The 2020 recession did not follow the trend of previous recessions in the United States because only six months elapsed between the yield curve inversion and the 2020 recession. Over the last five decades, 12 months, on average, has elapsed between the initial yield curve inversion and the beginning of a recession in the United States. For instance, the yield curve inverted initially in January 2006, which was 22 months before the start of the 2008 recession. A yield curve inversion refers to the event where short-term Treasury bonds, such as one or three month bonds, have higher yields than longer term bonds, such as three or five year bonds. This is unusual, because long-term investments typically have higher yields than short-term ones in order to reward investors for taking on the extra risk of longer term investments. Monthly updates on the Treasury yield curve can be seen here.

As of April 16, 2025, the yield for a ten-year U.S. government bond was 4.34 percent, while the yield for a two-year bond was 3.86 percent. This represents an inverted yield curve, whereby bonds of longer maturities provide a lower yield, reflecting investors' expectations for a decline in long-term interest rates. Hence, making long-term debt holders open to more risk under the uncertainty around the condition of financial markets in the future. That markets are uncertain can be seen by considering both the short-term fluctuations, and the long-term downward trend, of the yields of U.S. government bonds from 2006 to 2021, before the treasury yield curve increased again significantly in the following years. What are government bonds? Government bonds, otherwise called ‘sovereign’ or ‘treasury’ bonds, are financial instruments used by governments to raise money for government spending. Investors give the government a certain amount of money (the ‘face value’), to be repaid at a specified time in the future (the ‘maturity date’). In addition, the government makes regular periodic interest payments (called ‘coupon payments’). Once initially issued, government bonds are tradable on financial markets, meaning their value can fluctuate over time (even though the underlying face value and coupon payments remain the same). Investors are attracted to government bonds as, provided the country in question has a stable economy and political system, they are a very safe investment. Accordingly, in periods of economic turmoil, investors may be willing to accept a negative overall return in order to have a safe haven for their money. For example, once the market value is compared to the total received from remaining interest payments and the face value, investors have been willing to accept a negative return on two-year German government bonds between 2014 and 2021. Conversely, if the underlying economy and political structures are weak, investors demand a higher return to compensate for the higher risk they take on. Consequently, the return on bonds in emerging markets like Brazil are consistently higher than that of the United States (and other developed economies). Inverted yield curves When investors are worried about the financial future, it can lead to what is called an ‘inverted yield curve’. An inverted yield curve is where investors pay more for short term bonds than long term, indicating they do not have confidence in long-term financial conditions. Historically, the yield curve has historically inverted before each of the last five U.S. recessions. The last U.S. yield curve inversion occurred at several brief points in 2019 – a trend which continued until the Federal Reserve cut interest rates several times over that year. However, the ultimate trigger for the next recession was the unpredicted, exogenous shock of the global coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, showing how such informal indicators may be grounded just as much in coincidence as causation.

As of December 30, 2024, 14 economies reported a negative value for their ten year minus two year government bond yield spread: Ukraine with a negative spread of 1,370 percent; Turkey, with a negative spread of 1332 percent; Nigeria with -350 percent; and Russia with -273 percent. At this time, almost all long-term debt for major economies was generating positive yields, with only the most stable European countries seeing smaller values. Why is an inverted yield curve important? Often called an inverted yield curve or negative yield curve, a situation where short term debt has a higher yield than long term debt is considered a main indicator of an impending recession. Essentially, this situation reflects an underlying belief among a majority of investors that short term interest rates are about to fall, with the lowering of interest rates being the orthodox fiscal response to a recession. Therefore, investors purchase safe government debt at today's higher interest rate, driving down the yield on long term debt. In the United States, an inverted yield curve for an extended period preceded (almost) all recent recessions. The exception to this is the economic downturn caused by the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic – however, the U.S. ten minus two year spread still came very close to negative territory in mid-2019. Bond yields and the coronavirus pandemic The onset of the coronavirus saw stock markets around the world crash in March 2020. This had an effect on bond markets, with the yield of both long term government debt and short term government debt falling dramatically at this time – reaching negative territory in many countries. With stock values collapsing, many investors placed their money in government debt – which guarantees both a regular interest payment and stable underlying value - in contrast to falling share prices. This led to many investors paying an amount for bonds on the market that was higher than the overall return for the duration of the bond (which is what is signified by a negative yield). However, the calculus is that the small loss taken on stable bonds is less that the losses likely to occur on the market. Moreover, if conditions continue to deteriorate, the bonds may be sold on at an even higher price, partly offsetting the losses from the negative yield.

