As of 2019, Argentina was the country that spent the most time in economic recession in the Americas since 1950. Up to one third of the time since 1950, the Argentine economy was in contraction. In Venezuela, the percentage of time in recession amounted to 28 percent in the same period, whereas in the U.S. it represented around ten percent.

In 2019, 40 percent of American respondents said that President Trump would be the most responsible if the United States were to enter into a recession. This is compared to five percent of respondents, who said that former President Barack Obama would be the most responsible.

United States Recession Probability data was reported at 14.120 % in Oct 2019. This records a decrease from the previous number of 14.505 % for Sep 2019. United States Recession Probability data is updated monthly, averaging 7.668 % from Jan 1960 (Median) to Oct 2019, with 718 observations. The data reached an all-time high of 95.405 % in Dec 1981 and a record low of 0.080 % in Sep 1983. United States Recession Probability data remains active status in CEIC and is reported by Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The data is categorized under Global Database’s United States – Table US.S021: Recession Probability.

In 2019, 52 percent of American respondents who were part of Generation Z said they expected to be more impacted by the next recession when compared to the 2007-2008 recession. This is compared to 27 percent of Baby Boomers who said the same.

In 2019, 43 percent of surveyed respondents between the ages of 18 and 29 said that they were somewhat concerned about the next recession in the United States. This is compared to 45 percent of respondents aged 65 and over who said the same.

Interview transcripts with a sample of advanced manufacturing firms(aerospace, electrical, pharmaceutical and automotive sectors), and related policy and business organisations, in the East Midlands, North West and Central Belt of Scotland. The results of a firm questionnaire survey with advanced manufacturing firms (aerospace, electrical, pharmaceutical and automotive sectors) in British manufacturing areas.

The recession from 2008, and the persistent sectoral and spatial imbalances in the recovery, have provoked political calls to 'rebalance' the economy. According to Government representatives, Britain needs to 'reindustrialise', to rediscover its talent for manufacturing. Strengthening manufacturing in the Midlands and North will aid economic stability, raise productivity, and promote a more even distribution of growth. It has been argued that traditional industrial regions should develop new types of high-technology, 'advanced' manufacturing activities.

Such calls for rebalancing have triggered a major debate on whether the British economy can in any way 're-industrialise'. Optimists point to resurgent clusters of manufacturing industries. Others are sceptical and argue that British manufacturing has been undermined by the 2008 recession, long-term weaknesses and an unsupportive institutional context. In this view, supply chains in British manufacturing are now too thin, fragmented and sparse to support industrial renewal on the scale required. There is evidence to show uneven regional trends in manufacturing, especially between the North and South of Britain and, according to some, advanced manufacturing is growing at a much faster rate in Southern England due to its research intensity and proximity to high-technology institutions. There is a pressing need to know how, and how far, industrial regions in Britain are developing advanced manufacturing.

Relatively little is known about any potential regional manufacturing renaissance and the significance of location. There are several hypotheses. Some argue that advanced manufacturing develops best in specialised clusters and in local 'ecosystems' in which firms benefit from shared capabilities, resources, spill-overs and intermediaries. Others emphasise broader-scale external economies across sectors, so that location in cities and regions with a wide range of growing industries is more important to manufacturing performance. There is also debate about the degree to which location in traditional industrial regions aids or hinders advanced manufacturing. In a 'phoenix industry' view, manufacturing can be revived in traditional industrial regions by networks of small firms and by the diversification and branching of new sectors. This project tackles these questions. It places the performance of advanced manufacturing firms in the context of changes in supply chains and examines whether there is increasing specialisation of regions and locations in particular tasks, roles and functions rather than in entire industries.

