How many soldiers does Russia have? The Russian Armed Forces had 3.57 million troops as of 2025, with 37 percent of them, or 1.32 million, being active military personnel. Two million were reserve service members, and 250,000 were paramilitary forces. The number of people in the Russian military was increased twice after the invasion of Ukraine; the respective presidential decrees came into force in January and December 2023. Largest armies worldwide The Russian Army had the fourth-largest available active military manpower in 2025, having shared that rank with North Korea. The militaries of China, India, and the United States had more active soldiers. In terms of defense spending, Russia ranked third after the U.S. and China. Military personnel of Ukraine and NATO Russia’s active troops outnumbered Ukraine’s by 420,000 as of 2025. Furthermore, reserve and paramilitary forces of Russia were higher. When comparing Russia’s active military personnel to that of the countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), it was roughly 2.6 times smaller. In total, NATO members were estimated to over 3.4 million troops, including active, reserve, and paramilitary units. The U.S., Turkey, and Poland have the largest armies in NATO.

Russia military size for 2020 was 1,454,000, a 0% increase from 2019.

<ul style='margin-top:20px;'>

<li>Russia military size for 2019 was <strong>1,454,000</strong>, a <strong>0% increase</strong> from 2018.</li>
<li>Russia military size for 2018 was <strong>1,454,000</strong>, a <strong>0% increase</strong> from 2017.</li>
<li>Russia military size for 2017 was <strong>1,454,000</strong>, a <strong>0% increase</strong> from 2016.</li>
</ul>Armed forces personnel are active duty military personnel, including paramilitary forces if the training, organization, equipment, and control suggest they may be used to support or replace regular military forces.

Russia's military capabilities outnumbered those of Ukraine for most indicators as of 2025. For example, the number of aircraft at the disposal of the Russian Army was close to 4,300, while the Ukrainian Armed Forces possessed 324 aircraft. Russia's naval fleet was 4.7 times larger than Ukraine's. Moreover, Russia was one of the nine countries that possessed nuclear weapons. As of early 2024, Russia held the world's largest inventory of nuclear warheads. How many soldiers does Ukraine have? Ukraine's Army counted approximately 2.2 million military personnel as of 2025. Of them, 900,000 were active military staff. Furthermore, 1.2 million soldiers were part of the country's reserve forces. To compare, Russia had approximately 1.32 million active military personnel and two million of reserve military personnel. Russia's active soldier count was the fourth-largest worldwide, while Ukraine's ranked sixth. Ukraine's tank strength Ukraine's Armed Forces possessed over 1,100 tanks as of 2025, which was more than five times less than Russia's. To support Ukraine during the Russian invasion, several Western countries made commitments to deliver tanks to Ukraine, including Leopard 2, Challenger 2, and M1 Abrams. Furthermore, Ukraine received other types of armored vehicles from Western countries, such as M133 armored personnel carriers from the United States and Mastiff (6x6) protected patrol vehicles from the United Kingdom.

Starting from December 1, 2024, the Russian Armed Forces would count nearly 2.4 million personnel. Of them, over 60 percent had to be on active duty. The size of the Russian Army was increased three times after the start of the war in Ukraine in February 2022.

As of 2025,the combined forces of NATO had approximately 3.44 million active military personnel, compared with 1.32 million active military personnel in the Russian military. The collective military capabilities of the 32 countries that make up NATO outnumber Russia in terms of aircraft, at 22,377 to 4,957, and in naval power, with 1,143 military ships, to 419. In terms of ground combat vehicles, NATO had an estimated 11,495 main battle tanks, to Russia's 5,750. The combined nuclear arsenal of the United States, United Kingdom, and France amounted to 5,559 nuclear warheads, compared with Russia's 5,580. NATO military spending In 2024, the combined military expenditure of NATO states amounted to approximately 1.47 trillion U.S. dollars, with the United States responsible for the majority of this spending, as the U.S. military budget amounted to 967.7 billion dollars that year. The current U.S. President, Donald Trump has frequently taken aim at other NATO allies for not spending as much on defense as America. NATO member states are expected to spend at least two percent of their GDP on defense, although the U.S. has recently pushed for an even higher target. As of 2024, the U.S. spent around 3.38 percent of its GDP on defense, the third-highest in the alliance, with Estonia just ahead on 3.43 percent, and Poland spending the highest share at 4.12 percent. US aid to Ukraine The pause in aid to Ukraine from the United States at the start of March 2025 marks a significant policy change from Ukraine's most powerful ally. Throughout the War in Ukraine, military aid from America has been crucial to the Ukrainian cause. In Trump's first term in office, America sent a high number of anti-tank Javelins, with this aid scaling up to more advanced equipment after Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022. The donation of around 40 HIMARs rocket-artillery system, for example, has proven to be one of Ukraine's most effective offensive weapons against Russia. Defensive systems such as advanced Patriot air defense units have also helped protect Ukraine from aerial assaults. Although European countries have also provided significant aid, it is unclear if they will be able to fill the hole left by America should the pause in aid goes on indefinitely.

