.S. economy experienced a time of relative economic calm, with low inflation and consistent GDP growth. Compared with the turbulent economic era which had preceded it in the 1970s and the early 1980s, the lack of extreme fluctuations in the business cycle led some commentators to suggest that macroeconomic issues such as high inflation, long-term unemployment and financial crises were a thing of the past. Indeed, the President of the American Economic Association, Professor Robert Lucas, famously proclaimed in 2003 that "central problem of depression prevention has been solved, for all practical purposes". Ben Bernanke, the future chairman of the Federal Reserve during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and 2022 Nobel Prize in Economics recipient, coined the term 'the Great Moderation' to describe this era of newfound economic confidence. The era came to an abrupt end with the outbreak of the GFC in the Summer of 2007, as the U.S. financial system began to crash due to a downturn in the real estate market.

Causes of the Great Moderation, and its downfall

A number of factors have been cited as contributing to the Great Moderation including central bank monetary policies, the shift from manufacturing to services in the economy, improvements in information technology and management practices, as well as reduced energy prices. The period coincided with the term of Fed chairman Alan Greenspan (1987-2006), famous for the 'Greenspan put', a policy which meant that the Fed would proactively address downturns in the stock market using its monetary policy tools. These economic factors came to prominence at the same time as the end of the Cold War (1947-1991), with the U.S. attaining a new level of hegemony in global politics, as its main geopolitical rival, the Soviet Union, no longer existed. During the Great Moderation, the U.S. experienced a recession twice, between July 1990 and March 1991, and again from March 2001 tom November 2001, however, these relatively short recessions did not knock the U.S. off its growth path. The build up of household and corporate debt over the early 2000s eventually led to the Global Financial Crisis, as the bursting of the U.S. housing bubble in 2007 reverberated across the financial system, with a subsequent credit freeze and mass defaults.

According to a survey conducted in August 2024, over 20 percent of consumers in the United States believed both inflation and a pending recession would impact their Halloween spending plans. About the same number of people said these economic changes would not influence their spending.

This data package includes the underlying data and files to replicate the calculations, charts, and tables presented in Average Inflation Targeting Would Be a Weak Tool for the Fed to Deal with Recession and Chronic Low Inflation, PIIE Policy Brief 19-16. If you use the data, please cite as: Reifschneider, David, and David Wilcox. (2019). Average Inflation Targeting Would Be a Weak Tool for the Fed to Deal with Recession and Chronic Low Inflation. PIIE Policy Brief 19-16. Peterson Institute for International Economics.

Graph and download economic data for Dates of U.S. recessions as inferred by GDP-based recession indicator (JHDUSRGDPBR) from Q4 1967 to Q4 2024 about recession indicators, GDP, and USA.

Several prominent economists have argued that existing DSGE models cannot properly account for the evolution of key macroeconomic variables during and following the recent Great Recession. We challenge this argument by showing that a standard DSGE model with financial frictions available prior to the recent crisis successfully predicts a sharp contraction in economic activity along with a protracted but relatively modest decline in inflation, following the rise in financial stress in 2008:IV. The model does so even though inflation remains very dependent on the evolution of economic activity and of monetary policy. (JEL E12, E31, E32, E37, E44, E52, G01)