This project will examine the geographical, organisational and economic dynamics of four key manufacturing industries: electrical, computing and optical equipment; aerospace; pharmaceuticals; and motor vehicles. The project would proceed in three connected stages. The first stage would be to use and combine existing micro-data sources to examine the central issues on the relationships between manufacturing performance and location and investigate the key determinants of firm growth, performance and innovation in these industries. The project will use and combine several data-sets to provide a detailed analysis of change since the early 1970s. The second stage of the project will carry out a postal and online survey of firms in the four industries. This will explore the relationships between location and firm performance in more depth. For each industry, the survey aims to compare a set of firms within traditional industrial regions (in the North, Wales, Scotland or Midlands) with a similar group of firms in Southern regions. The final stage of the project will focus on manufacturers in these industries in four Midlands/Northern regions (selecting one region where each industry is well represented). In these areas, it will use firm interviews and focus groups to discuss findings, and identify and sound out key policy lessons and implications

In 2019, 40 percent of female American respondents said they expected to be more impacted in the next recession in comparison to the 2007-2008 recession. On the other hand, 15 percent said they expect to be less impacted.

In December 2024, the yield on a 10-year U.S. Treasury note was 4.39 percent, forecasted to decrease to reach 3.27 percent by August 2025. Treasury securities are debt instruments used by the government to finance the national debt. Who owns treasury notes? Because the U.S. treasury notes are generally assumed to be a risk-free investment, they are often used by large financial institutions as collateral. Because of this, billions of dollars in treasury securities are traded daily. Other countries also hold U.S. treasury securities, as do U.S. households. Investors and institutions accept the relatively low interest rate because the U.S. Treasury guarantees the investment. Looking into the future Because these notes are so commonly traded, their interest rate also serves as a signal about the market’s expectations of future growth. When markets expect the economy to grow, forecasts for treasury notes will reflect that in a higher interest rate. In fact, one harbinger of recession is an inverted yield curve, when the return on 3-month treasury bills is higher than the ten year rate. While this does not always lead to a recession, it certainly signals pessimism from financial markets.

This data package includes the underlying data and files to replicate the calculations, charts, and tables presented in Are Central Banks Out of Ammunition to Fight a Recession? Not Quite, PIIE Policy Brief 19-18.

If you use the data, please cite as: Gagnon, Joseph E., and Christopher G. Collins. (2019). Are Central Banks Out of Ammunition to Fight a Recession? Not Quite. PIIE Policy Brief 19-18. Peterson Institute for International Economics.

In 2019, 55 percent of American respondents between the ages of 18 and 29 said they expected to be more impacted in the next recession when compared to the 2007-2008 recession. This is in comparison to 22 percent of respondents aged 65 and older who said the same.

The project ‘Truth, Accountability or Impunity? Transitional Justice and the Economic Crisis’ completed a repository of policies of accountability in response to the post-2008 Great Recession in six European countries (Ireland, Iceland, Greece, Cyprus, Portugal & Spain). The repository included recorded prosecutions of bank executives, office holders and politicians on charges related to white collar crimes and/or corruption in the lead up to the economic crisis. It also includes fact finding commissions (i.e. independent commissions of inquiry and/or parliamentary commissions of inquiry) designed to document patterns of policy and institutional failures that led to the economic meltdown, in the period between 2010-2018. The rationale for developing the repository was, first, to map the range of policies deployed and, second, to investigate potential variations in the national policies. In parallel with the development of the repository, the project included the conduct of approximately 133 confidential semi-structured interviews in Ireland, Iceland, Greece, Cyprus, Portugal, Spain, Washington D.C. (IMF) and Brussels (EU). These included interviews with prosecutors, judges, elected officials (e.g. former Prime Ministers, Ministers, MPs), unelected officials (e.g. policymakers at central banks, relevant ministries, EU bodies, senior IMF executives etc), NGO members, journalists, academics, defense lawyers and other informed stakeholders to understand the rationale and their attitudes towards policies of accountability. There is little emphasis in the extant literature on the role and impact of different mechanisms of accountability in post-crisis settings, so these interviews were expected to shed useful analytical light. Finally, with regards to the case selection six European countries with similar background conditions and exposure to the crisis but different policy responses, each representing a different approach to accountability.

