In 2020/21 there were approximately 696,000 Polish nationals living in the United Kingdom, the highest non-British population at this time. Indian and Irish were the joint second-largest nationalities at approximately 370,000 people.

In the year ending June 2024, approximately 1.03 million people from outside the European Union migrated to the United Kingdom, compared with 116,000 people from European Union countries, and 58,000 British nationals.

UK residents by broad country of birth and citizenship groups, broken down by UK country, local authority, unitary authority, metropolitan and London boroughs, and counties. Estimates from the Annual Population Survey.

With nearly 49,000 living in Denmark as of January 1, 2024, most immigrants were from Poland. The second and third largest groups of immigrants were from Ukraine and Romania, amounting to roughly 41,000 and 40,000 people, respectively. Tightening immigration policies Like many European countries, Denmark experienced a heightened influx of immigrants in 2015. In the wake of the refugee situation, however, the number of immigrants, notably asylum seekers, declined in part due to sharpened immigration policies. In 2015, over 21,000 refugees applied for asylum in Denmark, whereas applications fell below 5,000 in 2022. Residence permits Among the different types of residence permits, permits granted based on asylum were the least delivered type of permit. Only 1,400 people were granted asylum in Denmark in 2022. The highest number of asylum seekers came from Ukraine, even when excluding Ukrainians arriving via the temporary protection act. In 2022, Denmark registered around 2,000 applications from Ukrainians.

Migrants from the United Kingdom have long been Australia’s primary immigrant group and in 2023 there were roughly 960 thousand English-born people living in Australia. India and China held second and third place respectively with regard to Australia’s foreign-born population. The relative dominance of Asian countries in the list of top ten foreign-born residents of Australia represents a significant shift in Australia’s immigration patterns over the past few decades. Where European-born migrants had previously overshadowed other migrant groups, Australian migration figures are now showing greater migration numbers from neighboring countries in Asia and the Pacific. A history of migration Australia is often referred to as an ‘immigrant nation’, alongside the United States, Canada, and New Zealand. Before the Second World War, migrants to Australia were almost exclusively from the UK, however after 1945, Australia’s immigration policy was broadened to attract economic migrants and temporary skilled migrants. These policy changes saw and increase in immigrants particularly from Greece and Italy. Today, Australia maintains its status as an ‘’Immigrant nation’’, with almost 30 percent of the population born overseas and around 50 percent of the population having both that were born overseas. Australian visas The Australian immigration program has two main categories of visa, permanent and temporary. The permanent visa category offers three primary pathways: skilled, family and humanitarian. The skilled visa category is by far the most common, with more than a million permanent migrants living in Australia on this visa category at the last Australian census in 2021. Of the temporary visa categories, the higher education visa is the most popular, exceeding 180 thousand arrivals in 2023.

Abstract copyright UK Data Service and data collection copyright owner.

This is a mixed methods dataset.

The project examined Scots living in England. Scots are one of the largest non-English born immigrant groups in the UK. While the attraction of Scotland to the English-born population is documented, less attention is given to why Scots continue to migrate to England (albeit in lower numbers) and how the employment and progression opportunities, especially in the South Eastern England labour market compare with opportunities in Scotland. This is important in the context of concern about Scotland's demographic regime and the significant reduction in numbers projected over the next three decades. The research literature points to the need to reassess the role of the Scots living in SE England (especially those in cities/large towns) in terms of the functions they perform. Why have their numbers declined? How has the scale of Scottish return migration from the SE varied over time relative to the changing role of Scotland in national/international economic and political processes and in relation to demographic change in Scotland?

The research uses questionnaire survey data from a sample of Scots migrants living in South East England in 2005 with 30 qualitative interviews with Scots who had returned to Scotland.

Further information can be found on the project's ESRC funding web page.

Abstract copyright UK Data Service and data collection copyright owner.

