From the Summer of 2007 until the end of 2009 (at least), the world was gripped by a series of economic crises commonly known as the Global Financial Crisis (2007-2008) and the Great Recession (2008-2009). The financial crisis was triggered by the collapse of the U.S. housing market, which caused panic on Wall Street, the center of global finance in New York. Due to the outsized nature of the U.S. economy compared to other countries and particularly the centrality of U.S. finance for the world economy, the crisis spread quickly to other countries, affecting most regions across the globe. By 2009, global GDP growth was in negative territory, with international credit markets frozen, international trade contracting, and tens of millions of workers being made unemployed.

Global similarities, global differences

Since the 1980s, the world economy had entered a period of integration and globalization. This process particularly accelerated after the collapse of the Soviet Union ended the Cold War (1947-1991). This was the period of the 'Washington Consensus', whereby the U.S. and international institutions such as the World Bank and IMF promoted policies of economic liberalization across the globe. This increasing interdependence and openness to the global economy meant that when the crisis hit in 2007, many countries experienced the same issues. This is particularly evident in the synchronization of the recessions in the most advanced economies of the G7. Nevertheless, the aggregate global GDP number masks the important regional differences which occurred during the recession. While the more advanced economies of North America, Western Europe, and Japan were all hit hard, along with countries who are reliant on them for trade or finance, large emerging economies such as India and China bucked this trend. In particular, China's huge fiscal stimulus in 2008-2009 likely did much to prevent the global economy from sliding further into a depression. In 2009, while the United States' GDP sank to -2.6 percent, China's GDP, as reported by national authorities, was almost 10 percent.

Lehman Brothers, the fourth largest investment bank on Wall Street, declared bankruptcy on the 15th of September 2008, becoming the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history. The investment house, which was founded in the mid-19th century, had become heavily involved in the U.S. housing bubble in the early 2000s, with its large holdings of toxic mortgage-backed securities (MBS) ultimately causing the bank's downfall. The bank had expanded rapidly following the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999, which meant that investment banks could also engage in commercial banking activities. Lehman vertically integrated their mortgage business, buying smaller commercial enterprises that originated housing loans, which allowed the bank to expand its MBS holdings. The downfall of Lehman and the crash of '08 As the U.S. housing market began to slow down in 2006, the default rate on housing loans began to spike, triggering losses for Lehman from their MBS portfolio. Lehman's main competitor in mortgage financing, Bear Stearns, was bought by J.P. Morgan Chase in order to prevent bankruptcy in March 2008, leading investors and lenders to become increasingly concerned about the bank's financial health. As the bank relied on short-term funding on money markets in order to meet its obligations, the news of its huge losses in the third-quarter of 2008 further prevented it from funding itself on financial markets. By September, it was clear that without external assistance, the bank would fail. As its losses from credit default swaps mounted due to the deepening crash in the housing market, Lehman was forced to declare bankruptcy on September 15, as no buyer could be found to save the bank. The collapse of Lehman triggered panic in global financial markets, forcing the U.S. government to step in and bail-out the insurance giant AIG the next day on September 16. The effects of this financial crisis hit the non-financial economy hard, causing a global recession in 2009.

