As a weapon of mass destruction, nuclear warheads are part of the defense arsenal of some countries in the world. There were approximately 12,100 nuclear warheads worldwide as of January 2024 and almost 90 percent of them belong to two countries: the United States and Russia. Even though the number of nuclear weapons worldwide has been decreasing since the Cold War, still the same two countries possess the majority of them. Moreover, with more conflicts ongoing worldwide, nuclear weapons become more important to nuclear powers as a way of deterring. What are nuclear warheads? Nuclear warheads are weapons of mass destruction and are able to destroy whole cities and kill millions of people. They also have tremendous long-lasting effects on the environment and future generations due to radioactive contamination taking its toll years after the explosion. They have only been used once; by the United States in 1945 in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the final stage of World War 2. Despite the devastating nature of nuclear weapons, some countries have been carrying out nuclear tests regularly. Global attitudes There have been debates about the prohibition of nuclear weapons due to the enormous destructive power that they have. In July of 2017, the United Nations General Assembly voted on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. There were 139 countries that supported the treaty and positioned themselves against the possession of nuclear weapons. However, as the forecasted budget for the nuclear weapons program of the United States from 2022 shows, the investments in this area are increasing rather than decreasing. Similar attitudes can be expected from the Russian government.

At the beginning of 2024, there were approximately 12,100 nuclear weapons worldwide. The number of nuclear warheads has decreased significantly after its peak in 1985, when an estimated 63,600 nuclear warheads existed. The potential danger of nuclear weapons has received increased attention after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

The United States became the world's first nuclear power on July 16, 1945, when it successfully detonated an atomic bomb at a testing site in Mexico, as part of the Manhattan Project. Less than one month later, on August 6 and 9 respectively, the U.S. dropped atomic bombs (known as "Fat Man" and "Little Boy") on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; forcing the Japanese into surrender and bringing the Second World War to an end. These bombings remain the only nuclear attacks in history, however, advancements in nuclear technology and the threat of nuclear warfare have became a defining characteristic of post-WWII diplomacy, particularly during the Cold War. The Nuclear Arms Race Four years after Hiroshima, the Soviet Union developed its first nuclear weapon (known as "First Lightning") and the Nuclear Arms Race began. By the mid-1960s, both the U.S. and USSR had amassed enough nuclear warheads to annihilate any opponent; it was generally accepted that if one were to launch a nuclear attack against the other then a retaliatory "second strike" was guaranteed and this would result in "mutual assured destruction" (MAD). The concept of a nuclear triad was also established, where a wide enough network of armed aerial bombers, land-based missile silos, and submarines scattered across the globe ensured that a single attack would not disarm the enemy and a second strike was almost a certainty. This came to a head in 1962; the U.S. stored warheads in Italy and Turkey (its NATO allies), and the USSR retaliated by building silos in Cuba; the Cuban Missile Crisis then saw the world on the brink of nuclear war for over a month, but was eventually resolved through tense diplomacy, rather than official military action. The U.S.' nuclear arsenal reached its largest size in the mid-1960s, at over 31,000 warheads, before falling to the low 20,000s in the 1980s. The Soviet arsenal's growth was more gradual, but it overtook that of the U.S. in 1978, and it peaked at over 40,000 nuclear warheads in 1986. The UK, France, and China also developed their own nuclear programs; while these did play an important psychological role in the Cold War, their nuclear programs were primarily focused on energy (France still gets a higher share of its electrical energy from nuclear power than any other country) and self-defense, and their arsenals paled in comparison to those amassed by the U.S. or USSR. Israel is also believed to have possessed nuclear weapons since the late 1960s, but has never openly acknowledged or denied this.

