Among the sanctions that Western countries imposed on Russia over its invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the ones whose impact was felt the most by the population were the inability to use Visa and MasterCard cards abroad and the ban on high-tech equipment and electronics exports into Russia, according to a survey conducted in March 2022. Furthermore, 15 percent of respondents believed the withdrawal of international companies from the country's market would have the most significant impact on them and their families.

Among the respondents in Russia, the lowest level of public support toward the actions of Russian military forces in Ukraine was recorded among the population aged 18 to 24 years, at around 66 percent in April 2025. In the age group of 55 years and above, that share stood at over 80 percent. Russian forces invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Overall, eight out of ten Russians supported the military actions.

In all age groups until 29 years old, there were more men than women in Russia as of January 1, 2024. After that age, the female population outnumbered the male population in each category. The most represented age group in the country was from 35 to 39 years old, with approximately *** million women and *** million men. Male-to-female ratio in Russia The number of men in Russia was historically lower than the number of women, which was a result of population losses during World War I and World War II. In 1950, in the age category from 25 to 29 years, ** men were recorded per 100 women in the Soviet Union. In today’s Russia, the female-to-male ratio in the same age group reached *** women per 1,000 men. Russia has the highest life expectancy gender gap The World Health Organization estimated the average life expectancy of women across the world at over five years longer than men. In Russia, this gap between genders exceeded 10 years. According to the study “Burden of disease in Russia, 1980-2016: A systematic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2016,” Russia had the highest gender difference in life expectancy worldwide.

Russia RU: Total Population data was reported at 145,845.591 Person th in 2021. This records a decrease from the previous number of 146,459.802 Person th for 2020. Russia RU: Total Population data is updated yearly, averaging 145,976.470 Person th from Dec 1981 (Median) to 2021, with 41 observations. The data reached an all-time high of 148,538.190 Person th in 1992 and a record low of 139,221.500 Person th in 1981. Russia RU: Total Population data remains active status in CEIC and is reported by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. The data is categorized under Global Database’s Russian Federation – Table RU.OECD.MSTI: Population, Labour Force and Employment: Non OECD Member: Annual.

In response to Russia's large-scale aggression against Ukraine, the OECD Council decided on 8 March 2022 to immediately suspend the participation of Russia and Belarus in OECD bodies. In view of this decision, the OECD suspended its solicitation of official statistics on R&D from Russian authorities, leading to the absence of more recent R&D statistics for this country in the OECD database. Previously collected and compiled indicators are still available.

The business enterprise sector includes all organisations and enterprises whose main activity is connected with the production of goods and services for sale, including those owned by the state, and private non-profit institutions serving the above-mentioned organisations. In practice however, R&D performed in this sector is carried out mostly by industrial research institutes other than enterprises. This particularity reflects the traditional organisation of Russian R&D.

Headcount data include full-time personnel only, and hence are underestimated, while data in full-time equivalents (FTE) are calculated on the basis of both full-time and part-time personnel. This explains why the FTE data are greater than the headcount data.

New budgetary procedures introduced in 2005 have resulted in items previously classified as GBARD being attributed to other headings and have affected the coverage and breakdown by socio-economic objective.

Russia's military capabilities outnumbered those of Ukraine for most indicators as of 2025. For example, the number of aircraft at the disposal of the Russian Army was close to 4,300, while the Ukrainian Armed Forces possessed 324 aircraft. Russia's naval fleet was 4.7 times larger than Ukraine's. Moreover, Russia was one of the nine countries that possessed nuclear weapons. As of early 2024, Russia held the world's largest inventory of nuclear warheads. How many soldiers does Ukraine have? Ukraine's Army counted approximately 2.2 million military personnel as of 2025. Of them, 900,000 were active military staff. Furthermore, 1.2 million soldiers were part of the country's reserve forces. To compare, Russia had approximately 1.32 million active military personnel and two million of reserve military personnel. Russia's active soldier count was the fourth-largest worldwide, while Ukraine's ranked sixth. Ukraine's tank strength Ukraine's Armed Forces possessed over 1,100 tanks as of 2025, which was more than five times less than Russia's. To support Ukraine during the Russian invasion, several Western countries made commitments to deliver tanks to Ukraine, including Leopard 2, Challenger 2, and M1 Abrams. Furthermore, Ukraine received other types of armored vehicles from Western countries, such as M133 armored personnel carriers from the United States and Mastiff (6x6) protected patrol vehicles from the United Kingdom.