Inflation is generally defined as the continued increase in the average prices of goods and services in a given region. Following the extremely high global inflation experienced in the 1980s and 1990s, global inflation has been relatively stable since the turn of the millennium, usually hovering between three and five percent per year. There was a sharp increase in 2008 due to the global financial crisis now known as the Great Recession, but inflation was fairly stable throughout the 2010s, before the current inflation crisis began in 2021. Recent years Despite the economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic, the global inflation rate fell to 3.26 percent in the pandemic's first year, before rising to 4.66 percent in 2021. This increase came as the impact of supply chain delays began to take more of an effect on consumer prices, before the Russia-Ukraine war exacerbated this further. A series of compounding issues such as rising energy and food prices, fiscal instability in the wake of the pandemic, and consumer insecurity have created a new global recession, and global inflation in 2024 is estimated to have reached 5.76 percent. This is the highest annual increase in inflation since 1996. Venezuela Venezuela is the country with the highest individual inflation rate in the world, forecast at around 200 percent in 2022. While this is figure is over 100 times larger than the global average in most years, it actually marks a decrease in Venezuela's inflation rate, which had peaked at over 65,000 percent in 2018. Between 2016 and 2021, Venezuela experienced hyperinflation due to the government's excessive spending and printing of money in an attempt to curve its already-high inflation rate, and the wave of migrants that left the country resulted in one of the largest refugee crises in recent years. In addition to its economic problems, political instability and foreign sanctions pose further long-term problems for Venezuela. While hyperinflation may be coming to an end, it remains to be seen how much of an impact this will have on the economy, how living standards will change, and how many refugees may return in the coming years.

We argue that the vast bulk of movements in aggregate real economic activity during the Great Recession were due to financial frictions. We reach this conclusion by looking through the lens of an estimated New Keynesian model in which firms face moderate degrees of price rigidities, no nominal rigidities in wages, and a binding zero lower bound constraint on the nominal interest rate. Our model does a good job of accounting for the joint behavior of labor and goods markets, as well as inflation, during the Great Recession. According to the model the observed fall in total factor productivity and the rise in the cost of working capital played critical roles in accounting for the small drop in inflation that occurred during the Great Recession. (JEL E12, E23, E24, E31, E32, E52)

The Volcker Shock was a period of historically high interest rates precipitated by Federal Reserve Chairperson Paul Volcker's decision to raise the central bank's key interest rate, the Fed funds effective rate, during the first three years of his term. Volcker was appointed chairperson of the Fed in August 1979 by President Jimmy Carter, as replacement for William Miller, who Carter had made his treasury secretary. Volcker was one of the most hawkish (supportive of tighter monetary policy to stem inflation) members of the Federal Reserve's committee, and quickly set about changing the course of monetary policy in the U.S. in order to quell inflation. The Volcker Shock is remembered for bringing an end to over a decade of high inflation in the United States, prompting a deep recession and high unemployment, and for spurring on debt defaults among developing countries in Latin America who had borrowed in U.S. dollars.

Monetary tightening and the recessions of the early '80s

Beginning in October 1979, Volcker's Fed tightened monetary policy by raising interest rates. This decision had the effect of depressing demand and slowing down the U.S. economy, as credit became more expensive for households and businesses. The Fed funds rate, the key overnight rate at which banks lend their excess reserves to each other, rose as high as 17.6 percent in early 1980. The rate was allowed to fall back below 10 percent following this first peak, however, due to worries that inflation was not falling fast enough, a second cycle of monetary tightening was embarked upon starting in August of 1980. The rate would reach its all-time peak in June of 1981, at 19.1 percent. The second recession sparked by these hikes was far deeper than the 1980 recession, with unemployment peaking at 10.8 percent in December 1980, the highest level since The Great Depression. This recession would drive inflation to a low point during Volcker's terms of 2.5 percent in August 1983.

The legacy of the Volcker Shock

By the end of Volcker's terms as Fed Chair, inflation was at a manageable rate of around four percent, while unemployment had fallen under six percent, as the economy grew and business confidence returned. While supporters of Volcker's actions point to these numbers as proof of the efficacy of his actions, critics have claimed that there were less harmful ways that inflation could have been brought under control. The recessions of the early 1980s are cited as accelerating deindustrialization in the U.S., as manufacturing jobs lost in 'rust belt' states such as Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania never returned during the years of recovery. The Volcker Shock was also a driving factor behind the Latin American debt crises of the 1980s, as governments in the region defaulted on debts which they had incurred in U.S. dollars. Debates about the validity of using interest rate hikes to get inflation under control have recently re-emerged due to the inflationary pressures facing the U.S. following the Coronavirus pandemic and the Federal Reserve's subsequent decision to embark on a course of monetary tightening.

