this data base contains african indexes returns , namely MASI , NSE20, INVSAF40 and TUNINDEX before and after the subprime crisis in order toinvestigate the impact of this crisis on linkages among african markets

The Federal National Mortgage Association, commonly known as Fannie Mae, was created by the U.S. congress in 1938, in order to maintain liquidity and stability in the domestic mortgage market. The company is a government-sponsored enterprise (GSE), meaning that while it was a publicly traded company for most of its history, it was still supported by the federal government. While there is no legally binding guarantee of shares in GSEs or their securities, it is generally acknowledged that the U.S. government is highly unlikely to let these enterprises fail. Due to these implicit guarantees, GSEs are able to access financing at a reduced cost of interest. Fannie Mae's main activity is the purchasing of mortgage loans from their originators (banks, mortgage brokers etc.) and packaging them into mortgage-backed securities (MBS) in order to ease the access of U.S. homebuyers to housing credit. The early 2000s U.S. mortgage finance boom During the early 2000s, Fannie Mae was swept up in the U.S. housing boom which eventually led to the financial crisis of 2007-2008. The association's stated goal of increasing access of lower income families to housing finance coalesced with the interests of private mortgage lenders and Wall Street investment banks, who had become heavily reliant on the housing market to drive profits. Private lenders had begun to offer riskier mortgage loans in the early 2000s due to low interest rates in the wake of the "Dot Com" crash and their need to maintain profits through increasing the volume of loans on their books. The securitized products created by these private lenders did not maintain the standards which had traditionally been upheld by GSEs. Due to their market share being eaten into by private firms, however, the GSEs involved in the mortgage markets began to also lower their standards, resulting in a 'race to the bottom'. The fall of Fannie Mae The lowering of lending standards was a key factor in creating the housing bubble, as mortgages were now being offered to borrowers with little or no ability to repay the loans. Combined with fraudulent practices from credit ratings agencies, who rated the junk securities created from these mortgage loans as being of the highest standard, this led directly to the financial panic that erupted on Wall Street beginning in 2007. As the U.S. economy slowed down in 2006, mortgage delinquency rates began to spike. Fannie Mae's losses in the mortgage security market in 2006 and 2007, along with the losses of the related GSE 'Freddie Mac', had caused its share value to plummet, stoking fears that it may collapse. On September 7th 2008, Fannie Mae was taken into government conservatorship along with Freddie Mac, with their stocks being delisted from stock exchanges in 2010. This act was seen as an unprecedented direct intervention into the economy by the U.S. government, and a symbol of how far the U.S. housing market had fallen.

The Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09 was a period of severe macroeconomic instability for the United States and the global economy more generally. The crisis was precipitated by the collapse of a number of financial institutions who were deeply involved in the U.S. mortgage market and associated credit markets. Beginning in the Summer of 2007, a number of banks began to report issues with increasing mortgage delinquencies and the problem of not being able to accurately price derivatives contracts which were based on bundles of these U.S. residential mortgages. By the end of 2008, U.S. financial institutions had begun to fail due to their exposure to the housing market, leading to one of the deepest recessions in the history of the United States and to extensive government bailouts of the financial sector.

Subprime and the collapse of the U.S. mortgage market

The early 2000s had seen explosive growth in the U.S. mortgage market, as credit became cheaper due to the Federal Reserve's decision to lower interest rates in the aftermath of the 2001 'Dot Com' Crash, as well as because of the increasing globalization of financial flows which directed funds into U.S. financial markets. Lower mortgage rates gave incentive to financial institutions to begin lending to riskier borrowers, using so-called 'subprime' loans. These were loans to borrowers with poor credit scores, who would not have met the requirements for a conventional mortgage loan. In order to hedge against the risk of these riskier loans, financial institutions began to use complex financial instruments known as derivatives, which bundled mortgage loans together and allowed the risk of default to be sold on to willing investors. This practice was supposed to remove the risk from these loans, by effectively allowing credit institutions to buy insurance against delinquencies. Due to the fraudulent practices of credit ratings agencies, however, the price of these contacts did not reflect the real risk of the loans involved. As the reality of the inability of the borrowers to repay began to kick in during 2007, the financial markets which traded these derivatives came under increasing stress and eventually led to a 'sudden stop' in trading and credit intermediation during 2008.

Market Panic and The Great Recession

As borrowers failed to make repayments, this had a knock-on effect among financial institutions who were highly leveraged with financial instruments based on the mortgage market. Lehman Brothers, one of the world's largest investment banks, failed on September 15th 2008, causing widespread panic in financial markets. Due to the fear of an unprecedented collapse in the financial sector which would have untold consequences for the wider economy, the U.S. government and central bank, The Fed, intervened the following day to bailout the United States' largest insurance company, AIG, and to backstop financial markets. The crisis prompted a deep recession, known colloquially as The Great Recession, drawing parallels between this period and The Great Depression. The collapse of credit intermediation in the economy lead to further issues in the real economy, as business were increasingly unable to pay back loans and were forced to lay off staff, driving unemployment to a high of almost 10 percent in 2010. While there has been criticism of the U.S. government's actions to bailout the financial institutions involved, the actions of the government and the Fed are seen by many as having prevented the crisis from spiraling into a depression of the magnitude of The Great Depression.

this data base contains USD/MAD and EUR/MAD returns in addition to S&P GSCI returns from 15 October 2005 until the 31 December 2014 as the main sample,then we divided this sample into four subsamples, (after & before) the subprime crisis, and (before & after) the debt crisis

Yearly citation counts for the publication titled "Provision of Liquidity Through the Primary Credit Facility During the Financial Crisis: A Structural Analysis".

