In 2024, Tajikistan was leading as the country of origin of immigrants in Russia, with nearly ******* people changing their residence to Russia. The leading five origins were former republics of the Soviet Union.

In every year of the observed period, the sum of internal and international immigrants exceeded that of emigrants in Russia. In 2023, the emigrant count saw a decrease from the previous year. In aggregate terms, migration flows steadily decreased from 1990 to 2009. After 2010, the figures for in- and outflows started to recover. Why do Russians emigrate? A year after the Russia-Ukraine war began, more than one in ten Russians expressed their willingness to emigrate. The desire to provide children with a decent future was the leading reason for emigration, as cited by ** percent of respondents who were willing to leave the country. The allegedly worsening economic situation in Russia and high-quality medicine abroad also ranked high. Among those who emigrated in 2022, the majority chose the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries or countries near the CIS region. Incentives to migrate to Russia One of the countries with the largest gross domestic product (GDP) worldwide, Russia remains a popular immigration destination. In 2023, nearly ******* people came to Russia from Tajikistan. Further ****** and ****** arrived from Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine, respectively. Russia’s visa-free regime with most post-Soviet states eases the entry into the country. For example, citizens of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan have the right to employment in Russia without obtaining a work permit. Citizens of Azerbaijan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan can enter Russia visa-free and obtain a work patent upon arrival.

ObjectiveExperiences of ethnic discrimination may constitute major stressors for ethnic minority groups. This study examined the associations between different forms of ethnic discrimination and levels of perceived stress in Russian immigrants living in Germany, taking into account potential moderating (in-group identification) and mediating (coping and social support) factors.MethodsRussian immigrants (N = 308) were assessed using online questionnaires (e.g., perceived stress scale, behaviors from intergroup affect and stereotype treatment scale, and brief COPE). Three forms of ethnic discrimination were examined: active harm (e.g., open aggression), passive harm (e.g., paternalistic behavior), and everyday discrimination (e.g., receiving poor service). Moderation by in-group identification and mediation via coping and social support were tested.ResultsPassive harm was more prevalent than everyday discrimination and active harm. Passive harm and everyday discrimination were associated with higher perceived stress (rs = .22 and .18, ps .27). The coping strategy self-blame mediated the association between active harm and stress. Substance use and self-blame mediated the association between passive harm and stress, whereas venting, behavioral disengagement, denial, self-blame, and social support mediated the association between everyday discrimination and stress. A direct effect remained for passive harm and everyday discrimination.ConclusionThe present study revealed that Russian immigrants encounter different forms of ethnic discrimination, and that this is associated with higher levels of stress. This association was partly explained by coping and social support, illustrating possibilities for interventions aimed at improving the use of adaptive coping strategies and promoting social support-seeking for Russian immigrants.

The majority of immigrants in Poland in 2023 were from Ukraine (******), a decrease of ** percent compared to the previous year. Immigration to Poland for different reasons In 2022, nearly ****** people immigrated to Poland for permanent residence, of which most came from Ukraine, the UK, and Germany, respectively. Furthermore, the majority of immigrants for temporary stay in Poland in 2022 were from Ukraine (****** immigrants), a decrease of *** percent compared to the previous year. In 2023, most Ukrainian citizens chose Poland as a place for economic emigration. The main reason for that choice was geographical and cultural proximity. Nearly every second respondent valued the low language barrier, and for every third person, the motivation was earnings. Poles attitudes toward Russia’s war with Ukraine In 2022, most Poles had a negative attitude toward Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Poles’ biggest concerns about the Russia-Ukraine war were the military threats from Russia and the impact of the war on the condition of the Polish economy. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Poles proved their support for Ukrainians. One of the most common forms of support for refugees fleeing the Russia-Ukraine war to Poland was to provide blankets, food, and hygiene items. Four out of 10 Poles donated money to a charity fundraiser and volunteered in organizations.