This is not going to be an article or Op-Ed about Michael Jordan. Since 2009 we've been in the longest bull-market in history, that's 11 years and counting. However a few metrics like the stock market P/E, the call to put ratio and of course the Shiller P/E suggest a great crash is coming in-between the levels of 1929 and the dot.com bubble. Mean reversion historically is inevitable and the Fed's printing money experiment could end in disaster for the stock market in late 2021 or 2022. You can read Jeremy Grantham's Last Dance article here. You are likely well aware of Michael Burry's predicament as well. It's easier for you just to skim through two related videos on this topic of a stock market crash. Michael Burry's Warning see this YouTube. Jeremy Grantham's Warning See this YouTube. Typically when there is a major event in the world, there is a crash and then a bear market and a recovery that takes many many months. In March, 2020 that's not what we saw since the Fed did some astonishing things that means a liquidity sloth and the risk of a major inflation event. The pandemic represented the quickest decline of at least 30% in the history of the benchmark S&P 500, but the recovery was not correlated to anything but Fed intervention. Since the pandemic clearly isn't disappearing and many sectors such as travel, business travel, tourism and supply chain disruptions appear significantly disrupted - the so-called economic recovery isn't so great. And there's this little problem at the heart of global capitalism today, the stock market just keeps going up. Crashes and corrections typically occur frequently in a normal market. But the Fed liquidity and irresponsible printing of money is creating a scenario where normal behavior isn't occurring on the markets. According to data provided by market analytics firm Yardeni Research, the benchmark index has undergone 38 declines of at least 10% since the beginning of 1950. Since March, 2020 we've barely seen a down month. September, 2020 was flat-ish. The S&P 500 has more than doubled since those lows. Look at the angle of the curve: The S&P 500 was 735 at the low in 2009, so in this bull market alone it has gone up 6x in valuation. That's not a normal cycle and it could mean we are due for an epic correction. I have to agree with the analysts who claim that the long, long bull market since 2009 has finally matured into a fully-fledged epic bubble. There is a complacency, buy-the dip frenzy and general meme environment to what BigTech can do in such an environment. The weight of Apple, Amazon, Alphabet, Microsoft, Facebook, Nvidia and Tesla together in the S&P and Nasdaq is approach a ridiculous weighting. When these stocks are seen both as growth, value and companies with unbeatable moats the entire dynamics of the stock market begin to break down. Check out FANG during the pandemic. BigTech is Seen as Bullet-Proof me valuations and a hysterical speculative behavior leads to even higher highs, even as 2020 offered many younger people an on-ramp into investing for the first time. Some analysts at JP Morgan are even saying that until retail investors stop charging into stocks, markets probably don’t have too much to worry about. Hedge funds with payment for order flows can predict exactly how these retail investors are behaving and monetize them. PFOF might even have to be banned by the SEC. The risk-on market theoretically just keeps going up until the Fed raises interest rates, which could be in 2023! For some context, we're more than 1.4 years removed from the bear-market bottom of the coronavirus crash and haven't had even a 5% correction in nine months. This is the most over-priced the market has likely ever been. At the night of the dot-com bubble the S&P 500 was only 1,400. Today it is 4,500, not so many years after. Clearly something is not quite right if you look at history and the P/E ratios. A market pumped with liquidity produces higher earnings with historically low interest rates, it's an environment where dangerous things can occur. In late 1997, as the S&P 500 passed its previous 1929 peak of 21x earnings, that seemed like a lot, but nothing compared to today. For some context, the S&P 500 Shiller P/E closed last week at 38.58, which is nearly a two-decade high. It's also well over double the average Shiller P/E of 16.84, dating back 151 years. So the stock market is likely around 2x over-valued. Try to think rationally about what this means for valuations today and your favorite stock prices, what should they be in historical terms? The S&P 500 is up 31% in the past year. It will likely hit 5,000 before a correction given the amount of added liquidity to the system and the QE the Fed is using that's like a huge abuse of MMT, or Modern Monetary Theory. This has also lent to bubbles in the housing market, crypto and even commodities like Gold with long-term global GDP meeting many headwinds in the years ahead due to a demographic