Post-Cold War

The global stockpile of nuclear weapons peaked in 1986, before Soviet dissolution and the end of the Cold War saw a significant de-escalation in tensions between the east and west, and the process of nuclear disarmament began. Since the 1980s, Russia's nuclear arsenal has decreased by a factor of nine, and the U.S. arsenal is now six times smaller. Disarmament between the U.S. and Russia has occurred at a fairly similar pace, and the removal of weapons from the former-Soviet states of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine were instrumental in their integration into the post-Soviet world. South Africa remains the only country to have established its own nuclear weapons program that was then dismantled. However, as these countries denuclearized, India and Pakistan developed their first nuclear weapons in the late 1990s, which they maintain as part of nuclear deterrent programs. North Korea has also developed a nuclear weapons program since the early 2000s, but its perceived hostility to the west and withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has seen its nuclear tests heighten tensions with some neighbors and the U.S.. In 2023, it is believed that nine countries are in possession of nuclear weapons, with the U.S. and Russia in possession of several thousand each. Although these countries maintain that their nuclear stockpiles are kept in the interests of self-defense, nuclear testing or the mobilization of nuclear forces (such as in Russia in 2022) are generally interpreted as a sign of international aggression.

As of 2023, Russia was estimated to have approximately 5,900 nuclear warheads, compared with the United States which had 5,240 warheads. The other nuclear powers in the world had far fewer nuclear warheads than the United States and Russia, with China having the third-largest nuclear arsenal, at 410 warheads.

In 2022, the United States spent approximately ** billion U.S. dollars on nuclear weapons, the highest of any country in the world. China spent the second-highest amount, at nearly ** billion dollars, while Russia spent the third most at nearly ** billion dollars. Russia is also the country with the highest number of nuclear warheads in the world.

This is a replication file for article "Regional socialization and disarmament preferences: Explaining state positions on the nuclear ban treaty", published in Contemporary Security Policy (DOI 10.1080/13523260.2024.2376416).In this article, we bring nuance to the understanding of cleavages among states over the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). We measure the positions of the participants to the 2022 and 2023 TPNW Meetings of State Parties, employing text-as-data approaches. Our results show that the participants can be placed along a single axis, roughly associated with whether they view nuclear disarmament in an “old” way as primarily a security problem or in a “new” way as a humanitarian and emancipatory issue. We find that membership in a nuclear weapon-free zone – particularly in Latin America and Africa – has a statistically significant effect on state positions. We therefore debunk the idea that parties to the nuclear ban treaty are a coherent single block. Our article provides a new, quantitative way of measuring the positions of states vis-à-vis the TPNW and contributes to the emerging scholarship on the treaty

As of 2022, Russia had approximately 1,185 nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) stockpiled, compared with NATO, which had 800 ICBMs. By comparison, NATO has more nuclear submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) as well as warheads that are intended to be delivered by aircraft. In terms of tactical, or nonstrategic nuclear warheads, Russia had a far greater amount, at 1,912 compared with 230 among NATO powers.

This is the replication data for the paper, "Nuclear Weapons and Interstate Conflict: an Empirical Analysis of Conflict Frequency and Intensity" by Ben Jebb and Matt Fiorelli. It is comprised of data that tracks different elements of state power and militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) from 1816 - 2014. It contains 33 unique variables, has over 1.9 million observations, and allows the user to compare states on a dyadic basis. The attached "Do File" also allows the user to confirm the authors' findings.

This article shows that Matthew Kroenig (2009)’s evidence that nuclear assistance increases states’ probability of acquiring nuclear weapons is overturned when more comprehensive indicators of state capacity are taken into account. Matthew Kroenig’s ``Importing the Bomb” presents a supply-side argument that a state’s ability to acquire nuclear weapons is determined by whether it receives sensitive nuclear assistance. This article challenges those findings by incorporating the composite index of national capability (CINC), a widely-accepted aggregate measure of national capability. Our findings show that such assistance has little effect on the probability of acquisition when national capability is included as a control.