Dataset Card for Russia Ukraine Conflict

  Dataset Summary

Context

On 24 February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine in a major escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian War that began in 2014. The invasion caused Europe's largest refugee crisis since World War II, with more than 6.3 million Ukrainians fleeing the country and a third of the population displaced (Source: Wikipedia).

Content

This dataset is a collection of 407 news articles from NYT and Guardians related to ongoing… See the full description on the dataset page: https://huggingface.co/datasets/hugginglearners/russia-ukraine-conflict-articles.

Ukraine Labour Force: Working Age: Female: Economically Active Population data was reported at 7,911.600 Person th in 2021. This records a decrease from the previous number of 8,028.700 Person th for 2020. Ukraine Labour Force: Working Age: Female: Economically Active Population data is updated yearly, averaging 9,342.400 Person th from Dec 2004 (Median) to 2021, with 18 observations. The data reached an all-time high of 9,811.000 Person th in 2004 and a record low of 7,911.600 Person th in 2021. Ukraine Labour Force: Working Age: Female: Economically Active Population data remains active status in CEIC and is reported by State Statistics Service of Ukraine. The data is categorized under Global Database’s Ukraine – Table UA.G010: Labour Force: Annual. Data release delayed due to the Ukraine-Russia conflict. No estimation on next release date can be made.
Economically active population comprises all population aged 15–70 of either sex who during reporting period performed the work related to the production of goods and services.

"Opinions and Views of the Population of Ukraine" is a regular omnibus survey, conducted by Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) among Ukraine's adult population and covering a wide range of topics. The data presented here is a subset of the survey conducted in September-October 2024 and include KIIS's own research questions. Topics covered by the survey include: readiness for concessions for peace, and acceptability of hypothetical territorial concessions to Russia; views on Western support for Ukraine in the context of the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war; perception of Russia's resilience and how long Ukrainians are ready to bear the burden of war; attitudes toward Russia and Russian citizens; trust in President Volodymyr Zelenskyy; perceptions of recent anti-corruption efforts in Ukraine; evaluation of national identity based on ethnic origin, language, and geographic location; social acceptance of various groups in different societal roles (refugees, internally displaced persons, residents of occupied territories, Russian-speaking Ukrainians, and citizens of Ukraine who identify as ethnically Russian). Data collection took place from September 20 to October 03, 2024. Some of the survey questions were asked to all respondents (n=2,004), while others were directed to a sub-sample of 989 respondents. The data is available in an SAV format (Ukrainian, English) and a converted CSV format (with a codebook). The Data Documentation (pdf file) also includes a short overview and discussion of survey results as well as the relevant parts of the original questionnaire.

