The largest number of immigrants in Germany were from Ukraine, as of 2023. The top three origin countries were rounded up by Romania and Turkey. Immigrants are defined as having left a country, which may be their home country, to permanently reside in another. Upon arriving, immigrants do not hold the citizenship of the country they move to. Immigration in the EU All three aforementioned countries are members of the European Union, which means their citizens have freedom of movement between EU member states. In practice, this means that citizens of any EU member country may relocate between them to live and work there. Unrestricted by visas or residence permits, the search for university courses, jobs, retirement options, and places to live seems to be defined by an enormous amount of choice. However, even in this freedom of movement scheme, immigration may be hampered by bureaucratic hurdles or financial challenges. Prosperity with a question mark While Germany continues to be an attractive destination for foreigners both in and outside the European Union, as well as asylum applicants, it remains to be seen how current events might influence these patterns, whether the number of immigrants arriving from certain countries will shift. Europe’s largest economy is suffering. Climbing inflation levels in the last few months, as well as remaining difficulties from the ongoing coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic are affecting global economic development. Ultimately, future immigrants may face the fact of moving from one struggling economy to another.

In 2023, around 1.93 million people immigrated to Germany. Numbers fluctuated during the time period covered in the graph at hand, peaking in 2015 during the high point of Europe’s refugee crisis. Significantly lower figures in 2020 may be attributed to the first year of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, and subsequent restrictions implemented by the German government on entering the country, in order to control the spread of the disease. Immigration to Germany “Immigrant” is a term used from the point of view of the receiving country, or the country being migrated to by a person. While reasons for and circumstances leading to an immigrant entering a foreign country may vary, they often include love, include seeking residence, employment, family reunions, or applying for asylum. Various countries are represented among foreigners living in Germany, though currently the leading three by numbers are Turkey, Ukraine, and Syria. Around 5.2 million immigrants living in Germany do not need a residence permit due to having EU citizenship, and therefore being allowed freedom of movement based on EU law. Another 2.64 million immigrants were granted an unlimited permit to stay in Germany. The near future Germany remains a popular choice for immigrants, even in currently challenging economic and political times. Welfare benefits, healthcare, and various support initiatives for those moving to or arriving in the country are on the list of selling points, though in practice, difficulties may be encountered depending on individual situations and laws in different German federal states. While the unemployment rate among foreigners living in Germany had gone up in 2020, it dropped again in the following years, but increased once more in 2023 and 2024 to over 16 percent. The country is Europe’s largest economy, housing many global players in various industries, which continues to attract jobseekers, despite these very industries facing struggles of their own brought on both by the ongoing coronavirus pandemic and geopolitical events in Europe.

This statistic shows the distribution of countries of origin for immigrants in Germany in 2023. In 2023, Ukraine had a 14.3 percent share among countries of origin for immigrants living in Germany.

This paper compares the partnership arrangements of Turkish and Ethnic German immigrants (i.e., return migrants from Ethnic German communities from predominantly Eastern European countries), the two largest migrant groups in Germany, and native Germans. Most existing analyses of migrants' partnerships focus on intermarriage, marriage formation, or union dissolution. We know only a little, however, about the prevalence of non-marital living arrangements. Given that single person households and cohabitation are widespread phenomena mainly in post-materialist societies, analyzing whether immigrants engage in these behaviors sheds light on potential adaptation processes. The analyses are based on the German Microcensus of the years 2009 and 2013, with a focus on adults in the 18–40 age group. First, we present descriptive findings on the prevalence of partnership arrangements of immigrants and native Germans. Second, we estimate cross-sectional regressions with the partnership arrangement as the outcome variable in order to control for compositional differences between immigrant groups with respect to education. Our results show that while the vast majority of first-generation immigrants are married, the share of married natives is considerably smaller. Living in an independent household without a partner and cohabitation are rare phenomena among immigrants. By contrast, about one in seven natives is cohabiting and more than one quarter is living in an independent household without a partner. The most prevalent partnership living arrangement of the Turkish second generation is living in the parental household without a partner. These results are robust after controlling for education, age, and year in the multiple regression analysis.

As of 2024, around **** million people from Turkey were living in Germany. Foreign nationals are those who are not German based on Article 116 Paragraph 1 of the German constitution. These include stateless persons and those with unclear citizenship as well as the population group with a migration background. Individuals with a migration background can either have immigrated into Germany or been born in the country to at least one parent who was born a foreigner.

