The Great Depression of the early twentieth century is widely considered the most devastating economic downturn that the developed world has ever seen. Industrial output was severely affected across Europe, and in Germany alone, it fell to just 58 percent of its pre-Depression level by 1932. Other Central European countries, such as Austria and Czechoslovakia, also saw their output fall to just sixty percent of their pre-Depression levels, while output in Western and Northern Europe declined by much less. By 1937/8, almost a decade after the Wall Street Crash, most of these countries saw their industrial output increase above its pre-Depression level. Germany saw its output increase to 132 percent of its 1928 output, as it emerged as Europe's strongest economy shortly before the beginning of the Second World War.

This contains data and programs used for "Recovery from the Great Depression: The Farm Channel in Spring 1933." Underlying data come from ICPSR studies 1,7,2896, and 35206. For further information, see the paper and the data and programs posted on the American Economic Review's website.

During the Great Depression in the United States in 1930s, the federal government's share of relief spending in major cities changed drastically following the inauguration of Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933. The previous administration of President Herbert Hoover oversaw the beginning of the depression in 1930, however federal spending on relief was virtually non-existent until his final year in office, and the share of overall relief spending was just two percent in 1932.

With Roosevelt's New Deal, the U.S. government established various agencies and programs that provided relief for its citizens. This included the introduction of social security systems, as well as the creation of public works programs which created government jobs in areas such as construction and infrastructure. In later years, economic recovery also allowed for the expansion of these programs into areas such as disability benefits, and per capita relief spending more than doubled from 1933 to 1936.

This contains the dataset of the 1936 household consumption survey and 1930 census data used in "Fiscal Policy and Economic Recovery: The Case of the 1936 Veterans' Bonus." The underlying household survey data come from ICPSR study 08908. The Census data come from the IPUMS 5% sample from the 1930 Census. The primary data file is urban_lprob.dta. urban_nodups.dta contains a subset of these data for programming convenience. For further documentation, see the paper, and the data and program files posted on the American Economic Review's website.

ABSTRACT By contrasting the Great Depression and the Coronacrisis, we demonstrate that narrative economics (Shiller, 2017) is key in the analysis of economic fluctuations. We note the importance of the populist narrative to understand the economic and health outcomes of the Coronacrisis in Mexico and highlight the role of the predominance of different economic paradigms in economic policy decision-making. We suggest that, just as in 1929, by following orthodox primary fiscal balance sheet policies at the cost of contracting government investment, the Mexican economy will undergo a long and painful recovery process compared to its global peers.

We evaluate the Friedman-Schwartz hypothesis that a more accommodative monetary policy could have greatly reduced the severity of the Great Depression. To do this, we first estimate a dynamic, general equilibrium model using data from the 1920s and 1930s. Although the model includes eight shocks, the story it tells about the Great Depression turns out to be a simple and familiar one. The contraction phase was primarily a consequence of a shock that induced a shift away from privately intermediated liabilities, such as demand deposits and liabilities that resemble equity, and towards currency. The slowness of the recovery from the Depression was due to a shock that increased the market power of workers. We identify a monetary base rule which responds only to the money demand shocks in the model. We solve the model with this counterfactual monetary policy rule. We then simulate the dynamic response of this model to all the estimated shocks. Based on the model analysis, we conclude that if the counterfactual policy rule had been in place in the 1930s, the Great Depression would have been relatively mild.

The map shows that the metro regions in the United States and Europe took the brunt of the economic downtown, while those in Asia and other developing countries weathered the storm in much better shape.

The statistic shows the change in employment in the United States for men and women during the time of recovery from the recent recession for all economic sectors. Between ********* and ********, the number of men employed in mining and lodging increased by **** percent.

Abstract The purpose of this article is to characterize the current Brazilian economic situation and outline a prescription for its recovery. Brazil currently encapsulates the main characteristics of the depressions of the 1870s and 1930s. During these events, there was a sharp fall in output, a high unemployment rate and prolonged insufficiency of demand. Brazil faces a depression and not a transitory recession. The diagnosis and the prescription for economic recovery were elaborated from the ideas and experience of J.M. Keynes during the 1930s.

This paper uses the historical narrative record to determine whether inflation expectations shifted during the second quarter of 1933, precisely as the recovery from the Great Depression took hold. First, by examining the historical news record and the forecasts of contemporary business analysts, we show that inflation expectations increased dramatically. Second, using an event-study approach, we identify the effect of the key events that shifted inflation expectations on financial markets. Third, we gather new evidence—both quantitative and narrative—that indicates that the shift in inflation expectations played a causal role in stimulating the recovery.

