Italy recorded a Government Debt to GDP of 135.30 percent of the country's Gross Domestic Product in 2024. This dataset provides - Italy Government Debt To GDP - actual values, historical data, forecast, chart, statistics, economic calendar and news.

The statistic presents a ranking of Italy's largest creditors', the organisations that have bought up Italian government bonds. As of Q4 2011, Intesta Sanpalo of Italy was the largest creditor, holding Italian bonds to the value of just over 58 billion U.S. dollars.

Several European Union member states have struggled with high levels of public debt in the period since the Global Financial Crisis. In particular, Greece's debt skyrocketed during the recession which followed the crisis, culminating in a period of intense political and social upheaval during the early 2010s in which the country came close to having to leave the Euro single currency zone. Along with Italy, Portugal, Spain and France, Greece is part of a group of EU members who have seen their debt soar to a value worth over one year's aggregate production in their economies (i.e. 100% of GDP) due to slow economic growth coupled with increasing public liabilities due to the need to provide emergency support to their domestic financial systems. Belgium, while also a part of this group of high-debt ratio countries has quite different circumstances, as its debt ratio has in fact fallen since the 1990s, remaining 20 percent below its 1995 level, even after a spike due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The national debt of Italy amounted to approximately 3.20 trillion U.S. dollars in 2024. Following a continuous upward trend, the national debt has risen by around 2.58 trillion U.S. dollars since 1988. Between 2024 and 2030, the national debt will rise by around 619.06 billion U.S. dollars, continuing its consistent upward trajectory.

The statistic shows the extent of lending by major European banks to Italy, during the Euro crisis. During the course of the euro crisis as of 31 December, 2010 Unicredit made lendings amounting to around 47.4 billion euros.

Government debt as a share of gross domestic product has risen for almost all of Europe's largest economies since the mid-20th century. While until the 1970s it was common for European countries to have debt levels of less than 20 percent of their GDP, with the onset of economic crises related to international financial instability and oil price shocks, the long-term slowdown of economic growth in Europe, and the substantial public spending burdens which states had incurred due to the expansion of welfare and social services, European governments began to amass significant amounts of debt.

Which European countries are the most indebted? Italy stands out as the country in Europe which has experienced the largest secular increase in its government debt level, with the southern European country having debt worth 1.4 times its GDP in 2022. Spain, the United Kingdom, and France have also experienced long-run increase in their debt levels to between 90 and 100 percent in 2022. Germany and Turkey, on the other hand, have experienced more gradual increases in their public debt, with both countries having debt worth less than half their GDP. Russia stands as an outlier, due to the fact that its debt level has fallen dramatically since the 1990s. After the eastern European country's transition from communism and particularly after the financial crisis it experienced in 1998, the Russian state has severely cut back on public expenditure, while also having little need to borrow due to the state ownership of the country's vast natural resources.

A steadily increasing number of European countries recently adopted their own ‘Africa policies’. The temporal and geographical clustering of such plans suggests that a policy diffusion process might have been at play, with the introduction and the shape of a policy in a given country being influenced by those of other countries. This paper tests the policy diffusion hypothesis through an in-depth analysis of the case of Italy, a country that in recent times stepped up substantially its engagement with sub-Saharan Africa. Tracing the origins and features of Rome’s policy towards the region, however, shows that external influences were much more limited than expected. It was primarily two country-specific drivers – namely, the enduring effects of the European debt crisis on the Italian economy and a sudden and massive, if temporary, increase in irregular migration – which pushed Italy towards Africa and shaped its approach. The paper thus sheds light on how the marked resemblance of policies almost contemporaneously adopted by distinct EU member states – that is, a tight succession and a highly interconnected environment strongly pointing at cross-country influences – can hide motives and processes that are actually highly specific to each of them and essentially by-pass policy diffusion dynamics.

The ratio of national debt to gross domestic product (GDP) of Italy was about 135.29 percent in 2024. From 1988 to 2024, the ratio rose by approximately 39.57 percentage points, though the increase followed an uneven trajectory rather than a consistent upward trend. Between 2024 and 2030, the ratio will rise by around 2.41 percentage points, showing an overall upward trend with periodic ups and downs.The general government gross debt consists of all liabilities that require payment or payments of interest and/or principal by the debtor to the creditor at a date or dates in the future. Here it is depicted in relation to the country's GDP, which refers to the total value of goods and services produced during a year.

Centralisation of powers typically occurs in times of crisis. The paper investigates and compares the intergovernmental relations (IGRs) in the Italian decentralised systems during the economic and financial crisis (2008-2013) and the COVID-19 pandemic (2020-2022). During both these two phases, Italy experienced a transition from a political government to a technical one. During the economic and financial crisis, Silvio Berlusconi’s government (2008-2011) was succeeded by a technical one led by Mario Monti (2011-2013); similarly, during the pandemic, Giuseppe Conte’s government (2020-2021) was followed by a technical one led by Mario Draghi (2021-2022). The hypothesis is that the presence of ‘political’ governments still guarantees a certain degree of cooperation with lower levels of government (i.e. regional and local administrations), while ‘technical’ governments further exacerbate the centralisation of powers. The paper analyses the legislative activities of the central government and the documents of the Italian ‘conference system’ during the two periods of analysis. According to our hypothesis, the findings show a greater centralisation of power under the technical government during the pandemic, but not during the economic crisis. This outcome suggests that the policy domain may serve as a main intervening factor over the degree of centralization of the IGRs during periods of crisis.

