Russia 10Y Bond Yield was 15.01 percent on Wednesday March 26, according to over-the-counter interbank yield quotes for this government bond maturity. Russia 10-Year Government Bond Yield - values, historical data, forecasts and news - updated on March of 2025.

Government debt as a share of gross domestic product has risen for almost all of Europe's largest economies since the mid-20th century. While until the 1970s it was common for European countries to have debt levels of less than 20 percent of their GDP, with the onset of economic crises related to international financial instability and oil price shocks, the long-term slowdown of economic growth in Europe, and the substantial public spending burdens which states had incurred due to the expansion of welfare and social services, European governments began to amass significant amounts of debt.

Which European countries are the most indebted? Italy stands out as the country in Europe which has experienced the largest secular increase in its government debt level, with the southern European country having debt worth 1.4 times its GDP in 2022. Spain, the United Kingdom, and France have also experienced long-run increase in their debt levels to between 90 and 100 percent in 2022. Germany and Turkey, on the other hand, have experienced more gradual increases in their public debt, with both countries having debt worth less than half their GDP. Russia stands as an outlier, due to the fact that its debt level has fallen dramatically since the 1990s. After the eastern European country's transition from communism and particularly after the financial crisis it experienced in 1998, the Russian state has severely cut back on public expenditure, while also having little need to borrow due to the state ownership of the country's vast natural resources.

Euroscepticism, the political position which opposes European integration or proposes leaving the EU, peaked in the early 2010s during the period of the Eurozone crisis. Approval of the EU had been stable at a relatively high level in the 2000s, with around half of respondents having a positive image of the Union, before sharply dropping from 2010 onwards to under a third of respondents. In spite of the spike in negative attitudes towards the EU, the total share of respondents with a negative outlook never exceeded the share of those with a positive one. By 2020, disapproval of the EU was back down to below twenty percent, and has fallen further since. The share of respondents with a positive image of the bloc has risen back to pre-financial crisis levels, signifying a remarkable turnaround in the public image of the EU. Whether this reflects a secular trend, or is the result of the external shocks of Covid-19 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which have both forced the member states of the union to cooperate on further integration measures, is yet to be seen. The Eurozone Crisis and the rise of euroscepticism Euroscepticism in the 2010s was driven by a succession of crises in both the economic and political spheres, which were latched onto by populists of both the far-left and far-right. The Eurozone crisis was triggered in 2010 by financial market pressure on the heavily indebted countries on the EU's periphery who were also member of the Euro currency area (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, among others). The economies of these member states had suffered greatly during the global financial crisis and great recession, with the collapse of their housing markets and failure of their banking systems meaning that their governments had to take on increasing debt burdens. As it became clear that their debt levels were unsustainable, the yield on their government debt spiked, meaning that new borrowing became unaffordable. In most cases, the 'Troika' of the EU Commission, ECB, and IMF stepped in to provide bailouts, but with harsh austerity conditions which generated further unemployment and social discontent. The crisis was largely resolved by late 2012, as ECB chief Mario Draghi resolved to do "whatever it takes" to stabilize yields and to save the Euro. Nevertheless, Greece remained in deep trouble until after 2015, with question marks remaining about whether they would leave the Euro. Greece finally exited its Troika bailout program in 2018. Increasing migration flows and populist discontent While the Eurozone crisis was resolved (or at least delayed until a future date) by the middle of the decade, the populist political forces which it had unleashed began to have successes across the continent. The humanitarian crisis trigerred by the fleeing of millions of people from the war in Syria and other conflicts in the Middle East & North Africa towards Europe poured fuel on the fire of populism. Parties who opposed migration took power in Central & Eastern Europe, with Poland's Law and Justice Party and Hungary's Fidesz becoming some of the EU's biggest adversaries over the 2010s. Far-right parties in Western Europe such as the AfD in Germany, National Rally in France, Lega in Italy, PVV in the Netherlands, and Vox in Spain began to have unprecedented electoral success. These parties were buoyed by the Brexit referendum in the UK, where the populist challenger UKIP had forced the ruling Conservative Party to announce a vote on the UK's membership of the EU. With the referendum won by the 'leave' side, populist forces in other countries sought to capitalize on this momentum by entering government and, if not leaving the EU entirely, forcing changes to the way the union is run. While much ink was spilled over the threat this populist challenge posed to the EU, in many cases when populist parties entered government, such as Syriza in Greece and the Five Star Movement in Italy, they softened their tone towards leaving the union and focused rather on domestic politics than EU reform. Covid-19, Russia-Ukraine War, and the decline of euroscepticism? By the end of the decade of the 2010s, the populist and eurosceptic wave which had swept over the continent began to recede. Voters became dissatisfied with the achievements of many populist parties once they had entered office and a series of external shocks would further dampen the hostility towards the EU. The Covid-19 Pandemic struck in early 2020, and while the EU has been criticized for not having a united response to the crisis and being slow to organize the roll-out of vaccination programs, the pandemic focused populist energies towards anti-lockdown and anti-vaccination campaigns which targeted national governments rather than the EU. The pandemic also produced a "rally around the flag" effect, whereby the public approval of establishment forces which were seeking to contain the crisis spiked, while support f...

