Poland's inflation rate has shown significant fluctuations recently, with the country experiencing both periods of high inflation and deflation. In April 2025, consumer prices increased by 4.3 percent compared to the previous year, marking a notable decline from the peak of 18.4 percent recorded in February 2023. Food and beverage prices drive inflation Food and non-alcoholic beverages have contributed to Poland's inflation, with prices in this category reaching a staggering 24.2 percent increase in March 2023. Although the rate has since decreased, it remained at 4.5 percent in September 2024, indicating ongoing pressure on consumer budgets. Similarly, alcoholic beverages experienced significant price hikes, peaking at 14.2 percent in March 2023 before settling at 6.4 percent in February 2024. These persistent increases in essential goods have substantially impacted the overall inflation rate. Varied impact across sectors While food and beverages have seen consistent price increases, other sectors have experienced more volatile trends. Clothing and footwear, for instance, went through a period of deflation from January 2019 to April 2021, with prices declining by as much as four percent in May 2020. However, this sector also saw a sharp reversal, with inflation peaking at 7.8 percent in March 2023. Liquid fuel prices demonstrated even more dramatic swings, soaring to an astonishing 108.3 percent increase in June 2022. As of January 2025, housing-related costs, including utilities, have emerged as the leading inflationary force, rising by nearly nine percent year-over-year and significantly influencing the overall inflation rate.

A 2022 survey revealed that even in times of inflation, most U.S. online shoppers have returned about the same proportion of purchases as before the current inflationary environment. Still, more than two in ten respondents in the two youngest age groups reported returning a higher percentage of online purchases due to economic pressure.

This statistic shows the average inflation rate in Malaysia from 1987 to 2024, with projections up to 2030. In 2024, the average inflation rate in Malaysia amounted to about 1.83 percent compared to the previous year. Malaysia's economy is slowly recovering The inflation rate is the annual rate of increase of a price index, normally the consumer price index over time. If the same item bought today for 1 U.S. dollar is bought again one year from now, but for 1.03 U.S. dollars, then the inflation rate is at 3 percent. Generally, a low inflation rate is sought by every country, and a rate of 3 percent, as is estimated for Malaysia in the next few years, is considered low. However, there was a slight rise in Malaysia’s inflation rate, from close to 2 percent in 2010 to a little over 3 percent in 2011. In 2012, it dropped back down to its normal rate, but future estimates predict a slight increase once again. Perhaps this increase has come from initial worries concerning the country’s slowing economy as the country’s GDP growth slowed from 7.43 percent in 2010 to 5.19 percent in 2011, or its negative budget balance in relation to GDP which was at its recent worst in 2010 at -4.66 percent. At the same time, the country’s national debt was also rising, but predictions show that this trend is reversing. Yet, the economic outlook and inflation rate still appear stable for the future of Malaysia, and the inflation rate is below the global inflation rate. Furthermore, the country’s GDP continues to rise and totaled 326.93 billion U.S. dollars in 2013.

No description was included in this Dataset collected from the OSF

Inflation Rate in Indonesia decreased to 1.60 percent in May from 1.95 percent in April of 2025. This dataset provides - Indonesia Inflation Rate - actual values, historical data, forecast, chart, statistics, economic calendar and news.

The Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland provides daily “nowcasts” of inflation for two popular price indexes, the price index for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) and the Consumer Price Index (CPI). These nowcasts give a sense of where inflation is today. Released each business day.

Inflation Rate in China remained unchanged at -0.10 percent in May. This dataset provides - China Inflation Rate - actual values, historical data, forecast, chart, statistics, economic calendar and news.

This paper seeks to address the policy issue of the usefulness of financial spreads as indicators of future inflation and output growth in the countries of the European Union, placing a particular focus on out-of-sample forecasting performance. Such analysis is of considerable relevance to monetary authorities, given the breakdown of the money/income relation in a number of countries and following increased emphasis of domestic monetary policy on control of inflation following the broadening of the ERM bands. The results confirm that for some countries, financial spread variables do contain some information about future output growth and inflation, with the yield curve and the reverse yield gap performing best. However, the relatively poor out-of-sample forecasting performance and/or parameter instability suggests that the need for caution in using spread variables for forecasting in EU countries. Only a small number of spreads contain information, and improve forecasting in a manner which is stable over time.

