A survey released in April 2024 found that roughly 47 percent of Americans thought it was likely or very likely that there would be another Civil War in their lifetime. Around 14 percent of surveyed Americans thought it very unlikely that there would be another Civil War in their lifetime.

Of the ten deadliest battles of the American Civil War, the Battle of Gettysburg in early July, 1863, was by far the most devastating battle of the war, claiming over 51 thousand casualties, of which 7 thousand were battle deaths. The Battles of Shiloh, Bull Run (Second), Antietam, Stones River and Chancellorsville all have very similar casualty counts, between 22.5 and 24 thousand casualties each, although it should be noted that the Battle of Antietam took place in a single day, and with 22,717 casualties it is the bloodiest day in U.S. history. The Battles of Chickamauga, the Wilderness and Spotsylvania, all had approximately 30 to 35 thousand casualties each, whereas the Siege of Vicksburg is the only entry on this list with less than 20 thousand casualties.

Existing research on civil war interventions provides contradicting evidence about the role that the media plays in affecting the likelihood of intervention. To date, studies often focus on specific cases (frequently by the United States) leaving it unclear whether the media'™s influence extends more broadly. In this article we examine this question cross-nationally and argue that we need to account for the possibility that interventions also lead to increases in media coverage. We test our hypotheses using cross-national data on civil war interventions and media coverage. These data include a new measure of media coverage of 73 countries experiencing civil wars between 1982 and 1999. These data allow us to determine whether media coverage is more likely to drive leaders'™ decisions or follow them. Toward this end we employ a two-stage conditional maximum likelihood model to control for potential endogeneity between media attention and interventions. The results suggest a reciprocal positive relationship between media attention and civil conflict interventions. Specifically, an increase of one standard deviation in media coverage raises the probability of intervention 68%.

This folder the script files and the underlying data used to aggregate, analyze, and create all the tables in the study “Measuring Spatio-Temporal Civil War Dimensions Using Community-Based Dynamic Network Representation (CoDNet).” These data include: 1. The .csv data file used to conduct the regressions, with all CoDNET based variables included therein (“ccnet_12_19.csv”). 2. The .R script file used to estimate these models, as well as all robustness models in the appendix, and summary statistics. For any questions about the data or scripts, please contact Ore Koren at okoren@iu.edu.

Previous work has suggested that civil wars can increase the risk of militarized interstate conflict. This research note examines the severity of different suggested linkages between civil war and international conflict using data from 1946 to 2001. The results show that instances of direct intervention and interstate coercion are associated with more severe interstate disputes, comparable in magnitude to the severity of territorial disputes. By contrast, disputes that entail pursuit of rebels across international borders, efforts to deter externalization and spillover events tend to have lower severity. The results underscore the important potential role of internal war for interstate conflicts as well as what types of conflict linkages seem to go together with more severe disputes.

This graph shows the total length of railroad tracks in each of the home fronts in 1861, at the outbreak of the American Civil War. From the data we can see that the Union States had over double the amount of railroad than the Confederacy, and well over ten time that of the Border states. This is was a significant advantage for the Union forces as they had a much better infrastructure for transporting men and supplies throughout the war.

Financial overview and grant giving statistics of Missouri Civil War Museum

These data contain daily and sub-daily coded data on historical civil wars. The data are interval. The date, day, action type, location, each sides' action, captures, injuries and deaths are shown, and there is a description of each event with the identification of the original source, which in these data is typically a history book.

In order to replicate the results in this study you require Stata 12 or higher versions and the provided data and do files. Download the do file and the data file into one directory, unzip the data file into that same directory, enter your working directory in the do file, and execute the code in Stata. When using the data, please cite: Nils-Christian Bormann, Lars-Erik Cederman & Manuel Vogt (2015). "Language, Religion, and Ethnic Civil War." Online first in Journal of Conflict Resolution. Abstract: Are certain ethnic cleavages more conflict-prone than others? While only few scholars focus on the contents of ethnicity, most of those who do argue that political violence is more likely to occur along religious divisions than linguistic ones. We challenge this claim by analyzing the path from linguistic differences to ethnic civil war along three theoretical steps: (1) the perception of grievances by group members, (2) rebel mobilization, and (3) government accommodation of rebel demands. Our argument is tested with a new data set of ethnic cleavages that records multiple linguistic and religious segments for ethnic groups from 1946 to 2009. Adopting a relational perspective, we assess ethnic differences between potential challengers and the politically dominant group in each country. Our findings indicate that intrastate conflict is more likely within linguistic dyads than among religious ones. Moreover, we find no support for the thesis that Muslim groups are particularly conflict-prone. http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/08/24/0022002715600755.abstract

This repository contains data and/or code supplementing the article "Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict, and Civil Wars".

Conflicting worlds : new dimensions of the American Civil War is a book series. It includes 5 books, written by 5 different authors.