The comparative project applies concepts of transitional justice, namely, 'dealing with the past', to investigate how six European societies (Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland, Cyprus, Iceland) have come to terms with the origins and consequences of the post-2008 financial crisis. The economic aspects of the crash are well discussed elsewhere; the proposed project argues significant political and legal lessons can be learned from the crisis, but these are missed by viewing it only through an economic lens. Simply stated, transitional justice, a framework developed over the past forty years, considers how national political elites balance popular calls for truth and justice with the pragmatic need for stability in the aftermath of crisis. Prosecutions, truth recovery and amnesties or impunity are much studied mechanisms. Notably, these mechanisms have been deployed in the cases under consideration. Spain and Portugal took only minimal steps to address the causes of the crisis, in effect, pursuing a policy of immunity. Iceland and Cyprus set up ad hoc truth commissions to document the causes of the crisis. Ireland and Greece have prosecuted and convicted a number of bankers and politicians deemed responsible. The project seeks to explain why, despite similar background conditions, societies have formulated different policy responses and to identify the strengths and limitations of each response. This is important. Examining the comparative experience of societies who experiment with policy mechanisms will contribute to the design of better policy responses in times of crisis, decreasing the level of social upheaval, boosting political legitimacy and paving the way for meaningful institutional reform. This project is explicitly about the intersection of politics and law; it focuses on issues of political and institutional failure and the role of law in promoting accountability, responsibility and political learning from economic crises.

The statistic shows the growth rate of the real gross domestic product (GDP) in Japan from 2019 to 2023, with projections up until 2029. In 2023, Japan's GDP increased by 1.68 percent compared to the previous year. For comparison, the GDP growth rate of China had reached about 8.45 percent that same year.Gross domestic product growth rate in JapanGDP serves as one of the most heavily relied upon indicators to gauge the state and health of a country’s economy. GDP is the total market value of all final goods and services that have been produced within a nation’s borders in a given period of time, usually a year. GDP figures allow a more fundamental understanding of a country’s economy. Year-on-year GDP growth acts as a helpful and clear sign of the direction in which a country is moving in economic terms. Real GDP is especially useful and insightful as it takes price changes (inflation and deflation) into account.The gross domestic product growth rate in Japan has been shaky since the recession of 2008 struck the world economy like a bolt out of the blue and Japan is still yet to gain a solid foothold. Despite its ongoing financial predicament however, Japan remains one of the world’s most highly developed economies. The economy of Japan is the third largest worldwide by nominal GDP and the nation has a very active manufacturing sector. It is active in the auto manufacturing sector, the third largest in the world after the United States and China, and has an electronics industry that is counted among the worlds most innovative. Japan can boast many titles, but perhaps the most significant to its future stability is that which relates to its astronomical national debts, currently running at over 200 percent of GDP, roughly 10.5 trillion US dollars.

We estimate across-county spending flows between firms and consumers for every county in the United States, providing a new consumption link that has not been studied previously. We highlight the importance of this link by estimating the effect of changes in local housing wealth on consumption and employment from 2001 to 2019. We generally find that the effect from changes in housing wealth crosses borders to affect consumption and employment in a pattern consistent with our spending flows. However, we find potential consumers who reside outside the local commuting zone disproportionately affect local spending and employment during the Great Recession.

In 2019, 50 percent of surveyed respondents between the ages of 18 and 29 said that they believe the next economic recession to hit the United States will be major. This is compared to 36 percent of respondents aged 65 and over who said the same.

This map shows which areas have concentrations of high risk businesses and potential loss of sales revenue in the event of an economic downturn. Areas in yellow have a higher concentration of sales revenue in one or more of the five categories (by NAICS code): Clothing/Accessory stores, General Merchandise stores, Arts/Entertainment/Recreation, Accommodation, and Food Service/Drinking Places. The popup breaks down total sales revenue by area, sales revenue as a percentage of total by area, percent of businesses for the area, and sales revenue by category. Data is 2019 vintage and available by county, tract, and block group. Overall, in the US, these 5 categories make up 7.11% of total sales revenue.Esri's Business Summary Data: Esri's Business Locations data is extracted from a comprehensive list of businesses licensed from Infogroup. It summarizes the comprehensive list of businesses from Infogroup for select NAICS and SIC summary categories by geography and includes total number of businesses, total sales, and total number of employees for a trade area.Esri's U.S. 2019 Data: Population, age, income, race, home value, spending, business, and market potential are among the topics included in the data suite. Each year, Esri's Data Development team employs its proven methodologies to update more than 2,000 demographic variables for a variety of U.S. geographies. To browse, all data variables available within Esri's demographics explore the Data Browser. Additional Esri Resources:Get StartedEsri DemographicsU.S. 2019 Esri Updated DemographicsBusiness Summary DataMethodologies

