The Long Depression was, by a large margin, the longest-lasting recession in U.S. history. It began in the U.S. with the Panic of 1873, and lasted for over five years. This depression was the largest in a series of recessions at the turn of the 20th century, which proved to be a period of overall stagnation as the U.S. financial markets failed to keep pace with industrialization and changes in monetary policy. Great Depression The Great Depression, however, is widely considered to have been the most severe recession in U.S. history. Following the Wall Street Crash in 1929, the country's economy collapsed, wages fell and a quarter of the workforce was unemployed. It would take almost four years for recovery to begin. Additionally, U.S. expansion and integration in international markets allowed the depression to become a global event, which became a major catalyst in the build up to the Second World War. Decreasing severity When comparing recessions before and after the Great Depression, they have generally become shorter and less frequent over time. Only three recessions in the latter period have lasted more than one year. Additionally, while there were 12 recessions between 1880 and 1920, there were only six recessions between 1980 and 2020. The most severe recession in recent years was the financial crisis of 2007 (known as the Great Recession), where irresponsible lending policies and lack of government regulation allowed for a property bubble to develop and become detached from the economy over time, this eventually became untenable and the bubble burst. Although the causes of both the Great Depression and Great Recession were similar in many aspects, economists have been able to use historical evidence to try and predict, prevent, or limit the impact of future recessions.

Graph and download economic data for Dates of U.S. recessions as inferred by GDP-based recession indicator (JHDUSRGDPBR) from Q4 1967 to Q4 2024 about recession indicators, GDP, and USA.

By April 2026, it is projected that there is a probability of ***** percent that the United States will fall into another economic recession. This reflects a significant decrease from the projection of the preceding month.

Recessions may disproportionally impact school districts, especially with established fiscal institutions and policies including balanced budget requirements, tax and expenditure limitations, and school finance reforms. Analyzing the Great Recession and school districts in the United States between 2003 and 2016, we estimate difference-in-differences models leveraging variation in state recession severity to evaluate revenue and expenditure impacts as well as measure differential recession effects for districts exposed to and not exposed to fiscal institutions and policies. While revenues and expenditures increased relative to pre-recession levels in all districts, increases are much larger in school districts with less severe than more severe recessions. Balance budget requirements exacerbate recession effects for low-income districts and local tax and expenditure limitations intensify recession effects for high-income districts. School finance reforms worsen recession effects for all districts. Our findings can aid districts in understanding potential recessionary impacts given their prior established fiscal policies and institutions.

Following the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008, countries across the world were thrown into recession. In comparison to North America, Europe, and Japan, however, many parts of the globe experienced less severe effects of the crisis, with some avoiding going into recession at all. Particularly in Africa and South & East Asia, many countries experienced a dip in their annual GDP growth, but still recorded high growth rates of over 2.5 percent. South Asia in particular actually experienced an increase in growth during the recession, bucking global trends. Latin America and the Caribbean was the only one of these regions to enter recession in 2009, due to the outsized importance of the United States as a partner in trade and finance for the region.

This data package includes the underlying data and files to replicate the calculations, charts, and tables presented in Average Inflation Targeting Would Be a Weak Tool for the Fed to Deal with Recession and Chronic Low Inflation, PIIE Policy Brief 19-16. If you use the data, please cite as: Reifschneider, David, and David Wilcox. (2019). Average Inflation Targeting Would Be a Weak Tool for the Fed to Deal with Recession and Chronic Low Inflation. PIIE Policy Brief 19-16. Peterson Institute for International Economics.

During the Great Recession many incumbent parties were not confirmed in power by the ballots. The harsh law of the economic vote severely undermined their electoral chances. Yet it is unclear if they were punished by the absolute poor state of affairs, or by the relative deterioration of the economy; by a direct judgement of the domestic situation, or by its comparison with some external benchmark capturing more global dynamics; and whether or not the global crisis modified all these parameters. This exploratory analysis looks into all these issues using a dataset covering all the elections that took place in 38 democracies in the period 2000-2015, and contributing to the recent debate about the actual benchmarking of the state of the economy from behalf of voters. The Great Recession confirms its exceptional character, revealing that absolute reference points became more important than tailored benchmarks and short-term comparisons.

The financial crisis of 2007-09 is widely viewed as the worst financial disruption since the Great Depression of 1929-1933. However, the accompanying economic recession was mild compared with the Great Depression, though severe by postwar standards.

Data underlying the report of a study that assesses and quantifes the impacts of the financial crisis and subsequent global economic recession on the growth and performance of UK SME employers. Analyses existing data from two previous survey sources on SME employers in the pre-recession and recessionary periods. Covers how the problems in the banking sector have affected the supply of finance to the SME sector, and whether this has depressed business performance and investment. Looks at the impact of the recession has been more serious for particular types of entrepreneurs and businesses.