PurposeThe study aims to highlight the behavior of people in a state in the vicinity of a military conflict zone. Specifically, it highlights the psychological behavior of Romanian citizens after the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation. It was considered appropriate to carry out this study, given the novelty of such a situation, since, after the end of the Second World War, Europe has no longer faced major problems of insecurity caused by armed conflicts of this magnitude.MethodsThe study was based on the questionnaire applied to a number of 1,193 people with permanent residence in Romania and a minimum age of 18 years. The data were collected in the beginning phase of the invasion of Ukraine by the troops of the Russian Federation, i.e. between March 1–17, 2022. The aim was to obtain information that would allow the observation of re-spondents' opinions on the conflict in Ukraine and its potential escalation, and on the other hand, to allow the assessment of quality of life, using the WHQOL-BREEF measurement instrument.ResultsBased on the results of the study, the highest average satisfaction among the four domains of WHOQOL-BREF is represented by the “Psychological” domain, of the category of people with the lowest fear about a potential future war between Romania and the Russian Federation (83.62 ± 17.48). On the contrary, the lowest average is represented by the “Environment” domain, for the category of persons who do not feel protected by the fact that Romania is a NATO member state (61.77 ± 20.96).ConclusionsThe results of the study show that the indices of the quality of life of the people in Romania, as a state in the proximity of a military conflict with the potential to escalate, are negatively influenced by the fears of people who believe that the war in Ukraine will escalate into a regional or global conflict, or that the Russian Federation is going to use its nuclear arsenal against Ukraine or another NATO member state.

Russia RU: Total Employment data was reported at 70,601.000 Person th in 2020. This records a decrease from the previous number of 71,933.000 Person th for 2019. Russia RU: Total Employment data is updated yearly, averaging 70,601.000 Person th from Dec 1998 (Median) to 2020, with 23 observations. The data reached an all-time high of 72,532.000 Person th in 2018 and a record low of 58,464.000 Person th in 1998. Russia RU: Total Employment data remains active status in CEIC and is reported by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. The data is categorized under Global Database’s Russian Federation – Table RU.OECD.MSTI: Population, Labour Force and Employment: Non OECD Member: Annual.

In response to Russia's large-scale aggression against Ukraine, the OECD Council decided on 8 March 2022 to immediately suspend the participation of Russia and Belarus in OECD bodies. In view of this decision, the OECD suspended its solicitation of official statistics on R&D from Russian authorities, leading to the absence of more recent R&D statistics for this country in the OECD database. Previously collected and compiled indicators are still available.

The business enterprise sector includes all organisations and enterprises whose main activity is connected with the production of goods and services for sale, including those owned by the state, and private non-profit institutions serving the above-mentioned organisations. In practice however, R&D performed in this sector is carried out mostly by industrial research institutes other than enterprises. This particularity reflects the traditional organisation of Russian R&D.

Headcount data include full-time personnel only, and hence are underestimated, while data in full-time equivalents (FTE) are calculated on the basis of both full-time and part-time personnel. This explains why the FTE data are greater than the headcount data.

New budgetary procedures introduced in 2005 have resulted in items previously classified as GBARD being attributed to other headings and have affected the coverage and breakdown by socio-economic objective.

The face-to-face survey was conducted by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation in cooperation with the Centre for Political Sociology from 5 to 15 June 2023.

A total of 2,001 respondents aged 18 or older took part in the survey in Vinnytsia, Volyn, Dnipropetrovsk, Zhytomyr, Zakarpattia, Zaporizhzhia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Lviv, Mykolaiiv, Odesa, Poltava, Rivne, Sumy, Ternopil, Kharkiv, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, and Chernivtsi regions, and the city of Kyiv (in Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv, and Kherson regions – only in the territories controlled by Ukraine and not affected by hostilities).

The sampling technique used in the survey is multi-stage, with a random selection of localities in the first stage and a quota-based selection of respondents in the final stage. The random selection is representative of the demographic structure of the adult population in the areas covered by the survey at the beginning of 2022.

The maximum sampling error shall not exceed 2.3%. At the same time, it is necessary to take into account systematic deviations in the sample caused by the forced migration of millions of citizens due to the Russian-Ukrainian war.

COMPOSITION OF MACRO-REGIONS: West – Volyn, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, and Chernivtsi regions; Center – Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, and Chernihiv regions, and the city of Kyiv; South – Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiiv, Kherson, and Odesa regions; East – Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv regions.

