By April 2026, it is projected that there is a probability of ***** percent that the United States will fall into another economic recession. This reflects a significant decrease from the projection of the preceding month.

The weekly gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate fluctuated significantly in the United States between January 2021 and April 2023. Between January and April 2021, it increased sharply from -0.71 percent to 25.12 percent. From April 2021 onwards, it started to decrease drastically, with slight occasional increases, and reached its lowest value at negative 0.43 percent in November 2022. After November 2022, the weekly GDP growth rate increased notably.

The Weekly Economic Index (WEI) of the United States exhibited notable fluctuations between January 2021 and June 2025. Throughout this period, the WEI reached its lowest point at negative **** percent in the third week of February 2021, while achieving its peak at ***** percent in the first week of May 2021. From 2021 through the initial half of 2023, the WEI demonstrated a gradual decline, interspersed with occasional minor upturns. This phase was succeeded by a period characterized by a modest overall increase. What is the Weekly Economic Index? The Weekly Economic Index (WEI) is an index of real economic activity using high-frequency data, used to signal the state of the U.S. economy. It is an index of ** daily and weekly indicators, scaled to align with the four-quarter GDP growth rate. The indicators reflected in the WEI cover consumer behavior, the labor market, and production.

Graph and download economic data for Dates of U.S. recessions as inferred by GDP-based recession indicator (JHDUSRGDPBR) from Q4 1967 to Q4 2024 about recession indicators, GDP, and USA.

Probability of Recession: Euro Area data was reported at 1.506 % in Mar 2025. This records a decrease from the previous number of 1.828 % for Feb 2025. Probability of Recession: Euro Area data is updated monthly, averaging 5.278 % from Jan 1996 (Median) to Mar 2025, with 351 observations. The data reached an all-time high of 70.141 % in Mar 2009 and a record low of 0.016 % in Jul 2021. Probability of Recession: Euro Area data remains active status in CEIC and is reported by CEIC Data. The data is categorized under World Trend Plus’s CEIC Leading Indicator – Table EU.S002: Probability of Recession: Euro Area.

Jeremy Piger Smoothed Recession Probabilities data was reported at 0.840 % in Mar 2025. This records an increase from the previous number of 0.180 % for Feb 2025. Jeremy Piger Smoothed Recession Probabilities data is updated monthly, averaging 0.150 % from Jun 1967 (Median) to Mar 2025, with 694 observations. The data reached an all-time high of 100.000 % in Apr 2020 and a record low of 0.000 % in Mar 2021. Jeremy Piger Smoothed Recession Probabilities data remains active status in CEIC and is reported by Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The data is categorized under Global Database’s United States – Table US.S089: Jeremy Piger Smooth Recession Probabilities.

The Weekly Activity Index (WAI) of the German economy showed notable fluctuations between January 2021 and January 2025. It reached its lowest point at ***** percent in the **** week of 2021 before experiencing a sharp increase, peaking at *** percent in the **** week of the same year. The index then declined significantly during the second half of 2021 but recovered slightly, ending the year at **** percent. In early 2022, the WAI saw another significant drop and remained in negative territory until the **** week of 2023. Throughout 2024, the index continued to fluctuate markedly, displaying an upward trend in the first half of the year followed by a downward trend in the second half. What is the weekly activity index? The weekly activity index (WAI) is a weekly index designed to measure real economic activity in Germany. It is calculated as a common component from various indicators, such as industrial output, GDP, electricity consumption, credit card payments, and other high-frequency indicators. Positive values in the index indicates above average growth in real economic activity, while negative values signal a decline in economic output.

Graph and download economic data for OECD based Recession Indicators for Russian Federation from the Peak through the Trough (DISCONTINUED) (RUSRECDM) from 1995-02-01 to 2021-08-31 about peak, trough, recession indicators, and Russia.

Graph and download economic data for OECD based Recession Indicators for the Russian Federation from the Period following the Peak through the Trough (DISCONTINUED) (RUSREC) from Feb 1995 to Aug 2021 about peak, trough, recession indicators, and Russia.

Graph and download economic data for NBER based Recession Indicators for the United States from the Period following the Peak through the Trough (USREC) from Dec 1854 to Jun 2025 about peak, trough, recession indicators, and USA.

