Consolidated list of sanctioned entities designated by different countries and international organisations. This can include military, trade and travel restrictions.

OFAC is providing all of its non-SDN sanctions lists in a consolidated set of data called "the Consolidated Sanctions List".

Explore all our datasets in raw format

The dataset is composed of the entire universe of sanctions regimes imposed by the UN, US and EU in the period from 1990 to 2010, including those sanctions regimes that were in place by 1990, targeting a country, its leadership and entities associated with it. Episodes which are still on-going are also recorded. Included are all sanctioned countries which have been coded – at least – at the start of sanction episodes as “autocratic regimes” by the Hadenius/Teorell/Wahman dataset on authoritarian regimes (2012).

The Security Council's set of sanctions serve as the foundation for most national sanctions lists.

Usage

This dataset can be used for Data Visualization and Data analytics purpose.

Context This dataset contains the sanctions imposed by the Countries.

Content | Column | Description | | --- | --- | | id | the unique identifier of the given entity | | schema| the entity type | | name| the display name of the given entity | | aliases| any alias names (e.g. other scripts, nom de guerre) provided by the data sources | | birth_date | for people, their birth date | | countries | Includes countries of residence, nationalities and corporate jurisdictions | | addresses | a list of known addresses for the entity | | identifiers | identifiers such as corporate registrations, passport numbers or tax identifiers linked to this sanctions target | | sanctions | details regarding the sanctions designation if any | | phones | a list of phone numbers in E.164 format | | emails | a list of email addresses linked to the entity | | dataset | the dataset this entity is in | | address | address | | last_seen | the last time this entity was observed in source data | | first_seen | the earliest date this entity has been noticed by OpenSanctions |

Acknowledgment This data is collected from the Open Sanction Project

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Sanctions by Race reports the total number and type of educational sanctions for a given school district by race and ethnicity.

We estimate the impact of financial sanctions in the U.S. criminal justice system leveraging nine natural experiments in a regression discontinuity design framework across a diverse range of enforcement levels ($17–$6,000) and institutional environments. We leverage survey and administrative data to consider a variety of short and long-term outcomes including employment, recidivism, household expenditures, and other self-reported measures of well-being. We find robust evidence of precise null effects, including ruling out long-run impacts larger than -$391–$142 in annual earnings and -0.001–0.01 in annual convictions, with no corresponding payment increases despite salient and heterogeneous enforcement mechanisms.

Sanctions imposed by Japan under its Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law.

No description is available. Visit https://dataone.org/datasets/sha256%3Ae1b9163b11078f54ae4c9aad34162b83a45bf53a3c8677c71214e71015a84965 for complete metadata about this dataset.

This data package includes the PIIE dataset to replicate the data and charts presented in The rise of US economic sanctions on China: Analysis of a new PIIE dataset by Martin Chorzempa, Mary E. Lovely, and Christine Wan, PIIE Policy Brief 24-14.

If you use the dataset, please cite as: Chorzempa, Martin, Mary E. Lovely, and Christine Wan. 2024. The rise of US economic sanctions on China: Analysis of a new PIIE dataset, PIIE Policy Brief 24-14. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics.

This paper investigates the effects of U.S. economic sanctions on UN General Assembly voting patterns. Using panel data for 123 developing countries from 1990–2014, and employing an instrumental variables approach to account for potential endogeneity, we find that U.S.- imposed sanctions generally lead to a decline in voting coincidence between the U.S. and target countries when the sanctioned country receives low U.S. aid. However, in instances where the U.S. sanctions countries dependent on U.S. foreign aid, we find targets are increasingly more likely to vote with the U.S. This is because sanctions send a credible signal of the U.S.’s willingness to carry out punishment and cancel future aid to countries that publicly oppose it. Our research shows how sanctions alone tend to pull countries apart while, together with aid dependence, have the potential to bring countries in line with the U.S.’s position on issues, adding nuance to the sanctions literature.

Since February 22, 2022, the United States has imposed over two thousand list-based sanctions on Russia as of February 10, 2023. Switzerland placed the second largest number of list-based sanctions on Russia after that date. The first sanctions on February 22 were placed over Russia recognizing Ukraine's Donetsk and Luhansk regions as independent. Two days later, the Russian invasion of Ukraine began.

Individuals and organisations targeted by the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law, Counter-Measures List and the Unreliable Entities List (UEL).

Why does the U.S. government choose to initiate human rights-based economic sanc- tions against some highly repressive target countries, but not others? And, under what conditions does it do so? In this paper, I posit an interactive theory wherein I argue that diaspora size moderates the relationship between target human rights con- duct and the onset of human rights-based economic sanctions. I contend that as the size of a diaspora increases, its capacity to influence the onset of human rights-based economic sanctions strengthens, as it can more effectively 1) lobby decisionmakers in Congress and the White House directly as well as 2) indirectly via using contentious action to mobilize public opinion, which intensifies the pressure on Congresspersons and the President to act. To test my contention, I combine U.S. sanctions data with data on American diasporas and homeland human rights conduct and find that while diaspora size strongly and consistently moderates the relationship between homeland human rights conduct and the onset of Congressional sanctions, its moderating impact on Presidential sanctions is inconsistent and, moreover, negligible when addressing en- dogeneity and other concerns.

What strategies work best for enforcing sanctions? Sanctions enforcement agencies like the United States’ Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) face both resource limitations and political constraints in punishing domestic firms for violating sanctions. Beyond monetary fines, sanctions enforcement actions also serve a “naming and shaming” function that tarnishes violators’ reputations. Larger, higher-profile companies tend have much more at stake in terms of their reputations than smaller or less-well known firms. At the same time, punishing higher profile companies for sanctions violations is likely to generate more publicity about the risks and potential consequences of not complying with sanctions. We theorize that OFAC should impose larger fines against high-profile companies to draw attention to those cases, make the enforcement actions more memorable, and enhance the reputational costs they also inflict. We test our theory via a statistical analysis of OFAC enforcement actions from 2010-2021 and find support for our theory.

Circumvention undermines the effectiveness of economic sanctions, yet evidence on the precise mechanisms remains limited. This paper documents two strategies deployed to work around trade sanctions imposed on Russia in 2022. These include intermediated trade through Caucasus and Central Asia and a simple, yet little-documented, method whereby goods shipped through the sanctioned economy to the neighbouring economies fail to reach their intended destination. The latter amounted to around half of total "abnormal" exports from the EU/UK to Armenia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. While these strategies offset less than 10% of the sanctions’ impact, substitution ratios exceed 50% for numerous sanctioned products.

We investigate the influence of case selection and (re)coding for two vintages of a key resource for research on economic sanctions: the Peterson Institute database reported in Hufbauer et al. (second edition in 1990 and third edition in 2007, often identified by their abbreviations HSE and HSEO). The Peterson Institute has not transparently reported about these changes. These changes make it more likely to find sanction success. A multivariate probit analysis establishes upward bias related to modest policy change, duration, and cost to target and downward bias for regime change, military impairment, companion policies, and cost to the sender.

As part of the Common Foreign Security Policy the European Union publishes a sanctions list that is implemented by all member states.

This replication package contains the data and code for the paper "Dodging Trade Sanctions? Evidence from Military Goods", published in AEA Papers and Proceedings 2025.