With the onset of the Global Financial Crisis in the late Summer of 2007, the United Kingdom was one of the first countries to experience financial panic after the United States. In September 2007, the bank Northern Rock became the UK's first bank to collapse in 150 years due to a bank run, as depositors reacted to the announcement that the bank would be seeking emergency liquidity support from the Bank of England by lining up outside their bank branches to withdraw money. The failure of Northern Rock was a bad omen for the UK economy and financial sector, as banks stopped lending to each other and to customers in what became known as the 'credit crunch'. Government bailouts, private bailouts By October 2008, many UK banks were facing a situation where if they did not receive external assistance, then they would have to default on their debts and likely have to declare bankruptcy. The UK's Labour government, led by Prime Minister Gordon Brown, announced that it would provide emergency funds to stabilize the banking system, leading to the part or full nationalization of some of Britain's largest financial firms. Specifically, Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds TSB, and HBOS received over 35 billion pounds in a government cash injection, while Barclays opted to seek investment from private investors in order to avoid nationalization, much of which came from the state of Qatar. The bailouts caused UK government debt ratios to almost double over the period of the crisis, while public trust in the financial system sank.

Graph and download economic data for OECD based Recession Indicators for the United Kingdom from the Peak through the Trough (GBRRECDM) from 1955-02-01 to 2022-09-30 about peak, trough, recession indicators, and United Kingdom.

The UK economy shrank by 0.1 percent in January 2025 after growing by 0.4 percent in December. Since a huge decline in GDP in April 2020, the UK economy has gradually recovered and is now around 3.4 percent larger than it was before the COVID-19 pandemic. After the initial recovery from the pandemic, however, the UK economy has effectively flatlined, fluctuating between low growth and small contractions since January 2022. Labour banking on growth to turn around fortunes in 2025 In February 2025, just over half a year after winning the last general election, the approval rating for the new Labour government fell to a low of -48 percent. Furthermore, the Prime Minister, Keir Starmer was not only less popular than the new Conservative leader, Kemi Badenoch, but also the leader of the Reform Party, Nigel Farage, whose party have surged in opinion polls recently. This remarkable decline in popularity for the new government is, in some part, due to a deliberate policy of making tough decisions early. Arguably, the most damaging of these policies was the withdrawal of the winter fuel allowance for some pensioners, although other factors such as a controversy about gifts and donations also hurt the government. While Labour aims to restore the UK's economic and political credibility in the long term, they will certainly hope for some good economic news sooner rather than later. Economy bounces back in 2024 after ending 2023 in recession Due to two consecutive quarters of negative economic growth, in late 2023 the UK economy ended the year in recession. After not growing at all in the second quarter of 2023, UK GDP fell by 0.1 percent in the third quarter, and then by 0.3 percent in the last quarter. For the whole of 2023, the economy grew by 0.4 percent compared to 2022, and for 2024 is forecast to have grown by 1.1 percent. During the first two quarters of 2024, UK GDP grew by 0.7 percent, and 0.4 percent, with this relatively strong growth followed by zero percent growth in the third quarter of the year. Although the economy had started to grow again by the time of the 2024 general election, this was not enough to save the Conservative government at the time. Despite usually seen as the best party for handling the economy, the Conservative's economic competency was behind that of Labour on the eve of the 2024 election.

Data underlying the report of a study that assesses and quantifes the impacts of the financial crisis and subsequent global economic recession on the growth and performance of UK SME employers. Analyses existing data from two previous survey sources on SME employers in the pre-recession and recessionary periods. Covers how the problems in the banking sector have affected the supply of finance to the SME sector, and whether this has depressed business performance and investment. Looks at the impact of the recession has been more serious for particular types of entrepreneurs and businesses.

This statistic shows the public perception of the economic situation in the United Kingdom (UK) as of May 2017. Respondents were asked how they would judge the current situation, 42 percent of the 1,365 respondents replying with 'rather bad' or 'very bad.' Whereas the perception of the economy in Sweden showed that 19 percent of respondents regarded the economy in a negative condition. Perceptions of the economy in the Netherlands reveal that 17 percent of respondents made the same assessment. The outlook in the UK regarding the economy negatively was over twice as common as both countries. Although, British opinion on household financial situation was one of optimism, with 80 percent of respondents stating that the current financial situation of their household was positive.