The aims of this project were to:

• understand the demographic changes that United Kingdom local ethnic populations are presently experiencing and are likely to experience in the remainder of the 21st century
• understand the impact that international migration is having on the size and ethnic composition of UK local populations
• understand the role that differences in fertility between the UK's ethnic groups plays in shaping current and future trends
• understand the role that mortality differences between ethnic groups is playing in the changing demography of the UK's local populations
• understand how the ethnic diversity of UK local populations is changing and likely to change in the future
• deliver the projections as a resource for use by social science in the UK
• build capacity in the analysis of demographic change through the development of young and middle career researchers
• tap into the best practice internationally to benefit the UK social science community.

To achieve the project aims, the objectives were to:

• build projections of the populations of ethnic groups for UK local areas
• use the population projection model to explore alternative futures.

The project built a model for projecting the ethnic group populations of UK Local Authorities (LAs), which handles 352 LAs, 16 ethnic groups, 102 ages and 2 sexes. To drive the projections, estimates of the components of ethnic change were prepared for 2001-7. A new method produced UK estimates of ethnic life expectancy, ranging from 82 years for Chinese women to 77 for Pakistani. A future 2% decline in mortality per annum was assumed. Ethnic fertility estimates showed that only Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis had total fertility rates above replacement. Small declines in fertility were forecast. New estimates of the local distribution of immigration were made, using administrative data, because of concerns about official figures. The ethnicity of both immigrants and emigrants for local areas was projected. Estimates were constructed of the ethnic group probabilities for internal in- and out-migration for LAs using 2001 Census data. These probabilities were assumed constant in the future, as migration was stable between 2001 and 2008. Five projections were produced. Two benchmark projections, using constant inputs from 2001-2, forecast the UK population would be 62 and 56 million in 2051.The official projection reports 77 million. The Trend projection, aligned to ONS assumptions projected 78 million for 2051. Using revised assumptions 80 million was projected in a fourth projection. When the model for emigration was changed the projected population was only 71 million. All projections showed ageing and dispersion of ethnic minorities. By 2051 the UK will have a larger, more diverse and integrated population.

For further information about the project, see documentation and the What happens when international migrants settle? Ethnic group population trends and projections for UK local areas under alternative scenarios ESRC award page.


Main Topics:

For full details of the individual files (and topics covered) within the study, see documentation files '6777_list_of_files.xlsx' and '6777_fileinformation.pdf' in the Documentation table below.

Users should note that this study is very large - c.8GB. Multiple files have been created for download, according to the type of compilation - benchef, bencher, trendef, uptapef and uptaper (see 6777_fileinformation.pdf for details). To obtain all files contained within the study, users should download all zip files.

For the year ending June 2024, approximately 1.2 million people migrated to the United Kingdom, while 479,000 people migrated from the UK, resulting in a net migration figure of 728,000. There have consistently been more people migrating to the United Kingdom than leaving it since 1993 when the net migration figure was negative 1,000. Although migration from the European Union has declined since the Brexit vote of 2016, migration from non-EU countries accelerated rapidly from 2021 onwards. In the year to June 2023, 968,000 people from non-EU countries migrated to the UK, compared with 129,000 from EU member states. Immigration and the next UK election Throughout 2023, immigration, along with the economy and healthcare, was consistently seen by UK voters as one of the top issues facing the country. Despite a pledge to deter irregular migration via small boats, and controversial plans to send asylum applicants to Rwanda while their claims are being processed, the current government is losing the trust of the public on this issue. As of February 2024, 20 percent of Britons thought the Labour Party would be the best party to handle immigration, compared with 16 percent who thought the Conservatives would handle it better. With the next UK election expected at some point in 2024, the Conservatives are battling to improve their public image on this and many other issues. Historical context of migration The first humans who arrived in the British Isles, were followed by acts of conquest and settlement from Romans, Anglo-Saxons, Danes, and Normans. In the early modern period, there were also significant waves of migration from people fleeing religious or political persecution, such as the French Huguenots. More recently, large numbers of people also left Britain. Between 1820 and 1957, for example, around 4.5 million people migrated from Britain to America. After World War Two, immigration from Britain's colonies and former colonies was encouraged to meet labor demands. A key group that migrated from the Caribbean between the late 1940s and early 1970s became known as the Windrush generation, named after one of the ships that brought the arrivals to Britain.

This table shows resident population of London broken down by nationality, showing data for London's largest communities in 2004, and 2008 to 2012.

