In France, in April 2025, the most common type of offense reported to the police was non-violent robbery against persons, with ****** cases. Moreover, *** armed robberies were committed during that time.

In 2024, violent crime in France declined to approximately ******* recorded offenses, marking a notable drop compared to previous years. According to police crime statistics, this represents a decrease of over ****** cases from 2023, when ******* violent offenses were reported. This decline contrasts with the consistent rise in violent crime since 2016, when police recorded just ******* offenses against the person.

France murder/homicide rate per 100K population for 2021 was 1.14, a 5.98% increase from 2020.

<ul style='margin-top:20px;'>

<li>France murder/homicide rate per 100K population for 2020 was <strong>1.07</strong>, a <strong>8.22% decline</strong> from 2019.</li>
<li>France murder/homicide rate per 100K population for 2019 was <strong>1.17</strong>, a <strong>7.98% increase</strong> from 2018.</li>
<li>France murder/homicide rate per 100K population for 2018 was <strong>1.08</strong>, a <strong>2.18% decline</strong> from 2017.</li>
</ul>Intentional homicides are estimates of unlawful homicides purposely inflicted as a result of domestic disputes, interpersonal violence, violent conflicts over land resources, intergang violence over turf or control, and predatory violence and killing by armed groups. Intentional homicide does not include all intentional killing; the difference is usually in the organization of the killing. Individuals or small groups usually commit homicide, whereas killing in armed conflict is usually committed by fairly cohesive groups of up to several hundred members and is thus usually excluded.

In 2018, the National Gendarmerie in France had reported around 68 thousand cybercrimes. From these, the source has provided an in depth ananlysis of the different types of cybercrimes and which ones were the most common in France in 2018. That year, most of the cybercrimes (75 percent) consisted of fraud. Identity theft was the second most common crime, yet around 70 percent less occuring than fraud.

Context

This dataset is an aggregated count of all crimes committed in France, broken down by month and category.

Content

This data was aggregated by the French national government and published online on the French Open Data Portal. It is a combination of records kept by both local and national police forces. It's important to note that the name of the categories of crime are in French!

Acknowledgements

This data is a part of a larger group of Excel files published by the French Goverment on the French Open Data Portal. It has been converted to a single CSV file before uploading here.

Inspiration

This is a simple time series dataset that can be probed for trends in the underlying types of crimes committed. Is petty theft more or less popular today than it was ten years ago? How much variation is there in the amount of robberies year-to-year? Can you normalize the growth in the number of crimes against the growth in the number of people? How do crimes committed here differ from those committed in, say, Los Angeles?

As of December 2023, approximately ** percent of IT security experts in French companies identified opportunistic cyber attacks as the most common cyber crime-related issue faced by businesses in France. The second most prevalent problem, reported by ** percent of respondents, was the implementation or use of unapproved applications, also known as shadow IT. Permanent residual vulnerabilities ranked as the third most common issue faced by French companies, with ** percent reporting it.

As of January 2023, phishing, spear phishing, or smishing were the most common types of cyberattacks in France, with around *** in ** companies encountering it. The exploitation of a vulnerability ranked second, with ** percent. The third most common cyberattack was denial-of-service attack (DOS), detected by ** percent of the respondents.

This chart shows the distribution of people involved in homicide cases in France in 2022, by nationality. It displays that ** percent of individuals accused of homicide in France were French.

This ethnographic project aims to examine criminalizing and illegalizing processes targeting pro-migration activists and other citizens (e.g. volunteers, practitioners) in Morocco and France. The study investigates the competing ways in which ‘crimes of solidarity’ mobilise discourses and practices of solidarity, citizenship, and illegality in Morocco and France. The data collection examines how state repression of pro-migration activists and other ‘citizens’, who are often conflated with smugglers and accused of aiding irregular migrants, sheds light on the shifting and contested legal, moral and political boundaries between ‘irregular migrants’ and ‘citizens’. The recent focus on the figure and experience of ‘the migrant’ has enriched scholarly engagements with the construction of migrant illegality, irregular migrant political agency, and the entanglements of humanitarianism and security. Our project expands these conversations by exploring how migration politics target and affect not just migrants but also citizens. This shift is necessary in order to examine the far-reaching bordering practices and contested politics of exclusion beyond inter-state boundaries and the precarious lives of irregular migrants. We investigate how migration politics in France and Morocco are shifting the political agency and subjectivity of citizens who face (the threat of) prosecution from state authorities at the border and beyond.