shift of an ageing population and significant technological automation. So if you think that stocks or equities or ETFs are the best place to put your money in 2022, you might want to think again. The crash of the OTC and small-cap market since February 2021 has been quite an indication of what a correction looks like. According to the Motley Fool what happens after major downturns in the market historically speaking? In each of the previous four instances that the S&P 500's Shiller P/E shot above and sustained 30, the index lost anywhere from 20% to 89% of its value. So what's what we too are due for, reversion to the mean will be realistically brutal after the Fed's hyper-extreme intervention has run its course. Of course what the Fed stimulus has really done is simply allowed the 1% to get a whole lot richer to the point of wealth inequality spiraling out of control in the decades ahead leading us likely to a dystopia in an unfair and unequal version of BigTech capitalism. This has also led to a trend of short squeeze to these tech stocks, as shown in recent years' data. Of course the Fed has to say that's its done all of these things for the people, employment numbers and the labor market. Women in the workplace have been set behind likely 15 years in social progress due to the pandemic and the Fed's response. While the 89% lost during the Great Depression would be virtually impossible today thanks to ongoing intervention from the Federal Reserve and Capitol Hill, a correction of 20% to 50% would be pretty fair and simply return the curve back to a normal trajectory as interest rates going back up eventually in the 2023 to 2025 period. It's very unlikely the market has taken Fed tapering into account (priced-in), since the euphoria of a can't miss market just keeps pushing the markets higher. But all good things must come to an end. Earlier this month, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics released inflation data from July. This report showed that the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers rose 5.2% over the past 12 months. While the Fed and economists promise us this inflation is temporary, others are not so certain. As you print so much money, the money you have is worth less and certain goods cost more. Wage gains in some industries cannot be taken back, they are permanent - in the service sector like restaurants, hospitality and travel that have been among the hardest hit. The pandemic has led to a paradigm shift in the future of work, and that too is not temporary. The Great Resignation means white collar jobs with be more WFM than ever before, with a new software revolution, different transport and energy behaviors and so forth. Climate change alone could slow down global GDP in the 21st century. How can inflation be temporary when so many trends don't appear to be temporary? Sure the price of lumber or used-cars could be temporary, but a global chip shortage is exasperating the automobile sector. The stock market isn't even behaving like it cares about anything other than the Fed, and its $billions of dollars of buying bonds each month. Some central banks will start to taper about December, 2021 (like the European). However Delta could further mutate into a variant that makes the first generation of vaccines less effective. Such a macro event could be enough to trigger the correction we've been speaking about. So stay safe, and keep your money safe. The Last Dance of the 2009 bull market could feel especially more painful because we've been spoiled for so long in the markets. We can barely remember what March, 2020 felt like. Some people sold their life savings simply due to scare tactics by the likes of Bill Ackman. His scare tactics on CNBC won him likely hundreds of millions as the stock market tanked. Hedge funds further gamed the Reddit and Gamestop movement, orchestrating them and leading the new retail investors into meme speculation and a whole bunch of other unsavory things like options trading at such scale we've never seen before. It's not just inflation and higher interest rates, it's how absurdly high valuations have become. Still correlation does not imply causation. Just because inflation has picked up, it doesn't guarantee that stocks will head lower. Nevertheless, weaker buying power associated with higher inflation can't be overlooked as a potential negative for the U.S. economy and equities. The current S&P500 10-year P/E Ratio is 38.7. This is 97% above the modern-era market average of 19.6, putting the current P/E 2.5 standard deviations above the modern-era average. This is just math, folks. History is saying the stock market is 2x its true value. So why and who would be full on the market or an asset class like crypto that is mostly speculative in nature to begin with? Study the following on a historical basis, and due your own due diligence as to the health of the markets: Debt-to-GDP ratio Call to put ratio

