Following the drastic increase directly after the COVID-19 pandemic, the delinquency rate started to gradually decline, falling below *** percent in the second quarter of 2023. In the second half of 2023, the delinquency rate picked up, but remained stable throughout 2024. In the first quarter of 2025, **** percent of mortgage loans were delinquent. That was significantly lower than the **** percent during the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 or the peak of *** percent during the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007-2010. What does the mortgage delinquency rate tell us? The mortgage delinquency rate is the share of the total number of mortgaged home loans in the U.S. where payment is overdue by 30 days or more. Many borrowers eventually manage to service their loan, though, as indicated by the markedly lower foreclosure rates. Total home mortgage debt in the U.S. stood at almost ** trillion U.S. dollars in 2024. Not all mortgage loans are made equal ‘Subprime’ loans, being targeted at high-risk borrowers and generally coupled with higher interest rates to compensate for the risk. These loans have far higher delinquency rates than conventional loans. Defaulting on such loans was one of the triggers for the 2007-2010 financial crisis, with subprime delinquency rates reaching almost ** percent around this time. These higher delinquency rates translate into higher foreclosure rates, which peaked at just under ** percent of all subprime mortgages in 2011.
The Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09 was a period of severe macroeconomic instability for the United States and the global economy more generally. The crisis was precipitated by the collapse of a number of financial institutions who were deeply involved in the U.S. mortgage market and associated credit markets. Beginning in the Summer of 2007, a number of banks began to report issues with increasing mortgage delinquencies and the problem of not being able to accurately price derivatives contracts which were based on bundles of these U.S. residential mortgages. By the end of 2008, U.S. financial institutions had begun to fail due to their exposure to the housing market, leading to one of the deepest recessions in the history of the United States and to extensive government bailouts of the financial sector.
Subprime and the collapse of the U.S. mortgage market
The early 2000s had seen explosive growth in the U.S. mortgage market, as credit became cheaper due to the Federal Reserve's decision to lower interest rates in the aftermath of the 2001 'Dot Com' Crash, as well as because of the increasing globalization of financial flows which directed funds into U.S. financial markets. Lower mortgage rates gave incentive to financial institutions to begin lending to riskier borrowers, using so-called 'subprime' loans. These were loans to borrowers with poor credit scores, who would not have met the requirements for a conventional mortgage loan. In order to hedge against the risk of these riskier loans, financial institutions began to use complex financial instruments known as derivatives, which bundled mortgage loans together and allowed the risk of default to be sold on to willing investors. This practice was supposed to remove the risk from these loans, by effectively allowing credit institutions to buy insurance against delinquencies. Due to the fraudulent practices of credit ratings agencies, however, the price of these contacts did not reflect the real risk of the loans involved. As the reality of the inability of the borrowers to repay began to kick in during 2007, the financial markets which traded these derivatives came under increasing stress and eventually led to a 'sudden stop' in trading and credit intermediation during 2008.
Market Panic and The Great Recession
As borrowers failed to make repayments, this had a knock-on effect among financial institutions who were highly leveraged with financial instruments based on the mortgage market. Lehman Brothers, one of the world's largest investment banks, failed on September 15th 2008, causing widespread panic in financial markets. Due to the fear of an unprecedented collapse in the financial sector which would have untold consequences for the wider economy, the U.S. government and central bank, The Fed, intervened the following day to bailout the United States' largest insurance company, AIG, and to backstop financial markets. The crisis prompted a deep recession, known colloquially as The Great Recession, drawing parallels between this period and The Great Depression. The collapse of credit intermediation in the economy lead to further issues in the real economy, as business were increasingly unable to pay back loans and were forced to lay off staff, driving unemployment to a high of almost 10 percent in 2010. While there has been criticism of the U.S. government's actions to bailout the financial institutions involved, the actions of the government and the Fed are seen by many as having prevented the crisis from spiraling into a depression of the magnitude of The Great Depression.
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Graph and download economic data for Delinquency Rate on Single-Family Residential Mortgages, Booked in Domestic Offices, All Commercial Banks (DRSFRMACBS) from Q1 1991 to Q1 2025 about domestic offices, delinquencies, 1-unit structures, mortgage, family, residential, commercial, domestic, banks, depository institutions, rate, and USA.