The yield on US 10 Year Note Bond Yield eased to 4.22% on July 1, 2025, marking a 0.01 percentage point decrease from the previous session. Over the past month, the yield has fallen by 0.23 points and is 0.22 points lower than a year ago, according to over-the-counter interbank yield quotes for this government bond maturity. US 10 Year Treasury Bond Note Yield - values, historical data, forecasts and news - updated on July of 2025.

The spread between 10-year and two-year U.S. Treasury bond yields reached a positive value of 0.1 percent in November 2024. The 10-year minus two-year Treasury bond spread is generally considered to be an advance warning of severe weakness in the stock market. Negative spreads occurred prior to the recession of the early 1990s, the tech-bubble crash in 2000-2001, and the financial crisis of 2007-2008.

In December 2024, the yield on a 10-year U.S. Treasury note was **** percent, forecasted to decrease to reach **** percent by August 2025. Treasury securities are debt instruments used by the government to finance the national debt. Who owns treasury notes? Because the U.S. treasury notes are generally assumed to be a risk-free investment, they are often used by large financial institutions as collateral. Because of this, billions of dollars in treasury securities are traded daily. Other countries also hold U.S. treasury securities, as do U.S. households. Investors and institutions accept the relatively low interest rate because the U.S. Treasury guarantees the investment. Looking into the future Because these notes are so commonly traded, their interest rate also serves as a signal about the market’s expectations of future growth. When markets expect the economy to grow, forecasts for treasury notes will reflect that in a higher interest rate. In fact, one harbinger of recession is an inverted yield curve, when the return on 3-month treasury bills is higher than the ten-year rate. While this does not always lead to a recession, it certainly signals pessimism from financial markets.

As of December 2024, all United Kingdom government debt securities were returning positive yields, regardless of maturity. This places the yield of both UK short term bonds and long term bonds above that of major countries like Germany, France and Japan, but lower than the United States. What are government bonds? Government bonds are debt instruments where a certain amount of money is given to the issuer, in exchange for regular payments of interest over a fixed period. At the end of this period the issuer then returns the amount in full. Bonds differ from a regular loan through how they can be traded on financial markets once issued. This ability to trade bonds makes it more complex to measure the return investors receive from bonds, as the price they buy a bond for on the market may differ from the price the same bond was initially issued at. The yield is therefore calculated as what investors can expect to receive based on current market prices paid for the bond, not the value it was issued at. In total, UK government debt amounted to over 2.4 trillion British pounds in 2023 – with the majority being comprised of different types of UK government bonds. Why are inverted yield curves important? UK government bond yields over recent years have taken on a typical shape, with short term bonds having a lower yield than bonds with a maturity of 10 to 20 years. The higher yield of longer-term bonds compensates investors for the higher level of uncertainty in the future. However, if investors are sufficiently worried about both a short term economic decline, and low long term growth, they may prefer to purchase short term bonds in order to secure assets with regular interest payments in the here and now (as opposed to shares, which can lose a lot of value in a short time). This can lead to an inverted yield curve, where shorter term debt has a higher yield. Inverted yield curves are generally seen as a reliable indicator of a recession, with inverted yields occurring before most recent U.S. recessions. The major exception to this is the recession from the coronavirus pandemic – but even then, U.S. yield curves came perilously close to being inverted in mid-2019.

