OECD members youth unemployment rate for 2023 was 11.30%, a 0.29% decline from 2022.

<ul style='margin-top:20px;'>

<li>OECD members youth unemployment rate for 2022 was <strong>11.59%</strong>, a <strong>2.07% decline</strong> from 2021.</li>
<li>OECD members youth unemployment rate for 2021 was <strong>13.66%</strong>, a <strong>2.16% decline</strong> from 2020.</li>
<li>OECD members youth unemployment rate for 2020 was <strong>15.82%</strong>, a <strong>3.18% increase</strong> from 2019.</li>
</ul>Youth unemployment refers to the share of the labor force ages 15-24 without work but available for and seeking employment.

Graph and download economic data for Youth Unemployment Rate for OECD Members (SLUEM1524ZSOED) from 1991 to 2024 about OECD Economies, unemployment, and rate.

This paper analyses the risk of unemployment, unemployment duration, and the risk of longterm unemployment immediately after apprenticeship graduation. Unemployed apprenticeship graduates constitute a large share of unemployed youth in Germany but unemployment incidence within this group is unequally distributed. Our paper extends previous research in three dimensions. It shows that (i) individual productivity assessment of the training firm, (ii) initial selection into high reputation training firms and occupations, and (iii) adverse selection of employer moving graduates are correlated with unemployment after apprenticeship graduation. The empirical evidence is obtained from the second longitudinal version of the linked employer-employee panel data from the IAB (LIAB). This large data set allows us to calculate the exact unemployment spell length of apprenticeship graduates. In addition, we can include individual, employer, occupation as well as industrial relation characteristics before and after apprenticeship graduation into our list of explanatory variables for unemployment risk. We show in several robustness checks that our results are remarkably stable when we vary the employees included in the sample, the definition of unemployment, and the list of explanatory variables.

United States - Youth Unemployment Rate for OECD Members was 15.70% in January of 2020, according to the United States Federal Reserve. Historically, United States - Youth Unemployment Rate for OECD Members reached a record high of 17.46 in January of 2010 and a record low of 12.35 in January of 2018. Trading Economics provides the current actual value, an historical data chart and related indicators for United States - Youth Unemployment Rate for OECD Members - last updated from the United States Federal Reserve on May of 2025.

Graph and download economic data for Infra-Annual Labor Statistics: Unemployment Rate Total: From 15 to 24 Years for United States (LRUN24TTUSM156S) from Jan 1955 to Apr 2025 about 15 to 24 years, unemployment, rate, and USA.

Unemployment Rate in China decreased to 5.10 percent in April from 5.20 percent in March of 2025. This dataset provides - China Unemployment Rate - actual values, historical data, forecast, chart, statistics, economic calendar and news.

