While political leaders’ role in foreign policy choices has received increasing scholarly attention, surprisingly less is known about how they affect the allocation and distribution of official development aid. This study examines how the material background of political leaders influence their aid allocation strategies in donor countries. We contend that leaders with economic hardship experience distribute more foreign aid than those without such experience. Through socialization, leaders with economic hardship experience become more supportive of public good provisions that address problems related to poverty and inequality. Resultantly, they exhibit more favorable attitudes toward development assistance programs targeting developing countries. We find that political leaders who experienced economic difficulty in their youth are likely to provide more foreign aid, especially social and economic infrastructure aid, than leaders without such experience. By introducing the political leaders’ role, this study contributes to the literature on the interaction between domestic politics and foreign aid.

Do the choices of city leaders matter for local economic conditions? While existing literature focuses on how the preferences of local officials influence city policy, we argue that the managerial skill of local leaders should condition their ability to achieve their goals. We conduct an original phone survey of over 300 mayors and city managers across the U.S. to learn about their management practices. Using a two-way fixed effects design that holds fixed a rich battery of individual and city-level characteristics, we examine how changes in leadership affect economic growth, a common goal for local officials. We find that when local leaders employ the "best practices" of organizational management, their cities grow across a range of indicators. These results are strongest for the subset of leaders who mention a growth-related goal for their time in office, suggesting that managerial skill allows local leaders to more effectively achieve their objectives.

Consideration of the effects of domestic politics on international conflict behavior often consists simply of contrasting democracies with non-democracies. One notable exception is work that links economic performance and the use of force. This link has often been addressed through use of a diversionary perspective. In this paper, we argue that more important than the alleged incentive to pursue a rallying effect when times are bad are domestic political and economic factors affecting leaders’ constraints, representing some of the costs to pursuing adventurous foreign policies. We examine three sources of constraints on democratic leaders: the willingness of the constituency to support the use of force internationally; the macroeconomic preferences of the party's constituency; and an interaction of those preferences with the state of the economy. We find that in developed democracies, the political orientation of the government is a significant factor affecting the likelihood of international conflict initiation. Specifically, right governments are more likely to initiate interstate disputes; economic conditions have a significant but lesser impact.

Countries use economic sanctions as a way to force their opponents to make policy concessions. Such external pressure may, as the designers of sanctions often intend, affect the degree of domestic support for the target's political leaders. It may even threaten the leaders’ survival in office. We investigate how these dual pressures—preference for policy concessions and concern about target leaders’ political future—shape the use of sanctions in the context of political relations between the sanctioning and sanctioned countries. The political relations between the two countries matter because a decline in the likelihood of the target leader's political survival results in a cost for the sanctioner when the target is a friendly regime and generates a benefit when the targeted regime is an adversary. Therefore, we argue, and show statistically, that economic coercion is more likely for friendly governments when they are politically stable and unfriendly governments when they are politically vulnerable. We illustrate our causal mechanism using declassified primary sources for two case studies of US sanctions against Chile.

The Political Leaders’ Affiliation Database (PLAD) contains information on the birthplaces and ethnicities of the effective leaders of 177 countries around the world in the 1989-2023 period. The dataset is at the political leader level and reports information on 1,171 effective leaders, in office for 1,334 distinct periods of time. Birthplaces of the effective leader are geo-coded, with highest precision being the village or city level. Ethnicity is linked to the GeoEPR database (Vogt et al. 2015).

The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the United States was worth 29184.89 billion US dollars in 2024, according to official data from the World Bank. The GDP value of the United States represents 27.49 percent of the world economy. This dataset provides - United States GDP - actual values, historical data, forecast, chart, statistics, economic calendar and news.

The data and programs replicate tables and figures from "The political economy of reforms in central bank design: evidence from a new dataset", by Romelli, D., Economic Policy, 2022, https://doi.org/10.1093/epolic/eiac011 (Open Access). Please see the README file for additional details.

The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the United States expanded 3.80 percent in the second quarter of 2025 over the previous quarter. This dataset provides the latest reported value for - United States GDP Growth Rate - plus previous releases, historical high and low, short-term forecast and long-term prediction, economic calendar, survey consensus and news.

Does power-sharing drive corruption in post-conflict countries? We conceptualize government elites in any post-conflict situation as rent-seeking agents who need to ensure the support of their key constituencies to remain in power. Power-sharing institutions---especially cabinet-level, executive power-sharing institutions---systematically shape these rent-seeking motives. Power-sharing cabinets create political coalitions dominated by small circles of government and rebel elites with direct access to state resources and low levels of loyalty towards the government leader. Also, the provisional nature of many power-sharing institutions increases rent-seeking incentives: facing a limited time horizon in office, rent-seeking elites within the power-sharing coalition are likely to capture as many rents as possible before they have to leave office. Thus, post-conflict countries with power-sharing institutions should exhibit higher aggregated levels of rent-seeking measured as the level of corruption in a country. Using statistical time-series cross-sectional analysis of post-conflict situations between 1996 and 2010, we find that power-sharing cabinets substantively increase corruption in post-conflict countries and that this effect is stronger in the presence of natural resource rents. These findings add quantitative evidence to the debate about drivers of post-conflict corruption. Moreover, they highlight a trade-off between short-term stability and long-term negative effects of corruption for post-conflict political and economic development.

