Abstract of associated article: Previous studies of the relationship between crude oil and gasoline prices have often found “rockets and feathers” behavior: a scenario where gasoline prices increase more rapidly when crude oil prices rise than they fall when crude oil prices drop. While we find this behavior in times of generally rising crude oil prices, we find the opposite to be true during times of generally falling crude oil prices, a phenomenon we call “balloons and rocks” behavior. This result was obtained by testing for parameter stability in error-correction models which were estimated for periods of significant variability in both crude oil and gasoline prices. The data used to estimate these results is unique in the literature as it is comprised of daily U.S. retail gasoline prices and daily crude oil prices. The sample was taken during the Great Recession, an exceptional period of time that saw both sharp increases and decreases in gasoline and crude oil prices.

Examining the 20-year chart of crude oil provides insights into its historical price movements and trends. This article explores the factors influencing crude oil prices, including supply and demand dynamics, geopolitical tensions, and economic indicators. It also discusses the significant shifts in the market, such as the impact of the global recession in 2008-2009 and the surge in shale oil production. However, predicting future crude oil prices remains challenging due to the complex nature of the industr

Some analysts and economists recently warned that the United States economy faces a much higher risk of recession should the price of oil rise to $100 per barrel or more. In February 2008, spot crude oil prices closed above $100 per barrel for the first time ever, and since then they have climbed even higher. Meanwhile, according to some surveys of economists, it is highly probable that a recession began in the United States in late 2007 or early 2008. Although the findings in this paper are consistent with the view that the United States economy has become much less sensitive to large changes in oil prices, a simple forecasting exercise using Hamilton's model augmented with the first principal component of 85 macroeconomic variables reveals that a permanent increase in the price of crude oil to $150 per barrel by the end of 2008 could have a significant negative effect on the growth rate of real gross domestic product in the short run. Moreover, the model also predicts that such an increase in oil prices would produce much higher overall and core inflation rates in 2009 than most policymakers expect.

Oil prices have hit a four-year low as the US-China trade war escalates, impacting global markets and leading to significant declines in crude oil and base metal prices.

Explore the yearly trends and fluctuations in crude oil prices from 2008 to 2021, influenced by global demand, geopolitics, and natural disasters. Discover how factors such as the global financial crisis, economic recession, geopolitical events, and the COVID-19 pandemic have shaped the oil market.

On April 20th, 2020, the price of West Texas Intermediate crude oil slumped into negative for the first time in history, falling to negative 37.63 U.S. dollars per barrel. The ongoing coronavirus pandemic has had a catastrophic impact on the global oil and gas industry. Declining consumer demand and high levels of production output are threatening to exceed oil storage capacities, which resulted in the lowest ever oil prices noted between April 20th and April 22nd.

For further information about the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, please visit our dedicated Fact and Figures page.

The annual price of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil is expected to reach an average of 63.58 U.S. dollars per barrel in 2025, according to an August 2025 forecast. This would be a decrease of roughly 13 U.S. dollar compared to the previous year. In the first eight months of 2025, weekly crude oil prices largely stayed below 70 U.S. dollars per barrel amid trade tariffs and an expected economic downturn. What are benchmark crudes? WTI is often used as a price reference point called a benchmark (or ”marker”) crude. This category includes Brent crude from the North Sea, Dubai Crude, as well as blends in the OPEC reference basket. WTI, Brent, and the OPEC basket have tended to trade closely, but since 2011, Brent has been selling at a higher annual spot price than WTI, largely due to increased oil production in the United States. What causes price volatility? Oil prices are historically volatile. While mostly shaped by demand and supply like all consumer goods, they may also be affected by production limits, a change in U.S. dollar value, and to an extent by market speculation. In 2022, the annual average price for WTI was close to the peak of nearly 100 U.S. dollars recorded in 2008. In the latter year, multiple factors, such as strikes in Nigeria, an oil sale stop in Venezuela, and the continuous increase in oil demand from China were partly responsible for the price surge. Higher oil prices allowed the pursuit of extraction methods previously deemed too expensive and risky, such as shale gas and tight oil production in the U.S. The widespread practice of fracturing source rocks for oil and gas extraction led to the oil glut in 2016 and made the U.S. the largest oil producer in the world.