United States Real-time Sahm Rule Recession Indicator: sa data was reported at 0.270 % Point in Apr 2025. This stayed constant from the previous number of 0.270 % Point for Mar 2025. United States Real-time Sahm Rule Recession Indicator: sa data is updated monthly, averaging 0.070 % Point from Dec 1959 (Median) to Apr 2025, with 785 observations. The data reached an all-time high of 9.500 % Point in Jun 2020 and a record low of -0.370 % Point in Sep 2021. United States Real-time Sahm Rule Recession Indicator: sa data remains active status in CEIC and is reported by Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The data is categorized under Global Database’s United States – Table US.S: Real-time Sahm Rule Recession Indicator.

Approximately one quarter of the UK population have a migration background (first- or second-generation immigrants). Some ethnic minority groups are more likely to be in atypical or flexible employment than the White British majority. In particular during a time of health and economic crisis, such as the COVID–19 pandemic, those ethnic groups were expected to be economically more vulnerable than other groups. This study shows the increased vulnerability of some ethnic minority groups during COVID–19 by looking at their labour market outcomes compared to White British. Specifically, we ask whether it was their disproportionate presence in flexible employment or in shut-down occupations that made some ethnic minority groups vulnerable to adverse labour market outcomes during the COVID–19 recession? Using the COVID–19 recession in the UK as a case study, we employ weighted linear probability models with 2021 data from the Evidence for Equality National Survey (EVENS) to look at changes in economic indicators across ethnic groups and gender. We report heterogeneity in flexible employment rates within the non-White group and between the non-White and the White British group. By using a conditional decomposition method, we aim to show that those ethnic minority groups who were disproportionately on flexible contracts experienced worse economic effects than the White British group. The collection consists of the Stata Do-File which can be used to reproduce the study.

The weekly gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate fluctuated significantly in the eurozone between January 2021 and April 2023. In the first quarter of 2021, the weekly GDP growth rate increased sharply, and it peaked in the first week of April, at ***** percent. After its peak in April, it decreased sharply until July 2021. After July 2021, it continued to fluctuate until April 2022, although less drastically. Between April and October 2022, the weekly GDP growth rate decreased gradually with some fluctuations, which was followed by a period of increasing trend. 2023 brought another downward trend with occasional elevations.

This 6MB download is a zip file containing 5 pdf documents and 2 xlsx spreadsheets. Presentation on COVID-19 and the potential impacts on employment

May 2020Waka Kotahi wants to better understand the potential implications of the COVID-19 downturn on the land transport system, particularly the potential impacts on regional economies and communities.

To do this, in May 2020 Waka Kotahi commissioned Martin Jenkins and Infometrics to consider the potential impacts of COVID-19 on New Zealand’s economy and demographics, as these are two key drivers of transport demand. In addition to providing a scan of national and international COVID-19 trends, the research involved modelling the economic impacts of three of the Treasury’s COVID-19 scenarios, to a regional scale, to help us understand where the impacts might be greatest.

Waka Kotahi studied this modelling by comparing the percentage difference in employment forecasts from the Treasury’s three COVID-19 scenarios compared to the business as usual scenario.

The source tables from the modelling (Tables 1-40), and the percentage difference in employment forecasts (Tables 41-43), are available as spreadsheets.

Arataki - potential impacts of COVID-19 Final Report

Employment modelling - interactive dashboard

The modelling produced employment forecasts for each region and district over three time periods – 2021, 2025 and 2031. In May 2020, the forecasts for 2021 carried greater certainty as they reflected the impacts of current events, such as border restrictions, reduction in international visitors and students etc. The 2025 and 2031 forecasts were less certain because of the potential for significant shifts in the socio-economic situation over the intervening years. While these later forecasts were useful in helping to understand the relative scale and duration of potential COVID-19 related impacts around the country, they needed to be treated with care recognising the higher levels of uncertainty.

The May 2020 research suggested that the ‘slow recovery scenario’ (Treasury’s scenario 5) was the most likely due to continuing high levels of uncertainty regarding global efforts to manage the pandemic (and the duration and scale of the resulting economic downturn).