This dataset contains the original survey data. The SPSS file (.sav) is the original file. It has been exported to an Excel file. The content of the corresponding XLSX file should be identical to the original SAV file. The SAV file contains the questions and answer options of the original questionnaire in Ukrainian. The original questionnaire and an English translation have also been included in this data collection as separate PDF files.

In addition, the dataset includes a file of "selected findings", which documents some of the key findings of the survey in the form of analytical summaries and descriptive statistics. The report was prepared by the civil society organisation OPORA.

ContextThe last decade witnessed growing differences in abortion dynamics in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine despite demographic, social, and historical similarities of these nations. This paper investigates changes in birth control practices in the three countries and searches for an explanation of the diverging trends in abortion. MethodsOfficial abortion and contraceptive use statistics, provided by national statistical agencies, were analysed. Respective laws and other legal documents were examined and compared between the three countries. To disclose inter-country differences in prevalence of the modern methods of contraception and its association with major demographic and social factors, an analysis of data from national sample surveys was performed, including binary logistic regression. ResultsThe growing gap in abortion rate in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine is a genuine phenomenon, not a statistical artefact. The examination of abortion and prevalence of contraception based on official statistics and three national sample surveys did not reveal any unambiguous factors that could explain differences in abortion dynamics in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine. However, it is very likely that the cause of the inter-country discrepancies lies in contraceptive behavior itself, in adequacies of contraceptive knowledge and practices. Additionally, large differences in government policies, which are very important in shaping contraceptive practices of the population, were detected. ConclusionSince the end of the 1990s, the Russian government switched to archaic ideology in the area of reproductive health and family planning and neglects evidence-based arguments. Such an extreme turn in the governmental position is not observed in Belarus or Ukraine. This is an important factor contributing to the slowdown in the decrease of abortion rates in Russia.

This merged dataset contains data on self-assessed happiness, collected through nationwide representative surveys conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) among the adult population of Ukraine in the period from 2001 to 2024. Happiness is measured using the question, "Do you consider yourself a happy person?" with five response options: "yes," "rather yes than no," "both yes and no," "rather no than yes," and "no." This question has been included in KIIS omnibus surveys since 2001, typically on an annual basis. However, in certain years (2003, 2004, 2019, and 2020), this question was not tracked, so data for those years are unavailable. The dataset combines data from 25 individual survey waves. All those surveys were carried out with samples representative of Ukraine's adult population (18 years and older), with an average sample size of around 2,000 respondents for each wave between 2001 and 2021, and approximately 1,000 respondents per wave between 2022 and 2024. In addition to the primary happiness data, the dataset includes socio-demographic variables such as gender, age, education, nationality, occupation, self-assessment of financial situation, and place of residence (oblast, type of settlement). These data allow for tracking changes in subjective well-being over time and exploring some of the factors that influence it, both at the national level and within different population groups. The data is available in an SAV format (Ukrainian, Russian, English) as well as a converted CSV format (with a codebook). The Data Documentation includes a short overview and discussion of survey results (with tables in Annex 1).

In 2023, the majority of Ukrainians in Poland were women. Since 2021, the share of Ukrainian men decreased sharply. While the share was ** percent in 2021, it dropped to ** percent in 2023. This could be related to the fact that Ukrainian men have basically not been allowed to leave the country since the expansion of the Russian invasion in 2022.

The gap between the number of women and men in Russia was measured at approximately 10.3 million as of January 1, 2024, with the female population of the country historically outnumbering the male population. Both genders saw a decrease in inhabitants compared to the previous year. Why are there more women than men in Russia? One of the factors explaining gender imbalance in modern Russia is the gap in average life expectancy between the genders. In 2022, Russian women outlived men by around 10 years. In particular, working-age men were six times more likely to die from external causes of death, such as accidents and suicides, compared to working age women in that year. Furthermore, partial mobilization announced as a result of the Russia-Ukraine war resulted in a mass exodus of young men fleeing from conscription. In response to the government’s call to recruit up to 300,000 reservists in end-September 2022, Google search interest in the term "How to leave Russia" increased sharply. Gender imbalance and its consequences for Russia In Russia, the labor market remains highly segregated by gender. Manual jobs in equipment operation, metal industry, manufacturing, and mechanics are male dominated. The labor shortage in these spheres could limit the country’s potential for increased industrial production. Furthermore, fewer men exacerbate the issue of falling births in Russia. In 2023, only 1.26 million births were recorded nationwide, the lowest over the past decade. Coupled with a decreasing number of working-age men, such a decline in live births could lead to less innovation, a larger share of retired people, and rising government expenditure on pensions and healthcare.