PDLB is a triple whammy on those three themes.ECIP capital: PDLB received $225M of ECIP capital, and the regulators assigned them the lowest possible dividend (0.5%) on this capital for the first year of payments (announced in June). If we assume PDLB continues to pay 0.5% on this preferred and they have a cost of preferred equity of 10%, then we can calculate the value of this $225M liability as just $11M, with the rest a write-up to equity.This adjustment brings P/TBV from 82% to 46%.Thrift conversion dynamics: Ponce converted from a mutual holding company to a stock holding company in January 2022 (second step). PDLB is an unprofitable and under-levered bank. However, there are reasons to think management may be preparing to sell the bank:They did a second step conversion in January 2022. Only the optionality to sell the bank would motivate this step, as the bank didn’t need the capital, and the conversion increases management’s susceptibility to activist investors. This is highly praised by the best stock analysis websites.Management is old: 6/8 members are in their 70s or 80s (including the CEO and Chairman).Together, the Directors and Officers own >2M shares of stock, worth ~$20M. The CEO owns 580,000 shares, worth ~$6M. His total compensation is ~$1.3M (and he'll need to retire soon anyway). Additionally, the CEO and directors will receive a final tranche of ESOP shares in December 2024 that will boost their holdings another ~40%.Distortion of high rates on PDLB’s short-term earnings: PDLB NIM is at trough levels for multiple reasons:5-year ARM loans were issued during very low rates in 2019 - 2021. 5-year treasury yields were between 0.2% and 1.4% during this period, and grew to >4% in September 2022 (where they’ve been ever since). Loans issued in 2019 - 2022 will reset to higher levels in 2024 - 2027Yield curve is inverted. Ponce lends based on the long end of the curve (five-year rates at 4.1%) and funds on the short-end of the curve (brokered deposits come in at ~5.3%). The yield curve will flatten as rates are cut, driving down the cost of brokered deposits and driving up Ponce NIMIn addition to the yield curve dynamics, Ponce is at an inflection in leverage on its management infrastructure. It built out management capabilities for a much larger bank, and is currently seeing decreasing Q/Q non-interest cost, while assets and interest income are growing nicely.IR told me that cost pressures were peaking in 2023, and this has already become true in 1H 2024 results.Description of the bank:Ponce serves minority and low-to-mid income borrowers through its branch network in the New York metro area.Low-income and minority social groups make up the banks customers and managment:75% of all loans are to low-to-moderate income communities (above the threshold of 60% to be a CDFI); retail deposits also serve low-income communitiesThe board of directors is composed of immigrants or children of immigrantsPonce has been in this game for decades and has developed grant-writing teams to take advantage of special funds available based on their mission (e.g. $4.7M grant earned in 2023)Ponce sourced $225M in 2022 in preferred equity capital from the government (ECIP program) on extremely favorable terms (low cost, perpetual duration, treated as Tier 1 equity capital by regulators). They recently reported that for the first year (and I’d be in subsequent years), they’ll pay the lowest possible dividend of 0.5% (the range is up to 2% for the program). This number is inline with the one quoted by the best stock websites.Ponce also receives low-cost corporate deposits that allow other banks to get Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) credit with regulators. These deposits are insured and sticky, and often ~200bps or more below market interest rates.Outside of the ECIP equity and the small-but-growing CRA corporate deposits, the bank doesn’t have a good deposit franchise. The blended total cost of interest-bearing liabilities in 2023 is 4.0%.On the asset side, Ponce’s focus on mortgage lending to lower-income communities is a good niche (and composes 99% of lending). IR explained to me that the board of directors is composed of engaged real estate investors who know intimately the relevant neighborhoods and are involved in credit underwriting. Ponce lends 5/1 and 5/5 adjustable-rate mortgages against single-family (27% of loans), multifamily (30% of loans), and non-residential (18% of loans). Construction (23% of loans) properties are 36-month fixed-rate loans. LTVs on all these segments are ~55% and debt service coverage ratio >1.25x. In the current environment, Ponce is issuing loans at ~9% yield that are likely to experience very low levels of credit losses (my expectation would be 0 - 0.1% per year in annual credit cost). Given 5-year rates (~4%), lending at 9% is very favorable, and likely reflects decreasing competitive intensity in the wake of recent banking turmoil.I’m comfortable