This article introduces the most comprehensive dataset on de jure central bank independence (CBI), including yearly data from 182 countries between 1970 and 2012. The dataset identifies statutory reforms affecting CBI, their direction, and the attributes necessary to build the Cukierman, Webb and Neyapty index. Previous datasets focused on developed countries, and included non-representative samples of developing countries. This dataset’s substantially broader coverage has important implications. First, it challenges the conventional wisdom about central bank reforms in the world, revealing CBI increases and restrictions in decades and regions previously considered barely affected by reforms. Second, the inclusion of almost 100 countries usually overlooked in previous studies suggests that the sample selection may have substantially affected results. Simple analyses show that the associations between CBI and inflation, unemployment or growth are very sensitive to sample selection. Finally, the dataset identifies numerous CBI decreases (restrictions), whereas previous datasets mostly look at CBI increases. These data’s coverage not only allows researchers to test competing explanations of the determinants and effects of CBI in a global sample, but it also provides a useful instrument for cross-national studies in diverse fields, such as liberalization, diffusion, political institutions, democratization, or responses to financial crises.

Replication data and code for all tables and figures in the paper as well as all robustness checks and figures in the online-only appendix. Requires Stata 14.2+ and R 4.1.2+ to run. Although central bank independence is a core tenet of monetary policy-making, it remains politically contested: In many emerging markets, populist governments are in frequent public conflict with the central bank. At other times, the same governments profess to respect the monetary authority’s independence. We model this conflict drawing on the crisis bargaining literature. Our model predicts that populist politicians will often bring a nominally independent central bank to heel without having to change its legal status. To provide evidence, we build a new data set of public pressure on central banks by classifying over 9000 analyst reports using machine learning. We find that populist politicians are more likely than non-populists to exert public pressure on the central bank, unless checked by financial markets, and also more likely to obtain interest rate concessions. Our findings underscore that de jure does not equal de facto central bank independence in the face of populist pressures.

A large literature establishes the benefits of central bank independence, yet very few have shown directly negative economic consequences. I argue that, rather than improving economic outcomes, independent central banks are myopically focused on inflation and this leads to tepid responsiveness to banking instability. I show that banking crises produce larger unemployment shocks, and credit and stock market contractions when the level of central bank independence is high. Further, I show that these significant economic costs can be mitigated by abandoning the inflation-centric policy mandates predominantly considered necessary. When the bank has high technical and political independence, banks’ whose policy mandate does not rigidly prioritize inflation produce significantly better outcomes during banking crises. At the same time, I show that this configuration does not produce higher inflation, suggesting it achieves a more flexible design without incurring significant costs.

In the literature, the consensus about the importance of the independence of the central banks towards stable economic growth has been proven (e.g. Barro and Gordon 1983). The empirical papers studying this problem follow Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992) central bank independence index which does not include some important factors such as rule of law in the given country and defines the components of independence too generally. In this project, we aim to build an alternative index that will measure the central bank independence in more detail which will account for the rule of law and other relevant aspects that indirectly affect the true independence of the central bank. Obtaining the index, we will study whether the independence of the central bank has a positive effect on maintaining the given central bank's primary target. Furthermore, in this research, we aim to test whether our results differ from the previous findings in the empirical literature on the central bank independence and its effect on stable prices. Based on the obtained results, an optimal legislature of the central bank's independence shall be suggested. This panel dataset provides an assessment of the independence of central banks in 21 OECD countries (excluding the Eurozone), focusing on their monetary policy autonomy as determined by legislation in 2010, 2015, and 2020. Our data collection adopts a novel approach, building upon theinnovating methodology proposed by Cukierman et al. (1992), while incorporating revised components of the index that place greater emphasis on current standards of central bank independence. Additionally, we introduce new criteria to evaluate budgetary independence, an important aspect of central bank autonomy (Swinburne and Castello-Branco, 1991). The dataset serves as a valuable resource for empirical studies seeking to analyze the impact of monetary policy independence on economic performance. Furthermore, policymakers can draw insights from this index to enhance legislative frameworks and promote stronger performance in central bank independence.