This scatter chart displays population (people) against armed forces personnel (people) in Russia. The data is about countries per year.

Among the respondents in Russia, the lowest level of public support toward the actions of Russian military forces in Ukraine was recorded among the population aged 18 to 24 years, at around 66 percent in April 2025. In the age group of 55 years and above, that share stood at over 80 percent. Russian forces invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Overall, eight out of ten Russians supported the military actions.

This scatter chart displays male population (people) against armed forces personnel (people) in Russia. The data is about countries per year.

As of May 2025, China had the largest armed forces in the world by active duty military personnel, with about *********** active soldiers. India, the United States, North Korea, and Russia rounded out the top five largest armies. Difference between active and reserve personnel Active personnel, also known as active duty in the United States and active service in the United Kingdom, are those individuals whose full-time occupation is being part of a military force. Active duty contrasts with a military’s reserve force, which are individuals who have both a military role and a civilian career. The number of active duty forces in the U.S. is much larger than its reserve membership. What is the strongest army? The strength of a country’s armed forces is not only determined by how many personnel they maintain, but also the number and quality of their military equipment. For example, looking only at personnel does not factor in the overwhelmingly higher number of nuclear warheads owned by Russia and the United States compared to other countries. One way to answer this question is to look at the total amount of money each country spends on their military, as spending includes both personnel and technology. In terms of countries with the highest military spending, the United States leads the world with an annual budget almost ***** times larger than second-placed China.

This scatter chart displays suicide mortality rate (per 100,000 population) against armed forces personnel (people) in Russia. The data is about countries per year.

For most of the Second World War, the Soviet Union had the largest number of active military personnel each year, peaking at over 12 million people in the war's final years. The Soviet Union's ability to draw from its larger population was decisive in its eventual victory over Germany in 1945, whose eastern forces were greatly diminished by 1944 after it had already suffered heavy losses fighting the Soviets and was then forced to fight on the western front.

Each of the Great Powers had varying conscription systems in place that allowed them to draft citizens into the military. In the U.S., over 50 million men aged 18-45 would register for the draft before the war's end, and over 10 million of these were inducted into the military (alongside volunteers and those already in service). Conscription in Japan grew more aggressive as the war progressed, and its armed forces doubled in size in the final two years of the war.

Attitudes of East German young people. Topics: relation between civilian population and People's Police; military purpose of the People's Police; relation between members of the People's Police and Russian troops; attitudes to the People's Police; internal conviction of members of the People's Police; voluntariness of membership in the People's Police; flight of members of the People's Police into the west; reputation of Russian troops in the civilian population; frequency of contact between Russian troops and the German civilian population; personal acquaintance with Russian soldiers; listening to western radio stations by Russian soldiers; change of views of Russian soldiers about the West from their stay in Germany. Demography: age; occupation; education; sex; state; city.

Over the course of the Second World War, approximately 44.5 percent of the Soviet population and 8.7 of Soviet territory was occupied by the Axis forces at some point. Despite being allied in the war's early stages, with both countries invading Poland in 1939 via the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Germany would launch Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the USSR, in 1941, which would become the largest military invasion in history. Movement of the Eastern Front The surprise invasion began on June 22, and Axis forces caught the Soviets off-guard, quickly pushing their way eastward along a frontline that stretched from the Baltic to Black seas. The length of the front-line allowed Axis forces to execute pincer movements around cities and strongholds, which cut off large numbers of Soviet soldiers from their supply lines, as well as preventing reinforcements; in this process millions of Soviet troops were taken as prisoner. Within three weeks, the Germans had taken much of present-day Poland, Belarus, and the Baltic states, before taking Moldova and Ukraine in September, and pushing into western Russia between September and December. The front lines had reached the outskirts of Moscow by November, before exhaustion and cold weather helped Soviet forces hold the line and stall the German offensive. The Red Army was then able to regroup and turning the Germans' own tactics against them, using two-pronged attacks to encircle large numbers of troops, although harsh weather made this stage of the conflict much slower.