The monthly inflation rate of Nicaragua decreased considerably between February 2020 and November of that same year, when this negative trend was reversed. By October 2022 the inflation rate reached the highest point of the period under consideration, 12.16 percent. The following month the year-over-year inflation rate fell slightly, as compared to November 2021, the consumer price index (CPI) grew 11.38 percentage points.

The Consumer Price Index in Switzerland increased 0.10 percent in May of 2025 over the previous month. This dataset provides - Switzerland Inflation Rate MoM - actual values, historical data, forecast, chart, statistics, economic calendar and news.

This dataset contains replication files for "The Fading American Dream: Trends in Absolute Income Mobility Since 1940" by Raj Chetty, David Grusky, Maximilian Hell, Nathaniel Hendren, Robert Manduca, and Jimmy Narang. For more information, see https://opportunityinsights.org/paper/the-fading-american-dream/. A summary of the related publication follows. One of the defining features of the “American Dream” is the ideal that children have a higher standard of living than their parents. We assess whether the U.S. is living up to this ideal by estimating rates of “absolute income mobility” – the fraction of children who earn more than their parents – since 1940. We measure absolute mobility by comparing children’s household incomes at age 30 (adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index) with their parents’ household incomes at age 30. We find that rates of absolute mobility have fallen from approximately 90% for children born in 1940 to 50% for children born in the 1980s. Absolute income mobility has fallen across the entire income distribution, with the largest declines for families in the middle class. These findings are unaffected by using alternative price indices to adjust for inflation, accounting for taxes and transfers, measuring income at later ages, and adjusting for changes in household size. Absolute mobility fell in all 50 states, although the rate of decline varied, with the largest declines concentrated in states in the industrial Midwest, such as Michigan and Illinois. The decline in absolute mobility is especially steep – from 95% for children born in 1940 to 41% for children born in 1984 – when we compare the sons’ earnings to their fathers’ earnings. Why have rates of upward income mobility fallen so sharply over the past half-century? There have been two important trends that have affected the incomes of children born in the 1980s relative to those born in the 1940s and 1950s: lower Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates and greater inequality in the distribution of growth. We find that most of the decline in absolute mobility is driven by the more unequal distribution of economic growth rather than the slowdown in aggregate growth rates. When we simulate an economy that restores GDP growth to the levels experienced in the 1940s and 1950s but distributes that growth across income groups as it is distributed today, absolute mobility only increases to 62%. In contrast, maintaining GDP at its current level but distributing it more broadly across income groups – at it was distributed for children born in the 1940s – would increase absolute mobility to 80%, thereby reversing more than two-thirds of the decline in absolute mobility. These findings show that higher growth rates alone are insufficient to restore absolute mobility to the levels experienced in mid-century America. Under the current distribution of GDP, we would need real GDP growth rates above 6% per year to return to rates of absolute mobility in the 1940s. Intuitively, because a large fraction of GDP goes to a small fraction of high-income households today, higher GDP growth does not substantially increase the number of children who earn more than their parents. Of course, this does not mean that GDP growth does not matter: changing the distribution of growth naturally has smaller effects on absolute mobility when there is very little growth to be distributed. The key point is that increasing absolute mobility substantially would require more broad-based economic growth. We conclude that absolute mobility has declined sharply in America over the past half-century primarily because of the growth in inequality. If one wants to revive the “American Dream” of high rates of absolute mobility, one must have an interest in growth that is shared more broadly across the income distribution.

Inflation Rate in Nigeria decreased to 23.71 percent in April from 24.23 percent in March of 2025. This dataset provides - Nigeria Inflation Rate - actual values, historical data, forecast, chart, statistics, economic calendar and news.