Replication data for Reyko Huang, "Rebel Diplomacy in Civil War," International Security, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Spring 2016), pp. 89–126.

This graph shows the total number of soldiers who were enlisted in the Union and Confederate armies during the American Civil War, between 1861 and 1865. The total population of the Union states was 18.9 million in 1860, and the Confederate states in the south had a population of 8.6 million. The Border States, who primarily supported the Union but sent troops to both sides, had a population of 3.5 million. From the graph we can see that over the course of the war a total of 2.1 million men enlisted for the Union Army, and 1.1 million enlisted for the Confederate Army. The Union Army had roughly double the number of soldiers of the Confederacy, and although the Confederacy won more major battles than the Union in the early stages of the war, the strength of numbers in the Union forces was a decisive factor in their overall victory as the war progressed.

Scholars have spent decades investigating various sources of rebellion, from societal and institutional explanations to individual motivations to take up arms against one's government. One element of the civil war process that has gone largely unstudied from a cross-national perspective is the role preexisting organizations in society play in the formation of rebel groups, principally due to a lack of comparable data on the origins of these armed actors across conflicts. In an effort to fill this gap, we present the Foundations of Rebel Group Emergence (FORGE) dataset, which offers information on the “parent” organizations and the founding processes that gave rise to rebel groups active between 1946 and 2011 in intrastate conflicts included in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's Armed Conflict Database. The new information on rebel foundations introduced in this research note should help scholars to reconsider and newly explore a variety of conditions before, during, and after civil wars including rebel-civilian interactions, structures of rebel organizations, bargaining processes with the government, participation in postwar governance, and more.

This dataset describes micro-level conflict activities relating to Nigeria, which was extracted from the ACLED. Nigeria is known to have witnessed a fair share of total civil conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa, including the acclaimed first modern warfare in the subcontinent – the Nigeria (versus Biafra) civil war . The large heterogeneous Nigerian population, divided along ethnic, religious and cultural lines continues to generate latent frictions and manifest conflicts. As of today, there are a number of deadly militias operating within the country, notably the Boko Haram and pastoral herders whose activities are recognised globally . This data may be relevant in understanding the nexus between the recent Nigeria's conflicts environment and national development along economic, social and political dimensions. In addition, it provides safety planning resources for individuals' safety and governments.

The coming of the Civil War, 1837-1861 is a book. It was written by John Niven and published by Eurospan in 1990.

Costs associated with recognizing an internal armed challenger as a legitimate bargaining partner deter governments from initiating peace talks. Yet peaceful termination of conflict requires formal negotiations between the belligerents. This article presents evidence that democratic reforms provide a window of opportunity for peace talks. Democratic reforms represent an opportunity to break away from the past policies of the state and render the conflict as an artifact of the preceding authoritarian institutions. The article contributes to the research field by enhancing our ability to predict negotiations. It also highlights that democratic reforms can be undertaken during an ongoing civil conflict.

Classic and modern theories of rebel warfare emphasize the role of resource endowments. We demonstrate that intelligence gathering, made possible by these endowments, plays a critical role in determining specifics of how rebels launch complex attacks against better-equipped government forces. We test implications of a theoretical model using highly detailed data about Afghan rebel attacks, insurgent-led spy networks, and counterinsurgent operations. Leveraging quasi-random variation in opium suitability, we find that improved rebel capacity is associated with (1) increased insurgent operations, (2) improved battlefield tactics through technological innovation, increased complexity, and attack clustering, and (3) increased effectiveness against security forces, especially harder targets. These results show that access to capital, coupled with intelligence gathering, meaningfully impacts how and where rebels fight.

Sharpshooting in the Civil War is a book. It was written by John L. Plaster and published by Paladin in 2009.

Scholars frequently use country-level indicators such as gross domestic product, bureaucratic quality, and military spending to approximate state capacity. These factors capture the aggregate level of state capacity, but do not adequately approximate the actual distribution of capacity within states. This presents a major problem, as intrastate variations in state capacity provide crucial information for understanding the relationship between state capacity and civil war. We offer nighttime light emissions as a measure of state capacity. It allows us to differentiate the influence of local variation on the outbreak of civil wars within the country from the effect of aggregate state capacity at the country level. We articulate pathways linking the distribution of nighttime light with the expansion of state capacity and validate our indicator against other measures at different levels of disaggregation across multiple contexts. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that civil wars are more likely to erupt where the state exercises more control. We provide three mechanisms that, we believe, account for this counterintuitive finding: rebel gravitation, elite fragmentation, and expansion reaction. In the first scenario, state presence attracts insurgent activities. In the second, insurgents emerge as a result of the fragmentation of political elites. In the third, antistate groups react violently to the state penetrating into a given territory. Finally, we validate these mechanisms using evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa.