Graph and download economic data for 10-Year Real Interest Rate (REAINTRATREARAT10Y) from Jan 1982 to Aug 2025 about 10-year, interest rate, interest, real, rate, and USA.

The United States Treasury's 10-year bond earned an average return of **** percent in 2023. This rate was adjusted to reflect a constant maturity and also indexed to inflation, giving an idea of real returns for longer-term investments. This expected return averaged around *** percent before the financial crisis but was negative in 2011, 2012, 2020, and 2021.

Graph and download economic data for 1-Year Real Interest Rate (REAINTRATREARAT1YE) from Jan 1982 to Aug 2025 about 1-year, interest rate, interest, real, rate, and USA.

Graph and download economic data for Market Yield on U.S. Treasury Securities at 5-Year Constant Maturity, Quoted on an Investment Basis, Inflation-Indexed (DFII5) from 2003-01-02 to 2025-08-19 about TIPS, maturity, Treasury, 5-year, securities, interest rate, interest, real, rate, and USA.

The average market yield on the United States Treasury's 10-year bond was **** percent during the second quarter of 2024. This rate was adjusted to reflect a constant maturity and also indexed to inflation, giving an idea of real returns for longer-term investments. The recent expected return was highest at the end of the end of the last quarter of 2024, and lowest in the second half of 2021, when it was negative.

Graph and download economic data for Market Yield on U.S. Treasury Securities at 30-Year Constant Maturity, Quoted on an Investment Basis, Inflation-Indexed (DFII30) from 2010-02-22 to 2025-08-19 about TIPS, 30-year, maturity, Treasury, securities, interest rate, interest, real, rate, and USA.

As of July 22, 2025, the yield for a ten-year U.S. government bond was 4.38 percent, while the yield for a two-year bond was 3.88 percent. This represents an inverted yield curve, whereby bonds of longer maturities provide a lower yield, reflecting investors' expectations for a decline in long-term interest rates. Hence, making long-term debt holders open to more risk under the uncertainty around the condition of financial markets in the future. That markets are uncertain can be seen by considering both the short-term fluctuations, and the long-term downward trend, of the yields of U.S. government bonds from 2006 to 2021, before the treasury yield curve increased again significantly in the following years. What are government bonds? Government bonds, otherwise called ‘sovereign’ or ‘treasury’ bonds, are financial instruments used by governments to raise money for government spending. Investors give the government a certain amount of money (the ‘face value’), to be repaid at a specified time in the future (the ‘maturity date’). In addition, the government makes regular periodic interest payments (called ‘coupon payments’). Once initially issued, government bonds are tradable on financial markets, meaning their value can fluctuate over time (even though the underlying face value and coupon payments remain the same). Investors are attracted to government bonds as, provided the country in question has a stable economy and political system, they are a very safe investment. Accordingly, in periods of economic turmoil, investors may be willing to accept a negative overall return in order to have a safe haven for their money. For example, once the market value is compared to the total received from remaining interest payments and the face value, investors have been willing to accept a negative return on two-year German government bonds between 2014 and 2021. Conversely, if the underlying economy and political structures are weak, investors demand a higher return to compensate for the higher risk they take on. Consequently, the return on bonds in emerging markets like Brazil are consistently higher than that of the United States (and other developed economies). Inverted yield curves When investors are worried about the financial future, it can lead to what is called an ‘inverted yield curve’. An inverted yield curve is where investors pay more for short term bonds than long term, indicating they do not have confidence in long-term financial conditions. Historically, the yield curve has historically inverted before each of the last five U.S. recessions. The last U.S. yield curve inversion occurred at several brief points in 2019 – a trend which continued until the Federal Reserve cut interest rates several times over that year. However, the ultimate trigger for the next recession was the unpredicted, exogenous shock of the global coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, showing how such informal indicators may be grounded just as much in coincidence as causation.

This is the replication package for "A Model of Zombie Firms and the Perils of Negative Real Interest Rates," accepted in 2023 by the Journal of Political Economy.