This paper utilizes data on subjective probabilities to study the impact of the stock market crash of 2008 on households' expectations about the returns on the stock market index. We use data from the Health and Retirement Study that was fielded in February 2008 through February 2009. The effect of the crash is identified from the date of the interview, which is shown to be exogenous to previous stock market expectations. We estimate the effect of the crash on the population average of expected returns, the population average of the uncertainty about returns (subjective standard deviation), and the cross-sectional heterogeneity in expected returns (disagreement). We show estimates from simple reduced-form regressions on probability answers as well as from a more structural model that focuses on the parameters of interest and separates survey noise from relevant heterogeneity. We find a temporary increase in the population average of expectations and uncertainty right after the crash. The effect on cross-sectional heterogeneity is more significant and longer lasting, which implies substantial long-term increase in disagreement. The increase in disagreement is larger among the stockholders, the more informed, and those with higher cognitive capacity, and disagreement co-moves with trading volume and volatility in the market.

The Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09 was a period of severe macroeconomic instability for the United States and the global economy more generally. The crisis was precipitated by the collapse of a number of financial institutions who were deeply involved in the U.S. mortgage market and associated credit markets. Beginning in the Summer of 2007, a number of banks began to report issues with increasing mortgage delinquencies and the problem of not being able to accurately price derivatives contracts which were based on bundles of these U.S. residential mortgages. By the end of 2008, U.S. financial institutions had begun to fail due to their exposure to the housing market, leading to one of the deepest recessions in the history of the United States and to extensive government bailouts of the financial sector.

Subprime and the collapse of the U.S. mortgage market

The early 2000s had seen explosive growth in the U.S. mortgage market, as credit became cheaper due to the Federal Reserve's decision to lower interest rates in the aftermath of the 2001 'Dot Com' Crash, as well as because of the increasing globalization of financial flows which directed funds into U.S. financial markets. Lower mortgage rates gave incentive to financial institutions to begin lending to riskier borrowers, using so-called 'subprime' loans. These were loans to borrowers with poor credit scores, who would not have met the requirements for a conventional mortgage loan. In order to hedge against the risk of these riskier loans, financial institutions began to use complex financial instruments known as derivatives, which bundled mortgage loans together and allowed the risk of default to be sold on to willing investors. This practice was supposed to remove the risk from these loans, by effectively allowing credit institutions to buy insurance against delinquencies. Due to the fraudulent practices of credit ratings agencies, however, the price of these contacts did not reflect the real risk of the loans involved. As the reality of the inability of the borrowers to repay began to kick in during 2007, the financial markets which traded these derivatives came under increasing stress and eventually led to a 'sudden stop' in trading and credit intermediation during 2008.

Market Panic and The Great Recession

As borrowers failed to make repayments, this had a knock-on effect among financial institutions who were highly leveraged with financial instruments based on the mortgage market. Lehman Brothers, one of the world's largest investment banks, failed on September 15th 2008, causing widespread panic in financial markets. Due to the fear of an unprecedented collapse in the financial sector which would have untold consequences for the wider economy, the U.S. government and central bank, The Fed, intervened the following day to bailout the United States' largest insurance company, AIG, and to backstop financial markets. The crisis prompted a deep recession, known colloquially as The Great Recession, drawing parallels between this period and The Great Depression. The collapse of credit intermediation in the economy lead to further issues in the real economy, as business were increasingly unable to pay back loans and were forced to lay off staff, driving unemployment to a high of almost 10 percent in 2010. While there has been criticism of the U.S. government's actions to bailout the financial institutions involved, the actions of the government and the Fed are seen by many as having prevented the crisis from spiraling into a depression of the magnitude of The Great Depression.

With the collapse of the U.S. housing market and the subsequent financial crisis on Wall Street in 2007 and 2008, economies across the globe began to enter into deep recessions. What had started out as a crisis centered on the United States quickly became global in nature, as it became apparent that not only had the economies of other advanced countries (grouped together as the G7) become intimately tied to the U.S. financial system, but that many of them had experienced housing and asset price bubbles similar to that in the U.S.. The United Kingdom had experienced a huge inflation of housing prices since the 1990s, while Eurozone members (such as Germany, France and Italy) had financial sectors which had become involved in reckless lending to economies on the periphery of the EU, such as Greece, Ireland and Portugal. Other countries, such as Japan, were hit heavily due their export-led growth models which suffered from the decline in international trade. Unemployment during the Great Recession As business and consumer confidence crashed, credit markets froze, and international trade contracted, the unemployment rate in the most advanced economies shot up. While four to five percent is generally considered to be a healthy unemployment rate, nearing full employment in the economy (when any remaining unemployment is not related to a lack of consumer demand), many of these countries experienced rates at least double that, with unemployment in the United States peaking at almost 10 percent in 2010. In large countries, unemployment rates of this level meant millions or tens of millions of people being out of work, which led to political pressures to stimulate economies and create jobs. By 2012, many of these countries were seeing declining unemployment rates, however, in France and Italy rates of joblessness continued to increase as the Euro crisis took hold. These countries suffered from having a monetary policy which was too tight for their economies (due to the ECB controlling interest rates) and fiscal policy which was constrained by EU debt rules. Left with the option of deregulating their labor markets and pursuing austerity policies, their unemployment rates remained over 10 percent well into the 2010s. Differences in labor markets The differences in unemployment rates at the peak of the crisis (2009-2010) reflect not only the differences in how economies were affected by the downturn, but also the differing labor market institutions and programs in the various countries. Countries with more 'liberalized' labor markets, such as the United States and United Kingdom experienced sharp jumps in their unemployment rate due to the ease at which employers can lay off workers in these countries. When the crisis subsided in these countries, however, their unemployment rates quickly began to drop below those of the other countries, due to their more dynamic labor markets which make it easier to hire workers when the economy is doing well. On the other hand, countries with more 'coordinated' labor market institutions, such as Germany and Japan, experiences lower rates of unemployment during the crisis, as programs such as short-time work, job sharing, and wage restraint agreements were used to keep workers in their jobs. While these countries are less likely to experience spikes in unemployment during crises, the highly regulated nature of their labor markets mean that they are slower to add jobs during periods of economic prosperity.

Traditional measures of dependence in time series are based on correlations or periodograms. These are adequate in many circumstances but, in others, especially when trying to assess market linkages and tail risk during abnormal times (e.g., financial contagion), they might be inappropriate. In particular, popular tail dependence measures based on exceedance correlations and marginal expected shortfall (MES) have large variances and also contain limited information on tail risk. Motivated by these limitations, we introduce the (tail-restricted) integrated regression function, and we show how it characterizes conditional dependence and persistence. We propose simple estimates for these measures and establish their asymptotic properties. We employ the proposed methods to analyze the dependence structure of some of the major international stock market indices before, during, and after the 2007–2009 financial crisis. Monte Carlo simulations and the application show that our new measures are more reliable and accurate than competing methods based on MES or exceedance correlations for testing tail dependence. Supplementary materials for this article are available online.

The Industrial Production Index (IPI) fell sharply in the United States during the Great Recession, reaching its lowest point in June 2009. The recession was triggered by the collapse of the U.S. housing market and the subsequent financial crisis in 2007 and 2008, during which a number of systemically critical financial institutions failed or came close to bankruptcy. The crisis in the financial sector quickly spread to the non-financial economy, where firms were adversely hit by the tightening of credit conditions and the drop in consumer confidence caused by the crisis. The largest monthly drop in the IPI came in September 2008, as Lehman Brothers collapsed and the U.S. government was forced to step in to backstop the financial sector. Industrial production would begin to recover in the Summer of 2009, but remained far below its pre-crisis levels.

We examine the pricing of financial crash insurance during the 2007-2009 financial crisis in US option markets, and we show that a large amount of aggregate tail risk is missing from the cost of financial sector crash insurance during the crisis. The difference in costs between out-of-the-money put options for individual banks and puts on the financial sector index increases four-fold from its precrisis 2003-2007 level. We provide evidence that a collective government guarantee for the financial sector lowers index put prices far more than those of individual banks and explains the increase in the basket-index put spread.

From the onset of the Global Financial Crisis in the Summer of 2007, the world economy experienced an almost unprecedented period of turmoil in which millions of people were made unemployed, businesses declared bankruptcy en masse, and structurally critical financial institutions failed. The crisis was triggered by the collapse of the U.S. housing market and subsequent losses by investment banks such as Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Merrill Lynch. These institutions, which had become over-leveraged with complex financial securities known as derivatives, were tied to each other through a web of financial contracts, meaning that the collapse of one investment bank could trigger the collapse of several others. As Lehman Brothers failed on September 15. 2008, becoming the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history, shockwaves were felt throughout the global financial system. The sudden stop of flows of credit worldwide caused a financial panic and sent most of the world's largest economies into a deep recession, later known as the Great Recession. The World Economy in recession
More than any other period in history, the world economy had become highly interconnected and interdependent over the period from the 1970s to 2007. As governments liberalized financial flows, banks and other financial institutions could take money in one country and invest it in another part of the globe. Financial institutions and other non-financial companies became multinational, meaning that they had subsidiaries and partners in many regions. All this meant that when Wall Street, the center of global finance in New York City, was shaken by bankruptcies and credit freezes in late 2007, other advanced economies did not need to wait long to feel the tremors. All of the G7 countries, the seven most economically advanced western-aligned countries, entered recession in 2008, before experiencing an even deeper trough in 2009. While all returned to growth by 2010, this was less stable in the countries of the Eurozone (Germany, France, Italy) over the following years due to the Eurozone crisis, as well as in Japan, which has had issues with low growth since the mid-1990s.