The German Internet Panel (GIP) is an infrastructure project. The GIP serves to collect data about individual attitudes and preferences which are relevant for political and economic decision-making processes.

Experimental variations were used in the instruments. The questionnaire contains numerous randomisations as well as a cross-questionnaire experiment.

Topics: Party preference (Sunday question); assessment of the importance of selected policy fields for the federal government (labour market, foreign policy, education and research, citizen participation, energy supply, food and agriculture, European unification, family, health care system, gender equality, internal security, personal rights, pension system, national debt, tax system, environment and climate protection, consumer protection, transport, defence, currency, economy, immigration and integration); currently most important policy areas for the respondent; satisfaction with the performance of the federal government (scalometer); satisfaction with the performance of the parties CDU/CSU, SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, Die Linke (scalometer); probability of an external event: Effects of the Ukraine crisis on the availability and price of Russian gas in Germany; Federal government should draw consequences from the Ukraine crisis and find alternatives to the purchase of Russian gas; assessment of political decisions of the Federal government on the introduction of a rent brake and a car toll, on the expansion of the digital infrastructure as well as on the re-regulation of prostitution; respective responsibility for the fact that corresponding laws have not yet been passed; expected change in unemployment due to the introduction of the minimum wage respectively in Eastern Germany, Western Germany and in Germany as a whole; opinion on the introduction of a statutory minimum wage; assessment of an alternative proposal to the minimum wage (state pays the difference between the real hourly wage and a gross wage of 8.50 euros); opinion on lowering the minimum wage in regions with high unemployment instead of the same minimum wage throughout Germany; self-assessment of patience and willingness to take risks (scalometer); preferred date for the debt brake (from 2015, from 2020, from 2025, after 2030 or not at all); assessment of the debt brake; assessment of the probability that one´s own federal state will manage without new debt from 2020; one´s own federal state should comply with the debt brake if not all 16 federal states manage without new debt from 2020; net household income resp. personal income; own willingness to pay an additional tax amount so that the own federal state can get along without new debts from 2020 onwards and the amount of this contribution (answer scale depending on household income and personal income); debts of cities and municipalities: Willingness to pay additional fees so that the municipality of residence can manage without new debts and the amount of this contribution (classified); willingness to agree to the merger of one´s own federal state with a neighbouring federal state; opinion on self-determination of the tax level by the federal states; opinion on the financing of infrastructure costs in poor regions via a common EU budget; opinion on EU loans within the framework of the euro bailout fund for heavily indebted member states; opinion on the fiscal equalisation system between the federal states; whether one´s own federal state belongs to the donor states or the recipient states; opinion on a law on the formation of reserves by the federal states for the pensions of state civil servants; demand for state measures to reduce income disparities; acceptance of tax evasion; inflation in Germany: Assessment of the price development for food and clothing in general and measured against the expectations of the European Central Bank (ECB) (inflation expectations); expected annual inflation rate in five and in ten years (medium-term and long-term inflation); assessment of the European Central Bank with regard to price stability in the Eurozone; preferred combination of the amount of monthly expenditure and the amount of a loan repayment; reception frequency of news in general and of news on the topic of economy.

Demography: sex; citizenship; year of birth (categorised); highest school-leaving qualification; highest professional qualification; marital status; household size; employment status; private internet use; federal state.

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