The lines remained fairly static until mid-1942, when the Germans focused their offensive on the south, concentrating on the Caucasian oil fields and the Volga River. By November 1942, Axis forces had pushed into these regions, establishing what would ultimately be the largest amount of occupied Soviet territory during the war. Once again, winter halted the Axis advance, and allowed the Red Army to regroup. Learning from the previous year, the Axis command strengthened their forces near Moscow in anticipation of the Soviet counter-offensive, but were caught off-guard by a second counter-offensive in the south, most famously at Stalingrad. The Battle of Stalingrad would come to epitomize the extreme loss, destruction, and brutality of war on the eastern front, with conflict continuing in the city months after the rest of the Axis forces had been pushed west. As 1943 progressed, the Red Army gained momentum by targeting inferiorly-trained and equipped non-German regiments. The spring then became something of a balancing act for the Axis powers, as the Soviets consistently attacked weak points, and German regiments were transferred to reinforce these areas. In the summer of 1943, the front line was static once more, however the momentum was with the Soviets, who were able to capitalize on victories such as Kursk and gradually force the Axis powers back. By 1944, the Red Army had re-captured much of Ukraine, and had re-taken the south by the summer. When the Western Allies arrived in France in June, the Soviets were already pushing through Ukraine and Belarus, towards Berlin. In August 1944, the last Axis forces were pushed out of Soviet territory, and Soviet forces continued their push towards the German capital, which fell in May 1945. Soviet death toll In addition to the near-five million Soviet troops who died during Operation Barbarossa, millions of civilians died through starvation, areal bombardment, forced labor, and systematic murder campaigns. Due to the nature and severity of Soviet losses, total figures are difficult to estimate; totals of 15-20 million civilians and 7-9 million military deaths are most common. Further estimates suggest that the disruption to fertility, in addition to the high death toll, meant that the USSR's population in 1946 was 40 million lower than it would have been had there been no war.

The Second World War had a profound impact on gender ratios within the Soviet Union's population, and its effect on different age groups varied greatly. The Soviet population structure had already been shaped heavily by the First World War, the Russian Revolution, and the famines of the early 1920s and early 1930s. The impact of these events on mortality and fertility meant that, in 1941, the generations whose births corresponded with these events had a lower population than would be expected on a typical population model. For example, in 1941, those aged between 5 and 9 had a significantly lower population than those aged 10 to 14, due to the effects of the Soviet famine of 1932-1933. Additionally, women outnumbered men in all age groups except the very youngest, due to the disproportionate effect of conflict and infant mortality on male populations. Impact of WWII In order to observe the impact of the war, one must compare populations of specific age groups in 1941 with the following age group in 1946. For men of "fighting age" in 1941, i.e. those aged between 15 and 44, these populations experience the most substantial decrease over the course of the war. For example, there are 5.6 million men aged 15-19 in 1941, but just 3.5 million aged 20-24 in 1946, giving a decrease of 38 percent. This decrease of almost forty percent can be observed until the 45-49 group, where the difference is 25 percent. Additionally, women aged between 15 and 34 saw a disproportionate decrease in their populations over this period, as many enlisted in the army and took an active part in the conflict, most notably as medics, snipers, and pilots.

The war's impact on fertility and child mortality meant that, in 1946, the total population under four years old was less than half its size in 1941. Generally, variations between age groups then fluctuated in line with pre-war patterns, however the overall ratio of women to men increased further after the war. For all age groups over 20 years, the number of men decreased between these years, whereas all women's age groups over 30 years saw an increase; this meant that, despite the war, women over 30 had a higher life expectancy in 1946.