The gross domestic product of the United Kingdom was around 2.56 trillion British pounds, an increase when compared to the previous year, when UK GDP amounted to about 2.54 trillion pounds. The significant drop in GDP visible in 2020 was due to the COVID-19 pandemic, with the smaller declines in 2008 and 2009 because of the global financial crisis of the late 2000s. Low growth problem in the UK Despite growing by 0.9 percent in 2024, and 0.4 percent in 2023 the UK economy is not that much larger than it was before the COVID-19 pandemic. Since recovering from a huge fall in GDP in the second quarter of 2020, the UK economy has alternated between periods of contraction and low growth, with the UK even in a recession at the end of 2023. While economic growth picked up somewhat in 2024, GDP per capita is lower than it was in 2022, following two years of negative growth. How big is the UK economy in relation to the rest of the world? As of 2024, the UK had the sixth-largest economy in the world, behind the United States, China, Japan, Germany, and India. Among European nations, this meant that the UK currently has the second-largest economy in Europe, although the economy of France, Europe's third-largest economy, is of a similar size. The UK's global economic ranking will likely fall in the coming years, however, with the UK's share of global GDP expected to fall from 2.16 percent in 2025 to 2.02 percent by 2029.  

This dataset is about books and is filtered where the book is The impact of economic recession on business strategy planning in UK companies, featuring 7 columns including author, BNB id, book, book publisher, and ISBN. The preview is ordered by publication date (descending).

Article on the labour market across the UK in the current recession

Source agency: Office for National Statistics

Designation: National Statistics

Language: English

Alternative title: The labour market across the UK in the current recession

In the fourth quarter of 2024, the quarterly gross domestic product of the United Kingdom was approximately, 641 billion British pounds, compared with around 632.4 billion pounds in the same quarter. The large dip in GDP that can be seen in the second quarter of 2020 saw the UK economy fall from 604.7 billion pounds to 481.8 billion, with more usual levels of output not recovering until well into 2021. The COVID-19 lockdowns enacted by the UK government at that time was the main reason for this large fall in GDP. Growth lagging as UK heads into 2025 After ending 2023 in recession, the UK economy started 2024 with the strongest quarterly GDP growth in several years, growing by 0.7 percent in the first quarter, and then by 0.4 percent in the second quarter. Economic growth in the second half of the year was, however, far less promising, with GDP flatlining in the third quarter, and monthly GDP shrinking by 0.1 percent in September and then again in October. Although GDP is still forecast to grow in 2025, the overall economic picture is precarious. In November, UK inflation rose to 2.6 percent, compared with just 1.7 percent in September, while the labor market continues to show signs of cooling after a period of high job vacancies and low unemployment. Labour pinning hopes on long-term growth After winning its first general election in 19 years in 2024, the Labour Government has seen its approval ratings plummet in its first few months in office. This shaky start is partly due to a government strategy of making unpopular decisions early in their tenure, which they hope will eventually encourage stable economic growth in the mid to long-term. By far the least popular policy was the withdrawal of winter fuel benefits for a significant number of pensioners, a cost-cutting measure deemed necessary due to the UK's vulnerable public finance position, with government debt at around 100 percent of GDP. A further measure introduced was a national insurance tax increase for employers, with almost half of UK firms citing increased taxes as their main external concern in Q3 2024. Avoiding any further tax rises or cuts to services will depend on if policies in other areas, such as planning reform, will kickstart the UK economy in time before the next election.

