This data package includes the underlying data to replicate the charts and calculations presented in US Monetary Policy and the Recent Surge in Inflation, PIIE Working Paper 24-13.

If you use the data, please cite as:

Reifschneider, David. 2024. US Monetary Policy and the Recent Surge in Inflation. PIIE Working Paper 24-13. Washington: Peterson Institute for International Economics.

This article analyzes how announced surprises in monetary policy actions and macroeconomic data releases affect the average rate of inflation that economic agents expect to prevail over the 10-year period following the surprise. The analysis also addresses the effect of Federal Reserve communication and surprises in monetary policy actions on perceived inflation risk over this 10-year period. The study shows that surprises in macroeconomic data releases and monetary policy actions indeed affect the expected rate of inflation. Further, there is evidence that surprises in monetary policy actions increase perceived inflation risk, whereas Federal Reserve communication reduces it.

The inflation rate in the United States declined significantly between June 2022 and June 2025, despite rising inflationary pressures towards the end of 2024. The peak inflation rate was recorded in June 2022, at *** percent. In August 2023, the Federal Reserve's interest rate hit its highest level during the observed period, at **** percent, and remained unchanged until September 2024, when the Federal Reserve implemented its first rate cut since September 2021. By January 2025, the rate dropped to **** percent, signalling a shift in monetary policy. What is the Federal Reserve interest rate? The Federal Reserve interest rate, or the federal funds rate, is the rate at which banks and credit unions lend to and borrow from each other. It is one of the Federal Reserve's key tools for maintaining strong employment rates, stable prices, and reasonable interest rates. The rate is determined by the Federal Reserve and adjusted eight times a year, though it can be changed through emergency meetings during times of crisis. The Fed doesn't directly control the interest rate but sets a target rate. It then uses open market operations to influence rates toward this target. Ways of measuring inflation Inflation is typically measured using several methods, with the most common being the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The CPI tracks the price of a fixed basket of goods and services over time, providing a measure of the price changes consumers face. At the end of 2023, the CPI in the United States was ****** percent, up from ****** a year earlier. A more business-focused measure is the producer price index (PPI), which represents the costs of firms.

CPI Inflation Projection: Quarterly: 6th Monetary Policy Statement data was reported at 4.200 % in Mar 2026. This records an increase from the previous number of 3.800 % for Dec 2025. CPI Inflation Projection: Quarterly: 6th Monetary Policy Statement data is updated quarterly, averaging 4.700 % from Jun 2017 (Median) to Mar 2026, with 35 observations. The data reached an all-time high of 6.500 % in Mar 2020 and a record low of 2.800 % in Mar 2019. CPI Inflation Projection: Quarterly: 6th Monetary Policy Statement data remains active status in CEIC and is reported by Reserve Bank of India. The data is categorized under India Premium Database’s Inflation – Table IN.IA002: RBI Monetary Policy Statement: Inflation Projection.

This data package includes the underlying data to replicate the charts, tables, and calculations presented in Fiscal policy and the pandemic-era surge in US inflation: Lessons for the future, PIIE Working Paper 24-22.

If you use the data, please cite as:

Dynan, Karen, and Douglas Elmendorf. 2024. Fiscal policy and the pandemic-era surge in US inflation: Lessons for the future. PIIE Working Paper 24-22. Washington: Peterson Institute for International Economics.

This paper constructs daily measures of the real interest rate and expected inflation using commodity futures prices and the term structure of Treasury yields. We find that commodity futures markets respond to surprise increases in the federal funds rate target by raising the inflation rate expected over the next three to nine months. There is no evidence that the real interest rate responds to surprises in the federal funds target. The data from the commodity futures markets are highly volatile. We show that one can substantially reduce the noise using limited information estimators such as the median change. Nevertheless, the basket of commodities actually traded daily is quite narrow and we do not know whether our observable rates are closely connected to the unobservable inflation and real rates that affect economy-wide consumption and investment decisions.

In June 2025, global inflation rates and central bank interest rates showed significant variation across major economies. Most economies initiated interest rate cuts from mid-2024 due to declining inflationary pressures. The U.S., UK, and EU central banks followed a consistent pattern of regular rate reductions throughout late 2024. In the first half of 2025, Russia maintained the highest interest rate at 20 percent, while Japan retained the lowest at 0.5 percent. Varied inflation rates across major economies The inflation landscape varies considerably among major economies. China had the lowest inflation rate at 0.1 percent in June 2025. In contrast, Russia maintained a high inflation rate of 9.4 percent. These figures align with broader trends observed in early 2025, where China had the lowest inflation rate among major developed and emerging economies, while Russia's rate remained the highest. Central bank responses and economic indicators Central banks globally implemented aggressive rate hikes throughout 2022-23 to combat inflation. The European Central Bank exemplified this trend, raising rates from 0 percent in January 2022 to 4.5 percent by September 2023. A coordinated shift among major central banks began in mid-2024, with the ECB, Bank of England, and Federal Reserve initiating rate cuts, with forecasts suggesting further cuts through 2025 and 2026.

South African monthly The FTSE/JSE All Share Index data was procured from Bloomberg and the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) from South African Reserve Bank (SARB) database, where the data has been seasonally adjusted specifying 2015 as the base year. Volatility measures in these markets are generated through a multivaraite EGARCH model in the WinRATS software. South African monthly consumer price index (CPI) data was procured from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) database, where the data has been seasonally adjusted, specifying 2010 as the base year. The inflation rate is constructed by taking the year-on-year changes in the monthly CPI figures. Inflation uncertainty was generated through the GARCH model in Eviews software. The following South African macroeconomic variables were procured from the SARB: real industrial production (IP), which is used as a proxy for real GDP, real investment (I), real consumption (C), inflation (CPI), broad money (M3), the 3-month treasury bill rate (TB3) and the policy rate (R), a measure of U.S. EPU developed by Baker et al. (2016) to account for global developments available at http://www.policyuncertainty.com/us_monthly.html.

This study examines the effect of inflation targeting (IT) on income distribution in a panel of 70 countries. Employing a variety of propensity score matching methods, we find strong evidence that that incomes became more unequal in IT-adopting countries relative to countries that did not adopt IT. On average, IT has been associated with a relative rise in the pre- and post-tax Gini coefficients of about 2 percentage points, and a relative increase in the share of national income going to the top 1% and 10% of households by about 12 percentage points and 13-17 percentage points.

This data package includes the underlying data and files to replicate the calculations, charts, and tables presented in Inflation and Activity: Two Explorations and Their Monetary Policy Implications, PIIE Working Paper 15-19. If you use the data, please cite as: Blanchard, Olivier, Eugenio Cerutti, and Lawrence H. Summers. (2015). Inflation and Activity: Two Explorations and Their Monetary Policy Implications. PIIE Working Paper 15-19. Peterson Institute for International Economics.

We present federal funds rates coming from a range of simple monetary policy rules based on multiple economic forecasts. Use our tool to create your own rule. Released quarterly.

Canada's inflation rate experienced significant fluctuations from 2018 to 2025. Inflation peaked at *** percent in June 2022 before steadily declining to *** percent by December 2024. In early 2025, inflation began to increase again, rising to *** percent in February, and dropping to *** percent in March. In response to rising inflation between 2020 and 2022, the Bank of Canada implemented aggressive interest rate hikes. The bank rate reached a maximum of **** percent in July 2023 and remained stable until June 2024. As inflationary pressures eased in the second half of 2024, the central bank reduced interest rates to *** percent in December 2024. In 2025, the bank rate witnessed two cuts, standing at ***** percent in June 2025. This pattern reflected broader global economic trends, with most advanced and emerging economies experiencing similar inflationary challenges and monetary policy adjustments. Global context of inflation and interest rates The Canadian experience aligns with the broader international trend of central banks raising policy rates to combat inflation. Between 2021 and 2023, nearly all advanced and emerging economies increased their central bank rates. However, a shift occurred in the latter half of 2024, with many countries, including Canada, beginning to lower rates. This change suggests a new phase in the global economic cycle and monetary policy approach. Notably, among surveyed countries, Russia maintained the highest interest rate in early 2025, while Japan had the lowest rate. Comparison with the United States The United States experienced a similar trajectory in inflation and interest rates. U.S. inflation peaked at *** percent in June 2022, slightly higher than Canada's peak. The Federal Reserve responded with a series of rate hikes, reaching **** percent in August 2023. This rate remained unchanged until September 2024, when the first cut since September 2021 was implemented. In contrast, Canada's bank rate peaked at **** percent and began decreasing earlier, with cuts in June and July 2024. These differences highlight the nuanced approaches of central banks in managing their respective economies amid global inflationary pressures.