This has been achieved through participant observation and informal interviews with activists, artists, community leaders, NGO practitioners, funders, and other relevant professionals in Morocco and France. Themes discussed during conversations included : participants’ opinions about the politics of migration in Morocco/France; their history of activism and other engagement around migration; the motivations behind their engagement; the difficulties and obstacles they have faced in their activities and engagement over migration etc.

The project has generated original insights into how hostile migration politics that selectively manage, stop, deter, and control forms of mobility also target individuals and organisations providing forms of support, assistance, aid to migrant people. The project has shed light on how state authorities in France and Morocco deploy indirect, opaque, and insidious forms of harassment to intimidate ‘subversive solidarity actors’: citizens engaging in acts of solidarity with migrant people who publicly or covertly engage in a critical stance on migration control policies and practices. This research emphasises the importance of taking the policing of solidarity actors into account to understand the policing of migration more broadly, detailing how the racist and gendered policing of migrant people bleeds into the disciplining of those who support them.

While attention to citizen solidarity has focused on European countries, the phenomenon is also visible in countries south of the Mediterranean. Spectacular trials have made the headlines. Our research findings shed light on the workings of less spectacular modes of criminalisation that target solidarity workers in the intimacy of their everyday lives, threatening their sense of security through opaque surveillance, attacks on their emotions, employment prospects and family life. We conceptualise this mode of criminalisation as ‘insidious harassment’, examining the entanglement of geopolitics, emotions, and the intimate at these migration pressure points. Without decentring migrants as the primary targets of violent bordering, it broadens our understanding of these regimes by drawing attention to the ways in which they viscerally target those who work to protect the rights of migrant people. The project’s findings highlight how forms of criminalisation range widely, from the explicit and physical to the intimate and psychological; from the formal to the informal, the banal to the spectacular.

The findings reveal that states invest considerable resources - money, human resources (official & unofficial) and time - in seeking to inflict a sense of constant surveillance and discomfort on solidarity actors. Many of the people we spoke to suspected that these indirect and opaque forms of state violence represent a way to protect the appearance and reputation of these states as rights-respecting, while in fact they pursue a dedicated campaign of trying to harass migrant people and those who support them into submission. The effects of insidious harassment are multiple: they are financial, administrative, emotional, psychological, physical and sometimes legal. Beyond just impacting practices of solidarity, they work to target solidarity actors on a moral and on practical levels, with repercussions on their work, family and social lives. This constitutes a protracted and everyday pressure that often works to disrupt solidarity actors’ sense of safety within and trust of the authorities and nation state. However, achieving an overview and in-depth understanding of these modes of policing and how they play out may contribute to reducing these effects. This research project has also shed light on how in contexts where repression is constantly squeezed and solidarity actors face damaging state practices, their commitment to rectifying social injustices and wrongs is also galvanised.