Approximately one quarter of the UK population have a migration background (first- or second-generation immigrants). Some ethnic minority groups are more likely to be in atypical or flexible employment than the White British majority. In particular during a time of health and economic crisis, such as the COVID–19 pandemic, those ethnic groups were expected to be economically more vulnerable than other groups. This study shows the increased vulnerability of some ethnic minority groups during COVID–19 by looking at their labour market outcomes compared to White British. Specifically, we ask whether it was their disproportionate presence in flexible employment or in shut-down occupations that made some ethnic minority groups vulnerable to adverse labour market outcomes during the COVID–19 recession? Using the COVID–19 recession in the UK as a case study, we employ weighted linear probability models with 2021 data from the Evidence for Equality National Survey (EVENS) to look at changes in economic indicators across ethnic groups and gender. We report heterogeneity in flexible employment rates within the non-White group and between the non-White and the White British group. By using a conditional decomposition method, we aim to show that those ethnic minority groups who were disproportionately on flexible contracts experienced worse economic effects than the White British group. The collection consists of the Stata Do-File which can be used to reproduce the study.

Was it their disproportionate presence in flexible employment or in shut-down occupations that made some ethnic minority groups vulnerable to adverse labour market outcomes during the COVID–19 recession? Using the COVID–19 recession in the UK as a case study, we employ weighted linear probability models with 2021 data from the Evidence for Equality National Survey (EVENS) to look at changes in economic indicators across ethnic groups and gender. We report heterogeneity in flexible employment rates within the non-White group and between the non-White and the White British group. By using a conditional decomposition method, we conclude that those ethnic minority groups who were disproportionately on flexible contracts experienced worse economic effects than the White British group.

The project adopted a broad approach, employing quantitative as well as qualitative methods. It covered both public and private forms of risk protection, and it analysed attitudes as well as actual behavior. First, we reviewed Britain's current 'mixed economy of welfare' in the aforementioned five key areas. We mapped the social programmes, occupational schemes and private options that have been available since the early 1990s. The second phase was based on quantitative data analysis, making use of the Family Resources Survey (FRS) and the ABI Risk and Protection Survey. We analysed the take-up of insurances and how it was influenced by attitudes and socio-demographic characteristics. Third, we conducted 61 qualitative interviews, where we explored personal risk management strategies of middle-income households from Scotland and England. The main result was a typology of risk management rationales that guide household economies. This stage also explored the ramifications of the recent financial uncertainties and economic downturn.

Comparing England and Scotland, the purpose was to review Britain's current 'mixed economy of welfare' in key areas: unemployment, sickness, costs of higher education for children, retirement and infirmity in old age. The aim was to map the types of statutory protection against such risks and contingencies and examine changes in the scope of public provision. In parallel, we will examine the scope of non-statutory (occupational and personal) provision, investigating how 'private welfare markets' have developed since the early 1990s. The second phase is based on quantitative data analysis of household savings and investment behaviour in insurances and private market-based contracts for risk protection. Finally, via qualitative interviews, we explore personal risk management of socially and economically similar families from Scotland and England. This stage will also explore the potential ramifications of the most recent financial uncertainties and economic downturn.

The project investigated risk management strategies of above average income households in England and Scotland. In the UK especially those with above average incomes are often assumed to have access to or seek private forms of risk protection, partly based on company provision or private voluntary protection complementing or substituting public social protection. The project investigated how households protect themselves against income loss due to unemployment, sickness or retirement and plan for expenses like long term care and higher education costs. We focused our analysis on how households balance these risks between public, occupational and private forms of protection. Moreover, we explored how the recent financial crisis has influenced the attitudes and behavior of households regarding their personal protection. The project sought to answer how and why some middle class households plan for contingencies and engage in private risk management strategies while others do not.

Analysis of household disposable income and the saving ratio.

Source agency: Office for National Statistics

Designation: Supporting material

Language: English

Alternative title: Household income and saving ratio

This release looks at the increase in unemployment during the recent economic downturn. Increases in unemployment will be compared across regions in the UK, age groups, gender and other characteristics. Claimant count data will also be included.

Source agency: Office for National Statistics

Designation: National Statistics

Language: English

Alternative title: Unemployment during the economic downturn

This statistic depicts the behavior of UK shoppers since the 2008 economic recession in the United Kingdom. Of respondents, 46 percent have been cutting back since the downturn and 69 percent will continue to do so.

