InforMEA provides easy access to information on Multilateral Environmental Agreements. It is an initiative facilitated by the United Nations Environment Programme and supported by the European Union. It seeks to develop Inter-operable information systems for the benefit of the (MEA) Parties and the environment community at large. This dataset provides direct links to: 1. "Pacific Islands" - related data on the InforMEA portal. For country-specific information, please type name of country on the InforMEA portal search tool. 2. Free online courses

The Environmental Treaty Status Data Set, 2012 Release contains comprehensive information on country participation in multilateral environmental agreements through August 2012. The data were produced by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) Environmental Law Center for use in the ECOLEX gateway to environmental law web service. The Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN) at Columbia University developed an interactive online tool that enables the users to query the data and create matrices describing multi-country participation in sets of treaties, as well as to download the results.

PNG is signatory to number of Multilateral Environmental Agreements and UN Conventions, in which CEPA administers 14 of them. The treaties focuses mainly on biodiversity, climate, wastes& pollution.

Explore Environmental SDG Statistics and Trends UNEP is custodian agency for 25 Sustainable Goals Indicators, of these 10 are tier I and tier II and where data is reported to the Secretary General Global database. Currently UNEP reports data for the following tier I and tier II indicators: 6.3.2 Proportion of bodies of water with good ambient water quality 6.5.1 Degree of integrated water resources management implementation (0-100) 6.6.1 Change in the extent of water-related ecosystems over time 8.4.2 Domestic material consumption (DMC) and DMC per capita, per GDP 12.1.1 Number of countries with sustainable consumption and production (SCP) national action plans or SCP mainstreamed as a priority or target into national policies 12.2.2 Domestic material consumption (DMC) and DMC per capita, per GDP 12.4.1 Number of Parties to international multilateral environmental agreements on hazardous waste, and other chemicals that meet their commitments and obligations in transmitting information as required by each relevant agreement 12.c.1 Amount of fossil-fuel subsidies per unit of GDP (production and consumption). 14.5.1 Coverage of protected areas in relation to marine areas 15.1.2 Proportion of important sites for terrestrial and freshwater biodiversity that are covered by protected areas, by ecosystem type 15.4.1 Coverage by protected areas of important sites for mountain biodiversity SDG Global reporting: We also coordinate our contribution of data and storylines on the SDG indicators presented in the SDG global reports. The yearly report contains Sustainable Development Goals Report and the Statistical Annex report. Click on each year to access report. 2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 SDG Global Database: UNSD SDG Global Database

Contains individual and aggregated scores of Australia’s performance against meeting multilateral agreement requirements.

This dataset records Qatar's compliance with its obligations to transmit information as required under major international multilateral environmental agreements related to hazardous waste and chemicals. It covers the Basel, Minamata, Montreal Protocol, Rotterdam, and Stockholm agreements. Each agreement is evaluated annually with a binary indicator (1 = Yes, 0 = No) reflecting whether commitments were met. The data supports transparency, international cooperation, and environmental governance tracking.

List of international environmental related agreements and conventions to which Vanuatu is obligated to.

adopted from the Vanuatu National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan 2018 - 2030, pg 24

This dataset is about book subjects. It has 2 rows and is filtered where the books is Leadership and self-enforcing international environmental agreements with non-negative emissions. It features 10 columns including number of authors, number of books, earliest publication date, and latest publication date.

no abstract provided

UNIDO pub. Report on assisting the developing countries to comply with the requirements of multilateral environmental conventions and protocols - covers: UNIDO and the Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEA) branch, the Montreal Protocol programme, ongoing projects, amount approved, number of projects completed since 1992, proposed services: the Stockholm Convention programme, etc.

Raw and processed data for the paper "How to estimate whether preferential trade agreements contribute to international environmental impact shifting. A new methodology and empirical illustration for Switzerland"

The raw trade data file is named TradeDataAggregated.rds

The raw greenhouse gas footprint data is contained in Output_all.xlsx

Manual on operations under multilateral environmental agreements - Montreal Protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer and Stockholm Convention on persistent organic pollutants. With geographic focus on Global.

KAV 5598 cover memo. Visit https://dataone.org/datasets/sha256%3A712f667f55a0e922cca27ee54a8466c0552d3a5fb48b40026fbd9b715c98ef28 for complete metadata about this dataset.

This dataset was used in the publication of "All Roads Lead to Paris: The Eight Pathways to Renewable Energy Target Adoption" in the journal of Energy Research & Social Science. The objective was to compile data on the first national adoption of a renewable energy target in each country to analyze its mechanisms of diffusion (learning, economic competition, emulation, and coercion). The data were compiled for 187 countries for the period ranging from 1975 to 2017. The list of countries was gathered from the Annex I of IRENA's "Renewable Energy Target Setting" report. We used primarily the IEA policies database (https://www.iea.org/policies) to identify the first adoption of a renewable energy target in each country. Other sources were used when data was unavailable in such repository for specific countries. Additionally, we include the data gathered from various sources, as they were used in our paper for measuring variables. The variables in this dataset include: target adoption (or “Target”, from various sources listed in the dataset); year of adoption (or “Year”, from various sources listed in the dataset); cumulative membership to energy-related international environmental agreements (or “IEA”, with data from Mitchell’s International Environmental Agreements Database Project); net energy imports as a percentage of energy use (or “Energy”, with data from the World Bank); a similarity index (or “Similarity”, created with data from the Polity Index, population and GDP per capita from the World Bank, and revenue from the World Bank); official development assistance as a percentage of gross national income (or “ODAGNI”, with data from the World Bank and OECD); income level (“Income”, with data from the World bank); and the international price for oil (“Oil”, with data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis). For more details, refer to the manuscript. Note that in 2018 the “IEA’s policy database” was actually the “IEA/IRENA RE Policies and Measures database”. The links for the sources for renewable energy target adoption for Norway and Albania were lost in the transition from one to the other; all other sources could be retrieved by the authors.