The updates to Arataki V2 were framed around the ‘Slower Recovery Scenario’, as that scenario remained the most closely aligned with the unfolding impacts of COVID-19 in New Zealand and globally at that time.

Find out more about Arataki, our 10-year plan for the land transport system

May 2021The May 2021 update to employment modelling used to inform Arataki Version 2 is now available. Employment modelling dashboard - updated 2021Arataki used the May 2020 information to compare how various regions and industries might be impacted by COVID-19. Almost a year later, it is clear that New Zealand fared better than forecast in May 2020.Waka Kotahi therefore commissioned an update to the projections through a high-level review of:the original projections for 2020/21 against performancethe implications of the most recent global (eg International monetary fund world economic Outlook) and national economic forecasts (eg Treasury half year economic and fiscal update)The treasury updated its scenarios in its December half year fiscal and economic update (HYEFU) and these new scenarios have been used for the revised projections.Considerable uncertainty remains about the potential scale and duration of the COVID-19 downturn, for example with regards to the duration of border restrictions, update of immunisation programmes. The updated analysis provides us with additional information regarding which sectors and parts of the country are likely to be most impacted. We continue to monitor the situation and keep up to date with other cross-Government scenario development and COVID-19 related work. The updated modelling has produced employment forecasts for each region and district over three time periods - 2022, 2025, 2031.The 2022 forecasts carry greater certainty as they reflect the impacts of current events. The 2025 and 2031 forecasts are less certain because of the potential for significant shifts over that time.

Data reuse caveats: as per license.

Additionally, please read / use this data in conjunction with the Infometrics and Martin Jenkins reports, to understand the uncertainties and assumptions involved in modelling the potential impacts of COVID-19.

COVID-19’s effect on industry and regional economic outcomes for NZ Transport Agency [PDF 620 KB]

Data quality statement: while the modelling undertaken is high quality, it represents two point-in-time analyses undertaken during a period of considerable uncertainty. This uncertainty comes from several factors relating to the COVID-19 pandemic, including:

a lack of clarity about the size of the global downturn and how quickly the international economy might recover differing views about the ability of the New Zealand economy to bounce back from the significant job losses that are occurring and how much of a structural change in the economy is required the possibility of a further wave of COVID-19 cases within New Zealand that might require a return to Alert Levels 3 or 4.

While high levels of uncertainty remain around the scale of impacts from the pandemic, particularly in coming years, the modelling is useful in indicating the direction of travel and the relative scale of impacts in different parts of the country.

Data quality caveats: as noted above, there is considerable uncertainty about the potential scale and duration of the COVID-19 downturn. Please treat the specific results of the modelling carefully, particularly in the forecasts to later years (2025, 2031), given the potential for significant shifts in New Zealand's socio-economic situation before then.

As such, please use the modelling results as a guide to the potential scale of the impacts of the downturn in different locations, rather than as a precise assessment of impacts over the coming decade.

The average weekly gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate in the OECD countries peaked during the first week of **********, when it reached a growth rate of **** percent. From ********** onwards, however, it started to decrease sharply. Between ************* and **********, the average weekly GDP growth rate in the OECD countries maintained a relatively stable level but started a gradual decrease from ********** to *************. During the first month of 2023, the GDP growth grate increased notably.

OECD based Recession Indicators for Russian Federation from the Peak through the Period preceding the Trough was 0.00000 +1 or 0 in August of 2021, according to the United States Federal Reserve. Historically, OECD based Recession Indicators for Russian Federation from the Peak through the Period preceding the Trough reached a record high of 1.00000 in March of 1995 and a record low of 0.00000 in October of 1996. Trading Economics provides the current actual value, an historical data chart and related indicators for OECD based Recession Indicators for Russian Federation from the Peak through the Period preceding the Trough - last updated from the United States Federal Reserve on July of 2025.