Though labor market statistics are often reported and discussed at the national level, conditions can vary quite a bit across individual states. We explore differences in these conditions before and after the Great Recession using a ratio of the number of unemployed workers to job vacancies. We show that the intensity of the adverse effects of the recession and the strength of the recovery varied geographically at all points in the process. We also demonstrate that wage growth is delayed until the ratio of unemployed workers to job vacancies returns to prerecession levels.

The Long Depression was, by a large margin, the longest-lasting recession in U.S. history. It began in the U.S. with the Panic of 1873, and lasted for over five years. This depression was the largest in a series of recessions at the turn of the 20th century, which proved to be a period of overall stagnation as the U.S. financial markets failed to keep pace with industrialization and changes in monetary policy. Great Depression The Great Depression, however, is widely considered to have been the most severe recession in U.S. history. Following the Wall Street Crash in 1929, the country's economy collapsed, wages fell and a quarter of the workforce was unemployed. It would take almost four years for recovery to begin. Additionally, U.S. expansion and integration in international markets allowed the depression to become a global event, which became a major catalyst in the build up to the Second World War. Decreasing severity When comparing recessions before and after the Great Depression, they have generally become shorter and less frequent over time. Only three recessions in the latter period have lasted more than one year. Additionally, while there were 12 recessions between 1880 and 1920, there were only six recessions between 1980 and 2020. The most severe recession in recent years was the financial crisis of 2007 (known as the Great Recession), where irresponsible lending policies and lack of government regulation allowed for a property bubble to develop and become detached from the economy over time, this eventually became untenable and the bubble burst. Although the causes of both the Great Depression and Great Recession were similar in many aspects, economists have been able to use historical evidence to try and predict, prevent, or limit the impact of future recessions.

The nation’s employment took less than 2 years to recover from the pandemic-associated recession. That many metro areas in our region have yet to see the same recovery suggests that structural factors may be limiting their progress.

Data and replication files for:Buckles, Kasey, Melanie Guldi, and Lucie Schmidt. and Elizabeth L. Munnich. "The Great Recession's Baby-less Recovery: The Role of Unintended Births." Journal of Human Resources, forthcoming.

The labor force participation rate of prime-age individuals (age 25 to 54) in the United States declined dramatically during and after the Great Recession. While the rate remains below its pre-recession level, it has been increasing steadily since 2015. We examine how different demographic groups have contributed to this rebound and find that college-educated women have made the largest contribution to the recent recovery in the prime-age labor force participation rate.

Over the course of their first terms in office, no U.S. president in the past 100 years saw as much of a decline in stock prices as Herbert Hoover, and none saw as much of an increase as Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) - these were the two presidents in office during the Great Depression. While Hoover is not generally considered to have caused the Wall Street Crash in 1929, less than a year into his term in office, he is viewed as having contributed to its fall, and exacerbating the economic collapse that followed. In contrast, Roosevelt is viewed as overseeing the economic recovery and restoring faith in the stock market played an important role in this.

By the end of Hoover's time in office, stock prices were 82 percent lower than when he entered the White House, whereas prices had risen by 237 percent by the end of Roosevelt's first term. While this is the largest price gain of any president within just one term, it is important to note that stock prices were valued at 317 on the Dow Jones index when Hoover took office, but just 51 when FDR took office four years later - stock prices had peaked in August 1929 at 380 on the Dow Jones index, but the highest they ever reached under FDR was 187, and it was not until late 1954 that they reached pre-Crash levels once more.

Contains data and code used in analyses.

The non-durable materials market took almost three and a half years to recover its performance levels from the effects caused by the great recession (between 2007 and 2009). Other industries, such as construction, and metals and mining, have still not returned to their pre-recession peak performances (as of May 2020).

In a survey conducted in September 2020, regarding consumer perception surrounding the economic recovery after coronavirus (COVID-19) in India, ** percent of the respondents are positive that the economy will bounce back to pre-COVID levels in the next few months. Majority of the respondents disagree that COVID-19 would cause a significant recession or a major economic depression.

In this Commentary, we show that realized wage growth since 2015 has mostly been at a rate that would be expected given observed rates of inflation and labor productivity growth. Moreover, labor productivity growth has been in line with its potential over the same period. This picture of the post-recession recovery of wages is very different from the one we observed in an earlier analysis, when all we had were data up through the end of 2015. The reasons underlying the difference are large revisions in labor productivity data and upticks in the inflation rate and labor productivity growth since our last report.