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The industry is composed of non-depository institutions that conduct primary and secondary market lending. Operators in this industry include government agencies in addition to non-agency issuers of mortgage-related securities. Through 2025, rising per capita disposable income and low levels of unemployment helped fuel the increase in primary and secondary market sales of collateralized debt. Nonetheless, due to the pandemic and the sharp contraction in economic activity in 2020, revenue gains were limited, but have climbed as the economy has normalized and interest rates shot up to tackle rampant inflation. However, in 2024 the Federal Reserve cut interest rates as inflationary pressures eased and is expected to be cut further in 2025. Overall, these trends, along with volatility in the real estate market, have caused revenue to slump at a CAGR of 1.5% to $485.0 billion over the past five years, including an expected decline of 1.1% in 2025 alone. The high interest rate environment has hindered real estate loan demand and caused industry profit to shrink to 11.6% of revenue in 2025. Higher access to credit and higher disposable income have fueled primary market lending over much of the past five years, increasing the variety and volume of loans to be securitized and sold in secondary markets. An additional boon for institutions has been an increase in interest rates in the latter part of the period, which raised interest income as the spread between short- and long-term interest rates increased. These macroeconomic factors, combined with changing risk appetite and regulation in the secondary markets, have resurrected collateralized debt trading since the middle of the period. Although the FED cut interest rates in 2024, this will reduce interest income for the industry but increase loan demand. Although institutions are poised to benefit from a strong economic recovery as inflationary pressures ease, relatively steady rates of homeownership, coupled with declines in the 30-year mortgage rate, are expected to damage the primary market through 2030. Shaky demand from commercial banking and uncertainty surrounding inflationary pressures will influence institutions' decisions on whether or not to sell mortgage-backed securities and commercial loans to secondary markets. These trends are expected to cause revenue to decline at a CAGR of 0.8% to $466.9 billion over the five years to 2030.
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Graph and download economic data for 30-Year Fixed Rate FHA Mortgage Index (OBMMIFHA30YF) from 2017-01-03 to 2025-06-26 about FHA, 30-year, fixed, mortgage, rate, indexes, and USA.
The CoreLogic Loan-Level Market Analytics (LLMA) for primary mortgages dataset contains detailed loan data, including origination, events, performance, forbearance and inferred modification data.
CoreLogic sources the Loan-Level Market Analytics data directly from loan servicers. CoreLogic cleans and augments the contributed records with modeled data. The Data Dictionary indicates which fields are contributed and which are inferred.
The Loan-Level Market Analytics data is aimed at providing lenders, servicers, investors, and advisory firms with the insights they need to make trustworthy assessments and accurate decisions. Stanford Libraries has purchased the Loan-Level Market Analytics data for researchers interested in housing, economics, finance and other topics related to prime and subprime first lien data.
CoreLogic provided the data to Stanford Libraries as pipe-delimited text files, which we have uploaded to Data Farm (Redivis) for preview, extraction and analysis.
For more information about how the data was prepared for Redivis, please see CoreLogic 2024 GitLab.
Per the End User License Agreement, the LLMA Data cannot be commingled (i.e. merged, mixed or combined) with Tax and Deed Data that Stanford University has licensed from CoreLogic, or other data which includes the same or similar data elements or that can otherwise be used to identify individual persons or loan servicers.
The 2015 major release of CoreLogic Loan-Level Market Analytics (for primary mortgages) was intended to enhance the CoreLogic servicing consortium through data quality improvements and integrated analytics. See **CL_LLMA_ReleaseNotes.pdf **for more information about these changes.
For more information about included variables, please see CL_LLMA_Data_Dictionary.pdf.
**
For more information about how the database was set up, please see LLMA_Download_Guide.pdf.
Data access is required to view this section.