Abstract (en): This research focuses on the longer-term monetary relationships in historical data. Charts describing the 10-year average growth rates in the M2 monetary aggregate, nominal GDP, real GDP, and inflation are used to show that there is a consistent longer-term correlation between M2 growth, nominal GDP growth, and inflation but not between such nominal variables and real GDP growth. The data reveal extremely long cycles in monetary growth and inflation, the most recent of which was the strong upward trend in M2 growth, nominal GDP growth, and inflation during the 1960s and 1970s, and the strong downward trend since then. Data going back to the 19th century show that the most recent inflation/disinflation cycle is a repetition of earlier long monetary growth and inflation cycles in the United States historical record. Also discussed is a measure of bond market inflation credibility, defined as the difference between averages in long-term bond rates and real GDP growth. By this measure, inflation credibility hovered close to zero during the 1950s and early 1960s, but then rose to a peak of about 10 percent in the early 1980s. During the 1990s, the bond market has yet to restore the low inflation credibility that existed before inflation turned up during the 1960s. The conclusion is that the risks of starting another costly inflation/disinflation cycle could be avoided by monitoring monetary growth and maintaining a sufficiently tight policy to keep inflation low. An environment of credible price stability would allow the economy to function unfettered by inflationary distortions, which is all that can reasonably be expected of monetary policy, and is precisely what should be expected. (1) The file submitted is the data file 9811WD.DAT. (2) These data are part of ICPSR's Publication-Related Archive and are distributed exactly as they arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigator(s) if further information is desired.

ABSTRACT In 1999 the inflation targeting regime was introduced in Brazil in an environment plenty of uncertainties and relatively high inflation rates. As a consequence, the set of rules that to this day govern the Brazilian regime still lack a strong institutional support. This paper makes some proposals for a permanent inflation targeting regime. In doing so, we discuss how can a greater institutional commitment be achieved with the inflation targeting setup. We also discuss issues on what the permanent inflation target level should be and also how much deviation from the target should be tolerated. Based on these issues, we suggest a set of rules to be adopted in Brazil.

India CPI Inflation Projection: Quarterly: 3rd Monetary Policy Statement data was reported at 4.400 % in Jun 2025. This records an increase from the previous number of 4.300 % for Mar 2025. India CPI Inflation Projection: Quarterly: 3rd Monetary Policy Statement data is updated quarterly, averaging 4.800 % from Sep 2017 (Median) to Jun 2025, with 27 observations. The data reached an all-time high of 7.100 % in Sep 2022 and a record low of 3.000 % in Sep 2017. India CPI Inflation Projection: Quarterly: 3rd Monetary Policy Statement data remains active status in CEIC and is reported by Reserve Bank of India. The data is categorized under India Premium Database’s Inflation – Table IN.IA002: RBI Monetary Policy Statement: Inflation Projection.

Between January 2018 and June 2025, the United Kingdom's consumer price inflation rate showed notable volatility. The rate hit its lowest point at *** percent in August 2020 and peaked at *** percent in October 2022. By September 2024, inflation had moderated to *** percent, but the following months saw inflation increase again, and it remained on a slightly upward trajectory in the first half of 2025. The Bank of England's interest rate policy closely tracked these inflationary trends. Rates remained low at -* percent until April 2020, when they were reduced to *** percent in response to economic challenges. A series of rate increases followed, reaching a peak of **** percent from August 2023 to July 2024. The central bank then initiated rate cuts in August and November 2024, lowering the rate to **** percent, signaling a potential shift in monetary policy. In February 2025, the Bank of England implemented another rate cut, setting the bank rate at *** percent, which was further reduced to **** percent in May 2025. Global context of inflation and interest rates The UK's experience reflects a broader international trend of rising inflation and subsequent central bank responses. From January 2022 to July 2024, advanced and emerging economies alike increased their policy rates to counter inflationary pressures. However, a shift began in late 2024, with many countries, including the UK, starting to lower rates. This change suggests a potential new phase in the global economic cycle and monetary policy approach. Comparison with other major economies The UK's monetary policy decisions align closely with those of other major economies. The United States, for instance, saw its federal funds rate peak at **** percent in August 2023, mirroring the UK's rate trajectory. Similarly, central bank rates in the EU all increased drastically between 2022 and 2024. These synchronized movements reflect the global nature of inflationary pressures and the coordinated efforts of central banks to maintain economic stability. As with the UK, both the U.S. and EU began considering rate cuts in late 2024, signaling a potential shift in the global economic landscape.