Central Banks are the central public monetary institution of a country or region, tasked with managing the currency and monetary policy of the state, as well as overseeing the financial system of the area under its supervision. In most of the largest economies of the world, gathered together formally as the Group of 20 (G20), the central bank is an independent institution with legally mandated goals which it must abide by. This means that central banks should, in theory at least, be independent of political control and pursue their mandated goals without being influenced by political concerns, such as pursuing wage growth in order to win votes for the incumbent government. Central banks have mostly been made legally independent since the 1980s, in an effort to allow central bank technocrats to take measures to control inflation, without needing popular political support. With the failures of many central bankers to foresee or prevent the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, however, central banks have come under increasing pressure to incorporate wider concerns into their mandates, with some questioning whether a central bank can ever be truly 'independent'. The goals of central banking For the majority of these central banks, price stability is the goal of their mandates. Price stability is the goal of maintaining price increases to a manageable level which is conducive of stable economic activity. This usually manifests itself as a goal of keeping inflation to around two percent per year. Since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, there has been a widening of some of these central banks' mandates to include financial stability. This action was often taken in reaction to the perception that many central banks became complacent about the growth of the financial sector during the period known as 'the Great Moderation' (1980s-2007), which led to the bank failures and subsequent bailouts of the crisis. Some experts have recently called for central banks to include climate change related goals in their mandates, with an aim to promote 'green central banking' and the growth of a sustainable finance industry. As of 2020 no central bank of the G20 countries has adopted such a goal in their mandates.

Description: Indicates whether the central bank is a regional organization (1), or a national central bank (0).

For more details please visist the following link https://datafinder.qog.gu.se/variable/cbi_reg

Abstract of associated article: Increasing the independence of a central bank from political influence, although ex-ante socially beneficial and initially successful in reducing inflation, would ultimately fail to lower inflation permanently. The smaller anticipated policy distortions implemented by a more independent central bank would induce the fiscal authority to decrease current distortions by increasing the deficit. Over time, inflation would increase to accommodate a higher public debt. By contrast, imposing a strict inflation target would lower inflation permanently and insulate the primary deficit from political distortions.

According to the diversionary use of force literature, unemployment as an indicator of poor economy should increase the likelihood of diversionary conflict. I argue, however, leaders do not engage in such conflict unconditionally simply when unemployment is rising. Whether worsening unemployment leads to diversionary conflict depends on the availability of policies that can alleviate the condition. Only when such policy availability is low, will diversionary conflict become more likely as unemployment deteriorates. When ameliorating policies are available, unemployment should reduce the likelihood of diversionary conflict. Focusing on central bank independence (CBI) as a primary mechanism that shapes the availability of policies that tackle unemployment, I expect that high CBI encourages the use of diversionary conflict as unemployment surges. An augmented zero-inflated negative binomial analysis of an updated militarized dispute dataset for the period 1975-2013 lends strong and robust support to this theoretical postulate. The causal mechanism is also empirically validated.

Recently, an unexpected public actor has joined climate activists’ forces: central banks increasingly care about and act on climate change. Their (potential) contribution to the climate-neutral economy is immense, as they possess vast institutional resources to influence investment in the economy. Central banks’ advocacy is puzzling, as they put their legitimacy at risk by stepping outside their mandates and area of expertise. To explore this puzzle, I study why and how climate change came on the agenda of the Dutch central bank, one of the first movers among central banks. By opening the black box of organizational politics within central banks and building on unique interview data, I show how the policy shift of the Dutch central bank can be traced back to a small group of policy-seeking staff. This process-tracing case study contributes to our understanding of transformative change in climate policy in particular and public policy more generally.

This paper adopts and develops the ‘‘fear of floating’’ theory to explain the decision to implement a de facto peg, the choice of anchor currency among multiple key currencies, and the role of central bank independence for these choices. We argue that since exchange rate depreciations are passed-through into higher prices of imported goods, avoiding the import of inflation provides an important motive to de facto peg the exchange rate in import-dependent countries. This study shows that the choice of anchor currency is determined by the degree of dependence of the potentially pegging country on imports from the key currency country and on imports from the key currency area, consisting of all countries which have already pegged to this key currency. The fear of floating approach also predicts that countries with more independent central banks are more likely to de facto peg their exchange rate since independent central banks are more averse to inflation than governments and can de facto peg a country’s exchange rate independently of the government.