In a V-shpaed recession, it is projected that European manufacturing companies will have a positive EBIT margin of four percent, already a significant decline from the pre-pandemic EBIT margin of seven percent. The V-shaped recession is the least severe type of recession. Different types of hypothetical economic scenarios paint a mixed picture of the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on earnings produced by European manufacturing companies. Depending on the severity of the recession, the amount of profit a company would generate differs. A U-shaped recession would result in an EBIT margin contraction of two percent, while the most severe type of recession, the L-shaped recession, would result in an EBIT margin slump of 19 percent. Thus, in the last two scenarios, companies would face significant losses in profit compared to the pre-pandemic status.

Abstract (en): The US Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program is designed to provide income support to workers who become unable to work because of a severe, long-lasting disability. In this study, we use administrative data to estimate the effect of labor market conditions, as measured by the unemployment rate, on the number of SSDI applications, the number and composition of initial allowances and denials, and the timing of applications relative to disability onset. We analyze the period of the Great Recession, and compare this period with business cycle effects over the past two decades, from 1992 through 2012.

A banking organization holds capital to guard against uncertainty. Capital reassures an institution’s depositors, creditors and counterparties--and the institution itself--that an event such as an unexpected surge in losses or an unanticipated deterioration in earnings will not impair its ability to engage in lending to creditworthy borrowers and protect the savings of its depositors. During this period of heightened economic uncertainty, U.S. federal banking supervisors believe that the largest U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) should have a capital buffer sufficient to withstand losses and allow them to meet the credit needs of their customers in a more severe recession than is anticipated. For this reason, the Federal Reserve and other bank supervisors embarked on a comprehensive simultaneous assessment of the capital held by the 19 largest U.S. BHCs in February of this year.

During the Great Recession, exceptionally harsh economic conditions were often countered by austerity policies that, according to many, further worsened and protracted the negative conjuncture. Both elements, the poor state of the economy and the contractionary manoeuvers, are supposed to reduce the electoral prospects for incumbents. In this article, we compare the relative explanatory powers of these two theories before and during the economic crisis. We demonstrate that in normal times citizens are fiscally responsible, whereas during the Great Recession, and under certain conditions, austerity policies systematically reduced the support for incumbents on top of the state of the economy. This happened when the burdens of the manoeuvers were shared by many, in more equal societies, when the country was constrained by external conditionalities and when readjustments were mostly based on tax increases.

The Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09 was a period of severe macroeconomic instability for the United States and the global economy more generally. The crisis was precipitated by the collapse of a number of financial institutions who were deeply involved in the U.S. mortgage market and associated credit markets. Beginning in the Summer of 2007, a number of banks began to report issues with increasing mortgage delinquencies and the problem of not being able to accurately price derivatives contracts which were based on bundles of these U.S. residential mortgages. By the end of 2008, U.S. financial institutions had begun to fail due to their exposure to the housing market, leading to one of the deepest recessions in the history of the United States and to extensive government bailouts of the financial sector.

Subprime and the collapse of the U.S. mortgage market

The early 2000s had seen explosive growth in the U.S. mortgage market, as credit became cheaper due to the Federal Reserve's decision to lower interest rates in the aftermath of the 2001 'Dot Com' Crash, as well as because of the increasing globalization of financial flows which directed funds into U.S. financial markets. Lower mortgage rates gave incentive to financial institutions to begin lending to riskier borrowers, using so-called 'subprime' loans. These were loans to borrowers with poor credit scores, who would not have met the requirements for a conventional mortgage loan. In order to hedge against the risk of these riskier loans, financial institutions began to use complex financial instruments known as derivatives, which bundled mortgage loans together and allowed the risk of default to be sold on to willing investors. This practice was supposed to remove the risk from these loans, by effectively allowing credit institutions to buy insurance against delinquencies. Due to the fraudulent practices of credit ratings agencies, however, the price of these contacts did not reflect the real risk of the loans involved. As the reality of the inability of the borrowers to repay began to kick in during 2007, the financial markets which traded these derivatives came under increasing stress and eventually led to a 'sudden stop' in trading and credit intermediation during 2008.

Market Panic and The Great Recession

As borrowers failed to make repayments, this had a knock-on effect among financial institutions who were highly leveraged with financial instruments based on the mortgage market. Lehman Brothers, one of the world's largest investment banks, failed on September 15th 2008, causing widespread panic in financial markets. Due to the fear of an unprecedented collapse in the financial sector which would have untold consequences for the wider economy, the U.S. government and central bank, The Fed, intervened the following day to bailout the United States' largest insurance company, AIG, and to backstop financial markets. The crisis prompted a deep recession, known colloquially as The Great Recession, drawing parallels between this period and The Great Depression. The collapse of credit intermediation in the economy lead to further issues in the real economy, as business were increasingly unable to pay back loans and were forced to lay off staff, driving unemployment to a high of almost 10 percent in 2010. While there has been criticism of the U.S. government's actions to bailout the financial institutions involved, the actions of the government and the Fed are seen by many as having prevented the crisis from spiraling into a depression of the magnitude of The Great Depression.