The stereotype content model (SCM), originating in the United States and generalized across nearly 50 countries, has yet to address ethnic relations in one of the world’s most influential nations. Russia and the United States are somewhat alike (large, powerful, immigrant-receiving), but differ in other ways relevant to intergroup images (culture, religions, ideology, and history). Russian ethnic stereotypes are understudied, but significant for theoretical breadth and practical politics. This research tested the SCM on ethnic stereotypes in a Russian sample (N = 1115). Study 1 (N = 438) produced an SCM map of the sixty most numerous domestic ethnic groups (both ethnic minorities and immigrants). Four clusters occupied the SCM warmth-by-competence space. Study 2 (N = 677) compared approaches to ethnic stereotypes in terms of status and competition, cultural distance, perceived region, and four intergroup threats. Using the same Study 1 groups, the Russian SCM map showed correlated warmth and competence, with few ambivalent stereotypes. As the SCM predicts, status predicted competence, and competition negatively predicted warmth. Beyond the SCM, status and property threat both were robust antecedents for both competence and warmth for all groups. Besides competition, cultural distance also negatively predicted warmth for all groups. The role of the other antecedents, as expected, varied from group to group. To examine relative impact, a network analysis demonstrated that status, competition, and property threat centrally influence many other variables in the networks. The SCM, along with antecedents from other models, describes Russian ethnic-group images. This research contributes: (1) a comparison of established approaches to ethnic stereotypes (from acculturation and intergroup relations) showing the stability of the main SCM predictions; (2) network structures of the multivariate dependencies of the considered variables; (3) systematically cataloged images of ethnic groups in Russia for further comparisons, illuminating the Russian historical, societal, and interethnic context.

Tajikistan was the leading country of destination of Russian emigrants in 2024, with around 92,000 people changing their residence to that country. Among countries that were not former Soviet Union states, the major destinations were India, China, and Vietnam.

In 2022, the largest group of immigrants arriving in Norway came from Ukraine after the Russian invasion of the country in February that year. Moreover, the origin of nearly 17,000 immigrants was unknown. Immigrants from Poland made up the third largest group. At the beginning of 2023, a total of nearly 112,000 Polish people resided in Norway.

This Excel file contains annual net migration records for Russian regions by 1-year age groups, from 0 to 80, for the periods 2003-2010 and 2011-2013. The first period is defined by the two Russian Censuses (end of 2002 and end of 2010). The second period is limited by the availability of data. Moreover, there was a significant change in the current migration record in 2011; so, the data for the two periods are barely comparable. There are 78 regions , as the data for Moscow and Leningrad regions are merged with the data for the federal cities of Moscow and St.Petersburg, correspondingly. List of data files:IR_0310.csv - inter-regional migration in 2003-2010IN_0310.csv - international migration in 2003-2010IR_1113.csv - inter-regional migration in 2011-2013IN_1113.csv - international migration in 2011-2013

IntroductionThis paper provides an initial exploration of Ukrainian–Russian bilingualism in the context of the war-affected migration from Ukraine to Austria and Germany. While extensive research exists on various aspects of Ukrainian– Russian bilingualism in relation to Ukraine itself, thus far no studies have been conducted on this bilingualism in the diasporic context, i.e., as a language of the first and subsequential generations with a migrant background in Austria and Germany.MethodsTo address this research gap, our paper examines the language attitudes of two respondent groups with a Ukrainian background in the two countries: migrants and refugees who left Ukraine after 2014 and those who left after Russia’s invasion in February 2022. In the framework of a sociolinguistic survey, we describe their current attitudes regarding the use of Ukrainian and Russian, among others, in relation to the actual and intended use of the language(s) in the multilingual context of migration. The survey eliciting information on demographic information, language proficiency, language attitudes and language use was conducted on 406 Ukrainians in two host countries (Austria: n = 103; Germany: n = 306). First, we compared self-rated proficiency in Ukrainian and Russian as well as attitudes and use of these languages. Second, we applied a network modelling analysis to determine the nature of relationships between these variables.Results and discussionThe results indicated that proficiency in Ukrainian and in Russian were the strongest nodes in the model affecting language use and language attitudes toward the respective languages. Our data analysis focused on the pragmatic and symbolic value of Russian and Ukrainian playing a crucial role in the language vitality in multilingual settings. The paper discusses the imbalanced correlation of the symbolic and pragmatic value of Ukrainian and Russian in the diasporic Ukrainian communities. While Ukrainian has gained a higher symbolic status, Russian maintains a better pragmatic one, despite its negative symbolic status. However, we anticipate that the increasing symbolic value of Ukrainian and the diminishing value of Russian will lead to an increase in the use of Ukrainian also in Russian-dominant bilingual groups of Ukrainian migrants and refugees, even as an insider-code in hermetic minority groups.