Graph and download economic data for Real-time Sahm Rule Recession Indicator (SAHMREALTIME) from Dec 1959 to Jun 2025 about recession indicators, academic data, and USA.

We use the yield curve to predict future GDP growth and recession probabilities. The spread between short- and long-term rates typically correlates with economic growth. Predications are calculated using a model developed by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. Released monthly.

In 2020, the inflation rate in Brazil amounted to about 3.21 percent compared to the previous year, a slight increase from the previous year’s 3.73 percent, but a large improvement compared to 2015 with more than 9 percent.

Superlative Brazil

Brazil is not only one of the largest countries in the world, it is also one of the largest economies and a member of the so-called BRIC states, four up-and-coming emerging economies. Unfortunately, Brazil also struggles due to an on-going recession; In 2017, the majority of Brazilians described the state of the country’s economy as “bad”.

The state of Brazil’s economy

Brazil’s mixed economy suffered a severe political and economic crisis in 2014 that only ended in 2016. The country’s GDP slumped dramatically and inflation skyrocketed. As of today, Brazil has recovered, GDP is on the rise again, and inflation is below four percent – however, as a result of the recession that saw millions of job cuts, unemployment is at an all-time high.

Abstract (en): Some analysts and economists recently warned that the United States economy faces a much higher risk of recession should the price of oil rise to $100 per barrel or more. In February 2008, spot crude oil prices closed above $100 per barrel for the first time ever, and since then they have climbed even higher. Meanwhile, according to some surveys of economists, it is highly probable that a recession began in the United States in late 2007 or early 2008. Although the findings in this paper are consistent with the view that the United States economy has become much less sensitive to large changes in oil prices, a simple forecasting exercise using Hamilton's model augmented with the first principal component of 85 macroeconomic variables reveals that a permanent increase in the price of crude oil to $150 per barrel by the end of 2008 could have a significant negative effect on the growth rate of real gross domestic product in the short run. Moreover, the model also predicts that such an increase in oil prices would produce much higher overall and core inflation rates in 2009 than most policymakers expect. A zipped package contains a programming syntax file (text format) and a Microsoft Excel file, which contains the data, tables, and corresponding figures used in the article.These data are part of ICPSR's Publication-Related Archive and are distributed exactly as they arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigators if further information is desired.

By April 2026, it is projected that there is a probability of ***** percent that the United States will fall into another economic recession. This reflects a significant decrease from the projection of the preceding month.

Stagflation (stagnation and inflation in one word) depicts a time period when an economy is not only suffering from a recession (declining GDP), but high unemployment and inflation rates as well. Usually unemployment and inflation are inversely related, which makes stagflation a rare occurrence. It first happened in the 1970s, when OPEC put an oil embargo on the United States, resulting in oil prices skyrocketing to three times the standard value at that time. As of September 2023, the price of oil fell by 20 percent in comparison to last year after having increased by 76 perent as a result of Russian invasion of Ukraine. The has been signs of stagflation in some countries through 2022 and 2023, but falling inflation rates indicate that the worst has been avoided.

The statistic depicts the average inflation rate in Mexico from 1987 to 2024, with projections up until 2030. The inflation rate measures price changes for a fixed basket of goods which includes a representative selection of goods and services. In 2024, Mexico's average inflation rate was around 4.72 percent compared to the previous year. Mexico’s economy Mexico’s gross domestic product (GDP) has been increasing slightly over the last decade, however, its national debt still amounts to almost half of its GDP. The majority of Mexico’s GDP is yielded by the services sector, as a look at the distribution of gross domestic product in Mexico by sector shows. More than 60 percent of GDP are generated in this sector; the majority of the Mexican workforce is employed in services. One important contributor to Mexico’s GDP is tourism. The total unemployment rate in Mexico took a turn for the worse during the recession of 2008 and is still to bounce back to previous levels. Mexico’s main export and import partner is the United States which accounts for approximately half of the value of both. Thus, the trade balance of goods in Mexico, showing the value of exports minus the value of imports, is heavily dependant on the United States. For the past decade, Mexico’s trade balance has run at a deficit of more than 10 billion US dollars. The trade balance of services sector in Mexico has also been in the red with a deficit of more than 6 percent since the recession and higher than 9 percent since 2011. Mexico is also one of the largest drug exporting countries worldwide. Specific trade figures are not available, however, Mexico is among the top countries for opium cultivation based on acreage, and thousands of illegal poppy fields, processed into opium, have been destroyed in Mexico year after year.