This statistic shows the estimated breakeven oil prices for 2016 in Middle Eastern and Northern African countries, in U.S. dollars per barrel, based on imports. In that year, the breakeven oil price based on imports in Libya was some ****** U.S. dollars.

Breakeven oil prices A breakeven oil price is the price at which oil must be sold in order to recover the costs associated with its production. With the recent downturn in the global oil industry, breakeven oil prices are an important measure of an oil extractor's ability to remain profitable. Breakeven oil prices vary greatly throughout the world due to the widely differing costs associated with extracting different types of oil, the unique circumstances associated with oil extraction in different oil-producing regions, and so on.

In times of economic downturn, oil resources with higher breakeven costs are the first to be discontinued. Unconventional oil resources, such as oil sands and shale oil, are more expensive to produce than conventional oil, and therefore suffer when oil prices drop. Since the oil glut began in 2014, even conventional oil deposits that are more expensive to extract are decreasing production. This has lead to significant economic impacts in places where the economy is closely tied to oil, such as Venezuela, which has oil sands deposits in addition to conventional oil resources. While oil prices have increased slightly since a record low in January 2016, it is uncertain how long it will take for oil prices to recover more substantially, if at all.

The cotton market experienced a downturn with contract declines, as reported by Barchart.com. October contracts were hit hardest, while crude oil prices saw a slight increase and the US dollar index dropped.

Alberta’s manufacturing sector is currently in recession as a result of the dramatic drop in crude oil prices. Lower oil prices have translated into much lower selling prices of refinery products and are causing oil and gas companies to drastically lower their capital spending which translates into reduced demand for machinery and equipment produced by Alberta’s manufacturing and fabricated metals sectors.

We construct new measures of drilling productivity and find that productivity increased sixfold from the mid-2000s to early 2017. Gains in below-ground efficiency—the number of barrels produced per foot of drilled wells—have largely driven this increase in overall productivity. The large oil price declines during the Great Recession and from 2014 to 2016 also played a role. However, further large increases in productivity are unlikely absent additional improvements in technology or a subsequent large downturn in oil prices.

Proved oil reserves in the United States rose to ***** billion barrels in 2023. This was a decrease compared to the previous year, which saw reserves at 47.73 billion barrels. U.S. proved reserves more than doubled since 2010. New methods, more oil When the global recession hit in 2008, oil prices skyrocketed and the U.S. sought to produce more fuel domestically. Investors took advantage of reduced interest in the wake of the financial crisis to develop new methods to reach previously inaccessible shale gas and oil resources from deep underground. With these permeable rock formations now considered a feasible hydrocarbon source, U.S. proven oil reserves drastically increased. As extraction methods such as hydraulic fracturing took off, U.S. oil production surged. Large formations of shale and tight sandstone made Texas and New Mexico the leading producers of crude oil. Already the biggest consumer of oil worldwide, the United States now produces more oil than any other country, exceeding its own high domestic demand.

The price rate of change (ROC) in Western European countries* across various time periods in the late twentieth century fluctuate greatly. In the 13 years between 1960 and 1973, the average price of items increased by just 4.6 percent, compared to an increase of 12.4 percent in the seven years between 1973 and 1980. This spike came as a result of the recession of 1973-1975 and the oil shock of 1979, as conflict in the Middle East led to significant rises in oil prices in Western Europe, whose economies had become increasingly dependent on foreign oil imports to sustain industrial production. Further conflicts in the region led to additional recessions in the west in the early 1980s, and price ROC in Western Europe remained relatively high at 8.8 percent in the first half of the decade. A series of domestic and international policy changes helped to stabilize inflation across Western Europe in the second half of the decade, and the price ROC dropped to just 4.1 percent over these five years.