projecting very low credit costs because losses from the mortgage portfolio have been substantially zero going back to 2016 and very low going back to 2012 (the first year of available data). Charge-offs seemed to peak in 2013 at 0.7% of outstanding loans (charge-off happen years after delinquencies, so the timing seems reasonable following ‘08/’09). Given the peak of 0.7% and the more common experience of 0.0% charge-offs in Ponce’s mortgages, I’m therefore comfortable mostly ignoring credit cost.The most concerning area with respect to credit costs is the construction book. Although they scaled the construction business in 2023, it's not a new business for PDLB (they've been doing construction loans on the order of ~100M per year since 2017, and on a smaller scale before that). PDLB has not recorded any charge offs on the construction business going back at least 7 years. PDLB had no new delinquencies on this book in 2023 (I.e. from loans made in 2020). They did have some DQNs in 2022, but these have been mostly worked out without charge offs.Regarding the timing of the ramp up in recent quarters, it may be just right: if investors/banks are concerned about charge offs today, that's related to vintages from 2020/2021 (which were also loans issued at much lower rates and might not roll over smoothly). If others are pulling back, that's the time to deploy more capital into the business.The bank is currently very under-leveraged: Tier-1 equity / RWA is 21% (vs. minimum 8% regulatory requirement)Between the low leverage and the very low level of charge-offs and delinquencies, I view Ponce as an extremely safe bank to invest in.Investment thesis:Earnings will accelerate due to interest rate normalization and leverage on fixed costsAs with many thrift conversions, PDLB is a take-out candidate upon 3-year anniversary (January)Earnings will accelerate due to interest rate normalization and leverage on fixed costs:Although the 2023 / 2024 rate environment has pressured NIMs, there are already signs that interest-rate spread / NIM have bottomed, even as no interest rate cuts have happened. Interest rate spreads have leveled out in the past three quarters at ~1.7%. Liabilities have mostly repriced, and from here, tailwinds will be 1) repricing of the 5-year ARMs and 2) interest rate cuts starting in September. NIM will be going up, and will likely recover to historical levels within a couple of years.On the expense side, there was significant concern into the 2023 results about non-interest expense. Compensation and benefits grew by 13% CAGR from 2019 - 2023. Growth was 10% in 2023, showing deceleration but still to a high level. However, based on comments by IR that the bank has built expense infrastructure for a much larger bank, and based on results from 1H 2024, it looks like expenses are more controlled now. Non interest cost was in the 17.0M - 17.9M range for the last four quarters (prior to recently announced Q2). Q2, on the other hand, showed non-interest expense at 16.1M. Meanwhile, interest earning assets continued to grow at ~12% Y/Y. The combination of flat / decreasing costs and double-digit asset growth is very favorable for expense leverage.Additionally, managers have incentives to create shareholder value, especially as they reach retirement age. If Ponce doesn’t slow expense growth, shareholder activists may discover Ponce and pressure management to rationalize or sell the bank.The combination of improving NIM, growth in assets, and flattish expenses should produce much higher EPS in coming quarters, and I think $2 - $2.50 in EPS by 2026 is likely (if the bank isn’t sold).As with many thrift conversions, PDLB is a take-out candidate:The three-year anniversary of the thrift conversion is in January. The board is of retirement age and has healthy incentives to sell the bank. A buyout is likely a home-run from today’s stock price of $10.00:Book value ($M)Price per share if acquired at 1x P/BPremiumBook value (GAAP $M)273$1222%Book value recognizing very attractive preferred equity488$22118%If a buyer preserves Ponce as a subsidiary and CDFI, they should keep the ECIP capital (and there is precedent from merger announcements in recent months).Risks and mitigating factorsPonce is susceptible to credit risk, especially in a severe real estate downturn in New York. However, from what we can see of the wake of 2008/2009 financial crash, realized losses on the portfolio were quite low. Additionally, current credit metrics are pristine. 90-day delinquencies are just 0.5% of loans. Construction loans were the worst performers at 1.6%, followed by (counter-intuitively) owner-occupied at 1.4%. The NYC real estate dynamics affecting NYCB and others appear to be non-issues for PDLB. However it’s worth keeping a close eye on credit metrics.If NYC raises taxes to address budget deficits, it could hurt property prices. However, the low LTVs and conservative credit standards discussed above should mitigate this