Youth unemployment rose sharply as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic and subsequent sector lockdowns in the UK and across the world with 18.5% of young people aged 15-24, unemployed across EU, 40% in Spain (European Parliament Study, 2021), and 14.9% in the UK (House of Commons Library, 2023). Although, the employment rates are showing some recovery, research shows that youth unemployment has delayed long-term negative impacts on future well-being, health and job satisfaction of individuals. It increases young people’s chances of being unemployed in later years and carry a wage penalty (Bell and Blanchflower, 2011). Young people (15-24 year olds) are also more likely to work part time, often not out of choice (Pay Rise Campaign 2015), are at higher risk of ‘in-work poverty’ (Hick and Lanau 2018), more likely to be employed in low-paid and insecure jobs (across OECD countries). In the UK, labour market disadvantage is coupled with the rising cost of higher education and crucially the tightening of social security conditionality through Welfare Reform (since 2012) which could be linked to a drop in eligible young people claiming welfare support (Wells 2018). A vast body of literature has emerged in the West on youth policies and the nature of welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1990; Taylor-Gooby 2004; Wallace and Bendit 2009; Pierson 2011). It, however, remains silent on the crucial question of devolution. This ESRC funded research examines the impact of devolution on welfare provision and the sub-state welfare regimes in the UK in the focused context of youth unemployment. The project is progressing in three phases (Wave 1: 2020-21 / Wave 2: 2022-23). Wave1 identified, categorised and compared scales and types of civil society involvement in youth unemployment policy between the three devolved nations of the UK: England, Scotland and Wales. In doing so examined the implications of these differences for both youth unemployment provision and devolved policy arrangements. It has provided an internationally salient analysis located in the global phenomenon of state reconfiguration, the emergence of sub-state welfare regimes and the adoption of welfare pluralism. The research found that devolved social policy in Scotland and, to a lesser extent, Wales goes some way to mitigating the work first policy approach emanating from Westminster. Crucial to this are the key points of convergence and contention between devolved (education) and non-devolved (welfare) areas of youth employment policy on the ground (Pearce and Lagana 2023). The way in which these key points of policy tension play-out in key institutional areas like Jobcentre Plus, is the focus of the second phase of project. Wave 2 focused on ground level sites of service delivery (2022-2023). Research shows that the policy structures and the perceptions of frontline staff about the policy provisions and people claiming them, shape the nature, attitudes and processes of service delivery, and have implications for service claimants and unemployment addressal (Cagliesi and Hawkes 2015; Fletcher 2011; Fletcher and Redman 2022; Rosenthal and Peccei 2006). This phase of project was a more in-depth, critical and comparative examination of the way policy plays out on the ground through a systematic investigation of the perspectives of frontline staff interacting with the young people, in the specific context of devolution. We interviewed frontline staff in England, Scotland and Wales to study how policy is perceived and translated on ground level at the sites of service delivery in these three devolved nations from the following five categories: 1). Work Coaches (Jobcentre Plus- All ages) 2). Youth Employability Coaches (Jobcentre Plus- Young People) 3). Additional Work Coaches (Youth Hubs) 4). Careers Wales / Fair Start / National Careers Service Advisers 5). Civil Society job advisers (CWVYS/Skills Development Scotland /Youth Employment UK) This research will continue to take advantage of the UK’s unique, asymmetrical devolved arrangements to address the identified gap in research examining youth (un)employment under devolved systems of governance. The broader aim is to critique the notion of 'one UK welfare state' and, in doing so, progress our understanding of the impact of decentralisation, devolution and territorial rescaling on welfare state formation across Western Europe.

This research is important for three key reasons: (1) EU comparisons treat the UK as 'one welfare state' when in fact devolution in the four nations of the UK mean that this is not the case and, as yet, we know little about the differences in policy and civil society approaches to tackling youth unemployment between England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. (2) It takes advantage of a valuable opportunity to compare policy divergences and create the first cross-comparative dataset on civil society activity in youth unemployment in the context of devolution. (3) It will tell us...

This repository contains the replication material for the article "Jeannet, A.-M. and Dražanová, L. 2023. Blame it on my youth: the origins of attitudes towards immigration. Acta Politica. doi: 10.1057/s41269-023-00314-6" - The Stata .do file "Drazanova_origins_attitudes_immigration.do" contains all code to reproduce the results and to generate the 4 figures and 1 table in the article - The Stata .do file "Jeannet_manifesto_replication.do" runs all the code to generate the manifesto data - The Excel .xlsx file "original Manifesto_values.xlsx" contains the recoded Manifesto data used for the analysis - The Excel .xlsx files "cohort principles.xlsx" and "period principles.xlsx" contain data based on the "Manifesto Project Data" to be loaded to the main dataset - The Excel .xlsx files "historical unemployment.xlsx" and "period unemployment.xlsx" data files contain data based on the "OECD Economic Outlook 10" data to be loaded to the main dataset - The Excel .xlsx files "historical net migration" and "period net migration" data files contain data based on the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs’ Population Division dataset - the Word document "READ ME.doc" describes all the data used in detail (2023-10-12)

대한민국 청년 실업률은 2025년 4월에 7.30%로 3월의 7.50%에서 감소했습니다. 이 페이지는 - 대한민국 청년 실업률 - 실제 값, 역사적 데이터, 예측, 차트, 통계, 경제 캘린더 및 뉴스를 제공합니다.