Despite the frequent use of economic sanctions by states, there are insufficient analyses of the collateral effects of these measures on target states. Under the sanctions, targeted leaders who pursue the longevity of their regimes adjust domestic policies to mitigate the costs associated with sanctions. Specifically, this article analyzes the effects of sanctions on capital account liberalization in target states. Economic sanctions trigger changes in the capital account openness of target states. However, the direction of the reform is dependent on the political institutions in target states, which characterize the behavioral incentive structure of the leaders. Specifically, economic sanctions lower capital account openness, albeit only in autocracies. Democracies, which are sensitive to the benefits of capital account openness, are less likely to tighten the restrictions. Instead, they are likely to open their markets. I employ the two-way fixed approach to test my argument, using timeseries cross-sectional data spanning 145 countries for the period 1965-2005. In this regard, I find evidence in favor of my argument, with the findings suggesting the indirect impact of economic sanctions on target states’ financial policies on which the decisions are primarily driven by the political incentives of the targeted leaders.

This paper examines the effect of political institutions on fiscal redistribution for a country-level panel from 1960-2010. Using data on Gini coefficients before and after government intervention, we apply a measure of effective fiscal redistribution that reflects the effect of taxes and transfers on income inequality. Our findings clearly indicate that non-democratic regimes demonstrate significantly greater direct fiscal redistribution. Subsequently, we employ fiscal data in an attempt to enlighten this puzzling empirical finding. We find that dictatorial regimes rely more heavily on cash transfers that exhibit a direct impact on net inequality and consequently on the difference between market and net inequality (i.e., effective fiscal redistribution), whereas democratic regimes devote a larger amount of resources to public inputs (health and education) that may influence market inequality but not the difference between market and net inequality per se. We argue that the driving force behind the observed differences within the pattern on government spending and effective fiscal redistribution is that democratic institutions lead survival-oriented leaders to care more for the private market, and thus to follow policies that enhance the productivity of the whole economy.

Here you can find the datasets and Stata codes to replicate the tables and figures in "Gender quotas and politicians' education", authored by Francesca Passarelli and David Boto-García.

Techsalerator's News Events Data for France: A Comprehensive Overview

Techsalerator's News Events Data for France provides a valuable resource for businesses, researchers, and media professionals. This dataset aggregates information on key news events across France, drawing from various media sources such as news outlets, online publications, and social media platforms. It offers critical insights for tracking trends, analyzing public sentiment, or monitoring developments across specific industries.

Key Data Fields Event Date: Captures the specific date of each news event, essential for trend analysis and for businesses needing to respond to market shifts.

Event Title: A concise headline summarizing the event. This enables users to quickly assess the relevance of the news to their area of interest.

Source: Identifies the media outlet or platform where the event was reported, allowing users to gauge credibility and assess the event's reach.

Location: Provides geographical data on where the event occurred within France. This is particularly useful for regional studies or localized business strategies.

Event Description: Offers a detailed account of the event, including significant developments, participants, and potential impacts. This information is vital for businesses and researchers to understand the context and possible consequences of the event.

Top 5 News Categories in France Politics: News covering government policies, elections, political movements, and key decisions that shape France’s political environment.

Economy: Highlights France’s economic performance, corporate activities, trade developments, and financial trends influencing both domestic and international markets.

Social Issues: Focuses on social movements, healthcare, education, protests, and societal challenges driving public discourse in France.

Sports: Covers significant sporting events, with special attention to football, rugby, tennis, and other popular sports that capture national interest.

Technology and Innovation: Reports on tech innovations, startups, and developments within France’s growing tech industry, including contributions from firms like Atos, Dassault Systèmes, and Orange.

Top 5 News Sources in France Le Monde: One of France's leading newspapers, renowned for its extensive coverage of politics, economy, and international affairs.

Le Figaro: A major French publication known for in-depth reporting on business, politics, and culture.

Libération: A prominent news outlet with a strong focus on social issues, politics, and investigative journalism.

BFM TV: A leading news network providing real-time updates on major events, politics, and sports across France.

France 24: A global news network offering coverage of French and international affairs, with a focus on political and economic developments.

Accessing Techsalerator’s News Events Data for France To access Techsalerator’s News Events Data for France, please contact info@techsalerator.com with your specific needs. We offer customized quotes based on the data fields and volume of records required, with delivery typically available within 24 hours. Ongoing access options can also be arranged.