The Great Recession was a period of economic contraction which came in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008. The recession was triggered by the collapse of the U.S. housing market and subsequent bankruptcies among Wall Street financial institutions, the most significant of which being the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history. These economic convulsions caused consumer confidence, measured by the Consumer Confidence Index (CCI), to drop sharply in 2007 and the beginning of 2008. How does the Consumer Confidence Index work? The CCI measures household's expectation of their future economic situation and, consequently, their likely future spending and savings decisions. A score of 100 in the index would indicate a neutral economic outlook, with consumers neither being optimistic nor pessimistic about the near future. Scores below 100 are then more pessimistic, while scores above 100 indicate optimism about the economy. Consumer confidence can have a self-fulfilling effect on the economy, as when consumers are pessimistic about the economy, they tend to save and postpone spending, contracting aggregate demand and causing the economy to slow down. Conversely, when consumers are optimistic and willing to spend, this can have a reinforcing effect as wages and employment may rise when consumers spend more. CCI and the Great Recession As the reality of the trouble which the U.S. financial sector was in set in over 2007, consumer confidence dropped sharply from being slightly positive, to being deeply pessimistic by the Summer of 2008. While confidence began to slowly rebound up until September 2008, with the panic caused by Lehman's bankruptcy and the freezing of new credit creation, the CCI plummeted once more, reaching its lowest point during the recession in February 2008. The U.S. government stepped in to prevent the bankruptcy of AIG in 2008, promising to do the same for any future possible failures in the financial system. This 'backstopping' policy, whereby the government assured that the economy would not be allowed to fall further into crisis, along with the Federal Reserve's unconventional monetary policies used to restart the economy, contributed to a rebound in consumer confidence in 2009 and 2010. In spite of this, consumers still remained pessimistic about the economy.

Interactive chart of the S&P 500 stock market index since 1927. Historical data is inflation-adjusted using the headline CPI and each data point represents the month-end closing value. The current month is updated on an hourly basis with today's latest value.

This paper looks at the relationship between negative news and stock markets in times of global crisis, such as the 2008/2009 period. We analysed one year of front page banner headlines of three financial newspapers, the Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, and Il Sole24ore to examine the influence of bad news both on stock market volatility and dynamic correlation. Our results show that the press and markets influenced each other in generating market volatility and in particular, that the Wall Street Journal had a crucial effect both on the volatility and correlation between the US and foreign markets. We also found significant differences between newspapers in their interpretation of the crisis, with the Financial Times being significantly pessimistic even in phases of low market volatility. Our results confirm the reflexive nature of stock markets. When the situation is uncertain and unpredictable, market behaviour may even reflect qualitative, big picture, and subjective information such as streamers in a newspaper, whose economic and informative value is questionable.