Germany is a country known for immigration. In 2015, 21% of the general population in Germany consisted of individuals with a migration background. This article focuses on cancer-specific incidence and mortality among one of the biggest migrant groups in Germany: the resettlers. Resettlers are ethnic Germans who mainly immigrated from the Russian federation and other countries of the former Soviet Union after its collapse in 1989. We investigated differences between resettlers and the general German population, regarding (i) incidence and mortality of malignant neoplasms, (ii) time trends of the corresponding incidence and mortality, and (iii) cancer stage at diagnosis. We provide data from two resettler cohorts covering an observation time of 20 years: one cohort on cancer incidence (N = 32,972), and another cohort on mortality (N = 59,390). Cancer-specific standardized incidence ratios (SIR) and standardized mortality ratios (SMR) for all malignant neoplasms combined and the most common cancer-sites were calculated between resettlers and the general German population. Time trend analyses using Poisson regression were performed to investigate the developments of SIRs and SMRs. To investigate differences in stage at diagnosis, logistic regression was performed, calculating Odds Ratios for condensed cancer stages. We observed higher incidence and mortality of stomach cancer [SIR (men) 1.62, 95%CI 1.17–2.19; SMR (men) 1.62, 95%CI 1.31–2.01; SIR (women) 1.32, 95%CI 0.86–1.94; SMR (women) 1.52, 95%CI 1.19–1.93] and higher mortality of lung cancer [SMR (men) 1.34, 95%CI 1.20–1.50] among resettlers compared to the general German population, but lower incidence and mortality of colorectal (both sexes), lung (women), prostate and female breast cancer. However, time trend analyses showed converging incidence risks of cause-specific incidence over time, whereas differences of mortality did not show changes over time. Results from logistic regression suggest that resettler men were more often diagnosed with advanced cancer stages compared to the Münster population. Our findings suggest that risk factor patterns of the most common cancer-sites among resettlers are similar to those observed within the Russian population. Such increases in prostate, colorectal and breast cancer incidence may be the consequence of improved detection measures, and/or the adaptation of resettlers to the German lifestyle.

This statistic shows the number of foreigners in Germany according to the Central Register of Foreign Nationals in 2023, by state. In 2023, North-Rhine-Westphalia had the most foreign nationals at over 3.2 million, followed by Bavaria with almost 2.4 million and Baden-Württemberg with around 2.2 million. Foreigners are those who are not German based on Article 116, Paragraph 1 of the German constitution. These include stateless persons and those with unclear citizenship as well as the population group with a migration background. Individuals with a migration background can either have immigrated into Germany or been born in the country to at least one parent who was born a foreigner.

The United States hosted, by far, the highest number of immigrants in the world in 2024. That year, there were over ** million people born outside of the States residing in the country. Germany and Saudi Arabia followed behind at around **** and **** million, respectively. There are varying reasons for people to emigrate from their country of origin, from poverty and unemployment to war and persecution. American Migration People migrate to the United States for a variety of reasons, from job and educational opportunities to family reunification. Overall, in 2021, most people that became legal residents of the United States did so for family reunification purposes, totaling ******* people that year. An additional ******* people became legal residents through employment opportunities. In terms of naturalized citizenship, ******* people from Mexico became naturalized American citizens in 2021, followed by people from India, the Philippines, Cuba, and China. German Migration Behind the United States, Germany also has a significant migrant population. Migration to Germany increased during the mid-2010's, in light of the Syrian Civil War and refugee crisis, and during the 2020’s, in light of conflict in Afghanistan and Ukraine. Moreover, as German society continues to age, there are less workers in the labor market. In a low-migration scenario, Germany will have **** million skilled workers by 2040, compared to **** million by 2040 in a high-migration scenario. In both scenarios, this is still a decrease from **** skilled workers in 2020.

Politicians and media frequently invoke immigration threats to shape public opinion. But how do outgroup threat frames affect norms of citizenship, including behavior, liberal value commitments and national belonging? This paper presents evidence from an embedded vignette survey experiment in three immigrant-receiving societies: United States, United Kingdom, and Germany. I find immigration threats are filtered through partisanship in polarized settings, and asymmetrically affect norms of “good citizenship” among individuals on the partisan left. However, we see variation within this group: Democrats (US) de-value norms of behavior, like voting and being informed, while Labour supports (UK) repudiate liberal norms like tolerance and rally around national belonging. By contrast, in Germany, we observe more consensus in citizenship norm responses. The strong effect of immigration threat framing on the partisan left brings our attention to the strategic use of immigration discourse to move traditionally sympathetic citizens away from democratic civic ideals.