This study aims to examine whether Central Bank Independence (CBI) and Macroprudential Policy (MAPP) are capable of assisting the improvement of stability in the financial system, regarding the credit gap for 20 developing markets from 2000 to 2021. To examine this financial association, a panel threshold nonlinear model was implemented, based on the potentially time-varying influence of the CBI and MAPP index on the credit gap. The effects of this relationship also emphasized the CBI degree, whose greater level often stabilized the financial sector better. In this case, a stronger effect is commonly prioritized when CBI is below its trend. Based on the analysis, the selected experimental countries were categorized into two groups. The results showed that the nations with a higher CBI degree had greater stability in the financial system. Tighter MAPP also improved financial stability when CBI was below its trend. However, it did not enhance stability when CBI was more than the threshold level.

During the financial crisis of 2007-10, the Federal Reserve (Fed) served as a global lender of last resort by establishing currency swap agreements with 14 foreign central banks, including several in East Asia. These agreements were controversial internationally because the Fed selectively established swaps with some central banks and not others, raising concerns about access to the Fed’s dollar-creating facilities. Within the U.S. Congress, the swaps were controversial because they appeared to be a new and unauthorized form of foreign aid. I analyze both the Fed’s decision to establish swap lines with certain central banks and the congressional response to these arrangements. I find that the Fed was more likely to establish swaps with central banks whose jurisdictions were important to U.S. commercial banks, suggesting that the Fed discriminated in ways that served U.S. interests. To analyze the congressional reaction to the foreign currency swaps, I examine voting in the House of Representatives on a legislative proposal known as “Audit the Fed” that would end the Fed's confidentiality about the foreign central banks it supports and reduce its political independence more broadly. I find that campaign contributions from commercial banks to representatives are negatively correlated with voting “yes” on this proposal. I also find that right-wing representatives are much more likely to support this proposal than left-wing representatives, which suggests that new congressional coalitions are forming on the role of the Fed in the (global) economy.

Abstract

In an environment where the Bank must demonstrate its impact and value, it is critical that the institution collects and tracks empirical data on how its work is perceived by clients, partners and other stakeholders in our client countries.

The Country Opinion Survey Program was scaled up in order to: - Annually assess perceptions of the World Bank among key stakeholders in a representative sample of client countries; - Track these opinions over time, representative of: regions, stakeholders, country lending levels, country income/size levels, etc. - Inform strategy and decision making: apply findings to challenges to ensure real time response at several levels: corporate, regional, country - Obtain systematic feedback from stakeholders regarding: • The general environment in their country; • Value of the World Bank in their country; • World Bank's presence (work, relationships, etc.); • World Bank's future role in their country. - Create a feedback loop that allows data to be shared with stakeholders.

Geographic coverage

The data from the 29 country surveys were combined in this review. Although individual countries are not specified, each country was designated as part of a particular region: Africa (AFR), East Asia (EAP), Europe/Central Asia (ECA), Latin America (LAC), Middle East/North Africa (MNA), and South Asia (SAR).

Analysis unit

Client Country

Kind of data

Sample survey data [ssd]

Sampling procedure

In FY 2012 (July 2011 to July 1, 2012), 15,029 stakeholders of the World Bank in 29 different countries were invited to provide their opinions on the Bank's assistance to the country by participating in a country survey. Participants in these surveys were drawn from among senior government officials (from the office of the Prime Minister, President, Minister, Parliamentarian; i.e., elected officials), staff of ministries (employees of ministries, ministerial departments, or implementation agencies, and government officials; i.e., non-elected government officials, and those attached to agencies implementing Bank-supported projects), consultants/contractors working on World Bank-supported projects/programs; project management units (PMUs) overseeing implementation of a project; local government officials or staff, bilateral and multilateral agency staff, private sector organizations, private foundations; the financial sector/private banks; non-government organizations (NGOs, including CBOs), the media, independent government institutions (e.g., regulatory agencies, central banks), trade unions, faith-based groups, members of academia or research institutes, and members of the judiciary.