The Global Financial Crisis (2007-2008), which began due to the collapse of the U.S. housing market, had a negative effect in many regions across the globe. The global recession which followed the crisis in 2008 and 2009 showed how interdependent and synchronized many of the world's economies had become, with the largest advanced economies showing very similar patterns of negative GDP growth during the crisis. Among the largest emerging economies (commonly referred to as the 'E7'), however, a different pattern emerged, with some countries avoiding a recession altogether. Some commentators have particularly pointed to 2008-2009 as the moment in which China emerged on the world stage as an economic superpower and a key driver of global economic growth. The Great Recession in the developing world While some countries, such as Russia, Mexico, and Turkey, experienced severe recessions due to their connections to the United States and Europe, others such as China, India, and Indonesia managed to record significant economic growth during the period. This can be partly explained by the decoupling from western financial systems which these countries undertook following the Asian financial crises of 1997, making many Asian nations more wary of opening their countries to 'hot money' from other countries. Other likely explanations of this trend are that these countries have large domestic economies which are not entirely reliant on the advanced economies, that their export sectors produce goods which are inelastic (meaning they are still bought during recessions), and that the Chinese economic stimulus worth almost 600 billion U.S. dollars in 2008/2009 increased growth in the region.

Interactive chart of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) stock market index for the last 100 years. Historical data is inflation-adjusted using the headline CPI and each data point represents the month-end closing value. The current month is updated on an hourly basis with today's latest value.

At the onset of the 2008-2009 global economic crisis, the Open Society Institute-Sofia and the World Bank partnered to implement Crisis Monitoring Survey (CMS). The CMS is a multi-topic household survey that followed three nationally representative cross-sections of about 2,400 households, including a panel of about 1,700 Bulgarian households, during February 2010, October 2010 and February 2011. The survey tracked the incidence of income shocks, the coping strategies used by affected households to mitigate the income losses, and the impact of public polices social protection in particular in alleviating the effects of the crisis. In particular, the survey investigated in some depth how households used the labor market to mitigate the impact of the crisis, whether formal social protection programs protected households against sliding into poverty, and the effectiveness of informal safety nets. Given the special need to study the more vulnerable ethnic minority Roma population, an independent "booster sample" of about 300 households was selected in settlements and neighborhoods identified as predominantly Roma. The second round of Crisis Monitoring Survey was conducted in October 2010. The data from this round is documented here.

The number of home sales in the United States peaked in 2021 at almost ************* after steadily rising since 2018. Nevertheless, the market contracted in the following year, with transaction volumes falling to ***********. Home sales remained muted in 2024, with a mild increase expected in 2025 and 2026. A major factor driving this trend is the unprecedented increase in mortgage interest rates due to high inflation. How have U.S. home prices developed over time? The average sales price of new homes has also been rising since 2011. Buyer confidence seems to have recovered after the property crash, which has increased demand for homes and also the prices sellers are demanding for homes. At the same time, the affordability of U.S. homes has decreased. Both the number of existing and newly built homes sold has declined since the housing market boom during the coronavirus pandemic. Challenges in housing supply The number of housing units in the U.S. rose steadily between 1975 and 2005 but has remained fairly stable since then. Construction increased notably in the 1990s and early 2000s, with the number of construction starts steadily rising, before plummeting amid the infamous housing market crash. Housing starts slowly started to pick up in 2011, mirroring the economic recovery. In 2022, the supply of newly built homes plummeted again, as supply chain challenges following the COVID-19 pandemic and tariffs on essential construction materials such as steel and lumber led to prices soaring.

Economic crisis. Globalisation. National and European employment and social policies. Discrimination. Development aid. Public transport services.

Topics: 1. General life satisfaction; assessment of the present situation and expectations for the next twelve months regarding life in general, the place of residence, the healthcare system and the pension system in the own country, unemployment benefits, cost of living, relations between people of different national and religious backgrounds in the own country, social inequality and poverty, energy costs, housing costs, public administration, economic situation of the own country, the national labour market situation, the personal job situation, and the financial situation of the own household; comparison of these issues with five years ago.

1. Economic crisis: own unemployment or in the social environment due to the economic crisis; feared personal unemployment or in the social environment (partner, colleague, child); expected impact of the crisis on the labour market situation.