Opinion data from Hungary, Bulgaria and Latvia (including the Russian-speaking minority).

This survey focuses on relations with and attitudes towards Russia in three East European countries with a record of close ties with Russia – Latvia, Hungary, and Bulgaria. The survey was carried out against the backdrop of Russia´s annexation of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. It may be the very first survey to tap East European reactions to Russia’s drastic attempt to redraw the map of post-war Eastern Europe. The 2015 Post-Crimea Survey asks many of the key questions in the Baltic Barometer questions about identity, democracy, and the European Union (Baltic Barometer 2014).

IntroductionIn addition to the health crisis that erupted during the COVID-19 pandemic, the war between Russia and Ukraine is impacting the mental health and wellbeing of the Romanian population in a negative way.ObjectivesThis study sets out to investigate the impact that social media consumption and an overload of information related to the armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine is having on the distribution of fake news among Romanians. In addition, it explores the way in which several psychological features, including resilience, general health, perceived stress, coping strategies, and fear of war, change as a function of exposure to traumatic events or interaction with victims of war.MethodsParticipants (N = 633) completed the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ), the CERQ scale with its nine subscales, the Perceived Stress Scale (PSS), and the BRS scale (Brief Resilience Scale), the last of which measures resilience. Information overload, information strain and the likelihood of the person concerned spreading fake news were assessed by adapting items related to these variables.FindingsOur results suggest that information strain partially moderates the relationship between information overload and the tendency to spread false information. Also, they indicate that information strain partially moderates the relationship between time spent online and the tendency to spread false information. Furthermore, our findings imply that there are differences of high and moderate significance between those who worked with refugees and those who did not as regards fear of war and coping strategies. We found no practical differences between the two groups as regards general health, level of resilience and perceived stress.Conclusion and recommendationsThe importance of discovering the reasons why people share false information is discussed, as is the need to adopt strategies to combat this behavior, including infographics and games designed to teach people how to detect fake news. At the same time, aid workers need to be further supported to maintain a high level of psychological wellbeing.

On behalf of the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, the opinion research institute forsa has regularly conducted representative population surveys on the topic of Germany and the Ukraine War from calendar week 13/2022. The individual question areas were adapted according on the survey period. During the survey period from 07.11.2022 to 09.11.2022, the German-speaking resident population aged 14 and over was surveyed in telephone interviews (CATI). The respondents were selected by multi-stage random sample.
Greatest responsibility for the conflict between Ukraine and Russia (Russia, Ukraine, USA, NATO); Germany should continue to maintain the adopted economic sanctions against Russia vs. end; extent of concern about possible impact of war in Ukraine on Germany; specific concern about possible impact of war in Ukraine on Germany (open question); extent of concern about following related to war in Ukraine: Germany being drawn into a war with Russia, Germany taking on too much by taking in refugees from Ukraine, everything becoming more expensive, use of nuclear weapons, threat to basic food supply in Germany, threat to energy supply in Germany, personal financial situation worsening, financial difficulties due to additional payments for electricity and energy costs; satisfaction with regard to how the German government is dealing with the effects of the war in Ukraine on Germany; assessment of the potential for conflict in Germany between different social groups (rich and poor, young and old, East Germans and West Germans, left-wing and right-wing political forces, foreigners and Germans, Ukrainian refugees and Germans, people of Russian and non-Russian origin in Germany); extent of restrictions in personal everyday life due to current price increases; relief measures adopted by the federal government so far are sufficient vs. further relief is necessary; level of awareness of relief received personally or of relief for the household; noticeable relief for one´s own household through the relief measures adopted by the federal government so far; expected future relief for one´s own household through the relief measures adopted by the federal government so far.