BackgroundHealth literacy (HL) is considered to be an important precondition for health. HL research often identifies migrants as vulnerable for low HL. However, in-depth data on HL among migrants especially in its domains of health care, disease prevention and health promotion and its determinants are still scarce.ObjectiveThe aim of this study was therefore to analyse the current status of HL among migrants and their descendants from Turkey and from the former Soviet Union (FSU) in Germany and factors associated with it. This has not been studied using large-scale data and bilingual interviews. We differentiate between dimensions of HL, namely the domains of health care, disease prevention and health promotion which goes beyond many previous studies. In addition, we explore new mechanisms by testing the explanatory power of self-efficacy and interethnic contacts for migrants' HL.MethodsThe study includes 825 first- and second-generation adult migrants from two of the largest immigration groups in Germany, from Turkey and FSU, who were interviewed face-to-face in German, Turkish or Russian in late summer 2020. HL was measured using the HLS19-Q47 instrument. Age, gender, educational level, social status and financial deprivation, chronic illness, health-related literacy skills, self-efficacy, interethnic contacts, migration generation, duration of stay and region of origin were considered as possible determinants. Ordinary least square regressions were estimated.ResultsThe average general HL score was 65.5. HL in health promotion and disease prevention was lower than in health care. Low financial deprivation, health-related literacy skills, and self-efficacy were positively correlated with each HL domain. Educational level, social status, age, gender, duration of stay and interethnic contacts were positively correlated with HL in some domains. Region of origin was only correlated with the domain of disease prevention until interethnic contact was accounted for.ConclusionOur study contributes to the existing knowledge by analyzing different domains of HL and testing its correlations with self-efficacy and interethnic contact among migrants. We reveal that migrants cannot generally be considered as vulnerable for low HL, as oftentimes outlined. There is a need for interventions e.g. to enhance the understanding of health information among subgroups with lower HL.

The purpose of the study was to collect survey data on the employment/work histories, family structure histories, and residential mobility histories of Russian adults from January 1985 through the end of the survey. The work histories include the following information about each job held during that time period: occupation, how the job was found, employer type, industry, and size. In addition, the survey gathered information on current residence, occupation, other job characteristics, earnings, sources of household income, household ownership of consumer goods, basic demographic indicators, and attitude measures. The data were designed to be used for multivariate analysis of the factors influencing changes in employment status, job mobility of various types, changes in marital status, fertility, and residential mobility in Russia during the period of 1985-2001. Since the period covered by the histories spans the final seven years of the Soviet era and the first decade of the post-Soviet era, the data are uniquely suited for assessing whether the transition from Soviet-style socialism has affected stratification, family formation, and migration processes. Moreover, because the data include work/employment, family structure, and migration histories, the dataset is uniquely suited for dynamic analyses of the inter-relationships among states and events in these three domains. Finally, because the data contain information on each respondent's oblast (region) of residence at all points in time from 1985-2001, data on regional characteristics can be merged with files created from the survey data, in order to measure the impact of regional characteristics on individual-level events. The data can be used to investigate job and employment transitions, union formation and dissolution, fertility, departures of children, internal migration, determinants of earnings, wage arrears, consumption, and other topics.