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Companies in the Subprime Auto Loans industry have contended with rising interest rates and significant economic volatility. Several small, specialized creditors have been pushed to bankruptcy because of diminishing profit and growing subprime auto loan delinquencies. According to Fitch Ratings Inc., the index of the 60-day delinquency rate of subprime auto loans reached 6.11% in September 2023 and remained significantly elevated at 6.00% in October 2023 (latest data available), a worse rating than during the great financial crisis. As a result, many businesses have exited the industry. However, in 2024 the Federal Reserve cut interest rates by half a point and is anticipated to cut rates further in the near future which will positively impact the industry. The pandemic shocked industry revenue in 2020, dampening profit and income for many lenders as stay-at-home orders rendered personal transportation less crucial to many. However, as the economy settles back to normal, many subprime consumers will return to work and lead the industry to growth in the latter part of the period. Overall, industry revenue has lagged at a CAGR of 1.2% to $19.0 billion over the five years to 2024, including an expected jump of 0.4% in 2024 alone. Despite the potential payout of subprime interest rates, many companies in the Auto Leasing, Loans and Sales Financing industry (IBISWorld report 52222) still chose not to expand the number of high-risk loans in their portfolios. Instead, they have sought super-prime and prime borrowers during heightened delinquency rates, which will aid in recovery. Moreover, many primary auto dealers have begun reducing their auto financing divisions to eliminate high-risk borrowers. Moving forward, industry revenue declines will be limited by rising access to credit and growth in consumer confidence, which will accelerate vehicle sales. Also, interest rates are expected to come down as the FED continues to monitor inflation and reduce rates accordingly. In addition, some consumers will seek to lock in financing deals as interest rates continue to be reduced. Overall, industry revenue is forecast to slump at a CAGR of 1.2% to $17.9 billion over the five years to 2029.
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United States Car Loan Market size was valued at USD 660 Billion in 2024 and is projected to reach USD 960 Billion by 2032, growing at a CAGR of 4.8% from 2026 to 2032.
United States Car Loan Market Drivers
Economic Stability: A stable economy with low unemployment and rising incomes encourages consumers to make major purchases, including vehicles.
Consumer Sentiment: Positive consumer sentiment about the economy and their financial prospects drives demand for car loans.
Interest Rate Environment: Low interest rates make car loans more affordable, stimulating demand. Conversely, rising interest rates can dampen demand.
Credit Score: Availability of credit is also a big driver. People with better credit scores, get offered better rates.
Lender Policies: The lending policies of banks, credit unions, and other financial institutions affect the availability and terms of car loans.
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The France Auto Loan Market is projected to grow from $31.45 million in 2023 to $49.63 million by 2033, exhibiting a CAGR of 4.56% during the forecast period. The market growth is attributed to several factors, including the increasing demand for vehicles, favorable government policies, and the growing popularity of subprime lending. Government initiatives such as the "Prime d'activité" and the "Eco-Prêt à Taux Zéro" program have significantly contributed to the market growth by providing financial assistance to consumers for vehicle purchases. Subprime lending, specifically, has witnessed a notable surge in demand, primarily due to the relaxed credit criteria and the high acceptance rate, making it more accessible for individuals with poor credit scores to secure auto loans. The market is also driven by the increasing number of non-banking financial companies (NBFCs) and fintech companies offering competitive interest rates and flexible loan terms, expanding the options available to consumers. However, rising interest rates and changing consumer preferences, such as the shift towards leasing and ride-hailing services, may pose challenges to the market growth in the future. Recent developments include: June 2023: BNP Paribas Personal Finance entered into exclusive talks with Orange SA to take on its Orange Bank clients, letting the French mobile phone carrier walk away from the business. The partnership is part of Orange’s plan to progressively withdraw Orange Bank from the retail banking market in France and Spain., September 2022: Cofidis France launched a new solidarity scheme to support 40 associations in its territory, 'Missions Booster.' The company offered each of its 1,500 employees 3 days of volunteer work to help associations in their area, i.e., 4,500 days offered to the non-profit sector.. Key drivers for this market are: Quick Processing of Loan through Digital Banking. Potential restraints include: Quick Processing of Loan through Digital Banking. Notable trends are: Increasing Number of Registered Passenger Cars in France.
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Commercial Banks generate most of their revenue through loans to customers and businesses. Loans are set at interest rates that are influenced by different factors, including the federal funds rate (FFR), the prime rate, debtors' creditworthiness and overall macroeconomic performance. The Commercial Banking industry’s performance was mixed during the current period, which included both the postpandemic recovery and a strong economy amid high interest rates. At the onset of the period, volatile economic conditions created domestic and global dollar funding pressures, creating havoc in the Treasuries market and causing the Fed to act as a dealer of last resort by flooding the international and domestic dollar funding markets with liquidity. The Fed set interest rates to near zero in March 2020 to stimulate the economy; despite this, weak economic performance in 2020 limited demand for bank lending and investment, causing industry revenue to decline. In 2022, the Fed began increasing interest rates to curb historically high inflation. Commercial Banks benefited from the higher rates, which resulted in greater interest income for the industry and contributed to double-digit revenue growth in 2022 and 2023. However, as inflation receded, the Fed cut interest rates in 2024 and is anticipated to cut rates further in 2025 to provide a boost to the economy. Overall, industry revenue has been growing at a CAGR of 7.2% to $1,418.0 billion over the past five years, including an expected decrease of 3.7% in 2025 alone. During the outlook period, industry revenue is forecast to shrink at a CAGR of 1.3% to $1,328.5 billion through the end of 2030. Further interest rate cuts would lower interest income for the industry, hampering profit. In a lower interest rate environment, commercial banks would likely encounter rising loan demand but experience reduced investment income from fixed-income securities. In addition, the acquisition of financial technology start-ups to compete will increase as the industry continues to evolve.