Also shows the percentage of the UK community that live in London.
The Annual Population Survey (APS) sampled around 325,000 people in the UK (around 28,000 in London). As such all figures must be treated with some caution. 95% confidence interval levels are provided.

All numbers based on fewer than 50 surveys have been suppressed.
Numbers have been rounded to the nearest thousand.

The APS is the only inter-censal data source that can provide estimates of the population stock by nationality. The data have a range of limitations, particularly in relation to their poor coverage of short-term migrants or recent arrivals. They also struggle to provide estimates for small migrant populations due to small sample sizes.
Information about Londoners by Country of Birth using APS data, can be found in DMAG Briefing 2008-05 http://legacy.london.gov.uk/gla/publications/factsandfigures/dmag-briefing-2008-05.pdf

ONS website

Time-series dataset of the demographic characteristics of the UK ethnic minority populations and religious groups up to 2006, to study ethnic and religious demographic diversity and its impact upon future population size, age-structure and the ethnic and religious composition of the UK population. This dataset is compiled from various existing data sources: 2001 Census, Labour Force Survey (LFS) and International Passenger Survey (IPS) data. In the absence of vital statistics by ethnic groups, indirect methods were used to estimate vital rates, including the ‘Own Child’ method applied to LFS household data to derive fertility estimates of ethnic and religious groups. Building on previous work, fertility rates of ethnic groups were produced up to 2006, distinguishing between UK-born and foreign-born populations. Migration rates were based on ONS International Migration Statistics (using IPS data), LFS and census data and projected on various assumptions. The results served population projections to mid-century and beyond of the main ethnic minority populations, including mixed populations, and using cohort-component methods. Furthermore, estimates of fertility rates for the major religious (and non-religious) groups were produced.

Datasets include: (1) Calculated fertility estimates for all women aged 15 to 49 in the UK, by 5 years age group, by ethnic group, religion and place of birth (UK/non-UK), based on LFS data; (2) Data on mixed children by ethnic group of the mother; (3) Data on country of birth by ethnic group (all populations); (4) Data on immigration flow by country of origin.

This project aims to analyse ethnic and religious demographic diversity, to investigate the potential for convergence of trends over time and its impact upon future population size, age-structure and the ethnic and religious composition of the UK population.

Existing statistical sources (especially the 2001 Census, the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the Office for National Statistics (ONS) Longitudinal Survey) will be used to produce time-series of the demographic characteristics of the ethnic minority populations and religious groups up to 2006. In the absence of vital statistics by ethnic groups, the Own Child method applied to LFS and census data will be used to derive fertility estimates of ethnic and religious groups.

The results will serve population projections to mid-century and beyond of the main ethnic minority populations, including mixed populations, and using cohort-component methods. Migration rates will be based on ONS International Migration Statistics, LFS and census data and projected on various assumptions.

Furthermore, estimates of fertility rates and other demographic information for the major religious (and non-religious) groups will be produced with a view to making preliminary projections of their future size. The potential convergence of the demographic characteristics of ethnic and religious groups will be analysed, including mixed unions as an indicator for integration.

This dataset contains multiple measures of psychological processes that have previously been found to vary cross-culturally: individualism, collectivism, closeness to others, attributional style, object categorisation, drawing style and self-enhancement. Respondents are all residents of East London, with most falling into three main groups: first generation British Bangladeshis, second generation British Bangladeshis, and non-migrants with no Bangladeshi or South Asian heritage. The data also contains various demographic and lifestyle measures, such as education level, family contact, mass media use, age, and age of migration (for first generation migrants). Please see attached publication (Mesoudi, Magid & Hussain, 2016, PLOS ONE) for more details.

Until recently, psychologists assumed that people from different societies all think in the same way as we do in the West - that there is a universal human psychology shared by everyone on the planet. However, when psychologists started testing non-Western people, rather than the American and British undergraduates who typically do psychology experiments, they found intriguing cultural differences. For example, there are differences in perception: Westerners focus on single objects, whereas non-Westerners focus on the relationships between objects. If you show a British and a Japanese person a scene containing lots of objects, the British person is subsequently better at recognising the objects if they are presented on their own, whereas the Japanese person has better memory if the object is presented in the original scene. Or differences in explaining other people's behaviour: Westerners explain behaviour of others in terms of fixed personality traits, whereas non-Westerners explain actions in terms of social contexts. A British teacher might explain a student's poor exam performance in terms of their laziness or lack of intelligence, whereas a Korean teacher might appeal instead to the overbearing pressure to succeed academically.

