The dataset is composed of the entire universe of sanctions regimes imposed by the UN, US and EU in the period from 1990 to 2010, including those sanctions regimes that were in place by 1990, targeting a country, its leadership and entities associated with it. Episodes which are still on-going are also recorded. Included are all sanctioned countries which have been coded – at least – at the start of sanction episodes as “autocratic regimes” by the Hadenius/Teorell/Wahman dataset on authoritarian regimes (2012).

With in-depth information on individuals who have been included in the international sanctions list and are currently facing economic sanctions from various countries and international organizations, you can benefit greatly. Our list includes key data attributes such as - first name, last name, citizenship, passport details, address, date of proscription & reason for listing. The comprehensive information on individuals listed on the international sanctions list helps organizations ensure compliance with sanctions regulations and avoid any potential risks associated with doing business with sanctioned entities.

Popular attributes:

✔ Financial Intelligence

✔ Credit Risk Analysis

✔ Compliance

✔ Bank Data Enrichment

✔ Account Profiling

This data package includes the PIIE dataset to replicate the data and charts presented in The rise of US economic sanctions on China: Analysis of a new PIIE dataset by Martin Chorzempa, Mary E. Lovely, and Christine Wan, PIIE Policy Brief 24-14.

If you use the dataset, please cite as: Chorzempa, Martin, Mary E. Lovely, and Christine Wan. 2024. The rise of US economic sanctions on China: Analysis of a new PIIE dataset, PIIE Policy Brief 24-14. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics.

Consolidated list of sanctioned entities designated by different countries and international organisations. This can include military, trade and travel restrictions.

In its policy, the European Union intervenes when necessary to prevent conflict or in response to emerging or actual crises. In certain cases, EU intervention can take the form of restrictive measures or 'sanctions'. The application of financial sanctions and more precisely the freezing of assets constitutes an obligation for both the public and private sector. In this regard, a particular responsibility falls on credit and financial institutions, since they are involved in the bulk of financial transfers.

In order to facilitate the application of financial sanctions, the European Banking Federation, the European Savings Banks Group, the European Association of Co-operative Banks, the European Association of Public Banks ("the EU Credit Sector Federations") and the European Commission recognised the need for an EU consolidated list of persons, groups and entities subject to financial sanctions and more precisely the freezing of assets. The Credit Sector Federations set up an initial database containing the consolidated list. The European Commission subsequently took over this database and is responsible for its maintenance and for keeping the consolidated list of sanctions up-to-date. In this respect, the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) of the European Commission launched a new Web page in June 2017, where the consolidated lists of financial sanctions consisting in freezing of assets are published in different formats (see link below).

Disclaimer: While every effort is made to ensure that the database and the consolidated list correctly reproduce all relevant data of the officially adopted texts published in the Official Journal of the European Union, neither the Commission nor the EU Credit Sector Federations accepts any liability for possible omissions of relevant data or mistakes, and nor for any use the database or of the consolidated list. Only the information published in the Official Journal of the EU is deemed authentic.

Usage

This dataset can be used for Data Visualization and Data analytics purpose.

Context This dataset contains the sanctions imposed by the Countries.

Content | Column | Description | | --- | --- | | id | the unique identifier of the given entity | | schema| the entity type | | name| the display name of the given entity | | aliases| any alias names (e.g. other scripts, nom de guerre) provided by the data sources | | birth_date | for people, their birth date | | countries | Includes countries of residence, nationalities and corporate jurisdictions | | addresses | a list of known addresses for the entity | | identifiers | identifiers such as corporate registrations, passport numbers or tax identifiers linked to this sanctions target | | sanctions | details regarding the sanctions designation if any | | phones | a list of phone numbers in E.164 format | | emails | a list of email addresses linked to the entity | | dataset | the dataset this entity is in | | address | address | | last_seen | the last time this entity was observed in source data | | first_seen | the earliest date this entity has been noticed by OpenSanctions |

Acknowledgment This data is collected from the Open Sanction Project

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As of February 24, 2025, 1,889 Russian individuals and 531 entities were sanctioned by the European Union (EU) for undermining or threatening Ukraine's territorial integrity. The sanctioned persons were subject to a travel ban and asset freeze in the EU, while the companies had their assets frozen and could not get funding in the EU. The number of individuals sanctioned by the EU increased dramatically on February 23, 2022, when the EU sanctioned 351 Russian lawmakers in the State Duma who voted to recognize the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk. Further individual measures were imposed after Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022.

To make it easier to comply with OFAC's sanctions regulations, OFAC offers all of its non-SDN sanctions lists in a consolidated set of data files "the Consolidated Sanctions List". These consolidated files comply with all OFAC's existing data standards. In the future, if OFAC creates a new non-SDN style list, the office will add the new data associated with that list to these consolidated data files if appropriate. While the consolidated sanctions list data files are not part of OFAC's list of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons "the SDN List," the records in these consolidated files may also appear on the SDN List. 02262021

The Security Council's set of sanctions serve as the foundation for most national sanctions lists.

Between February 22, 2022, and January 11, 2024, territories and organizations worldwide imposed over 16,000 restrictions on individuals from Russia. Furthermore, roughly 9,300 list-based sanctions were placed on entities over that period. The sanctions were first placed due to the country's recognition of the separatist Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics (DPR and LPR) and then due to its military attack on Ukraine. Restrictions targeting individuals typically include asset freezes and travel bans. Sanctions on Russia prior to the war in Ukraine Over the past decade, Western countries have placed restrictions on Russia for various reasons. In 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea and Sevastopol, the EU restricted entry to several individuals and froze assets of companies allegedly responsible for undermining and threatening Ukraine's territorial integrity. Furthermore, the EU and the U.S. sanctioned several persons and companies in relation to human rights violations and the use of chemical weapons, referring to the poisonings of Sergei and Yulia Skripal and Alexei Navalny. In addition, the United States imposed measures on Russia over its malicious cyber activities and evading United Nations (UN) sanctions restricting trade and financial transactions with North Korea, Syria, and Venezuela.