In June 2025, global inflation rates and central bank interest rates showed significant variation across major economies. Most economies initiated interest rate cuts from mid-2024 due to declining inflationary pressures. The U.S., UK, and EU central banks followed a consistent pattern of regular rate reductions throughout late 2024. In the first half of 2025, Russia maintained the highest interest rate at 20 percent, while Japan retained the lowest at 0.5 percent. Varied inflation rates across major economies The inflation landscape varies considerably among major economies. China had the lowest inflation rate at 0.1 percent in June 2025. In contrast, Russia maintained a high inflation rate of 9.4 percent. These figures align with broader trends observed in early 2025, where China had the lowest inflation rate among major developed and emerging economies, while Russia's rate remained the highest. Central bank responses and economic indicators Central banks globally implemented aggressive rate hikes throughout 2022-23 to combat inflation. The European Central Bank exemplified this trend, raising rates from 0 percent in January 2022 to 4.5 percent by September 2023. A coordinated shift among major central banks began in mid-2024, with the ECB, Bank of England, and Federal Reserve initiating rate cuts, with forecasts suggesting further cuts through 2025 and 2026.

The benchmark interest rate in Japan was last recorded at 0.50 percent. This dataset provides - Japan Interest Rate - actual values, historical data, forecast, chart, statistics, economic calendar and news.

The yield on Germany 10Y Bond Yield eased to 2.71% on August 20, 2025, marking a 0.04 percentage point decrease from the previous session. Over the past month, the yield has edged up by 0.10 points and is 0.51 points higher than a year ago, according to over-the-counter interbank yield quotes for this government bond maturity. Germany 10-Year Bond Yield - values, historical data, forecasts and news - updated on August of 2025.

The U.S. bank prime loan rate has undergone significant fluctuations over the past three decades, reflecting broader economic trends and monetary policy decisions. From a high of **** percent in 1990, the rate has seen periods of decline, stability, and recent increases. As of June 2025, the prime rate stood at *** percent, marking a notable rise from the historic lows seen in the early 2020s. Federal Reserve's impact on lending rates The prime rate's trajectory closely mirrors changes in the federal funds rate, which serves as a key benchmark for the U.S. financial system. In 2023, the Federal Reserve implemented a series of rate hikes, pushing the federal funds target range to ******** percent by year-end. This was followed by several rate cuts in 2024, with the target range standing at 4.25 to 4.5 percent in December 2024. The aggressive monetary tightening in 2023 was aimed at combating rising inflation, and its effects rippled through various lending rates, including the prime rate. Long-term investment outlook While short-term rates have risen, long-term investment yields have also seen changes. The 10-year U.S. Treasury bond, a benchmark for long-term interest rates, showed an average market yield of **** percent in the second quarter of 2024, adjusted for constant maturity and inflation. This figure represents a recovery from negative real returns seen in 2021, reflecting shifting expectations for economic growth and inflation. The evolving yield environment has implications for both borrowers and investors, influencing decisions across the financial landscape.

The Chinese economy has undergone a long-term transition reform, but there is still a planned economy characteristic in the financial sector, which is financial repression. Due to the existence of financial repression, China’s actual interest rate level should be lower than the Consumer Price Index (CPI). However, based on official China’s interest rates and CPI, over half of the years China’s actual interest rate remained higher than CPI by our calculation from 1999 to 2022. This is inconsistent with the financial repression that exists in China, and the main reason is the calculation methods of China’s CPI. China’s CPI measurement system originated from the planned economy era, which did not fully consider the rise in housing purchase prices, so the current CPI measurement system can be more realistically presented by taking the rise in housing prices into consider. The core idea of this study is to mining relevant official statistical data and calculate the proportion of Chinese residents’ expenditure on purchasing houses to their total expenditure. By taking the proportion of house purchases as the weight of house price factor, and taking the proportion of other consumption as the weight of official CPI, the Generalized CPI (GCPI) is formulated. The GCPI is then compared with market interest rates to determine the actual interest rate situation in China over the past 20 years. This study has found that if GCPI is used as a measure, China’s real interest rates have been negative for most years since 1999. Chinese residents have suffered the negative effects of financial repression over the past 20 years, and their property income cannot keep up with the actual losses caused by inflation. Therefore, it is believed that China’s CPI calculation method should be adjusted to take into account the rise in housing prices, so China’s actual inflation level could be more accurately reflected. In view of the above, deepening interest rate marketization reform and expand channels for financial investment are the future development goals of China’s financial system.

This paper presents a model that provides an explanation, based on regime switching in the real interest rate and learning, of why tests based on stock adjustment models, Euler equations, or decision rules—which emphasize short-run fluctuations in inventories and the interest rate—are unlikely to uncover a negative relationship between inventories and the real interest rate. The model, however, predicts that inventories will respond to long-run movements, that is, to regime shifts in the real interest rate. Tests emphasizing cointegration techniques confirm this prediction and show a significant long-run relationship between inventories and the real interest rate.

Graph and download economic data for 30-year Breakeven Inflation Rate (T30YIEM) from Feb 2010 to Jul 2025 about 30-year, participation, inflation, rate, and USA.