This ethnographic project aims to examine criminalizing and illegalizing processes targeting pro-migration activists and other citizens (e.g. volunteers, practitioners) in Morocco and France. The study investigates the competing ways in which ‘crimes of solidarity’ mobilise discourses and practices of solidarity, citizenship, and illegality in Morocco and France. The data collection examines how state repression of pro-migration activists and other ‘citizens’, who are often conflated with smugglers and accused of aiding irregular migrants, sheds light on the shifting and contested legal, moral and political boundaries between ‘irregular migrants’ and ‘citizens’. The recent focus on the figure and experience of ‘the migrant’ has enriched scholarly engagements with the construction of migrant illegality, irregular migrant political agency, and the entanglements of humanitarianism and security. Our project expands these conversations by exploring how migration politics target and affect not just migrants but also citizens. This shift is necessary in order to examine the far-reaching bordering practices and contested politics of exclusion beyond inter-state boundaries and the precarious lives of irregular migrants. We investigate how migration politics in France and Morocco are shifting the political agency and subjectivity of citizens who face (the threat of) prosecution from state authorities at the border and beyond. This has been achieved through participant observation and informal interviews with activists, artists, community leaders, NGO practitioners, funders, and other relevant professionals in Morocco and France. Themes discussed during conversations included : participants’ opinions about the politics of migration in Morocco/France; their history of activism and other engagement around migration; the motivations behind their engagement; the difficulties and obstacles they have faced in their activities and engagement over migration etc. The project has generated original insights into how hostile migration politics that selectively manage, stop, deter, and control forms of mobility also target individuals and organisations providing forms of support, assistance, aid to migrant people. The project has shed light on how state authorities in France and Morocco deploy indirect, opaque, and insidious forms of harassment to intimidate ‘subversive solidarity actors’: citizens engaging in acts of solidarity with migrant people who publicly or covertly engage in a critical stance on migration control policies and practices. This research emphasises the importance of taking the policing of solidarity actors into account to understand the policing of migration more broadly, detailing how the racist and gendered policing of migrant people bleeds into the disciplining of those who support them. While attention to citizen solidarity has focused on European countries, the phenomenon is also visible in countries south of the Mediterranean. Spectacular trials have made the headlines. Our research findings shed light on the workings of less spectacular modes of criminalisation that target solidarity workers in the intimacy of their everyday lives, threatening their sense of security through opaque surveillance, attacks on their emotions, employment prospects and family life. We conceptualise this mode of criminalisation as ‘insidious harassment’, examining the entanglement of geopolitics, emotions, and the intimate at these migration pressure points. Without decentring migrants as the primary targets of violent bordering, it broadens our understanding of these regimes by drawing attention to the ways in which they viscerally target those who work to protect the rights of migrant people. The project’s findings highlight how forms of criminalisation range widely, from the explicit and physical to the intimate and psychological; from the formal to the informal, the banal to the spectacular. The findings reveal that states invest considerable resources - money, human resources (official & unofficial) and time - in seeking to inflict a sense of constant surveillance and discomfort on solidarity actors. Many of the people we spoke to suspected that these indirect and opaque forms of state violence represent a way to protect the appearance and reputation of these states as rights-respecting, while in fact they pursue a dedicated campaign of trying to harass migrant people and those who support them into submission. The effects of insidious harassment are multiple: they are financial, administrative, emotional, psychological, physical and sometimes legal. Beyond just impacting practices of solidarity, they work to target solidarity actors on a moral and on practical levels, with repercussions on their work, family and social lives. This constitutes a protracted and everyday pressure that often works to disrupt solidarity actors’ sense of safety within and trust of the authorities and nation state. However, achieving an overview and in-depth understanding of these modes of policing and how they play out may contribute to reducing these effects. This research project has also shed light on how in contexts where repression is constantly squeezed and solidarity actors face damaging state practices, their commitment to rectifying social injustices and wrongs is also galvanised.As irregular migration into Europe remains at the centre of heated political debates, 'citizens' (including charity workers, activists, volunteers etc.) who provide help to 'irregular migrants' increasingly face intimidation, repression and prosecution from state authorities. There has been a rise in high-profile cases such as French farmer Herrou sentenced to prison for facilitating irregular entry at the French-Italian border, and Spanish activist Helena Maleno, accused by both Spain and Morocco of smuggling migrants. The activities for which individuals (and organizations) can be prosecuted are diverse and whether such activities are criminal is often contested: giving a lift to migrants, providing food or shelter, preventing a plane used for deportation from taking off, helping migrants to cross borders without documents, rescuing people at sea etc. Activists have coined the term 'crimes of solidarity', arguing that repressive legislations have been deployed not only to sanction criminals (e.g. 'smugglers') who benefit financially, but also to potentially sanction anyone providing help and relief to migrants, in defiance of international norms of human rights. This study explores these illegalisation and criminalisation processes amongst volunteers, activists, practitioners and other citizens in Morocco and France, where Civil Society Organisations have denounced state repression against migrants trying to cross the sea to continue their journeys and those providing assistance to them. It brings to the fore the shifting boundaries between 'citizens' and 'irregular migrants' and debates over solidarity and illegality. Whilst scholars have increasingly paid attention to the production of illegality amongst migrants, there has been little work on how such processes also affect the political agency and subjectivity of citizens. The study will address this gap by generating qualitative data on how citizens are subjected to and navigate illegalisation and criminalisation processes. It examines these processes in a European country (France) and one of its partners in the Global South (Morocco) for the 'management of migration'. This comparative approach enables to further highlight how hostile migration politics are entangled with a range of connections across Africa and Europe and competing discourses over values such as solidarity. To address the methodological and ethical issues which emerge from researching such politically contentious matters, this ethnographic study will combine participant-observation and interviews with visual methods to generate outputs with transformative power. Co-designed and co-delivered with civil society partners to ensure cross-sector relevance, the project includes two Knowledge Exchange and Impact events (in France and in Morocco) to bring together practitioners, activists, researchers, artists and policy-makers. These events will foster wider cross-sector collaborations through the sharing of best practice and solutions to the criminalisation of solidarity towards migrants. The KEI events will include the launch of country-specific policy briefs about: the legal framework and risks faced by activists; testimonials and evidence-based policy recommendations on practices and policies. The policy briefs will be aimed to relevant state bodies and decision-makers and other research users in France, Morocco and beyond. The project will also entail one international workshop in Manchester with delegates from across and beyond academia to share findings and responses to the criminalisation of acts of solidarity towards irregular migrants in Europe and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Creative outputs (e.g. photographs, videos) generated through the use of visual methods will result in a touring exhibition organised with a curator to increase awareness and understanding of migration issues and criminalisation processes amongst the general public in Morocco, France and beyond.