Demography: sex; age (grouped); employment; education; household size; net household income (grouped); party preference in the next general election; voting behaviour in the last general election.

Additionally coded were: region; federal state; weight.

Ukraine Labour Force: Working Age: Male: Economically Active Population data was reported at 8,755.200 Person th in 2021. This records a decrease from the previous number of 8,889.100 Person th for 2020. Ukraine Labour Force: Working Age: Male: Economically Active Population data is updated yearly, averaging 10,809.350 Person th from Dec 2004 (Median) to 2021, with 18 observations. The data reached an all-time high of 11,119.700 Person th in 2008 and a record low of 8,755.200 Person th in 2021. Ukraine Labour Force: Working Age: Male: Economically Active Population data remains active status in CEIC and is reported by State Statistics Service of Ukraine. The data is categorized under Global Database’s Ukraine – Table UA.G010: Labour Force: Annual. Data release delayed due to the Ukraine-Russia conflict. No estimation on next release date can be made.
Economically active population comprises all population aged 15–70 of either sex who during reporting period performed the work related to the production of goods and services.

Euromaidan (or the Revolution of Dignity) is the name given to the protests of late November 2013 - February 2014 that began after the Ukrainian government announced that it was suspending its course towards European integration. KIIS, in collaboration with DIF and with funding from the International Renaissance Foundation, conducted three polls among participants of the Maidan protests in Kyiv: • The first poll of Maidan participants was held on weekdays, the 7th and 8th of December 2013. A total of 1037 respondents were interviewed using a method that provides a random sample of Maidan participants. • The second poll of Maidan, conducted when it had become a stationary camp (Maidan-camp), took place on December 20, 2013 (Friday). A total of 515 persons were interviewed, representing all stationary points on the square. • On February 3, 2014 (Monday), the third survey of Maidan participants was conducted. In total, 502 people were interviewed at all stationary points of Maidan (tents, House of Trade Unions, the building of the Kyiv City State Administration, October Palace, Ukrainian House, and others), according to a sample that provided proportional coverage of Maidan participants. The topics addressed in these polls include the motivations and demands of the protesters, their willingness to continue participating in protests, the conditions under which they would leave, as well as the socio-demographic profile of participants. The purpose of the survey was to discover whether and what changes had happened among Maidan participants at different stages, exploring shifts in the social and demographic structure, as well as changes in views and demands.

After the end of Euromaidan and a period of time passed, KIIS incorporated a question into its nationwide polls with the objective of understanding the public's perception of those protests. The question was: "Please tell me which of the following two statements is closer to your opinion? Euromaidan was... 1) a people's protest in support of Ukraine's European path of development, against government corruption, and violence from representatives of law enforcement OR 2) a struggle for power by anti-Russian, nationalist forces supported by Western intelligence services". This question was designed and employed as part of an assessment of the effectiveness of Russian propaganda; therefore, the second option deliberately repeats one of the Russian propaganda theses. In the period 2015-2018, this question was included in four public opinion polls. Each of the polls was carried out on a sample representative of Ukraine's adult population (aged 18 and older), with an average sample size of about 2,000 respondents. For ease of analysis, the data from these polls was merged into one dataset, with a total of 8,119 respondents. The background information includes respondents' socio-demographic profiles (gender, age, education, nationality, occupation, self-assessment of financial situation) and place of residence (oblast, type of settlement). These data can be used to analyse the transformations of retrospective perceptions of the Euromaidan events among the population of Ukraine, particularly as an indicator of the influence of various narratives across different territorial and socio-demographic groups.