This paper considers the application of long-memory processes to describing inflation for ten countries. We implement a new procedure to obtain approximate maximum likelihood estimates of an ARFIMA-GARCH process; which is fractionally integrated I(d) with a superimposed stationary ARMA component in its conditional mean. Additionally, this long memory process is allowed to have GARCH type conditional heteroscedasticity. On analysing monthly post-World War II CPI inflation for ten different countries, we find strong evidence of long memory with mean reverting behaviour for all countries except Japan, which appears stationary. For three high inflation economies there is evidence that the mean and volatility of inflation interact in a way that is consistent with the Friedman hypothesis.

We study the impact of targeted price controls on supermarket products in Argentina between 2007 and 2015. Using web-scraping methods, we collected daily prices for controlled and non-controlled goods and examined the differential effects of the policy on inflation, product availability, entry and exit, and price dispersion. We first show that price controls have only a small and temporary effect on inflation that reverses itself as soon as the controls are lifted. Second, contrary to common beliefs, we find that controlled goods are consistently available for sale. Third, firms compensate for price controls by introducing new product varieties at higher prices, thereby increasing price dispersion within narrow categories. Overall, our results show that targeted price controls are just as ineffective as more traditional forms of price controls in reducing aggregate inflation.

The statistic shows the inflation rate in Spain from 1987 to 2024, with projections up until 2030. The inflation rate is calculated using the price increase of a defined product basket. This product basket contains products and services, on which the average consumer spends money throughout the year. They include expenses for groceries, clothes, rent, power, telecommunications, recreational activities and raw materials (e.g. gas, oil), as well as federal fees and taxes. In 2023, the average inflation rate in Spain increased by about 3.4 percent compared to the previous year. Inflation in Spain As explained briefly above, inflation is commonly defined as the level of prices for goods and services in a country’s economy over a certain time span. It increases when the total money supply of a country increases, causing the money’s value to decrease, and prices to increase again in turn. Nowadays the term “inflation” is used more or less synonymously with “price level increase”. Its opposite is deflation, which, in short, means a decrease of the price level. Spain and its economy have been severely affected by the financial crisis of 2008 (as can be seen above), when the real estate bubble imploded and caused the demand for goods and services to decrease and the unemployment rate in Spain to increase dramatically. Even though deflation only occurred for one year in 2009 and the price level has been increasing since, Spain’s economy still has a long way to go until full recovery. Apart from the inflation rate and the unemployment rate, gross domestic product / GDP growth in Spain and the trade balance of goods in Spain, i.e. the exports of goods minus the imports, are additional indicators of Spain’s desolate condition during the economic crisis and its slow and difficult recovery ever since. Still, there is a silver lining for Spain’s economy. All in all, things seems to be improving economically, albeit slowly; many key indicators are starting to stabilize or even pick up again, while others still have some recovering to do.

Uruguay's monthly inflation rate decreased significantly between May 2020 and May 2021, after which this negative trend reversed and increased until September 2022, when it reached 9.95 percent. In August 2024, the inflation rate was 5.57 percent.

In December 2023, the reverse repo rate for Bank Indonesia was six percent, the highest rate it had been since October 2016. Due to anticipation of inflation, this increase was made to strengthen the framework for monetary operations.

Datafiles for the manuscript "Ring Fault Slip Reversal at Bárðarbunga Volcano, Iceland: Seismicity during Caldera Collapse and Re-Inflation 2014-2018" by Glastonbury-Southern, E., Winder, T., White, R.S., and Brandsdóttir, B., submitted for publication in Geophysical Research Letters.

This includes cut waveform data in miniseed format from stations operated by the University of Cambridge for the 30 earthquakes included in the study, as listed in Table S1.

We investigate the pass-through of a temporary value-added tax (VAT) cut on selected food products to consumer prices in Portugal. Exploiting a novel data set of daily online prices, we find that the VAT cut was fully transmitted to consumer prices, persisted throughout the policy duration, and prices returned to the pre-implementation trend after reversal. We discuss two potential mechanisms driving this result: the policy's salience to consumers in a high-inflation environment and the decline of producer prices when implemented. We estimate that the policy reduced the inflation rate by 0.68 percentage points on impact.

Reduced-form VAR results of developed countries.