The study examined Ingrian-Finnish remigrants and their social adjustment in Finland. Main themes included, among others, the respondents' motives for moving from Russia to Finland, integration into Finnish society, social well-being, and perceptions of Finnish and Russian culture and values. The data consist of four surveys conducted between 2008 and 2013. The study follows the same remigrants throughout the surveys, and the first survey was conducted in Russia before the respondents moved to Finland. Some questions were repeated, although not always identically, in the four surveys. The surveys were conducted in Russian, but the data are in Finnish and English. Because the data do not contain all questions included in the questionnaire, only the questions included in the data are described here. The first three surveys were conducted as part of the INPRES (Intervening at the pre-migration stage: Providing tools for promoting integration and adaptation) research project and the fourth survey was conducted as part of the LADA (The Long-Term Adaptation of Diaspora Migrants) research project. The aim of the projects was to study pre- and post-migration factors involved in the long-term adaptation of ethnic re-migrants from Russia to Finland. Both research projects were funded by the Academy of Finland. In the first survey, which was the most extensive out of the four surveys, the motives for the respondents' prospective move to Finland (e.g. aspiration to secure children's future, will to live in the country of their ancestors, concerns regarding financial circumstances, will to live with relatives residing in Finland) as well as with whom they were planning to move were charted. The respondents' sources of information regarding Finland and Finnish society, for example, relatives/friends, Finnish language teachers, authorities or the media, as well as whether they had received support from the same sources were surveyed. Finally, the first survey charted whether the respondents had learned Finnish and for how long. In the four surveys, question sets charting the respondents' values, attitudes and prejudices against Finns and Russians were repeated. Several character trait descriptions were presented to the respondents, and they were asked to evaluate how well the descriptions fit a typical Finn, a typical Russian or them personally. The character trait descriptions included various themes, such as the importance of wealth, willingness to draw attention or take risks, devotion to friends, and importance of tradition. The respondents' social activity and participation in Finland were also charted from the second survey onwards with recurring questions on, for example, whether they spoke Russian/Finnish at home or with friends, read books in Russian/Finnish, and participated in different events. In the fourth survey, political activity was surveyed with questions on whether the respondents followed political discussion, voted and participated in collective activity. Additionally, other recurring questions in the surveys examined, for example, the respondents' satisfaction in their decision to move, their social networks and language skills, the stressfulness of the move as well as general information on the respondents' health and well-being. The respondents' sociodemographic background information was charted thoroughly in this study. Among other things, they were asked about their family, housing arrangements, employment situation, religious affiliation, religiosity and education. Background variables included, among others, the respondent's age (categorised), gender, marital status, financial circumstances, and economic activity and occupational status.

BackgroundIn migration and health research, the healthy migrant effect has been a common finding, but it usually pertains to specific contexts only. Existing findings are inconsistent and inconclusive regarding the cognitive functioning of the (aging) foreign-origin population relative to the populations of their host and sending countries. Moreover, this comparison is an understudied design setting.ObjectiveWe analyze the outcomes and associations of cognitive functioning outcomes of the non-institutionalized middle-aged and older population, comparing the Russian-origin population in Estonia with Estonians in Estonia and Russians in Russia in a cross-sectional design. We aim to estimate the (long-term) effects of migration on cognitive functioning in later life, contextualizing the findings in previous research on the healthy migrant effect.Data and methodsWe use data from face-to-face interviews conducted within the SHARE Estonia (2010–2011) and SAGE Russia (2007–2010) surveys. Respondents aged 50+ living in urban areas were grouped by self-identified ethnicity, including 2,365 Estonians, 1,373 Russians in Estonia, and 2,339 Russians in Russia (total N = 6,077). Cognitive functioning was measured using a 25-percentile cut-off threshold for the results of two cognition outcomes - immediate recall and verbal fluency - and the odds of impairment were estimated using binary logistic regression.ResultsRussian men and women living in Estonia have significantly higher odds of impairment in immediate recall than Estonian men and women, though they do not differ from Russians in Russia in the final adjusted models. The differences between all groups are non-significant if age at migration is considered. There are no significant differences between the groups in verbal fluency.ConclusionContrary to the commonly found healthy migrant effect, the middle-aged and older foreign-origin population in Estonia fares initially worse than the native population in the immediate recall outcome, but does not differ from their sending country population, possibly due to Russia’s higher mortality rate and therefore the selective survival of healthier people. Different results depending on the cognitive functioning outcome suggest that migration may affect temporary memory more than crystallized knowledge. However, there are no differences between the groups if defined based on age at migration, which suggests that the age profile differences explain most of the groups’ differences in cognitive functioning.