Our methodology is based on Mosleh et al., (2021) The main goal of our experiment is to study which narratives on immigration enjoy greater popularity on social media, depending on the (estimated) political orientation of the public. The basic principle of an “experiment” is to expose participants to a set of stimuli, changing one characteristic at a time. In this way, variation of responses can be causally attributed to the characteristic being varied. In the present study, the “stimulus” is given by the different narratives on immigration reported in the different “pinned” tweet of our four different experimental Twitter profiles. A screenshot of the accounts is given in the Appendix. The actual narratives that are employed in this study have been validated through the previous study

1 - survey -.

Our methodology works as follows: 1) We open (in June 2021) four Twitter accounts that are identical except for the “pinned tweets'' (See Appendix for one example). The accounts are meant to represent an “average” German young male with a common name and surname. The activity of the account is limited to posting standard and politically neutral daily news from mainstream German online outlets. The pinned tweets convey a different “narrative” regardingPRE-REG_study#2_TWITTER_OSFdnxgj [v01] immigration policies in Germany and represent our main “experimental variation”. The four different statements resulted to be the most shared narratives in survey 1 shortened so to fit into the Twitter limit for tweets. The profile picture has been taken from the website Unsplash, whose photos can be used freely for all purposes with no need of permission request. 2) We randomly select four different pools of German-speaking Twitter users. Each pool is composed of users aligned to a specific political orientation (right-wing: CDU/CSU+FDP, left-wing: SPD+Greens, far right: AfD, far left: Die Linke). Users whose activity cannot be assigned a specific political orientation will not be used. We assign users to one of the four groups performing objective analysis on users’ past Twitter activity. Then we proceed forming four target experimental groups based on a blocked randomization process. 3) Each experimental Twitter profile start “following” the assigned target users. Each target user is followed only by one of our experimental profiles. The main outcome variables for our study are: (a) the “follow-back rate” realized by the different experimental Twitter accounts; (b) the tweet activity of the users in the 72 hours following our tweet request, and the 24 hours after the follow-back, if the case, the activity associated to the pinned tweets (the number of likes, comments, retweets and interactions). 4) The twitter accounts are deleted at the end of the research. 5) We also analyze the degree of general users’ engagement with tweets by German political parties and the tweets by German leading politicians. The above protocol is preceded by a pilot phase (June-Sept. 2021) in which our twitter accounts are made active on a relatively small scale and their operations closely monitored. In order to provide ecological validity to our experimental Twitter profiles, we bought 250 German-targeted followers (form https://famousfollower.com/) for each profile, to make them credible. Our research will address the following research question: 1) Which type of narrative triggers higher support among supporters of different political parties? In particular, do narratives that emphasize reciprocity (i.e., narratives emphasizing the costs and benefits of immigrants’ integration) trigger more support than narratives emphasizing the outgroup (i.e., those making salient the outgroup, either as a source of threat to German society, or as a group that German people that can enrich Germany’s cultural and economic life ).? 2) The main purpose of our research is to identify narratives that could reduce political polarization and increase mutual understanding among politically active German citizens.

All persons (German and non-German) who resided in private households on the day of the interview and were born before 1 January 1990

The majority of immigrants moving to Sweden in 2023 were Swedes returning to Sweden. Nearly 10,600 Swedes returned to their home country in 2023. The remaining top five countries of origin were India, Poland, Germany, and Syria. In total, 95,000 people immigrated to Sweden in 2023.

Syrians largest immigrant group

Of Sweden's foreign-born population, Syrians made up the largest group. Following the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, many people left the country in search of a better life in Europe, some of which landed in Sweden. In 2022, Sweden hosted the world's 7th largest group of Syrian refugees.

Immigration drives population increase in Sweden

Over the past decade, Sweden has seen a positive migration rate, with more people immigrating to the country than people leaving. This is one of the main reasons why the country's population has been increasing steadily over recent years.

Personal interview with standardized questionnaire (PAPI – Paper and Pencil Interviewing; since 2000: CAPI – Computer Assisted Personal Interviewing), supplementary data from accompanying ISSP surveys (self-completion questionnaires, drop off).