But why do people from different cultures think differently? This is the central question addressed by this project. Several explanations are possible: it could be that psychological variation is caused by genetic differences between populations, and cognitive style is inherited genetically from parents. Alternatively, parents could have a non-genetic influence, through direct teaching or passive observation. Or psychological traits could be transmitted non-parentally, via peers, formal schooling, or the mass media.

We will take advantage of a unique natural experiment to tease apart these factors: immigration. If the UK-born children of non-Western immigrants resemble their parents in their psychological traits, we can infer that those traits are transmitted from parents either genetically or culturally. If, on the other hand, they resemble local non-immigrants, then non-parental influence must be at work. We will then see whether this shift is associated with specific factors, such as years of schooling, exposure to mass media, or bilingualism.

Another way of explaining psychological variation is in terms of history. For example, it has been suggested that Western individualism arose in ancient Greece as a response to solitary herding, whereas Eastern collectivism arose in ancient China as a response to collective rice farming. We will test this by simulating these conditions in the lab, as an experimental "microcosm" of cultural history, to see whether solitary action stimulates individualism and collective action stimulates collectivism.

Finally, we will develop a web app that will let us test these ideas in multiple countries, beyond the UK, and specifically targeting immigrant groups. If these relationships hold across several regions, we can be more confident that they are valid. On the other hand, differences between regions might also be valuable. If immigrants acculturate faster in London than elsewhere, as suggested by pilot data, we can identify why this is, such as differences in mass media influence, bilingualism or family size.

This project has major potential benefits for the successful integration of immigrants to the UK. Psychological differences can constitute a barrier to successful social and economic integration. For example, non-Western students can find it difficult to cope in Western educational systems that favour autonomy and creative thinking. Knowing the origin of these differences can help to overcome them better, for example by targeting parents (if parents have an influence) or the media (if the media plays a role).

In 2021, there were approximately 357,000 Indian residents living in London, the most of any foreign nationality. Nigerian nationals numbered 142,000, and were the second most common nationality in this year.

This paper that supplements the code available in this collection examines UK immigrant-native wage differentials for men across major first- and second-generation immigrant groups with the UK Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS) pooling cross-sections over the years 2009–2019. I find that first-generation immigrants with UK human capital experience less of a wage disadvantage than their immigrant counterparts with foreign language proficiency, qualifications, and work experience. Conditional on the heterogeneity in these productivity characteristics of first-generation immigrants, I observe no intergenerational economic progress across the two generations relative to UK natives. Using a conditional decomposition shows that UK work experience and not the source country of study for the qualification is a key factor in reducing first-generation, immigrant-native wage differentials in the UK.

Current literature reports large first-generation immigrant-native wage differentials in the UK. The aim of this research is to show that some if by no means all of the wage differentials can be explained by human capital factors, i.e., by the source of qualification, work experience, and language.

As recorded by the source, Moroccans ranked as the foreign nationality with more residents in Spain in 2023, closely followed by Romanians. After years of losing its foreign population, Spain’s immigration figures started to pick up in 2015, with the number of people that moved to the Mediterranean country surpassing the number of foreigners that decided to leave.

A matter of balance The net migration rate of Spain changed its course mainly due to the great inflow of foreigners that move to reside in the Mediterranean country. Spain’s immigration flow slowed down after the 2008 financial crisis, albeit the number of foreigners that opted to change their residence saw a significant growth in the last years. In 2022, Colombians ranked first as the foreign nationality that most relocated to Spain, distantly followed by Moroccans and Ukranians.