In 2022, more than 17,000 individuals immigrated to Iceland. Of these, people immigrating from Poland made up the largest group with nearly 4,000 immigrants. People from Ukraine made up the second largest group, which must be seen in relation with the Russia-Ukraine war that broke out in February 2022.

The survey charted the values and attitudes of Finnish people. The main themes of the autumn 2018 survey included social services reformation, immigration, trust in different actors in Finnish society, recent societal changes, security and Finland's foreign policy. First, the respondents were presented with attitudinal statements regarding different spheres of society, for instance, public services, immigration, the Finnish workforce, NATO membership, Russia and the United States, climate policy, the functionality of democracy, and whether politicians care about ordinary people's lives and opinions. As regards reforming social services and welfare, respondents' opinions were charted on, for instance, the gratuitousness of welfare, basic security, universal basic income, and the funding and level of social benefits. Views on immigration were charted with attitudinal statements regarding, for instance, strictness of Finnish policy on aliens, social benefits received by immigrants, increased crime due to immigrants, and immigration as an aid to shortage of workforce. Next, the respondents' views were examined on equality and their own position in Finnish society (e.g. in occupational life, as a taxpayer, in the eyes of authorities). Their trust in different types of actors in society was also charted (e.g. Parliament, church, judicial system, police, enterprises, banks, social media, Wikipedia, the market economy, newspaper press, Google). In addition, the respondents were asked to estimate whether Finland had changed positively or negatively in the previous 10 years in different areas (e.g. Finland's position in Europe, democracy, disparity in income and well-being, standard of education, social security). The next questions charted the respondents' views on the severity of different threats, e.g. armed attack against Finland, cyber attacks, terrorist attack, financial crisis, foreign efforts to interfere with Finnish elections, global warming, pandemic diseases, being a victim of violence. The respondents were asked to evaluate how well different actors (e.g. president, prime minister, foreign minister, the current Government) had handled foreign policy. Finally, the respondents' views on Finland's EU membership and the Euro were examined as well as how the respondents would vote if a referendum were held on Finland's EU membership. Background variables included gender, age group, type of municipality of residence, region of residence, education level, economic activity and occupational status, type of employer, occupational sector, type of contract, political party preference (which party R would vote for if parliamentary elections were held at the time of the survey), federation of trade unions membership, and self-perceived social class.

Abstract

Monitoring of External Migration Situation in Armenia through Sample Survey Program commissioned by the State Committee of Science of the Republic of Armenia and being currently implemented by Russian–Armenian (Slavonic) University.

The Socio-Demographic Research Center of the Slavonic University (“Research Center”) has been engaged in analyzing migration decisions in Armenia as part of its ongoing Three-Year Program on monitoring migration through collection of household survey data and is therefore uniquely placed to analyze the situation with regards to migration in 2017. The 2017 household survey of migration conducted by “Research Center” is a follow-up survey (repeated cross-section) to those conducted in the years 2015 and 2016.

The survey gives an opportunity to: - Assess the influence of external migration on living conditions of households; - Restructure the whole timetable of trips done by migrant members of households prior to the monitoring; - Measure migration potential of population; - Analyze separate survey questionnaires for returned migrants and migrants staying abroad to reveal the issues they face abroad and after arrival to Armenia, a cause–effect relationship of the phenomenon, etc.