Hate speech, or intentional derogatory expressions about people based on assigned group characteristics, has been studied primarily in online contexts. Less is known about the occurrence of this phenomenon in schools. As it has negative consequences for victims, perpetrators, and those who witness it, it is crucial to characterize the occurrence of offline (i.e., in the school) and online hate speech to describe similarities and differences between these two socialization contexts. The present study aimed to investigate the prevalence of hate speech witnessing, victimization, and perpetration, in a sample of 3,620 7–9th graders (51% self-identified as female) from 42 schools in Germany and Switzerland. We found that 67% of the students witnessed hate speech in their school, and 65% witnessed online hate speech at least once in the past 12 months. Approximately 21% of the students self-identified as offline perpetrators and 33% as offline victims, whereas these percentages were lower for online hate speech (13 and 20%, respectively). In both settings, skin color and origin were the most common group references for hate speech (50% offline and 63% online). Offline hate speech mainly came from classmates (88%), unknown sources (e.g., graffiti; 19%), or teachers (12%), whereas online hate speech mostly came from unknown persons (77%). The most frequent forms of offline hate speech were offensive jokes (94%) and the spread of lies and rumors about the members of a specific social group (84%). Significant differences by country, gender, and migration background were observed. Girls reported more offline victimization experiences, less perpetration, and a greater frequency of witnessing hate speech. This difference was larger in magnitude in the online setting. Students in Switzerland reported being exposed to hate speech more often than students in Germany. Students with a migration background reported higher hate speech victimization based on skin color and origin than students without a migration background. The high prevalence of hate speech highlights the need for school-based prevention programs. Our findings are discussed in terms of the practical implications.

Concern that immigration worsens crime problems is prevalent across Western publics. How does it shape electoral politics? Prior research asserted a growing left-right divide in immigration attitudes and voting behavior due to educational realignment. In contrast, I argue that leftist voters are more conservative on immigrant crime than leftist parties, which can drive highly-educated progressives (so-called `cosmopolitans') to right-wing parties. I demonstrate this voter-party mismatch using survey data from 14 Western European countries linked with expert ratings of party positions. A panel survey from Germany further shows that concern about immigrant crime increases vote intention for the center right among voters of the Greens – the party of leftist cosmopolitans. A conjoint experiment among German voters replicates this defection effect and shows that it persists even if the center right stigmatizes immigrants or adopts conservative socio-cultural issue positions. Repercussions of immigration can in fact drive leftist cosmopolitans to the right.

Living and housing situation of the German and the foreign population in selected parts of town in Cologne. Attitude to integration and contacts with countrymen or foreigners. Topics: The survey consists of a common part for foreigners and Germans and a supplemental part posed only to foreigners. The common part contains the following questions: judgement on the proportion of countrymen or foreigners in the residential area; local residency and moving frequency within the city; utilization of ethnic facilities in the municipal area; description of housing situation; manner of arranging residence; length of residence; rent costs; proportion of countrymen and foreigners in residential building; length of residence and satisfaction with housing; interest and reasons for change of residence; attitude or assumed attitude to integration of guest workers and presumable reasons for the difficulties of foreigners in the FRG (scales); neighborhood contacts and desire for more contacts with countrymen or foreigners; general contentment with life; leisure activities; information on personal employment and that of spouse; weekly working hours; work satisfaction; desire for occupational mobility. Among foreigners the following additional questions were posed: size of place of residence in country of origin; vocational training and last occupational activity in native country; reasons for moving to the FRG and planned length of stay; first occupational activity after moving to the FRG; housing situation after moving; presence and use of ethnic infrastructure facilities in residential area; interest in acquisition of German citizenship; self-assessment of knowledge of German and participation in German courses. Demography: age; sex; marital status; number of children under 15 years; school education; vocational training; occupation; occupational position; employment; income; income of spouse; size of household; residential status; employment of spouse; occupation of spouse; occupational position of spouse. Lebens- und Wohnsituation der deutschen und der ausländischen Bevölkerung in ausgewählten Stadtteilen Kölns. Einstellung zur Integration und Kontakte zwischen Landsleuten bzw. zu Ausländern. Themen: Die Befragung besteht aus einem gemeinsamen Befragungsteil für Ausländer und Deutsche und einem Zusatzteil, der nur an die Ausländer gestellt wurde. Der gemeinsame Teil enthält folgende Fragen: Beurteilung des Anteils von Landsleuten bzw. Ausländern in der Wohngegend; Ortsansässigkeit und Umzugshäufigkeit innerhalb der Stadt; Inanspruchnahme ethnischer Einrichtungen im Stadtgebiet; Beschreibung der Wohnsituation; Art der Wohnungsvermittlung; Wohndauer; Mietkosten; Anteil der Landsleute und Ausländer im Wohnhaus; Wohndauer und Wohnzufriedenheit; Interesse und Gründe für Wohnungswechsel; Einstellung bzw. vermutete Einstellung zur Integration von Gastarbeitern und vermutliche Gründe für die Schwierigkeiten der Ausländer in der BRD (Skalen); Nachbarschaftskontakte und Wunsch nach mehr Kontakten zu Landsleuten bzw. Ausländern; allgemeine Lebenszufriedenheit; Freizeitaktivitäten; Angaben über die eigene Berufstätigkeit und die des Ehepartners; wöchentliche Arbeitszeit; Arbeitszufriedenheit; Wunsch nach beruflicher Mobilität. Bei Ausländern wurde zusätzlich gefragt: Größe des Wohnorts im Herkunftsland; Berufsausbildung und letzte berufliche Tätigkeit im Heimatland; Gründe für die Einreise in die BRD und geplante Aufenthaltsdauer; erste berufliche Tätigkeit nach der Einreise in die BRD; Wohnsituation nach der Einreise; Vorhandensein und Nutzung von ethnischen Infrastruktureinrichtungen in der Wohngegend; Interesse am Erwerb der deutschen Staatsangehörigkeit; Selbsteinschätzung der Deutschkenntnisse und Teilnahme an Deutschkursen. Demographie: Alter; Geschlecht; Familienstand; Anzahl der Kinder unter 15 Jahren; Schulbildung; Berufsausbildung; Beruf; berufliche Position; Berufstätigkeit; Einkommen; Einkommen des Ehepartners; Haushaltsgröße; Wohnstatus; Berufstätigkeit des Ehepartners; Beruf des Ehepartners; berufliche Position des Ehepartners.