Mode of data collection

Mail Questionnaire [mail]

Research instrument

The Questionnaire consists of the following sections:

A. General Issues facing a country: Respondents were asked to indicate whether the country is headed in the right direction, what they thought were the top three most important development priorities, and which areas would contribute most to reducing poverty and generating economic growth in the country.

B. Overall Attitudes toward the World Bank: Respondents were asked to rate their familiarity with the World Bank, the Bank's effectiveness in the country, the extent to which the Bank meets the country's needs for knowledge services and financial instruments, and the extent to which the Bank should seek or does seek to influence the global development agenda. Respondents were also asked to rate their agreement with various statements regarding the Bank's work and the extent to which the Bank is an effective development partner. Furthermore, respondents were asked to indicate the sectoral areas on which it would be most productive for the Bank to focus its resources, the Bank's greatest values and greatest weaknesses in its work, the most and least effective instruments in helping to reduce poverty in the country, with which groups the Bank should collaborate more, and to what reasons respondents attributed failed or slow reform efforts.

C. World Bank Effectiveness and Results: Respondents were asked to rate the extent to which the Bank's work helps achieve sustainable development results in the country, and the Bank's level of effectiveness across thirty-five development areas, such as economic growth, public sector governance, basic infrastructure, social protection, and others.

D. The World Bank's Knowledge: Respondents were asked to indicate the areas on which the Bank should focus its research efforts, and to rate the effectiveness and quality of the Bank's knowledge/research, including how significant of a contribution it makes to development results, its technical quality, and the Bank's effectiveness at providing linkage to non-Bank expertise.

E. Working with the World Bank: Respondents were asked to rate their level of agreement with a series of statements regarding working with the Bank, such as the World Bank's "Safeguard Policy" requirements being reasonable, the Bank imposing reasonable conditions on its lending, disbursing funds promptly, and increasing the country's institutional capacity.

F. The Future Role of the World Bank in the country: Respondents were asked to rate how significant a role the Bank should play in the country's development in the near future, and to indicate what the Bank should do to make itself of greater value in the country.

G. Communication and Information Sharing: Respondents were asked to indicate where they get information about economic and social development issues, how they prefer to receive information from the Bank, their access to the Internet, and their usage and evaluation of the Bank's websites. Respondents were asked about their awareness of the Bank's Access to Information policy, past information requests from the Bank, and their level of agreement that they use more data from the World Bank as a result of the Bank's Open Data policy. Respondents were also asked to indicate their level of agreement that they know how to find information from the Bank and that the Bank is responsive to information requests.

H. Background Information: Respondents were asked to indicate their current position, specialization, whether they professionally collaborate with the World Bank, their exposure to the Bank in the country, and their geographic location.

Response rate

A total of 7,142 stakeholders (48% response rate) participated and are part of this review.

Abstract

The World Bank is interested in gauging the views of clients and partners who are either involved in development in China or who observe activities related to social and economic development. The World Bank Country Assessment Survey is meant to give the Bank's team that works in China, more in-depth insight into how the Bank's work is perceived. This is one tool the Bank uses to assess the views of its critical stakeholders. With this understanding, the World Bank hopes to develop more effective strategies, outreach and programs that support development in China. The World Bank commissioned an independent firm to oversee the logistics of this effort in China.

The survey was designed to achieve the following objectives: - Assist the World Bank in gaining a better understanding of how stakeholders in China perceive the Bank; - Obtain systematic feedback from stakeholders in China regarding: · Their views regarding the general environment in China; · Their perceived overall value of the World Bank in China; · Overall impressions of the World Bank as related to programs, poverty reduction, personal relationships, effectiveness, knowledge base, collaboration, and its day-to-day operation; and · Perceptions of the World Bank's communication and outreach in China. - Use data to help inform the China country team's strategy.