Two years after the UK recession ended in the final quarter of 2009, came a decrease in GDP in the final quarter of 2011 and the first quarter of 2012, signifying an official “double dip” recession. This Update looks at key labour market indicators since the beginning of the recession period in 2008. It presents the latest national and London figures of those claiming Jobseekers’ Allowance (JSA), known as the claimant count, and also shows the official unemployment measure: the International Labour Organisation (ILO) definition, which is derived from the Labour Force Survey. It gives some detail on the geography and characteristics of those looking for work. In addition, it gives figures for employment levels.

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In January 2025, the employment rate in the United Kingdom was 74.9 percent, up from 74.7 percent in the same period a year earlier. After almost dropping below 70 percent in 2011, the employment rate in the United Kingdom started to climb at a relatively fast pace, peaking in early 2020. Due to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, however, the employment declined to 74.6 percent by January 2021. Although not quite at pre-pandemic levels, the employment rate has since recovered. Hot UK labor market cools in 2023 Although unemployment in the UK spiked at 5.1 percent in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, it fell throughout most of 2022, to just 3.6 percent in August 2022. Around that time, the number of job vacancies in the UK was also at quite high levels, reaching a peak of 1.3 million by May 2022. The strong labor market put employees in quite a strong position, perhaps encouraging the high number of resignations that took place around that time. While wage growth has also been strong since 2022, these gains were cancelled-out for a long period between 2021 and 2023 when inflation grew faster than wages. By July 2023, unemployment had bounced back to 4.3 percent, while the number of job vacancies fell below one million in August 2023 for the first time since August 2021. UK in recession at end of 2023 Although the UK labor market has loosened since 2022, it has generally remained in good health, with unemployment low by historical standards. Inflation also fell throughout 2023, from 10.1 percent at the beginning of the year, to four percent by December. Getting inflation down to more acceptable levels, however, came at the expense of raising the Bank of England's already high-interest rate throughout 2023. The knock-on effect of higher borrowing costs likely did little to spur economic growth that year, with GDP growing by just 0.1 percent in 2023. Even this meager economic growth was only achieved due to growth in the first half of the year. In the second half of 2023, the economy shrank in two consecutive quarters, meaning the UK is officially in recession heading into a probable election year.

Extensive research has been conducted on the concept of jobless recoveries and their potential causes, primarily focused on the United States from the 1990s. This paper finds that the prolonged employment downturn following the brief 1980-1981 recession in Britain qualifies as a jobless recovery and then investigates possible contributing factors: labor reallocation across industries, regional employment changes, and job polarization. The United States, which did not have a jobless recovery from the early 1980s recession, is taken as a comparison case. I find that the leading candidate explanation for this jobless recovery was the reallocation of labor across industries. This suggests an important role for structural change in the early 1980s recession and in jobless recoveries more generally.

A survey carried out in the United Kingdom (UK) in March 2020, found that 38 percent of respondents think a global recession is likely to happen as a result of coronavirus (COVID-19), while a further 14 percent think it is extremely likely. On the other hand, only 12 percent of respondents believe a global recession is overall unlikely, as a result of coronavirus. For further information about the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, please visit our dedicated Facts and Figures page.

Abstract The Holderness coastline is known to be one of the most rapidly retreating coastal regions in Europe. Previous studies on the recession of this coastline have often concentrated on providing a single annual value for the whole coast or for large subdivisions of it; however, relatively little attention has been given to the overall spatial and temporal variability. This paper summarizes and critically appraises the work previously undertaken in this region, presents the results of the former recession rate investigations and displays new interpretations of the data. This assessment found there to be a knowledge gap relating to the processes involved in the recession of this coastline, particularly with regard to frequency of high recession events, further knowledge of which could assist in the planning of the region. It is concluded that many of the former investigations are inadequate by today's standards, because of either the methods employed or the manner in which the results are displayed. Significant steps in gathering high-quality data relating to the erosion of this coastline have been made by the East Riding of Yorkshire Council with the initiation of their Erosion Post monitoring scheme and more recently by their dGPS monitoring. However, if further advancement is to be made in the understanding of the erosion of this region, this work will need to be supplemented with geomorphological monitoring of the cliff line, which will further resolve the processes occurring and aid the production of predictive models. These geomorphological data could be obtained through employment of traditional methods as well as new techniques such as laser scanning or digital photogrammetry.