Descriptive statistics for the bank and sovereign CDS spreads, the bank and country variables and the market variables.

The article examines causal relationships between sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) prices for the BRICS and most important EU economies (Germany, France, the UK, Italy, Spain) during the European debt crisis. The cross-correlation function (CCF) approach used in the research distinguishes between causality-in-mean and causality-in-variance. In both causality dimensions, the BRICS CDS prices tend to Granger cause those of the EU counterparts with the exception of Germany. Italy and Spain exhibit the highest dependence on the BRICS, whereas only India has a negative balance of outgoing and incoming causal linkages among the BRICS. Thus, the paper underscores the signs of decoupling effects in the sovereign CDS market and also supports the view that the European debt crisis has so far had a limited non-EU impact in this market.

The remaining bank-to-sovereign risk transmission is assessed by the interaction of the bank risk shock and the BRRD time dummy. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the bank level. *, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% percent level, respectively.

During the first half of the *****, the Italian government debt has been almost totally owned by private investors, such as banks and financial intermediaries. Most notably, more than ********* of the national debt was held by foreign investors. After the 2011 Eurozone crisis, the European Central Bank started to purchase government bonds through a quantitative easing measure. Hence, the share of Italian debt owned by the Bank of Italy increased from less than **** percent in 2010 to ** percent in 2024.

Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the bank level. *, ** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% percent level, respectively.

The table displays the findings when considering 15/04/2014 as the BRRD implementation. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the bank level. *** represents significance at the 1% percent level.

This statistic shows the national debt of Greece from 2020 to 2023, with projections until 2030. In 2023, the national debt in Greece was around 420.4 billion U.S. dollars. In a ranking of debt to GDP per country, Greece is currently ranked third. Greece's struggle after the financial crisis Greece is a developed country in the EU and is highly dependent on its service sector as well as its tourism sector in order to gain profits. After going through a large economic boom from the 1950s to the 1970s as well as somewhat high GDP growth in the early to mid 2000s, Greece’s economy took a turn for the worse and struggled intensively, primarily due to the Great Recession, the Euro crisis as well as its own debt crisis. National debt within the country saw significant gains over the past decades, however roughly came to a halt due to financial rescue packages issued from the European Union in order to help Greece maintain and improve their economical situation. The nation’s continuous rise in debt has overwhelmed its estimated GDP over the years, which can be attributed to poor government execution and unnecessary spending. Large sums of financial aid were taken from major European banks to help balance out these government-induced failures and to potentially help refuel the economy to encourage more spending, which in turn would decrease the country’s continuously rising unemployment rate. Investors, consumers and workers alike are struggling to see a bright future in Greece, whose chances of an economic comeback are much lower than that of other struggling countries such as Portugal and Italy. However, Greece's financial situation might improve in the future, as it is estimated that at least its national debt will decrease - slowly, but steadily. Still, since its future participation in the European Union is in limbo as of now, these figures can only be estimates, not predictions.

Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the bank level. *** represents significance at the 1% percent level.

The European Commission published today a Flash Eurobarometer on "Possible obstacles to using the euro in international trade" as perceived by companies in France, Germany, Italy and the UK in the aircraft and shipbuilding, energy, financial services, and electrical and mechanical engineering industries. The survey confirms that the euro is widely used by European firms in their invoicing practices with nearly eight out of ten companies invoicing more than 75% of their export in euros. Two thirds of the surveyed firms in France, Germany and Italy said they did not use any other currency for export invoicing than the euro. If companies did use other currencies, this was mostly due to client preference and the important role of the US dollar in global finance. Also, firm's trade invoicing practices appear not to be markedly affected by the European sovereign debt crisis, with around four fifths of the companies saying the crisis had no effect on their use of the euro in trade invoicing.

The results by volumes are distributed as follows:

• Volume A: Countries
• Volume AA: Groups of countries
• Volume A' (AP): Trends
• Volume AA' (AAP): Trends of groups of countries
• Volume B: EU/socio-demographics
• Volume B' (BP) : Trends of EU/ socio-demographics
• Volume C: Country/socio-demographics ---- Researchers may also contact GESIS - Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences: https://www.gesis.org/eurobarometer

Panel A displays the results for the BRRD dummy from 15/04/2014 onwards, panel B shows the findings when considering 01/01/2016 as the BRRD implementation. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the bank level. *** represents significance at the 1% percent level.

Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the bank level. *** represents significance at the 1% percent level.