Geographic coverage

National

Analysis unit

Stakeholder

Universe

Stakeholders of the World Bank in China

Kind of data

Sample survey data [ssd]

Sampling procedure

December 2011 thru March 2012, 518 stakeholders of the World Bank in China were invited to provide their opinions on the Bank's assistance to the country by participating in a country survey. Participants in the survey were drawn from among employees of a ministry or ministerial department of central government; local government officials or staff; project management offices at the central and local level; the central bank; financial sector/banks; NGOs; regulatory agencies; state-owned enterprises; bilateral or multilateral agencies; private sector organizations; consultants/contractors working on World Bank supported projects/programs; the media; and academia, research institutes or think tanks.

Mode of data collection

Face-to-face [f2f]

Research instrument

The Questionnaire consists of 8 Sections: 1. Background Information: The first section asked respondents for their current position; specialization; familiarity, exposure to, and involvement with the Bank; and geographic location.

1. General Issues facing China: Respondents were asked to indicate what they thought were the most important development priorities, which areas would contribute most to poverty reduction and economic growth in China, as well as rating their perspective on the future of the next generation in China.

2. Overall Attitudes toward the World Bank: Respondents were asked to rate the Bank's overall effectiveness in China, the extent to which the Bank's financial instruments meet China's needs, the extent to which the Bank meets China's need for knowledge services, and their agreement with various statements regarding the Bank's programs, poverty mission, relationships, and collaborations in China. Respondents were also asked to indicate the areas on which it would be most productive for the Bank to focus its resources and research, what the Bank's level of involvement should be, and what they felt were the Bank's greatest values and greatest weaknesses in its work.

3. The Work of the World Bank: Respondents were asked to rate their level of importance and the Bank's level of effectiveness across fifteen areas in which the Bank was involved, such as helping to reduce poverty and encouraging greater transparency in governance.

4. The Way the World Bank does Business: Respondents were asked to rate the Bank's level of effectiveness in the way it does business, including the Bank's knowledge, personal relationships, collaborations, and poverty mission.

5. Project/Program Related Issues: Respondents were asked to rate their level of agreement with a series of statements regarding the Bank's programs, day-to-day operations, and collaborations in China.

6. The Future of the World Bank in China: Respondents were asked to rate how significant a role the Bank should play in China's development and to indicate what the Bank could do to make itself of greater value and what the greatest obstacle was to the Bank playing a significant role in China.

7. Communication and Outreach: Respondents were asked to indicate where they get information about development issues and the Bank's development activities in China, as well as how they prefer to receive information from the Bank. Respondents were also asked to indicate their usage of the Bank's website and PICs, and to evaluate these communication and outreach efforts.

Response rate

A total of 207 stakeholders participated in the country survey (40%).

The dissertation addresses the growth of government commitments to the provision of social insurance, the provision of "public" goods, and the political management of the macroeconomy. It does so in three parts: (a) a study of the determinants and consequences of transfers growth, (b) a study of the determinants and consequences of public-debt growth, and (c) a study of the interactions of monetary-policy institutions with wage-/price-bargaining institutions and the sectoral composition of employment. Highlighting and summarizing some key arguments and findings: (a) The first study argues that demand for transfers would increase with income inequality, as has previously been noted, but only to the degree that the poor participate in the democracy (e.g., vote). The findings from a test of this and other propositions emerging from the literature include that transfer tends to grow more quickly where both the distribution of income is more unequal and the percentage of the population voting is high. The chapter then proceeds to evaluate the economic and political consequences for the functioning of the Keynesian Welfare State (KWS). (b) The second study presents a series of tests of the theoretical literature on the rise of public debt in developed democracies since the oil crises, in many cases representing the first empirical analysis of these propositions. Many of the arguments considered receive broad support from the available data, but the tests also reveal significant weaknesses and suggest some corrections. Again, the chapter proceeds to evaluate the consequences of these trends in debt for the KWS. (c) The third study derives a model showing that the real economic effects of central bank independence are not, in general, zero, as had been argued, but rather depend on the institutional structure of wage-/price-bargaining and the sectoral composition of employment: traded, private non-traded, and public. The findings indicate that central bank independence is less costly where bargaining is more coordinated and conversely that coordination is more beneficial where the bank is more independent. They also indicate that central bank independence is more (less) costly where the public (traded) sector is large. Again, the political ramifications of these arguments and findings are considered.