The global nuclear missiles and bombs market, valued at $92.21 billion in 2025, is projected to experience robust growth, driven by escalating geopolitical tensions and the ongoing modernization of nuclear arsenals by major global powers. A Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 4.96% from 2025 to 2033 suggests a significant market expansion over the forecast period. Key drivers include the persistent threat of nuclear proliferation, the need for enhanced national security, and continuous advancements in missile technology, such as improved accuracy, range, and payload capacity. Technological innovations, particularly in hypersonic missile systems and advanced warhead designs, further fuel market growth. However, stringent international regulations and treaties aimed at limiting nuclear proliferation, along with the high cost of research, development, and maintenance of nuclear weapons, act as significant restraints. Market segmentation reveals substantial variations in production and consumption across different regions, with North America and Europe currently holding the largest market shares, although Asia-Pacific is expected to show significant growth driven by increasing military expenditure in countries like China and India. The analysis of import and export data reveals complex trade patterns influenced by geopolitical factors and strategic partnerships between nations. Price trends indicate a consistent upward trajectory influenced by technological complexities and raw material costs. Leading companies like Thales, Lockheed Martin, and Boeing dominate the market, leveraging their extensive experience and technological prowess. The competitive landscape is characterized by a few dominant players, emphasizing the high barriers to entry due to technological expertise and substantial capital investment required. Regional analysis highlights the concentration of market activity in North America and Europe, owing to established nuclear capabilities and higher defense budgets. However, emerging economies in Asia-Pacific are expected to exhibit significant growth, driven by rising defense spending and the quest for enhanced regional security. Future market growth will likely be influenced by evolving geopolitical dynamics, technological innovations, and international collaborations related to nuclear non-proliferation efforts. The continued investment in research and development by key players will be crucial in shaping the future of this market. Recent developments include: October 2023: The US DoD awarded a contract worth approximately USD 1 billion to Lockheed Martin Corporation to conduct engineering, manufacturing, and design work to provide a “low technical risk and affordable” RV for the Mk21A program, which will fit a new RV to the US’ Sentinel nuclear missile system., November 2022: The US Navy awarded Lockheed Martin Corporation a contract worth USD 581.2 million for supplying additional UGM-133A Trident II Submarine-launched nuclear ballistic missiles. The contract also involved a foreign military sale to the United Kingdom. It is expected to be completed by September 2027.. Notable trends are: Nuclear Missiles to Dominate Market Share During the Forecast Period.

Financial overview and grant giving statistics of Utah Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons Ucan

Prediction of Caesium-137 (Cs-137) deposition from atmospheric nuclear weapons tests. The methodology uses a ratio of Cs-137 deposition and precipitation measured at Milford Haven by the Atomic Energy Authority extrapolated across Great Britain using a 5 by 5 km resolution UKCIP precipitation dataset. The prediction is for 31 December 1985. Full details about this dataset can be found at https://doi.org/10.5285/c3e530bf-af20-43fc-8b4b-92682233ff08

To this day, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki remain the only instances in history where nuclear weapons were used in warfare. The weapons used in these attacks had blast yields equal to 16 kilotons and 21 kilotons of TNT respectively, and resulted in the immediate deaths of over 100,000 people, over 200,000 deaths by the year's end, and they each destroyed a significant portion of these cities. However, the strength of the bombs used in the Second World War pale in comparison to those developed by the United States and Soviet Union in the decades that followed. American tests By 1954, the United States had developed nuclear weapons with yields equal to 15 Megatons of TNT, almost 1,000 times stronger than the bomb used in Hiroshima less than ten years before. In total, public information states that the U.S. developed and tested four weapons with yields greater than 10 MT. The United States used its facilities in Nevada and the Marshall Islands for much of its nuclear testing, with Bikini Atoll in particular used as the site of its three largest tests. These activities resulted in long-term low-level radiation causing some regions to become inhospitable for native populations, who suffered much higher levels of cancer and other medical side effects in the decades that followed - much of the Pacific population was forcefully relocated by the U.S., and the Bikini Atoll remains largely uninhabited to this day. In total, the United States conducted over 1,000 nuclear weapons tests between 1945 and 1992, whereby the end of the Cold War brought the Nuclear Arms Race to a halt, and the process of nuclear disarmament began. Soviet tests The Soviet Union developed and tested at least four known atomic weapons that were larger than any tested by the U.S.. The largest nuclear weapon ever was the Tsar Bomba, with a blast yield of 50 megatons (over 3,000 times larger than Hiroshima) - the Tsar Bomba had been capable of creating a blast equal to 100 MT, but this was reduced in order to limit the nuclear fallout. The Tsar Bomba, along with the other three largest nuclear weapons ever tested, were all detonated at the Soviet testing sites at the Novaya Zemlya archipelago in the Arctic Ocean - this was the primary testing sites for the Soviet nuclear weapons program during the cold war, along with the site at Semey, Kazakhstan, before the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 banned all nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere, ocean, or space, therefore all testing moved underground thereafter.