The original surveys have been designed to monitor trends in attitudes, behavior, and societal change in the Federal Republic of Germany. The main topics of this cumulative study are:

1.) Economy 2.) Politics 3.) Social inequality 4.) Ethnocentrism and minorities 5.) Family 6.) Lifestyle and personality 7.) Health 8.) Religion and world view 9.) Personal and collective values 10.) Social networks and social capital 11.) Deviant behavior and sanctions 12.) ALLBUScompact-Demography 13.) Geographic data 14.) Added value

Topics:

1.) Economy: assessment of the present and future economic situation in Germany and in one´s own federal state, assessment of present and future personal economic situation.

2.) Politics: satisfaction with the federal and state government, with German democracy and with the performance of the German political system (political support);

basic political attitudes: self-placement on left-right continuum, placement of political parties on a left-right-continuum, political interest, party inclination;

voting intention (Sonntagsfrage), participation in last federal elections, recall of vote in last federal elections, party-sympathy-scales, likelihood of voting for different political parties;

political participation: personal participation and willingness to participate in selected forms of protest and other political activities, norms for political participation; frequency of discussing politics with friends, acquaintances, strangers, and family;

political issues: attitudes towards nuclear energy, the death penalty for terrorists, towards the privatization of publicly owned companies; support for less government interference in the economy, for stricter environmental protection measures, for harsher punishment of criminals, for making social security government´s top priority, for a redistribution of income in favor of the common people; for the view that immigrants are good for the economy, for access to abortion without legal limitations, for more global free trade; attitude towards expanding or cutting budgets for social services and defense, perceived position of the federal government in these matters;

democracy scale;

political knowledge questions (party affiliation of top-level politicians, functioning of democratic institutions etc.);

political efficacy: perception of individual influence on politics, gap between politicians and citizens, self-assuredness with regard to political group work, too much complexity in politics, perception of politicians´ closeness to constituents, participation in the vote as a civic duty;

perceived strength of conflicts between social groups;

confidence in public institutions and organizations;

identification with various political entities: identification with own municipality, the federal state, the old Federal Republic or the GDR, unified Germany and the EU;

attitudes relating to the process of German unification: attitude towards the demand for increased willingness to make sacrifices in the West and more patience in the East, unification is advantageous, for East and West respectively, future of the East depends on the willingness of eastern Germans to make an effort, strangeness of citizens in the other part of Germany, performance pressure in the new states, attitude towards dealing with the Stasi-past of individuals, evaluation of socialism as an idea;

evaluation of administration services and assessment of treatment by the administration;

national pride and right-wing extremism: pride in German institutions and German achievements, pride in being a German, extremism scale.

3.) Social Inequality: fair share in standard of living, self-assessment of social class and classification on a top-bottom-scale, evaluation of personal occupational success, comparison with father´s position and personal occupational expectations for the future, attitudes towards the German economic system and evaluation of policies supporting the welfare state, assessment of access to education, perceived prerequisites for success in society, income differences as incentive to achieve, acceptance of social differences, evaluation of personal social security.