Spain does not have the highest number of immigrants in Europe In recent years, the European Union confronted a rising number of refugees arriving from the Middle East. Migration figures show that Germany accommodated approximately 15 million foreign-born citizens, ranking it as the country that most hosted immigrants in Europe in 2022. By comparison, Spain’s foreign population stood slightly over seven million, positioning the Western Mediterranean country third on the European list of foreign-born population. Unfortunately, thousands of persons have died ore gone missing trying to reach Spanish territory, as more and more irregular migrants opt to use dangerous maritime routes to arrive at Southern Europe from Africa's coasts.

This is a dataset generated from information extracted from previously published studies, for the purpose of a meta-analysis investigating fitness benefits of different migratory strategies in partially migratory populations. Each line of data includes a mean and associated variance for a given fitness metric for both migrants and residents extracted from a study, in addition to information concerning population location, study species, type of fitness metric, year data were collected, and details on the publication from which the data were obtained. Data were collected as part of a NERC-funded PhD project, grant number NE/L002582/1.

Colombia ranked as the country of origin of the largest immigration group arriving into Spain in 2023, as revealed by the latest data. Over 170,000 people migrated from the South American country to Spain that year. The second largest group was comprised by Moroccans with around 122,000 newcomers. A matter of balance The net migration rate of Spain changed its course mainly due to the great inflow of foreigners that move to reside in the Mediterranean country. Spain’s immigration flow slowed down after the 2008 financial crisis, albeit the number of foreigners that opted to change their residence saw a significant growth in the last years. In 2023, Moroccans ranked first as the foreign nationality residing Spain, followed by people from Romania and the Colombians. Spain does not have the highest number of immigrants in Europe In recent years, the European Union confronted a rising number of refugees arriving from the Middle East and Africa. Migration figures show that Germany accommodated approximately 15 million foreign-born citizens, ranking it as the country that most hosted immigrants in Europe in 2023. By comparison, Spain’s foreign population stood over eight million, positioning the Western Mediterranean country third on the European list of foreign-born population. Unfortunately, thousands of persons have died or gone missing trying to reach Spanish territory, as more and more irregular migrants opt to use dangerous maritime routes to arrive at Southern Europe from Africa's coasts.

The largest number of immigrants in Germany were from Ukraine, as of 2023. The top three origin countries were rounded up by Romania and Turkey. Immigrants are defined as having left a country, which may be their home country, to permanently reside in another. Upon arriving, immigrants do not hold the citizenship of the country they move to. Immigration in the EU All three aforementioned countries are members of the European Union, which means their citizens have freedom of movement between EU member states. In practice, this means that citizens of any EU member country may relocate between them to live and work there. Unrestricted by visas or residence permits, the search for university courses, jobs, retirement options, and places to live seems to be defined by an enormous amount of choice. However, even in this freedom of movement scheme, immigration may be hampered by bureaucratic hurdles or financial challenges. Prosperity with a question mark While Germany continues to be an attractive destination for foreigners both in and outside the European Union, as well as asylum applicants, it remains to be seen how current events might influence these patterns, whether the number of immigrants arriving from certain countries will shift. Europe’s largest economy is suffering. Climbing inflation levels in the last few months, as well as remaining difficulties from the ongoing coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic are affecting global economic development. Ultimately, future immigrants may face the fact of moving from one struggling economy to another.

The majority of immigrants moving to Sweden in 2023 were Swedes returning to Sweden. Nearly 10,600 Swedes returned to their home country in 2023. The remaining top five countries of origin were India, Poland, Germany, and Syria. In total, 95,000 people immigrated to Sweden in 2023.

Syrians largest immigrant group

Of Sweden's foreign-born population, Syrians made up the largest group. Following the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, many people left the country in search of a better life in Europe, some of which landed in Sweden. In 2022, Sweden hosted the world's 7th largest group of Syrian refugees.

Immigration drives population increase in Sweden

Over the past decade, Sweden has seen a positive migration rate, with more people immigrating to the country than people leaving. This is one of the main reasons why the country's population has been increasing steadily over recent years.

There were approximately 268 thousand Portuguese nationals residing in the United Kingdom in 2021, an increase from the 90 thousand Portuguese nationals residing in the United Kingdom in 2008. The highest number of Portuguese nationals residing in the United Kingdom was in 2020 with 271 thousand.