With the collapse of the U.S. housing market and the subsequent financial crisis on Wall Street in 2007 and 2008, economies across the globe began to enter into deep recessions. What had started out as a crisis centered on the United States quickly became global in nature, as it became apparent that not only had the economies of other advanced countries (grouped together as the G7) become intimately tied to the U.S. financial system, but that many of them had experienced housing and asset price bubbles similar to that in the U.S.. The United Kingdom had experienced a huge inflation of housing prices since the 1990s, while Eurozone members (such as Germany, France and Italy) had financial sectors which had become involved in reckless lending to economies on the periphery of the EU, such as Greece, Ireland and Portugal. Other countries, such as Japan, were hit heavily due their export-led growth models which suffered from the decline in international trade. Unemployment during the Great Recession As business and consumer confidence crashed, credit markets froze, and international trade contracted, the unemployment rate in the most advanced economies shot up. While four to five percent is generally considered to be a healthy unemployment rate, nearing full employment in the economy (when any remaining unemployment is not related to a lack of consumer demand), many of these countries experienced rates at least double that, with unemployment in the United States peaking at almost 10 percent in 2010. In large countries, unemployment rates of this level meant millions or tens of millions of people being out of work, which led to political pressures to stimulate economies and create jobs. By 2012, many of these countries were seeing declining unemployment rates, however, in France and Italy rates of joblessness continued to increase as the Euro crisis took hold. These countries suffered from having a monetary policy which was too tight for their economies (due to the ECB controlling interest rates) and fiscal policy which was constrained by EU debt rules. Left with the option of deregulating their labor markets and pursuing austerity policies, their unemployment rates remained over 10 percent well into the 2010s. Differences in labor markets The differences in unemployment rates at the peak of the crisis (2009-2010) reflect not only the differences in how economies were affected by the downturn, but also the differing labor market institutions and programs in the various countries. Countries with more 'liberalized' labor markets, such as the United States and United Kingdom experienced sharp jumps in their unemployment rate due to the ease at which employers can lay off workers in these countries. When the crisis subsided in these countries, however, their unemployment rates quickly began to drop below those of the other countries, due to their more dynamic labor markets which make it easier to hire workers when the economy is doing well. On the other hand, countries with more 'coordinated' labor market institutions, such as Germany and Japan, experiences lower rates of unemployment during the crisis, as programs such as short-time work, job sharing, and wage restraint agreements were used to keep workers in their jobs. While these countries are less likely to experience spikes in unemployment during crises, the highly regulated nature of their labor markets mean that they are slower to add jobs during periods of economic prosperity.

The Global Financial Crisis (2007-2008), which began due to the collapse of the U.S. housing market, had a negative effect in many regions across the globe. The global recession which followed the crisis in 2008 and 2009 showed how interdependent and synchronized many of the world's economies had become, with the largest advanced economies showing very similar patterns of negative GDP growth during the crisis. Among the largest emerging economies (commonly referred to as the 'E7'), however, a different pattern emerged, with some countries avoiding a recession altogether. Some commentators have particularly pointed to 2008-2009 as the moment in which China emerged on the world stage as an economic superpower and a key driver of global economic growth. The Great Recession in the developing world While some countries, such as Russia, Mexico, and Turkey, experienced severe recessions due to their connections to the United States and Europe, others such as China, India, and Indonesia managed to record significant economic growth during the period. This can be partly explained by the decoupling from western financial systems which these countries undertook following the Asian financial crises of 1997, making many Asian nations more wary of opening their countries to 'hot money' from other countries. Other likely explanations of this trend are that these countries have large domestic economies which are not entirely reliant on the advanced economies, that their export sectors produce goods which are inelastic (meaning they are still bought during recessions), and that the Chinese economic stimulus worth almost 600 billion U.S. dollars in 2008/2009 increased growth in the region.

Between ************ and *********, global recession fear went through periods of sharp increases three times. First, in the summer of 2019, due to an escalation in U.S.-China relations and a recession signal being flashed by the bond market. The second peak of worldwide recession fear took place in **********, as a result of the alarming jump in the rate of COVID-19 cases. The fear of recession started to increase sharply again in *************, as the conflict between Russia and Ukraine escalated.

ABSTRACT The current crisis generated by Covid-19 has three major characteristics: first, the high cost in terms of lives and sequelae that have injured and killed a huge number of people in a very short period of time; second, the severe recession and the consequent reduction in employment, wages and income, not to mention the closing of companies and disorganizing of the economy, with an increase in inequality and poverty; third, the institutional corrosion and the dissemination of fear and perplexity in society. Brazilian science actively participates in the efforts to mitigate the perverse effects of the crisis caused by the pandemic, despite its depreciation by government authorities. Universities around the world and in Brazil quickly accepted the challenges posed by the coronavirus and guided their actions to save lives. This effort can be institutionalized to survive over time and contribute to increase the economic and social impact of Brazilian science and technology.

Several prominent economists have argued that existing DSGE models cannot properly account for the evolution of key macroeconomic variables during and following the recent Great Recession. We challenge this argument by showing that a standard DSGE model with financial frictions available prior to the recent crisis successfully predicts a sharp contraction in economic activity along with a protracted but relatively modest decline in inflation, following the rise in financial stress in 2008:IV. The model does so even though inflation remains very dependent on the evolution of economic activity and of monetary policy. (JEL E12, E31, E32, E37, E44, E52, G01)