4.) Ethnocentrism and minorities: attitude towards the influx of eastern European ethnic Germans, asylum seekers, labor from EU or non-EU countries; perceived consequences of presence of foreigners in Germany, attitudes towards refugees, treatment of foreigners by the administration, ranking in terms of...

ALLBUS (GGSS - the German General Social Survey) is a biennial trend survey based on random samples of the German population. Established in 1980, its mission is to monitor attitudes, behavior, and social change in Germany. Each ALLBUS cross-sectional survey consists of one or two main question modules covering changing topics, a range of supplementary questions and a core module providing detailed demographic information. Additionally, data on the interview and the interviewers are provided as well. Key topics generally follow a 10-year replication cycle, many individual indicators and item batteries are replicated at shorter intervals.

Since the mid-1980ies ALLBUS also regularly hosts one or two modules of the ISSP (International Social Survey Programme).

The main question module of ALLBUS/GGSS 2018 covers political attitudes and political participation (including trust, populism, political knowledge, attitudes towards democracy). Other topics include use of media, social inequality and social capital, national pride and right-wing-extremism, and attitudes relating to the process of German unification. Additionally included are the ISSP modules “Social networks II” and “Religion IV”.

Topics:

1.) Economy: assessments of the present and future economic situation in Germany, assessment of present and future personal economic situation.

2.) Use of media: frequency and overall time of watching television; frequency of watching news programs on public and private channels respectively; frequency of reading a daily newspaper per week; frequency of using the Internet for political information.

3.) Politics: Political attitudes: Party inclination, political interest, self-placement on left-right continuum, placement of political parties on a left-right-continuum likelihood of voting for different political parties, postmaterialism (importance of law and order, fighting rising prices, free expression of opinions, and influence on governmental decisions); attitudes towards refugees, support for demanding more adaptation of immigrants to German customs and practices, for less government interference in the economy, for stricter environmental protection measures, for a ban on same-sex marriages, for the preferential treatment of women with regard to job applications and promotions, for harsher punishment of criminals, for making social security government´s top priority, for a redistribution of income in favor of the common people; for the view that immigrants are good for the economy, for access to abortion without legal limitations, for more global free trade, for stopping the influx of refugees;

Political participation: personal participation or willingness to participate in selected forms of protest, norms for political participation (citizens should voice their political discontent, participation in the vote is a civic duty, acceptability of political violence, plebiscites are a necessary part of democracy, everybody should keep up with politics);

Political self-efficacy: assessment of own capability and that of the majority of people with regard to working in apolitical group, too much complexity in politics, perception of politicians’ attitude toward the people, personal and average citizen´s level of political knowledge; Confidence in public institutions and organizations: public health service, federal constitutional court, federal parliament (Bundestag), city or municipal administration, judiciary, television, newspapers, universities, federal government, the police, political parties, European Commission, European Parliament;

Populism scale: members of parliament must only be bound to the will of the people, politicians talk too much and do too little, ordinary citizens would make better representatives than professional politicians, political compromise is a betrayal of principles, the people should make the important political decisions, the people agree on what needs to happen politically, politicians only care about the rich and powerful;

Attitudes towards democracy: support for the idea of democracy, political support (satisfaction with democracy in Germany, satisfaction with the performance of the federal government), necessity and role of the political opposition, freedom of expression, necessity and role of political parties, all democratic parties should have the chance of getting into government, social conflicts and the common good, media influence on the formation of political opinion, satisfac...

In light of ongoing debates about racially motivated police violence, this paper examines two separate but interrelated phenomena: instances of police discrimination and mistrust in police and the judicial system among ethnic minorities in Germany. Analyses are carried out based on waves 1, 3, and 5 of the CILS4EU-DE data collected among 14 to 20 year-old respondents in Germany. The focus of the paper lies on young men from the Middle East, as well as Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa, who—as our study demonstrates—tend to disproportionally more often report discrimination experiences and particularly low levels of trust in police and courts compared to other ethnic minorities and the majority populations in Germany, and partially also in comparison to their female counterparts. We also show that more frequent experiences of police discrimination are associated with greater distrust of the police and partially also with courts among young men from the Middle East, North and Sub-Saharan Africa. Female adolescents from similar backgrounds are also more distrustful of the police, but this is not explained by their own experiences of police discrimination.

All residents (German and non-German) living in private households in the Federal Republic of Germany who were born before 1 January 2000.