"Before discussing basic research needs in UCG , we need to address a still more fundamental question. Does the nation need a synfuel industry? The technical community in the energy field seems to agree almost universally that the nation does need such an industry. The prevailing opinion is that the United States is currently living in a ""fool's paradise."" Oil prices have dropped recently by as much a5 25% which is small compared to the 12 to 15 fold increase in cost since 1973 . A world wide recession has produced a small surplus in the oil export market, but that recession resulted in part from the rapid rise in the cost of energy. Economic recovery will quickly dry up the oil surplus. In the meantime, three separate , simultaneous wars in the Middle- East underline the precarious political balance in that area which produces about 50% of the exported oil. In essence, current conditions have given us only little extra time to complete the mammoth undertaking of developing available syn fuels industry. A second question: Even if synfuels are needed, does the nation need an UCG industry? UCG probably offers economic and some environmental advantages. UCG may be the only viable method for recovering coal energy from thick deep lying coal seams. But, for the near future, one advantage probably overrides all others. In times of national emergency, UCG can be developed more rapidly than any other synfuel industry. This fact may be important should the "" fool's paradise"" end too swiftly."

{"Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Western countries have signed several agreements on using hydrocarbon resources in the Caspian basin, aiming to diversify their energy suppliers. On the other hand, recession in the world economy and persistently low oil prices deeply affected economies of the Caspian states, whose Gross Domestic Product and exports are dominated by oil and oil products. Strongly dependent on export revenues from oil and gas, the economic growth of the Caspian states slowed, beginning from 2014. Although limited energy resources mainly lead to focus on security of supply that is fundamentally understood as a continuity and a low risk of interruption of energy import flows, low oil prices have reminded the challenge of security of demand that energy producing economies may face in terms of stable energy export revenues. However, geopolitical developments in the world, especially local armed conflicts show the importance of secure routes as they present a threat for energy transportation. Using the indicator-based approach and country-level data over the period 2000-2017, this chapter assesses the security of demand for oil and gas of three countries from the Caspian region: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan over 16 years period, capturing geopolitical situation and contribute to broaden understanding of the impact of geopolitical situation in energy-transporting countries on energy transportation to the EU. The results demonstrate that risk of energy security of demand is greater when political risk in energy-transporting countries is included in a measure of energy security of demand, i.e. Risky External Energy Demand. The sharp decline of Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism Index in Ukraine and Turkey increased the risk of security of energy demand in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The results highlight the necessity for cooperation not only between the EU and the Caspian region, but also with energy-transporting countries, e.g. Ukrain, Georgia and Turkey or finding alternative routes bypassing countries with low political stability, e.g. through Trans-Caspian pipeline. Source(s): UN COMTRADE, World Bank dataset, Author’s own calculations Resource Language: English Geographic coverage: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan Data period: 2000-2017 Frequency: Annual"}

In 2023, U.S. wind power capacity additions reached approximately seven gigawatts, a decrease from the previous year, which registered nine gigawatts. The share of renewable energy sources in the U.S. has seen an increase in the last years. In 2023, renewables accounted for almost 3 percent of the country's electricity generation. Energy after recession When crude oil prices increased during the financial crisis, investors began to consider how to make other sources more cost-effective. Post-Recession investments included clean energy, but also largely focused on developing new methods to extract more fossil fuels such as natural gas. In general, fossil fuel subsidies worldwide have increased for oil and natural gas from 2010 to 2012 and from 2016 to 2018. International investments in clean energy U.S. investment in clean energy drastically increased from 2004 to around the time of the financial crisis, and then grew at a slower and more variable rate. In 2022, renewable energy investments registered record values. In 2019, the United States ranked second worldwide in terms of new investment in renewable energy. In that year, China invested much more into renewables than the United States. Other countries, such as Japan, India, and Brazil also had notable clean energy investments.

Stagflation (stagnation and inflation in one word) depicts a time period when an economy is not only suffering from a recession (declining GDP), but high unemployment and inflation rates as well. Usually unemployment and inflation are inversely related, which makes stagflation a rare occurrence. It first happened in the 1970s, when OPEC put an oil embargo on the United States, resulting in oil prices skyrocketing to three times the standard value at that time. As of September 2023, the price of oil fell by 20 percent in comparison to last year after having increased by 76 perent as a result of Russian invasion of Ukraine. The has been signs of stagflation in some countries through 2022 and 2023, but falling inflation rates indicate that the worst has been avoided.