How does authoritarian aid influence the durability of dictatorships? Western aid is thought to facilitate authoritarian durability because it can provide patronage. Authoritarian aid, by contrast, has received far less attention. This article examines both Soviet economic and military assistance, developing a theory of donor–recipient institutional complementarity to explain the impact of Soviet aid during the Cold War. The argument is developed through case studies of Vietnam and Ghana and a cross-national statistical analysis of Soviet economic aid and military assistance to developing countries from 1955 to 1991. Soviet economic aid was tied to the purchase of Soviet industrial equipment. When recipient states shared the Soviet Union's centrally planned economy, economic aid strengthened state infrastructural power by (1) enhancing fiscal capacity and (2) cultivating the dependency of the population on the state. Aid flows helped consolidate and maintain authoritarian institutions, promoting authoritarian durability. By contrast, while Soviet economic aid to noncommunist regimes provided some opportunities for patronage through employment in SOEs, the lack of institutional complementarity in planning institutions and overall lack of capacity of these institutions caused Soviet aid to contribute to inflation and fiscal crises. Economic problems, in turn, increased the vulnerability of noncommunist regimes to military coups, particularly when ideological splits emerged between pro-Soviet rulers and pro-Western militaries that undermined elite cohesion. The institutional subordination of the military to communist parties insulated communist regimes from the risk of coups.

Attitude of the population of the FRG to the military, defense policy and NATO.

Topics: Attitude to rearmament of the FRG and a professional or volunteer army; military preparedness; military knowledge; attitude to military drill and obedience; position of the FRG in NATO; attitude and relationship of the Germans to American occupying forces; reasons and evaluation of presence of American soldiers in the FRG; attitude to military service; image of the soldiers of selected countries; social distance from Americans; evaluation of Russian recommendations about reunification; evaluation of the cultural achievements of various peoples; personal participation in the world wars; relative social prestige of selected occupations; membership in a club, trade union or party; honorary activities; party preference.

Demography: age (classified); sex; religious denomination; school education; occupation; household income; head of household; state; refugee status.

Interviewer rating: social class and willingness of respondent to cooperate; number of contact attempts; city size.

Also encoded were: identification of interviewer; sex of interviewer and age of interviewer.

Since 1996, the Center for Military History and Social Sciences of the Bundeswehr (ZMSBw) has conducted a representative survey of the German population on defense and security policy issues on behalf of the Federal Ministry of Defense. In 2015, this study was continued. For this purpose, N = 2653 persons were interviewed on various issues from September 08, 2015, until October 30, 2015. The present survey focused in particular on security and threat perception, security policy attitudes, perception of the Federal Armed Forces, attitudes toward the Federal Armed Forces, Day of the Federal Armed Forces, relationship between the Federal Armed Forces and society. Perceived attractiveness of the Federal Armed Forces as an employer, tasks of the Federal Armed Forces, level of defense expenditures and number of personnel, foreign deployments of the Federal Armed Forces, awareness and evaluation of the slogan ´Wir.Dienen.Deutschland.´ (´We.Serve.Germany.´) Political interest, media use, and political participation and preferences.
1. Security and threat perception: most important political issues in Germany (open); assessment of the security situation worldwide and in the Federal Republic of Germany; personal sense of security; sense of threat from: Job loss or difficulty in finding a job, insufficient financial security in old age, worldwide climate change due to global warming, major natural disasters, war in Europe, terrorist attacks in Germany, worldwide spread of a dangerous disease or epidemic, xenophobia in Germany, religious fundamentalism in Germany, immigration to Germany, rising prices, crime in personal environment, malfunction in a nuclear power plant, tensions between the West and Russia.

1. Security policy attitudes: increase vs. decrease in Germany´s responsibility at the international level; preference for an active vs. Germany´s passive international policy (split); reasons for Germany´s active role in addressing problems in other countries and regions; reasons why Germany should keep out of it if possible; approval of various instruments of German foreign and security policy (development aid, taking in refugees, diplomatic negotiations, economic sanctions, military cooperation, arms deliveries befriended states, Federal Armed Forces missions, police missions); Importance of various cooperations for German foreign and security policy (Germany´s membership in NATO, the United Nations (UN, UNO), the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), cooperation with the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, and Poland).