Included Data Fields Event Date Event Title Source Location Event Description Event Category (Politics, Economy, Sports, etc.) Participants (if applicable) Event Impact (Social, Economic, etc.) Techsalerator’s dataset is an essential tool for keeping up with significant events in France. It supports informed decision-making in areas such as business strategy, market analysis, and academic research by providing a comprehensive view of the country’s news landscape.

The average for 2023 based on 193 countries was -0.07 points. The highest value was in Liechtenstein: 1.61 points and the lowest value was in Syria: -2.75 points. The indicator is available from 1996 to 2023. Below is a chart for all countries where data are available.

The Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement in 2017 marked a critical rupture in global climate governance, prompting advanced economies to reassess their regulatory commitments. This study examines how OECD democracies responded to the erosion of U.S. climate leadership, focusing on the political economy of environmental policy stringency. Using two-way fixed effects panel regressions from 1990 to 2020, the analysis reveals a general increase in environmental policy stringency following the U.S. retreat, but with substantial cross-national variation. Countries with greater trade dependence on the United States exhibited weaker regulatory responses, suggesting that economic interdependence constrained climate ambition. These findings highlight a core tension between normative leadership and structural vulnerability in an open-economy context. This study contributes to theories of international cooperation and regulatory politics by showing how reputational incentives and trade asymmetries jointly shape national responses to hegemonic withdrawal from multilateral regimes.

Population eligible to vote, aged 18 years and older

What are the political implications of Chinese loans to borrowing countries? Our argument is that similar to other forms of international finance, loans from China provide leaders with additional resources to maintain their power. The nature of China's lending practices---characterized by an absence of good governance conditions---offers a unique advantage to political leaders, allowing corrupt leaders who receive loans from China to stay in power for longer periods. To support this argument, we conducted an analysis of a dataset of 115 developing countries from 2000 to 2015, focusing on the relationship between Chinese loans and leaders' political survival. Our findings indicate that Chinese loans positively impact leader survival, with the strongest effects observed in more corrupt regimes. To address endogeneity concerns, we employ a shift-share instrumentation strategy and several additional tests. Our analysis underscores the importance of Chinese lending to both international and domestic politics.

Could perceived relative economic standing affect citizens' support for political leaders and institutions? We explore this question by examining Pakistan's national unconditional cash transfer program, the Benazir Income Support Program (BISP). Leveraging a regression discontinuity approach using BISP's administrative data and an original survey experiment, we find that perceptions of relative deprivation color citizen reactions to social protection. When citizens do not feel relatively deprived, receiving cash transfers has little sustained effect on individuals' reported level of support for their political system and its leaders. However, when citizens feel relatively worse off, those receiving cash transfers become more politically satisfied, while those denied transfers become more politically disgruntled. Moreover, the magnitude of the reduction in political support among non-beneficiaries is larger than the magnitude of the increase in political support among beneficiaries. This has important implications for our understanding of the political ramifications of rising perceived inequality.

The UK economy shrank by 0.1 percent in September 2025 after reporting zero growth in the previous month. Since a huge decline in GDP in April 2020, the UK economy has gradually recovered and is now slightly larger than it was before the COVID-19 pandemic. After the initial recovery from the pandemic, however, the UK economy has effectively flatlined, fluctuating between low growth and small contractions since 2022. Labour banking on growth to turn around fortunes in 2025 In February 2025, just over half a year after winning the last general election, the approval rating for the new Labour government fell to a low of -48 percent. Furthermore, the Prime Minister, Keir Starmer was not only less popular than the new Conservative leader, Kemi Badenoch, but also the leader of the Reform Party, Nigel Farage, whose party have surged in opinion polls recently. This remarkable decline in popularity for the new government is, in some part, due to a deliberate policy of making tough decisions early. Arguably, the most damaging of these policies was the withdrawal of the winter fuel allowance for some pensioners, although other factors such as a controversy about gifts and donations also hurt the government. While Labour aims to restore the UK's economic and political credibility in the long term, they will certainly hope for some good economic news sooner rather than later. Economy bounces back in 2024 after ending 2023 in recession Due to two consecutive quarters of negative economic growth, in late 2023 the UK economy ended the year in recession. After not growing at all in the second quarter of 2023, UK GDP fell by 0.1 percent in the third quarter, and then by 0.3 percent in the last quarter. For the whole of 2023, the economy grew by 0.4 percent compared to 2022, and for 2024 is forecast to have grown by 1.1 percent. During the first two quarters of 2024, UK GDP grew by 0.7 percent, and 0.4 percent, with this relatively strong growth followed by zero percent growth in the third quarter of the year. Although the economy had started to grow again by the time of the 2024 general election, this was not enough to save the Conservative government at the time. Despite usually seen as the best party for handling the economy, the Conservative's economic competency was behind that of Labour on the eve of the 2024 election.

The data and programs replicate tables and figures from "The political economy of tariff protection in China: evidence from the WTO accession", by Hong. Please see the ReadMe file for additional details.