This is the code replication archive for the paper, "The COVID-19 Baby Bump in the United States," published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. The underlying natality microdata are restricted, so this archive contains only the code to replicate our analysis.We use natality microdata covering the universe of U.S. births for 2015-2021 and California births from 2015 through February 2023 to examine childbearing responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. We find that 60% of the 2020 decline in U.S. fertility rates was driven by sharp reductions in births to foreign-born mothers although births to this group comprised only 22% of all U.S. births in 2019. This decline started in January 2020. In contrast, the COVID-19 recession resulted in an overall “baby bump” among U.S.-born mothers which marked the first reversal in declining fertility rates since the Great Recession. Births to U.S.-born mothers fell by 31,000 in 2020 relative to a pre-pandemic trend but increased by 71,000 in 2021. The data for California suggest that U.S. births remained elevated through February 2023. The baby bump was most pronounced for first births and women under age 25, suggesting that the pandemic led some women to start families earlier. Above age 25, the baby bump was most pronounced for women ages 30-34 and women with a college education. The 2021-2022 baby bump is especially remarkable given the large declines in fertility rates that would have been projected by standard statistical models.

Using micro-data on six surveys–the Gallup World Poll 2005–2023, the U.S. Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, 1993–2022, Eurobarometer 1991–2022, the UK Covid Social Survey Panel, 2020–2022, the European Social Survey 2002–2020 and the IPSOS Happiness Survey 2018–2023 –we show individuals’ reports of subjective wellbeing in Europe declined in the Great Recession of 2008/9 and during the Covid pandemic of 2020–2021 on most measures. They also declined in four countries bordering Ukraine after the Russian invasion in 2022. However, the movements are not large and are not apparent everywhere. We also used data from the European Commission’s Business and Consumer Surveys on people’s expectations of life in general, their financial situation and the economic and employment situation in the country. All of these dropped markedly in the Great Recession and during Covid, but bounced back quickly, as did firms’ expectations of the economy and the labor market. Neither the annual data from the United Nation’s Human Development Index (HDI) nor data used in the World Happiness Report from the Gallup World Poll shifted much in response to negative shocks. The HDI has been rising in the last decade reflecting overall improvements in economic and social wellbeing, captured in part by real earnings growth, although it fell slightly after 2020 as life expectancy dipped. This secular improvement is mirrored in life satisfaction which has been rising in the last decade. However, so too have negative affect in Europe and despair in the United States.

Between February and April 2021, the weekly gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate increased sharply in the United Kingdom. After April 2021, however, it started to decrease significantly, until July 2021. In the following period, the GDP maintained a relatively stable weekly growth rate, and increased to 12.89 percent at the beginning of 2022. From January 2022 onwards, it started a gradual decrease, and reached its lowest rate during December 2022. This was followed by a period of sharp fluctuations between January and April 2023.

Inflation is generally defined as the continued increase in the average prices of goods and services in a given region. Following the extremely high global inflation experienced in the 1980s and 1990s, global inflation has been relatively stable since the turn of the millennium, usually hovering between three and five percent per year. There was a sharp increase in 2008 due to the global financial crisis now known as the Great Recession, but inflation was fairly stable throughout the 2010s, before the current inflation crisis began in 2021. Recent years Despite the economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic, the global inflation rate fell to 3.26 percent in the pandemic's first year, before rising to 4.66 percent in 2021. This increase came as the impact of supply chain delays began to take more of an effect on consumer prices, before the Russia-Ukraine war exacerbated this further. A series of compounding issues such as rising energy and food prices, fiscal instability in the wake of the pandemic, and consumer insecurity have created a new global recession, and global inflation in 2024 is estimated to have reached 5.76 percent. This is the highest annual increase in inflation since 1996. Venezuela Venezuela is the country with the highest individual inflation rate in the world, forecast at around 200 percent in 2022. While this is figure is over 100 times larger than the global average in most years, it actually marks a decrease in Venezuela's inflation rate, which had peaked at over 65,000 percent in 2018. Between 2016 and 2021, Venezuela experienced hyperinflation due to the government's excessive spending and printing of money in an attempt to curve its already-high inflation rate, and the wave of migrants that left the country resulted in one of the largest refugee crises in recent years. In addition to its economic problems, political instability and foreign sanctions pose further long-term problems for Venezuela. While hyperinflation may be coming to an end, it remains to be seen how much of an impact this will have on the economy, how living standards will change, and how many refugees may return in the coming years.