Global Sanction Screening and Access Options

Our Global Sanction Lists Database is a powerful tool designed for quick and easy global sanction screening and verification of both individuals and organizations listed on international sanction lists. This service emphasizes the fight against money laundering and terrorism financing (AML-CFT), ensuring your business stays in line with global regulations. We keep our database up to date every day, processed into a professional and secure system, giving you access to the most current information.

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EU-Level PEP Screening and Access Options

Our service provides exclusive access to a database for EU-level PEP screening of Politically Exposed Persons at the European Union level. It empowers obligated entities to efficiently identify individuals with significant public roles within EU institutions and bodies. This database provides insights into persons currently in or those who have held significant public positions in Brussels and other EU institutions in the last 12 months. It spans not only individuals in key positions but also their relatives, broadening the scope for risk assessment. With daily updates from diverse public sources and careful manual processing, our database aids organizations in effectively navigating compliance and mitigating PEP-related risks.

PEP Group 1: Significant Public Functions

Includes individuals currently in or who have in the last 12 months held function of significant public role as defined by the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council EU 2015/849 and further detailed in the Commission Decision C/2002/3105. Profiles generally include the exact date of birth and usually the domicile. In cases where the full date of birth is not available, the indication "Partially Identified PEP" is displayed. Individuals with enduring risks are recorded for up to five years after ending their function, especially for positions of pan-European significance or extended duration.

Specific Positions within PEP Group 1: Executive Authority Leaders Legislative Members Judges Members of the European Central Bank Bodies Members of the Court of Auditors Ambassadors and Chargés d’Affaires

PEP Groups 2 - 4 and 7: Family and Close Associates

Includes spouses/partners, children (including sons-in-law and daughters-in-law), and parents of individuals in Group PEP1, as well as individuals in a familial or similar relationship.

Specification PEP2: Spouse/partner PEP3: Child/son-in-law/daughter-in-law PEP4: Parent PEP7: Individuals in a long-term familial or similar relationship

We investigate the influence of case selection and (re)coding for two vintages of a key resource for research on economic sanctions: the Peterson Institute database reported in Hufbauer et al. (second edition in 1990 and third edition in 2007, often identified by their abbreviations HSE and HSEO). The Peterson Institute has not transparently reported about these changes. These changes make it more likely to find sanction success. A multivariate probit analysis establishes upward bias related to modest policy change, duration, and cost to target and downward bias for regime change, military impairment, companion policies, and cost to the sender.

Individuals and entities in the sanctions list of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Circumvention undermines the effectiveness of economic sanctions, yet evidence on the precise mechanisms remains limited. This paper documents two strategies deployed to work around trade sanctions imposed on Russia in 2022. These include intermediated trade through Caucasus and Central Asia and a simple, yet little-documented, method whereby goods shipped through the sanctioned economy to the neighbouring economies fail to reach their intended destination. The latter amounted to around half of total "abnormal" exports from the EU/UK to Armenia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. While these strategies offset less than 10% of the sanctions’ impact, substitution ratios exceed 50% for numerous sanctioned products.

Record Major Sanction AGAI 67 actions for purposes of reporting data to AG, CoC and responding to Parliamentary questions and FOI requests.

What strategies work best for enforcing sanctions? Sanctions enforcement agencies like the United States’ Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) face both resource limitations and political constraints in punishing domestic firms for violating sanctions. Beyond monetary fines, sanctions enforcement actions also serve a “naming and shaming” function that tarnishes violators’ reputations. Larger, higher-profile companies tend have much more at stake in terms of their reputations than smaller or less-well known firms. At the same time, punishing higher profile companies for sanctions violations is likely to generate more publicity about the risks and potential consequences of not complying with sanctions. We theorize that OFAC should impose larger fines against high-profile companies to draw attention to those cases, make the enforcement actions more memorable, and enhance the reputational costs they also inflict. We test our theory via a statistical analysis of OFAC enforcement actions from 2010-2021 and find support for our theory.

We estimate the impact of financial sanctions in the U.S. criminal justice system leveraging nine natural experiments in a regression discontinuity design framework across a diverse range of enforcement levels ($17–$6,000) and institutional environments. We leverage survey and administrative data to consider a variety of short and long-term outcomes including employment, recidivism, household expenditures, and other self-reported measures of well-being. We find robust evidence of precise null effects, including ruling out long-run impacts larger than -$391–$142 in annual earnings and -0.001–0.01 in annual convictions, with no corresponding payment increases despite salient and heterogeneous enforcement mechanisms.

Number of community sanctions cases 2018-2019

Do economic sanctions destabilize the governments they target? A form of foreign pressure, sanctions are typically meant to alter the policies of other countries. There is much pessimism on whether they ever work. This article shows that economic pressure works in at least one respect: it destabilizes the leaders it targets. I present a theoretical argument that explains why destabilization is a necessary condition for successful coercion. I find evidence that pressure destabilizes in a large panel of cross-country time-series data. The destabilization finding indicates that sanctions may be more effective at altering policies than we think. I conclude by noting that greater optimism regarding the effectiveness of sanctions should be balanced by a careful consideration of the policy's real and sizeable costs for those caught in the middle.