The nuclear bomb market, an area of significant geopolitical and defense interest, encompasses the development, production, and strategic deployment of nuclear weapons by nation-states. As of recent reports, the global nuclear bomb market is valued in the billions, reflecting ongoing investments in nuclear arsenals,

In this paper, we introduce a novel approach for assessing the effectiveness of messaging designed to influence public opinion on the use of nuclear weapons. We argue that messages intended to decrease support for nuclear use are most effective when they meet three conditions. First, they must present subjects with novel counter-attitudinal information or interpretations that were not likely to be already incorporated into subjects’ opinions. Second, they must provide salient information that resonates with the values and concerns of subjects. Third, since, in the real world, the public is likely to hear both arguments and counterarguments for important policy issues, effective messages must be resilient, maintaining their effect even when respondents are exposed to strong, competing messages. We use this framework to test the effects of different messages about the legality of nuclear use, the military effectiveness of nuclear weapons, and the potential for setting precedents for nuclear use by others. We find that most messages have only modest and reversible effects. Alerting subjects to the possibility that using nuclear weapons might set a precedent making American adversaries more likely to use them in the future, however, produces the most significant reduction in support for nuclear use.

Context

This file contains the availability of nucear warheads of countries between 1945-2022

Content

First Column Year represents the year and other columns contain country names

Scholars have long argued that international organizations solve information problems through increased transparency. This article introduces a distinct problem that instead requires such institutions to keep information secret. We argue that states often seek to reveal intelligence about other states' violations of international rules and laws but are deterred by concerns about revealing the sources and methods used to collect it. Properly equipped international organizations, however, can mitigate these dilemmas by analyzing and acting on sensitive information while protecting it from wide dissemination. Using new data on intelligence disclosures to the International Atomic Energy Agency and an analysis of the full universe of nuclear proliferation cases, we demonstrate that strengthening the Agency's intelligence protection capabilities led to greater intelligence sharing and fewer suspected nuclear facilities. However, our theory suggests that this solution gives informed states a subtle form of influence and is in tension with the normative goal of international transparency.

These data were collected in a national survey designed to examine attitudes of American citizens towards civil defense and emergency management. They provide indicators of public opinion on foreign affairs, nuclear weapons, nuclear war, disarmament, emergency shelters, federal spending, evacuation and natural disasters. Ecological variables are appended to each record which characterize respondents as residing in Department of Defense defined risk areas.

In this paper, we provide an empirical test for the theoretical claim that ambiguous nuclear threats create a “commitment trap” for American leaders: when deterrence fails, supposedly they are more likely to order the use of nuclear weapons to avoid domestic audience costs for backing down. We designed an original survey experiment and fielded it to a sample of 1,000 U.S. citizens. We found no evidence of a commitment trap when ambiguous nuclear threats are made. Unlike explicit threats, ambiguous ones did not generate domestic disapproval when the leader backed down; the decision to employ nuclear weapons led to more public backlash for the leader than being caught bluffing; and the threats did not influence public preference for nuclear use across our scenarios. Our findings contribute to the scholarly literature on nuclear crisis bargaining and policy debates over the future of U.S. declaratory policy.

Full edition for scientific use. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT) is the central regime within the global nuclear order. According to Art. VIII of the treaty, state parties have to meet in intervals of five years to review its operation. The NPT Review Conferences Dataset is a collection of 2959 statements from these quinquennial Review Conferences (RevCon) and their respective Committees (PrepCom). It includes data from 4 RevCons (2000, 2005, 2010, 2015) and 12 PrepComs (2002, 2003, 2004, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2017, 2018, and 2019). In addition, it includes data on attendance and delegation size at all RevCons and PrepComs from 1975 through 2022.