Abstract

In an environment where the Bank must demonstrate its impact and value, it is critical that the institution collects and tracks empirical data on how its work is perceived by clients, partners and other stakeholders in our client countries.

In FY 2013, the Country Opinion Survey Program was scaled up in order to: - Annually assess perceptions of the World Bank among key stakeholders in a representative sample of client countries; - Track these opinions over time, representative of: regions, stakeholders, country lending levels, country income/size levels, etc. - Inform strategy and decision making: apply findings to challenges to ensure real time response at several levels: corporate, regional, country - Obtain systematic feedback from stakeholders regarding: - The general environment in their country; - Value of the World Bank in their country; - World Bank's presence (work, relationships, etc.); - World Bank's future role in their country. - Create a feedback loop that allows data to be shared with stakeholders.

Geographic coverage

The data from the 41 country surveys were combined in this review. Although individual countries are not specified, each country was designated as part of a particular region: Africa (AFR), East Asia (EAP), Europe/Central Asia (ECA), Latin America (LAC), Middle East/North Africa (MNA), and South Asia (SAR).

Analysis unit

Client Country

Kind of data

Sample survey data [ssd]

Sampling procedure

In FY 2013 (July 2012 to July 1, 2013), 26,014 stakeholders of the World Bank in 41 different countries were invited to provide their opinions on the Bank's assistance to the country by participating in a country survey. Participants in these surveys were drawn from among senior government officials (from the office of the Prime Minister, President, Minister, Parliamentarian; i.e., elected officials), staff of ministries (employees of ministries, ministerial departments, or implementation agencies, and government officials; i.e., non-elected government officials, and those attached to agencies implementing Bank-supported projects), consultants/contractors working on World Bank-supported projects/programs; project management units (PMUs) overseeing implementation of a project; local government officials or staff, bilateral and multilateral agency staff, private sector organizations, private foundations; the financial sector/private banks; non-government organizations (NGOs, including CBOs), the media, independent government institutions (e.g., regulatory agencies, central banks), trade unions, faith-based groups, members of academia or research institutes, and members of the judiciary.

Mode of data collection

Mail Questionnaire [mail]

Research instrument

The Questionnaire consists of the following sections:

A. General Issues facing a country: Respondents were asked to indicate whether the country is headed in the right direction, what they thought were the top three most important development priorities, and which areas would contribute most to reducing poverty and generating economic growth in the country.

B. Overall Attitudes toward the World Bank: Respondents were asked to rate their familiarity with the World Bank, the Bank's effectiveness in the country, the extent to which the Bank meets the country's needs for knowledge services and financial instruments, and the extent to which the Bank should seek or does seek to influence the global development agenda. Respondents were also asked to rate their agreement with various statements regarding the Bank's work and the extent to which the Bank is an effective development partner. Furthermore, respondents were asked to indicate the sectoral areas on which it would be most productive for the Bank to focus its resources, the Bank's greatest values and greatest weaknesses in its work, the most and least effective instruments in helping to reduce poverty in the country, with which groups the Bank should collaborate more, and to what reasons respondents attributed failed or slow reform efforts.

C. World Bank Effectiveness and Results: Respondents were asked to rate the extent to which the Bank's work helps achieve sustainable development results in the country, and the Bank's level of effectiveness across thirty-five development areas, such as economic growth, public sector governance, basic infrastructure, social protection, and others.

D. The World Bank's Knowledge: Respondents were asked to indicate the areas on which the Bank should focus its research efforts, and to rate the effectiveness and quality of the Bank's knowledge/research, including how significant of a contribution it makes to development results, its technical quality, and the Bank's effectiveness at providing linkage to non-Bank expertise.

E. Working with the World Bank: Respondents were asked to rate their level of agreement with a series of statements regarding working with the Bank, such as the World Bank's "Safeguard Policy" requirements being reasonable, the Bank imposing reasonable conditions on its lending, disbursing funds promptly, and increasing the country's institutional capacity.