Formaat: MP4
Omvang: 47,2 Mb
27 February 2008
Online beschikbaar: [01-12-2014]
Standard Youtube License
Uploaded on Jun 11, 2008
Video summary of the ALDE workshop "The International Financial Crisis: Its causes and what to do about it?"
Event date: 27/02/08 14:00 to 18:00
Location: Room ASP 5G2, European Parliament, Brussels
This workshop will bring together Members of the European Parliament, economists, academics and journalists as well as representatives of the European Commission to discuss the lessons that have to be drawn from the recent financial crisis caused by the US sub-prime mortgage market.
With the view of the informal ECOFIN meeting in April which will look at the financial sector supervision and crisis management mechanisms, this workshop aims at debating a wide range of topics including:
- how to improve the existing supervisory framework,
- how to combat the opacity of financial markets and improve transparency requirements,
- how to address the rating agencies' performance and conflict of interest,
- what regulatory lessons are to be learnt in order to avoid a repetition of the sub-prime and the resulting credit crunch.
PROGRAMME
14:00 - 14:10 Opening remarks: Graham Watson, leader of the of the ALDE Group
14:10 - 14:25 Keynote speech by Charlie McCreevy, Commissioner for the Internal Market and Services, European Commission
14:25 - 14:40 Presentation by Daniel Daianu, MEP (ALDE) of his background paper
14:40 - 15:30 Panel I: Current features of the financial systems and the main causes of the current international crisis.
-John Purvis, MEP EPP
-Eric De Keuleneer, Solvay Business School, Free University of Brussels
-Nigel Phipps, Head of European Regulatory Affairs Moody's
-Wolfgang Munchau, journalist Financial Times
-Robert Priester, European Banking Federation (EBF), Head of Department Banking Supervision and Financial Markets
-Ray Kinsella, Director of the Centre for Insurance Studies University College Dublin
-Servaas Deroose, Director ECFIN.C, Macroeconomy of the euro area and the EU, European Commission
-Leke Van den Burg, MEP PSE
-David Smith, Visiting Professor at Derby Business School
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Graph and download economic data for Delinquency Rate on Credit Card Loans, All Commercial Banks (DRCCLACBS) from Q1 1991 to Q1 2025 about credit cards, delinquencies, commercial, loans, banks, depository institutions, rate, and USA.
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Graph and download economic data for Charge-Off Rate on Consumer Loans, All Commercial Banks (CORCACBS) from Q1 1985 to Q1 2025 about charge-offs, commercial, loans, consumer, banks, depository institutions, rate, and USA.
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Following the drastic increase directly after the COVID-19 pandemic, the delinquency rate started to gradually decline, falling below *** percent in the second quarter of 2023. In the second half of 2023, the delinquency rate picked up, but remained stable throughout 2024. In the first quarter of 2025, **** percent of mortgage loans were delinquent. That was significantly lower than the **** percent during the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 or the peak of *** percent during the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007-2010. What does the mortgage delinquency rate tell us? The mortgage delinquency rate is the share of the total number of mortgaged home loans in the U.S. where payment is overdue by 30 days or more. Many borrowers eventually manage to service their loan, though, as indicated by the markedly lower foreclosure rates. Total home mortgage debt in the U.S. stood at almost ** trillion U.S. dollars in 2024. Not all mortgage loans are made equal ‘Subprime’ loans, being targeted at high-risk borrowers and generally coupled with higher interest rates to compensate for the risk. These loans have far higher delinquency rates than conventional loans. Defaulting on such loans was one of the triggers for the 2007-2010 financial crisis, with subprime delinquency rates reaching almost ** percent around this time. These higher delinquency rates translate into higher foreclosure rates, which peaked at just under ** percent of all subprime mortgages in 2011.