Geographic coverage

National

Analysis unit

Individuals and Households

Kind of data

Sample survey data [ssd]

Sampling procedure

Similar to the studies done in 2015 and 2016, this year methodology of the study has been based on multistage stratified and cluster sampling. At the primary stage of sampling the research group has determined that unit of observation is a household. The sample size: 2100 households.

Mode of data collection

Face-to-face [f2f]

Research instrument

The main instrument of the study is the survey questionnaire, which consists of the Tittle Page and 5 sections: Section 1. Welfare and remittances Section 2. Socio-demographic and economic characteristics of household members Section 3. The schedule of migration departures and arrivals from the given settlement of present and absent h/h members since 2014 Section 4. Returnees from abroad Section 5. Those who are abroad

In 2022, the highest number of immigrants to Denmark for several years was registered, a number that must be seen in relation with the Russian invasion of Ukraine. That year, a total of 121,000 people immigrated to Denmark, compared to 76,000 the previous year. In 2023, the number fell below 100,000.

Eastern Europeans largest group of immigrants

Today, Ukrainians make up the second largest group of immigrants living in Denmark, a high number of who are refugees from the Russia-Ukraine war. Meanwhile, Poles made up the largest group. Many of these are people moving to Denmark for work.

Immigration drives population increase

With the annual number of people immigrating to Denmark being higher than the number of people emigrating, migration has played an important part in the country's increasing population.

The second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey (EU-MIDIS II) was conducted in 2016 by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) as a follow-up to the first survey on minorities´ and immigrants´ experiences of discrimination and criminal victimisation conducted by the Agency in 2008. The EU-MIDIS II survey collected information from 25,515 respondents from different ethnic minority and migrant backgrounds, including Roma, in all EU Member States (2016: EU-28 including the UK). The EU-MIDIS II sample is representative of the selected populations that were interviewed. The sample includes persons belonging to ethnic or national minorities, Roma and Russians, persons born outside the EU (first generation respondents) and persons with at least one parent born outside the EU (second generation respondents). All respondents were 16 years or older and had lived in a private household for at least 12 months before the interview. People living in institutional settings - for example, hospitals or prisons - were not interviewed.

The selection of groups to be surveyed in each country was based on several criteria, including the size of the target population, the feasibility of surveying the target population in terms of cost and accessibility, the risk of certain groups experiencing ´racial´, ´ethnic´ or ´religious´ discrimination and victimisation, their vulnerability to the risk of social exclusion and, finally, comparability with previous FRA surveys. The target groups of the EU-MIDIS II survey are immigrants and descendants of immigrants from North Africa; immigrants and descendants of immigrants from Turkey; immigrants and descendants of immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa; immigrants and descendants of immigrants from Asia and South Asia; new immigrants; Roma; members of the Russian minority. In Slovenia and Poland, people who immigrated to the EU in the last 10 years were included, regardless of country of origin. The fieldwork was conducted between September 2015 and September 2016 by Ipsos MORI under the supervision of FRA staff who monitored compliance with strict quality control procedures.

The questionnaire includes questions on perceived discrimination in various areas, such as employment, education, housing, health and in the use of public or private services. It also covers police checks, criminal victimisation (including hate crime), and awareness of rights and of institutions that provide victim support. In addition, respondents were asked about issues of social participation and integration, including trust in public institutions and the degree of attachment to the country in which they live.

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In 2022, the most common age for people immigrating to Norway was 16 to 44 years. 55,000 people in this age group immigrated to Norway that year. The second largest age group was children from zero to 15 years, counting 20,000 immigrants. Meanwhile, only around 2,500 people aged 67 years or more immigrated to the country. The number of immigrants to Norway peaked in 2022, partly as a result of the Russia-Ukraine war.