Spreadsheet used to calculated hydrograph recession parameters (Minimum, Most Probable Value, and Maximum) for the Stochastic Empirical Loading Dilution Model (SELDM) . The spreadsheet was used in conjunction with the SELDM simulations used in the publication: Stonewall, A.J., and Granato, G.E., 2018, Assessing potential effects of highway and urban runoff on receiving streams in total maximum daily load watersheds in Oregon using the Stochastic Empirical Loading and Dilution Model: U.S. Geological Survey Scientific Investigations Report 2019-5053, 116 p., https://doi.org/10.3133/sir20195053

The UK economy grew by 0.1 percent in the fourth quarter of 2024, compared with zero growth in the previous quarter. After ending 2023 in recession, the UK economy grew quite strongly in the first half of 2024, growing by 0.8 percent in Q1, and 0.4 percent in Q2, with growth slowing in the second half of the year. In the third quarter of 2020 the UK experienced record setting growth of 16.8 percent, which itself followed the record 20.3 percent contraction in Q2 2020. Growing economy key to Labour's plans Since winning the 2024 general election, the UK's Labour Party have seen their popularity fall substantially. In February 2025, the government's approval rating fell to a low of -54 percent, making them almost as disliked as the Conservatives just before the last election. A string of unpopular policies since taking office have taken a heavy toll on support for the government. Labour hope they can reverse their declining popularity by growing the economy, which has underperformed for several years, and when measured in GDP per capita, fell in 2023, and 2024. Steady labor market trends set to continue? After a robust 2022, the UK labor market remained resilient throughout 2023 and 2024. The unemployment rate at the end of 2024 was 4.4 percent, up from four percent at the start of the year, but still one of the lowest rates on record. While the average number of job vacancies has been falling since a May 2022 peak, there was a slight increase in January 2025 when compared with the previous month. The more concerning aspect of the labor market, from the government's perspective, are the high levels of economic inactivity due to long-term sickness, which reached a peak of 2.84 million in late 2023, and remained at high levels throughout 2024.

In a July 2019 survey, 73 percent of likely November 2020 voters said that Wall Street should be held more accountable for the 2008 financial crisis through increased regulation and greater enforcement.

56 percent of surveyed Democrats in 2019 said that they believe that the next economic recession to hit the United States will be major. This is compared to 42 percent of Independents and 27 percent of Republicans who said the same.

As of January 29, 2025, the FTSE index stood at 8,557.81 points - well above its average value of around 7,500 points in the past few years.On the 12th of March 2020, amid the escalating crisis surrounding the coronavirus and fears of a global recession, the FTSE 100 suffered the second largest one day crash in its history and the biggest since the 1987 market crash. On the 23rd of March, the FTSE index saw its lowest value this year to date at 4,993.89 but has since began a tentative recovery. With the continuation of the pandemic, the FTSE 100 index was making a tentative recovery between late March 2020 and early June 2020. Since then the FSTE 100 index had plateaued towards the end of July, before starting a tentative upward trend in November. FTSE 100 The Financial Times Stock Exchange 100 Index, otherwise known as the FTSE 100 Index is a share index of the 100 largest companies trading on the London Stock Exchange in terms of market capitalization. At the end of March 2024, the largest company trading on the LSE was Shell. The largest ever initial public offering (IPO) on the LSE was Glencore International plc. European stock exchanges While nearly every country in Europe has a stock exchange, only five are considered major, and have a market capital of over one trillion U.S dollars. European stock exchanges make up two of the top ten major stock markets in the world. Europe’s biggest stock exchange is the Euronext which combines seven markets based in Belgium, France, England, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Portugal.