Cyber violence has become a growing issue in France, with at least ** percent of the young people questioned declaring having been confronted at least once with one of the situations characteristic of cyber violence in 2019. Insults was the most common cyberviolence, with ** percent of those respondents saying being perpetrators of such felony, including ***** percent who stated doing so more than once.

As of December 2023, data theft was the most common consequence of cyberattacks detected by companies in France, with ** percent of respondents experiencing it. Following closely, denial of service was the second most common result of an attack, reported by ** percent of respondents. Additionally, ** percent of companies experienced data exposure.

In 2022, disputes and unaccepted separations were the main motives for the male perpetrators of domestic homicide. 29 men killed their spouses due to an unaccepted separation in that year. Unknown causes were also common, as well as jealousy. The number of women killed by their spouse has fluctuated in France since 2006 but has decreased overall. There were 148 in that year, compared to 118 in 2022. Spikes in the number of deaths of women by their partners were also recorded for the years 2007, 2012, and 2019.

In April 2025, over ****** sexual offenses were reported to the police in France. Between 2020 and 2025, the number of reported sexual crimes steadily increased. For instance, around ***** cases were recorded in August 2020, rising to more than ****** by August 2024, the highest monthly total during the period analyzed.

As of January 2023, the number of cyberattacks detected by companies in France varied across different ranges. Approximately ** percent of companies reported detecting between one and three cyberattacks, while ***** percent experienced between **** and **** attacks. Only *** percent of companies faced between ** and ** cyberattacks. During the measured period, the most prevalent issue encountered by French companies was negligence or errors in handling or configuration by internal administrators or employees.

At the heart of the difficulties in observing violence against women, lesbians, and bi-women are often difficult to understand as a specific group in existing victimization surveys. This weakness is known and identified, and surveys have been carried out, notably by the association SOS Homophobie, which, in addition to its annual reports on LGBTphobia, has been able to focus on lesbophobia. The latest report shows that rejection (** percent), insults (** percent), threats (** percent), and harassment (** percent) were the most common manifestations in France in 2023.

In Europe, the Baltic countries of Latvia and Lithuania had the highest and third highest homicide rates respectively in 2022. Latvia had the highest rate at over four per 100,000 inhabitants. Meanwhile, the lowest homicide rate was found in Liechtenstein, with zero murders The most dangerous country worldwide Saint Kitts and Nevis is the world's most dangerous country to live in in terms of murder rate. The Caribbean country had a homicide rate of 65 per 100,000 inhabitants. Nine of the 10 countries with the highest murder rates worldwide are located in Latin America and the Caribbean. Whereas Celaya in Mexico was listed as the city with the highest murder rate worldwide, Colima in Mexico was the city with the highest homicide rate in Latin America, so the numbers vary from source to source. Nevertheless, several Mexican cities rank among the deadliest in the world when it comes to intentional homicides. Violent conflicts worldwide Notably, these figures do not include deaths that resulted from war or a violent conflict. While there is a persistent number of conflicts worldwide, resulting casualties are not considered murders. Partially due to this reason, homicide rates in Latin America are higher than those in countries such as Ukraine or the DR Congo. A different definition of murder in these circumstances could change the rate significantly.

In 2023, there were more than 86,700 people in prisons in France. Among them, around 67,000 were French nationals, and almost 19,400 were foreigners.

The United States had, by far, the highest homicide rate of the G7 countries between 2000 and 2023. In 2023, it reached 5.76 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, a decrease from 6.78 in 2021. By comparison, Canada, the G7 nation with the second-highest homicide rate, had 1.98 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2023. Out of each G7 nation, Japan had the lowest rate with 0.23 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.

Ce diagramme illustre le nombre de crimes et de délits enregistrés par la police et la gendarmerie en France en 2024, par type. Les vols sans violence contre des personnes étaient le délit le plus fréquemment recensé au cours de cette année-là. En outre, 284 homicides ont été recensé en 2024.