2. Perception of the Federal Armed Forces: associations with the Federal Armed Forces (open); perception of media coverage of the Federal Armed Forces in general; agreement on the strong influence of media coverage on the image of the Federal Armed Forces among the respondent himself, among people in his circle of friends and family, and among the general population (split).

3. Attitudes toward the Federal Armed Forces: personal attitudes toward the Federal Armed Forces; importance of the Federal Armed Forces to Germany; prestige of the Federal Armed Forces among the respondent; prestige of the Federal Armed Forces among most people in Germany; degree of appreciation by the respondent and in Germany in general for the service of the soldiers; evaluation of the Federal Armed Forces in terms of: Their performance at home and abroad, equipment and armament, integration of the Federal Armed Forces into society, public appearance, and the training of soldiers; institutional trust (public schools, the German Parliament (Bundestag), public pension insurance, political parties, the Federal Employment Agency, trade unions, the Federal Constitutional Court, public health insurance, the Federal Armed Forces, the police, the Protestant Church, the Catholic Church, the Federal Criminal Police Office, the Federal Intelligence Service, the German government, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution); reasons for trust or for lack of trust in the Federal Armed Forces (open); perception of the Federal Armed Forces in the past 12 months on the following occasions: in everyday life, at public events, conversations with friends, relatives or colleagues, on TV or radio broadcasts, articles on the Internet and reports in newspapers and magazines; personal impression of the Federal Armed Forces on the respective occasions.

4. Federal Armed Forces Day: relationship between the Federal Armed Forces and society: Perception of Federal Armed Forces Day; participation in Federal Armed Forces Day this year; enjoyment of the event; advocacy of Federal Armed Forces Day; sufficient efforts by the Federal Armed Forces to stay in touch with society; events that should be held more frequently in public (public pledge, reception of soldiers returning from a foreign deployment, public promotions of soldiers, taps); Participation in these events as visitors;...

Russia had the most powerful military in Europe according to its PowerIndex score of ****, which compares the strength and capability of different countries. According to this ranking, as of 2025, the UK had the second-strongest military in Europe, followed by France and then Turkey.

Over the course of the Second World War approximately 127.2 million people were mobilized. The world's population in 1940 was roughly 2.3 billion, meaning that between five and six percent of the world was drafted into the military in some capacity. Approximately one in every 25 people mobilized were women, who generally served in an administrative or medical role, although hundreds of thousands of women did see active combat. Largest armies In absolute numbers, the Soviet Union mobilized the largest number of people at just under 34.5 million, and this included roughly 35 percent of the USSR's male population. By the war's end, more Soviets were mobilized than all European Axis powers combined. However, in relative terms, it was Germany who mobilized the largest share of its male population, with approximately 42 percent of men serving. The USSR was forced to find a balance between reinforcing its frontlines and maintaining agricultural and military production to supply its army (in addition to those in annexed territory after 1941), whereas a large share of soldiers taken from the German workforce were replaced by workers drafted or forcibly taken from other countries (including concentration camp prisoners and PoWs). Studying the figures The figures given in these statistics are a very simplified and rounded overview - in reality, there were many nuances in the number of people who were effectively mobilized for each country, their roles, and their status as auxiliary, collaborative, or resistance forces. The British Empire is the only power where distinctions are made between the metropole and its colonies or territories, whereas breakdowns of those who fought in other parts of Asia or Africa remains unclear. Additionally, when comparing this data with total fatalities, it is important to account for the civilian death toll, i.e. those who were not mobilized.

During the Second World War, the three Axis powers of Germany, Italy, and Finland mobilized the largest share of their male population. For the Allies, the Soviet Union mobilized the largest share of men, as well as the largest total army of any country, but it was restricted in its ability to mobilize more due to the impact this would have on its economy. Other notable statistics come from the British Empire, where a larger share of men were drafted from Dominions than from the metropole, and there is also a discrepancy between the share of the black and white populations from South Africa.

However, it should be noted that there were many external factors from the war that influenced these figures. For example, gender ratios among the adult populations of many European countries was already skewed due to previous conflicts of the 20th century (namely WWI and the Russian Revolution), whereas the share of the male population eligible to fight in many Asian and African countries was lower than more demographically developed societies, as high child mortality rates meant that the average age of the population was much lower.