2. Globalisation: knowledge of the European Globalisation adjustment Fund to assist victims of globalisation.

3. National and European employment and social policies: knowledge of the European Social Fund (ESF), the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the Erasmus Programme, and the ´Lisbon Strategy´; assessment of the proportion of the EU budget used for financing the European Social Fund; frequency of occupational and job change over the life course of the respondent; duration of the current or the last employment; most important skills to find a job; assessment of the safety of the own job in the next few months, and in two years; participation in training courses within the last twelve months; funding of the training; own education to date is sufficient, or further training is needed to keep the job; reasons that prevent from participating in training courses; likelihood to find a new job within six months (scale); kind of job to which the respondent would apply after a layoff; estimation of the amount of compensation by the national unemployment insurance and the welfare system during the first six months after a presumed job loss on the basis of the current income (percentage); easiest way to find a job; assessment of the statements: life-time jobs with the same employer are a thing of the past, more jobs through more flexible work contracts, making job change easier is a helpful asset to find new work, too many people in the country go into retirement too early, improved chances on the labour market through regular training; assessment of the effectiveness of selected measures to support employment promotion (increasing child care facilities, increasing care facilities for persons in need, discouraging early retirement, increasing the difference of income between working and non-working people, promoting mobility, supporting self-employment, conversion of undeclared work into regular jobs, regular training for employees); assessment of the EU´s influence on the employment and social policies as positive or negative: setting minimum standards for working conditions throughout the EU, creation of new jobs and combating unemployment, reducing regional disparities in unemployment, exchanging best practices in employment policies between EU member states, improving access to education and training, promotion of dialogue between employers and trade unions, fight against social exclusion and poverty, promotion of gender equality, combating discrimination, coordination of reforms of national social protection systems; interest in information on the EU´s employment and social policies; image of the actions regarding employment and social affairs taken by the EU.

4. Discrimination: perceived general extent of discrimination at present and five years ago with regard to: ethnic origin, gender, sexual orientation, age, religion, disability; own experience of discrimination as well as recently observed discrimination against other persons according to the above characteristics; adversely affecting characteristics of an applicant in a concurrent application situation: name, address, way of speaking, ethnic origin, gender, sexual orientation, age, disability, religious belief, smoking, physical appearance; acceptance of a person in a high political position with the following characteristics: woman, homosexual, different ethnic origin, aged under 30, different religious belief, disabled, aged over 75 years (scale); attitude towards specific measures to ensure equal opportunity in the field of employment; approval to monitor the workforce composition with respect to the representation of ethnic minorities and the recruitment procedures; sufficient efforts of the own country to fight discrimination; knowledge of the own rights in the case of discrimination; adequate reflection of social diversity in the media regarding the above characteristics; negative impact of the economic...

Interactive chart of the NASDAQ Composite stock market index since 1971. Historical data is inflation-adjusted using the headline CPI and each data point represents the month-end closing value. The current month is updated on an hourly basis with today's latest value.

The industry players are the development banks of the federal and state governments. Turnover is expected to total €27.4 billion in 2024, which corresponds to an increase of 1.1% compared to the previous year. Between 2019 and 2024, industry turnover increased by an average of 0.5% per year. As the turnover of development banks consists almost exclusively of interest income plus comparatively low commission income, the past phase of low interest rates and the expiry of higher-interest legacy loans have reduced the level of income.Although the development banks were also confronted with falling earnings due to the low interest rates following the financial crisis in the years 2007 to 2009, they were able to benefit from the post-crisis economic environment in contrast to other credit institutions. Since then, most banks have found it very difficult to refinance themselves on the capital market at favourable conditions, as many investors consider the default risk for banks to be significantly higher than before the financial crisis. As the development banks can rely on the federal and state governments, they receive very good ratings and can refinance themselves at favourable conditions, enabling them to expand their business. Following the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic, the development banks were faced with the task of making a significant contribution to supporting the German economy during the crisis. Due to the effects of the war in Ukraine, the volume of funding will remain at a high level in the current year.An average growth rate of 0.5% per year is expected for the period from 2024 to 2029. This means that industry turnover is expected to amount to 28.2 billion euros in 2029. IBISWorld anticipates a slow and slight decline in interest rates over the next five years, meaning that interest income is likely to fall slightly. At the same time, a high volume of funding is expected, as development banks are likely to play a key role in the recovery of the German economy and its transformation towards sustainability and digitalisation.