Survey investigates indepth attitudes toward the economy, affects of inflation, and financial management.

Questions include standard of living, income, financial stress, savings and borrowing habits, money budgeted for housing, transportation, food and leisure. Questions about taxation, causes of inflation, recession, tax revolt, cost of living and financial investments are also included. A tack-on surveys attitudes toward environmental air and water pollution, political affairs, civil rights, and Joe Namath.

ABSTRACT Food prices play a major role in setting inflation rates, and in recent years’ global climatic conditions has worsened a lot while global demand is increasing due to the growth of the middle class in countries such as China and India. Rising food prices remains a key concern for the government of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia remains vulnerable to increases in food prices due to its high dependence on imports. The Saudi economy is an open-market based economy which is reflected by data of foreign trade with trading partners of the Kingdom. High degree of economic openness of a country causes the domestic inflation rate to be affected by change in the prices of goods in the country of origin. Saudi government is facing the challenge of limiting inflation amid a spike in global food prices. Another major challenge to the effectiveness of the Saudi monetary policy is the lack of autonomy due to the pegged exchange rate system with the US dollar. This paper attempts to study the market dynamics of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, drivers responsible for inflation and measures that has been taken by the government to deal with the situation.

In a New Keynesian model with downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR), we show that government spending is more effective in stimulating output in a low-inflation recession relative to a high-inflation recession. The government spending multiplier is large when DNWR binds, but the nature of recession matters due to the opposing response of inflation, and consequently for real wages. Using U.S. historical time series data, we provide evidence of larger spending multipliers in low inflation recessions and the importance of the depth of recessions. We also employ cross-sectional data from U.S. states to document supporting evidence on multipliers and our proposed mechanism.

ABSTRACT The paper discusses the determination of inflation in Brazil, especially after the great recession of 2015-2016, to assess the adequacy of manipulating interest rates to control the rise in prices due to permanent cost pressure. The burden of using the interest rate to fight cost inflation is to create a highly conventional level of the real interest rate, which benefits the rentier class in a financialized economy. In the light of the post-Keynesian macroeconomics, a high-interest rate convention keeps the economy with a low growth rate and a low investment rate, which in the case of the Brazilian economy has resulted in a regression in the productive matrix and productivity stagnation, and both contribute to perpetuating cost pressures on prices. The empirical analysis corroborates the discussion about recent inflation having its origin in cost pressures over which the interest rate impact for its control is limited. We complement the empirical analysis by testing the response to the SELIC interest rate of the variables used to explain the fluctuation of market prices and administered prices: commodity price index, exchange rate and activity level. As expected, the impact of an increase in the interest rate appreciates the exchange rate, favouring inflation control and reducing the level of activity but has no impact on the commodity price index.

We make substantial progress on understanding the Phillips curve, yielding important monetarypolicy implications. Inflation responds differently to persistent versus moderately persistent (ortransient) fluctuations in the unemployment gap. This persistence-dependent relationship alignswith business-cycle stages, and is consistent with existing theory. Previous work fails to modelthis dependence, thereby finding the numerous “inflation puzzles” – e.g., missinginflation/disinflation – noted in the literature. Our specification eliminates these puzzles; e.g., thePhillips curve has not weakened; inflation’s post-2012 slow upward trudge was predictable. Themodel’s coefficients are stable, and it provides accurate out-of-sample conditional recursiveforecasts through the Great Recession and recovery.Keywords: overheating; recession gap; frequency dependence; NAIRU; Phillips curve.