The Chinese economy has undergone a long-term transition reform, but there is still a planned economy characteristic in the financial sector, which is financial repression. Due to the existence of financial repression, China’s actual interest rate level should be lower than the Consumer Price Index (CPI). However, based on official China’s interest rates and CPI, over half of the years China’s actual interest rate remained higher than CPI by our calculation from 1999 to 2022. This is inconsistent with the financial repression that exists in China, and the main reason is the calculation methods of China’s CPI. China’s CPI measurement system originated from the planned economy era, which did not fully consider the rise in housing purchase prices, so the current CPI measurement system can be more realistically presented by taking the rise in housing prices into consider. The core idea of this study is to mining relevant official statistical data and calculate the proportion of Chinese residents’ expenditure on purchasing houses to their total expenditure. By taking the proportion of house purchases as the weight of house price factor, and taking the proportion of other consumption as the weight of official CPI, the Generalized CPI (GCPI) is formulated. The GCPI is then compared with market interest rates to determine the actual interest rate situation in China over the past 20 years. This study has found that if GCPI is used as a measure, China’s real interest rates have been negative for most years since 1999. Chinese residents have suffered the negative effects of financial repression over the past 20 years, and their property income cannot keep up with the actual losses caused by inflation. Therefore, it is believed that China’s CPI calculation method should be adjusted to take into account the rise in housing prices, so China’s actual inflation level could be more accurately reflected. In view of the above, deepening interest rate marketization reform and expand channels for financial investment are the future development goals of China’s financial system.

Between April and June 2022 in India, the savings scheme Sukanya Samriddhi Yojana generated an interest rate of *** percent, closely followed by the five-year senior citizen savings scheme and the public provident fund (PPF). These were the only three schemes with an interest rate higher than the then inflation rate of **** percent. Most of the other small savings schemes generated negative real rate of returns.

The benchmark interest rate in Switzerland was last recorded at 0 percent. This dataset provides - Switzerland Interest Rate - actual values, historical data, forecast, chart, statistics, economic calendar and news.

Using a two-step approach GMM, this study examines the short- and long-term effects of fiscal deficit on the economic growth of 42 Sub-Saharan African nations between 2011 and 2021. The World Development Index, the most reliable source, is where the panel data is taken from. Using the Levin-Lin-Chu and Hadri LM tests for unit root, it was determined that there is no risk of a random walk in the data. The study’s findings indicate that while the fiscal deficit has short-term, positive, and significant benefits on the economic growth of SSA countries, it has long-term, negative repercussions. According to the system GMM’s results, an increase in the fiscal deficit of SSA countries is linked to a short-term increase in economic growth of 0.036 percent, while an increase in the fiscal deficit of one percentage point is linked to a long-term decline in economic growth of SSA countries of 0.013 percent, holding all other factors constant. The study’s findings also showed that the budget deficit has a larger positive short-run coefficient than a negative long-run coefficient. The study also revealed that while real effective exchange rates and inflation short-term hinder economic growth, gross fixed capital creation and real interest rates are the primary drivers of economic expansion. Long-term economic growth in the SSA countries is also found to be positively and significantly impacted by gross fixed capital formation. According to the study, SSA nations should manage their fiscal deficits and, in the long run, provide more funds for gross fixed capital development.

Using a two-step approach GMM, this study examines the short- and long-term effects of fiscal deficit on the economic growth of 42 Sub-Saharan African nations between 2011 and 2021. The World Development Index, the most reliable source, is where the panel data is taken from. Using the Levin-Lin-Chu and Hadri LM tests for unit root, it was determined that there is no risk of a random walk in the data. The study’s findings indicate that while the fiscal deficit has short-term, positive, and significant benefits on the economic growth of SSA countries, it has long-term, negative repercussions. According to the system GMM’s results, an increase in the fiscal deficit of SSA countries is linked to a short-term increase in economic growth of 0.036 percent, while an increase in the fiscal deficit of one percentage point is linked to a long-term decline in economic growth of SSA countries of 0.013 percent, holding all other factors constant. The study’s findings also showed that the budget deficit has a larger positive short-run coefficient than a negative long-run coefficient. The study also revealed that while real effective exchange rates and inflation short-term hinder economic growth, gross fixed capital creation and real interest rates are the primary drivers of economic expansion. Long-term economic growth in the SSA countries is also found to be positively and significantly impacted by gross fixed capital formation. According to the study, SSA nations should manage their fiscal deficits and, in the long run, provide more funds for gross fixed capital development.