F. The Future Role of the World Bank in the country: Respondents were asked to rate how significant a role the Bank should play in the country's development in the near future, and to indicate what the Bank should do to make itself of greater value in the country.

G. Communication and Information Sharing: Respondents were asked to indicate where they get information about economic and social development issues, how they prefer to receive information from the Bank, their access to the Internet, and their usage and evaluation of the Bank's websites. Respondents were asked about their awareness of the Bank's Access to Information policy, past information requests from the Bank, and their level of agreement that they use more data from the World Bank as a result of the Bank's Open Data policy. Respondents were also asked to indicate their level of agreement that they know how to find information from the Bank and that the Bank is responsive to information requests.

H. Background Information: Respondents were asked to indicate their current position, specialization, whether they professionally collaborate with the World Bank, their exposure to the Bank in the country, and their geographic location.

Response rate

A total of 9,279 stakeholders (36% response rate) participated and are part of this review.

Turkey saw phenomenal growth in the 2000s as economic reforms ushered in FDI, GVCs expanded, and productivity increased. The early 2000s saw Turkey exit from major economic crisis with a strengthened fiscal framework, a strengthened, inflation-targeting mandate for the Central Bank, the establishment of an independent bank regulator, and importantly, a recently agreed Customs Union agreement with the EU. From 2001 to 2017, incomes per capita in Turkey doubled in real terms and tripled in current dollar terms. Turkey transformed from a lower-middle-income country (LMIC) at the start of the 2000s to very nearly reaching high-income status by 2014. This drove a rapid fall in poverty from above 30 percent to just 9 percent1. Very few other countries matched Turkey’s growth over this period, and almost all of them were new EU member states.

At the end of 2023, Zimbabwe had the highest inflation rate in the world, at 667.36 percent change compared to the previous year. Inflation in industrialized and in emerging countries Higher inflation rates are more present in less developed economies, as they often lack a sufficient central banking system, which in turn results in the manipulation of currency to achieve short term economic goals. Thus, interest rates increase while the general economic situation remains constant. In more developed economies and in the prime emerging markets, the inflation rate does not fluctuate as sporadically. Additionally, the majority of countries that maintained the lowest inflation rate compared to previous years are primarily oil producers or small island independent states. These countries experienced deflation, which occurs when the inflation rate falls below zero; this may happen for a variety of factors, such as a shift in supply or demand of goods and services, or an outflow of capital.

This study aims to examine whether Central Bank Independence (CBI) and Macroprudential Policy (MAPP) are capable of assisting the improvement of stability in the financial system, regarding the credit gap for 20 developing markets from 2000 to 2021. To examine this financial association, a panel threshold nonlinear model was implemented, based on the potentially time-varying influence of the CBI and MAPP index on the credit gap. The effects of this relationship also emphasized the CBI degree, whose greater level often stabilized the financial sector better. In this case, a stronger effect is commonly prioritized when CBI is below its trend. Based on the analysis, the selected experimental countries were categorized into two groups. The results showed that the nations with a higher CBI degree had greater stability in the financial system. Tighter MAPP also improved financial stability when CBI was below its trend. However, it did not enhance stability when CBI was more than the threshold level.

The World Bank is interested in gauging the views of clients and partners who are either involved in development in Central African Republic (CAR) or who observe activities related to social and economic development. The World Bank Country Assessment Survey is meant to give the World Bank’s team that works in CAR, more in-depth insight into how the Bank’s work is perceived. This is one tool the World Bank uses to assess the views of its critical stakeholders. With this understanding, the World Bank hopes to develop more effective strategies, outreach and programs that support development in CAR. The World Bank commissioned an independent firm to oversee the logistics of this effort in CAR. The survey was designed to achieve the following objectives: Assist the World Bank in gaining a better understanding of how stakeholders in CAR perceive the Bank; Obtain systematic feedback from stakeholders in CAR regarding: · Their views regarding the general environment in CAR; · Their overall attitudes toward the World Bank in CAR; · Overall impressions of the World Bank's effectiveness and results, knowledge and research, and communication and information sharing in CAR; and · Perceptions of the World Bank's future role in CAR. Use data to help inform the CAR country team's strategy.