The enduring discourse regarding the effectiveness of interest rate policy in mitigating inflation within developing economies is characterized by the interplay of structural and supply-side determinants. Moreover, extant academic literature fails to resolve the direction of causality between inflation and interest rates. Nevertheless, the prevalent adoption of interest rate-based monetary policies in numerous developing economies raises a fundamental inquiry: What motivates central banks in these nations to consistently espouse this strategy? To address this inquiry, our study leverages wavelet transformation to dissect interest rate and inflation data across a spectrum of frequency scales. This innovative methodology paves the way for a meticulous exploration of the intricate causal interplay between these pivotal macroeconomic variables for twenty-two developing economies using monthly data from 1992 to 2022. Traditional literature on causality tends to focus on short- and long-run timescales, yet our study posits that numerous uncharted time and frequency scales exist between these extremes. These intermediate scales may wield substantial influence over the causal relationship and its direction. Our research thus extends the boundaries of existing causality literature and presents fresh insights into the complexities of monetary policy in developing economies. Traditional wisdom suggests that central banks should raise interest rates to combat inflation. However, our study uncovers a contrasting reality in developing economies. It demonstrates a positive causal link between the policy rate and inflation, where an increase in the central bank’s interest rates leads to an upsurge in price levels. Paradoxically, in response to escalating prices, the central bank continues to heighten the policy rate, thereby perpetuating this cyclical pattern. Given this observed positive causal relationship in developing economies, central banks must explore structural and supply-side factors to break this cycle and regain control over inflation.

From January 2022 to July 2024, a global trend emerged as almost all advanced and emerging economies increased their central bank policy rates. This widespread tightening of monetary policy was in response to inflationary pressures and economic challenges. However, a shift occurred in the latter half of 2024, with most countries beginning to lower their rates, signaling a new phase in the global economic cycle and monetary policy approach. Since September 2023, ****** has consistently held the highest interest rate among the observed countries.

The Volcker Shock was a period of historically high interest rates precipitated by Federal Reserve Chairperson Paul Volcker's decision to raise the central bank's key interest rate, the Fed funds effective rate, during the first three years of his term. Volcker was appointed chairperson of the Fed in August 1979 by President Jimmy Carter, as replacement for William Miller, who Carter had made his treasury secretary. Volcker was one of the most hawkish (supportive of tighter monetary policy to stem inflation) members of the Federal Reserve's committee, and quickly set about changing the course of monetary policy in the U.S. in order to quell inflation. The Volcker Shock is remembered for bringing an end to over a decade of high inflation in the United States, prompting a deep recession and high unemployment, and for spurring on debt defaults among developing countries in Latin America who had borrowed in U.S. dollars.

Monetary tightening and the recessions of the early '80s

Beginning in October 1979, Volcker's Fed tightened monetary policy by raising interest rates. This decision had the effect of depressing demand and slowing down the U.S. economy, as credit became more expensive for households and businesses. The Fed funds rate, the key overnight rate at which banks lend their excess reserves to each other, rose as high as 17.6 percent in early 1980. The rate was allowed to fall back below 10 percent following this first peak, however, due to worries that inflation was not falling fast enough, a second cycle of monetary tightening was embarked upon starting in August of 1980. The rate would reach its all-time peak in June of 1981, at 19.1 percent. The second recession sparked by these hikes was far deeper than the 1980 recession, with unemployment peaking at 10.8 percent in December 1980, the highest level since The Great Depression. This recession would drive inflation to a low point during Volcker's terms of 2.5 percent in August 1983.

The legacy of the Volcker Shock

By the end of Volcker's terms as Fed Chair, inflation was at a manageable rate of around four percent, while unemployment had fallen under six percent, as the economy grew and business confidence returned. While supporters of Volcker's actions point to these numbers as proof of the efficacy of his actions, critics have claimed that there were less harmful ways that inflation could have been brought under control. The recessions of the early 1980s are cited as accelerating deindustrialization in the U.S., as manufacturing jobs lost in 'rust belt' states such as Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania never returned during the years of recovery. The Volcker Shock was also a driving factor behind the Latin American debt crises of the 1980s, as governments in the region defaulted on debts which they had incurred in U.S. dollars. Debates about the validity of using interest rate hikes to get inflation under control have recently re-emerged due to the inflationary pressures facing the U.S. following the Coronavirus pandemic and the Federal Reserve's subsequent decision to embark on a course of monetary tightening.

ABSTRACT This article shows that the theory that supports the inflation targeting regime does not have a relationship with reality. Moreover, this stresses that monetary policy should be used to full capacity because it not only controls inflation, but is also useful to achieve real goals, such as employment. The article shows that there is no evidence that the regime reduced inflation in the 1990’s. Developed countries which adopted the regime and developed countries which did not adopt inflation targeting regime have both reduced and kept inflation under control.