The Water Freight Transport industry has grown over the past five years, but revenue volatility has been very high. The industry experienced strong revenue growth over the two years through 2022-23, due to a recovery in activity following a slump in 2020-21 at the start of the pandemic. Rising fuel prices over the two years through 2022-23, caused by the onset of the Russia-Ukraine conflict allowed shipping companies to increase fuel surcharges, boosting revenue. Meanwhile, disruptions to global supply chains increased demand and pricing power of domestic shipping companies, further increasing revenue and supporting a surge in margins. However, over the three years through 2025-26, the industry has faced declines with falling world crude oil prices leading to declining fuel surcharges, normalising global supply chains limiting pricing power, weakening economic conditions reducing freight volumes and fleet breakdowns and ageing and retiring vessels disrupting coastal shipping and ferry activity. Overall, industry revenue is expected to grow by an annualised 6.8% over the five years through 2025-26, including a 5.2% slump in the current year. The industry has faced significant turmoil over the last five years. The second-largest player, KiwiRail, has had multiple major breakdowns of its ferries and was forced to retire its Aratere ferry, the only rail ferry in New Zealand, in mid-2025 due to mounting maintenance costs and decaying infrastructure. The change in government in 2023 saw the scrapping of coastal shipping funding for the expansion of domestic New Zealand fleets, and a new funding plan for landside infrastructure funding for Cook Strait ferries. Shifts in government funding policies have caused delays and disruptions to the expansion of the New Zealand shipping fleet and upgrades of ageing landside infrastructure. The industry is expected to return to sluggish growth over the next five years, following revenue declines over the three years through 2025-26. Growth is expected to be supported by the recovery of the New Zealand economy, following a recession in mid- to late-2024. Slow growth in oil prices is also expected to increase fuel surcharges slightly. However, margins are expected to remain low amid rising maintenance costs from an ageing fleet. Industry revenue is expected to grow at an annualised 1.0% over the five years through 2030-31.

The commercial trade in wild meat is booming in Central Africa. Addressing this issue is a global priority because the trade poses a major threat to biodiversity and human health. We investigated the impact of socioeconomic factors, public health emergencies, and conservation efforts on the wild meat trade using daily surveys of wild meat markets on Bioko Island, Equatorial Guinea (EG), from 1997 through 2021. Bioko is an ideal location for examining how external factors impact the wild meat market trade. Although small, the island has large areas of intact forest that host populations of commercially valuable wildlife; low-cost protein substitutes are available; and Malabo, the island’s only large metropolitan area and wild meat trading hub, hosts a wealthy class of urbanites. We found significant associations between global market trends and the wild meat trade, especially China’s foreign investment and oil production in the US and EG. Economic crises like EG’s 2009 economic downturn that followed a global crash in oil prices and reduced production, redirected demand towards cheaper mainland wildlife carcasses amid reduced consumer demand. Public health emergencies had the most comprehensive impact on the wild meat trade. The 2014 Ebola outbreak and the COVID-19 pandemic both induced shifts in market demand, and the COVID-19 pandemic disrupted trade routes, affecting both urban and rural markets. Internally, we observed market decentralization over the last decade and changes in wildlife supply chains during public health emergencies. Conservation policies, including anti-poaching measures and educational outreach, temporarily influenced wildlife market trends, sometimes leading to trading surges in endangered primate carcasses. Our study highlights the importance of monitoring global market trends, public health campaigns, and adapting conservation strategies to disrupt wildlife supply chains and curb consumer demand for wild meat.

The Middle East produces more oil than any other region in the world, accounting for slightly less than ******* of global oil production in 2024, at **** percent. Overall, Middle Eastern oil production makes up a slightly larger share of global production than it did ten years ago, but the contribution to worldwide oil production has risen most consistently in North America while declining in all other regions. Shifts in North American oil production Over the past decade, higher oil production in North America has largely been driven by the United States. In the last ten years, oil production in the United States has more than doubled, with its annual output only mildly affected by the coronavirus pandemic. Meanwhile, Canada's crude oil production has also increased in the period, although in a less consistent manner. The U.S. moves towards less dependency Oil prices from OPEC countries, many of which are in the Middle East, had been rising in the years leading up to the global recession, reaching a peak in 2012. As a result, the United States decreased oil imports, and investors capitalized on lower interest rates to develop technologies such as hydraulic fracturing (fracking) that would allow domestic oil extraction from wells deep underground that were once too hard to reach. In 2019, before oil demand was affected by the pandemic, the North American country's imports dipped below *** million barrels, a ** percent drop in comparison to a decade earlier.