This article tests the hypothesis that democracies exhibit stronger international environmental commitment than non-democracies, using multivariate econometric techniques. A number of proxy variables are used in lieu of environmental commitment, a non-observable variable. Strong evidence is found that democracies sign and ratify more multilateral environmental agreements, participate in more environmental intergovernmental organizations, comply better with reporting requirements under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora, put a greater percentage of their land area under protections status, are more likely to have a National Council on Sustainable Development in their country and have more environmentally relevant information available than non-democracies. The findings suggest that a spread of democracy around the world will lead to enhanced environmental commitment worldwide. Results are robust with respect to inclusion or exclusion of developed countries in the sample. The use of four different variables for democracy also ensures robustness with respect to the measure of democracy. The strong evidence in favour of a positive link between democracy and environmental commitment stands in contrast to the somewhat weak evidence on such a link between democracy and environmental outcomes. The explanation presumably is that theory predicts a stronger positive link of democracy with environmental commitment than with environmental outcomes.

The signing of international treaties is usually considered insignificant for international legal cooperation. Accordingly, International Relations theorists have paid it little attention. We show in this paper how and why treaty signature matters for the ultimate decision to ratify an international treaty. We argue that when multiple well-informed actors publicly sign an international treaty, this can provide a strong signal of issue importance to domestic veto players, and in turn may persuade them to ratify the treaty. We formalize this argument in a two-level signaling game, and test it on a data set of 126 international environmental agreements. We find that treaties are more likely to be ratified when their signatories include countries with high levels of general or issue-specific knowledge.

Replication Data for: Commitment-Failures Are Unlikely to Undermine Public Support for the Paris Agreement, forthcoming at Nature Climate Change Abstract: Success of the 2015 Paris Agreement, which is founded on Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), hinges on whether domestic support for international environmental agreements would be undermined if countries that are crucial to the global effort fail to reduce their emissions. Here we find that citizens in China (n = 3000) and the United States (n = 3007) have strong preferences over the design of international climate agreements, and contributions of other countries to the global effort. However, contrary to what standard accounts of international politics would predict, a survey-embedded experiment in which respondents were randomly exposed to different information on other countries’ behavior showed that information on other countries failing to reduce their emissions does not undermine support for how international agreements are designed. While other factors still make large emission cuts challenging, these results suggest that the Paris approach per se is not posing a problem.

International cooperation on biodiversity conservation when spatial structures matter. Spatial Economic Analysis. This paper considers the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) for biodiversity conservation with an explicit spatial structure. It studies the impact of distance between countries on coalition stability. It analyses a circular spatial structure with different spatial patterns. Robust results are obtained for a wide range of cost-and-benefit parameters: stable coalitions have a maximum size of two members. The best global payoff is obtained when coalitions are composed of neighbouring countries with the smallest possible distance. A ‘remoteness effect’ is observed, i.e., some coalitions of two members are unstable when one of the signatory countries is far away from the other coalition member and from the singletons.

UNIDO pub. Handbook on operations under multilateral environmental agreements (Montreal Protocol on ozone depleting substances and the Stockholm Convention on persistent organic pollutants) - covers (A) the Montreal Protocol on substances depleting the ozone layer: (1) the role of the multilateral fund for the implementation of the Protocol, government contribution (2) rationale for institutional strengthening, international cooperation (3) initiation of project implementation, operational costs (4) reporting under institutional-strengthening project, general organizational aspects, legislation, consumption (5) reporting under projects for recovery and recycling (B) the Stockholm Convention on persistent organic pollutants, advanced technologys for decontamination and destruction. Glossary. Statistics, diagrams.

It is usually assumed that the cost of abating pollution is the main deterrent of domestic support for international climate cooperation. In particular, some scholars have argued that, due to the burden of pollution abatement, businesses commonly constrain governments, which then take less cooperative positions on global climate agreements. I suggest that this argument needs further qualification: pollution-related costs rarely have unconditional effects on preferences for global climate agreements. Instead, a sector's pollution level is more likely to influence preferences for climate cooperation if mediated by its trade exposure. If pollution is high, firms in high-trade sectors may be less able to absorb climate regulation, and hence they should be more sensitive to climate cooperation. If pollution is low, firms in high-trade sectors may support climate cooperation, because by being more efficient they are more capable of adjusting to regulation. These dynamics should then affect governmental positions on global climate politics. I test my sectoral argument with original data from business statements and national communications at the United Nations climate negotiations. In line with my argument, I find that businesses in trade-open sectors are more likely to oppose climate agreement as their sector's emissions increase. I also find that in countries where high-emission sectors are open to trade, governments have low preferences for climate cooperation. The findings have implications for the domestic politics of environmental agreements and the distributive politics of global public good provision.