Formaat: MP4Omvang: 47,2 Mb27 February 2008Online beschikbaar: [01-12-2014]Standard Youtube LicenseUploaded on Jun 11, 2008Video summary of the ALDE workshop "The International Financial Crisis: Its causes and what to do about it?"Event date: 27/02/08 14:00 to 18:00Location: Room ASP 5G2, European Parliament, BrusselsThis workshop will bring together Members of the European Parliament, economists, academics and journalists as well as representatives of the European Commission to discuss the lessons that have to be drawn from the recent financial crisis caused by the US sub-prime mortgage market.With the view of the informal ECOFIN meeting in April which will look at the financial sector supervision and crisis management mechanisms, this workshop aims at debating a wide range of topics including:- how to improve the existing supervisory framework,- how to combat the opacity of financial markets and improve transparency requirements,- how to address the rating agencies' performance and conflict of interest,- what regulatory lessons are to be learnt in order to avoid a repetition of the sub-prime and the resulting credit crunch.PROGRAMME14:00 - 14:10 Opening remarks: Graham Watson, leader of the of the ALDE Group14:10 - 14:25 Keynote speech by Charlie McCreevy, Commissioner for the Internal Market and Services, European Commission14:25 - 14:40 Presentation by Daniel Daianu, MEP (ALDE) of his background paper14:40 - 15:30 Panel I: Current features of the financial systems and the main causes of the current international crisis.-John Purvis, MEP EPP-Eric De Keuleneer, Solvay Business School, Free University of Brussels-Nigel Phipps, Head of European Regulatory Affairs Moody's-Wolfgang Munchau, journalist Financial Times-Robert Priester, European Banking Federation (EBF), Head of Department Banking Supervision and Financial Markets-Ray Kinsella, Director of the Centre for Insurance Studies University College Dublin-Servaas Deroose, Director ECFIN.C, Macroeconomy of the euro area and the EU, European Commission-Leke Van den Burg, MEP PSE-David Smith, Visiting Professor at Derby Business School

Affordable Housing Market Analysis The global affordable housing market is projected to reach $1,983.52 billion by 2033, exhibiting a CAGR of 4.71% from 2025 to 2033. The rising population, urbanization, affordability crisis, and supportive government policies are the primary drivers fueling market growth. The increasing demand for affordable single-family homes, multi-family units, and townhouses, coupled with the adoption of innovative construction methods like prefabrication, 3D printing, and sustainable construction, are key trends shaping the market. The market faces restraints such as escalating land and construction costs, regulatory challenges, and the shortage of skilled labor. Nevertheless, the emergence of crowdfunding platforms and non-profit organizations providing financial assistance, as well as government subsidies and tax incentives, are expected to mitigate these constraints. The market is segmented based on housing type, funding source, construction method, and target demographics. D.R. Horton, Taylor Morrison, PulteGroup, Zillow, Hovnanian Enterprises, and Lennar Corporation are notable companies in the global affordable housing market, with operations in key regions like North America, Europe, and Asia Pacific. Recent developments include: Recent developments in the Affordable Housing Market have highlighted the urgent need for innovative housing solutions as governments and organizations strive to address the growing housing crisis exacerbated by economic challenges and population growth. Various nations are prioritizing policies that encourage public-private partnerships to stimulate investment in affordable housing initiatives. Additionally, the integration of sustainable building practices and smart technologies is gaining traction as stakeholders aim to improve energy efficiency while reducing construction costs. Recent collaborations among international entities and local governments focus on leveraging funding for housing projects, particularly in urban areas where demand is surging. Moreover, rising material costs and labor shortages are prompting stakeholders to explore alternative building materials and methods, including modular construction and 3D printing, to streamline processes. These trends underscore a collective commitment to creating equitable housing opportunities while navigating the complexities of market dynamics, aiming for significant progress by 2032. Overall, this evolving landscape reflects a concerted effort to promote affordability, sustainability, and accessibility in housing worldwide.. Key drivers for this market are: Green building technologies adoption Public-private partnerships expansion Innovative financing solutions development Urban regeneration projects implementation Digital platforms for housing access. Potential restraints include: rising urbanization, government initiatives; increasing housing demand; socioeconomic disparities; affordable financing options.

Following the drastic increase directly after the COVID-19 pandemic, the delinquency rate started to gradually decline, falling below *** percent in the second quarter of 2023. In the second half of 2023, the delinquency rate picked up, but remained stable throughout 2024. In the first quarter of 2025, **** percent of mortgage loans were delinquent. That was significantly lower than the **** percent during the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 or the peak of *** percent during the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007-2010. What does the mortgage delinquency rate tell us? The mortgage delinquency rate is the share of the total number of mortgaged home loans in the U.S. where payment is overdue by 30 days or more. Many borrowers eventually manage to service their loan, though, as indicated by the markedly lower foreclosure rates. Total home mortgage debt in the U.S. stood at almost ** trillion U.S. dollars in 2024. Not all mortgage loans are made equal ‘Subprime’ loans, being targeted at high-risk borrowers and generally coupled with higher interest rates to compensate for the risk. These loans have far higher delinquency rates than conventional loans. Defaulting on such loans was one of the triggers for the 2007-2010 financial crisis, with subprime delinquency rates reaching almost ** percent around this time. These higher delinquency rates translate into higher foreclosure rates, which peaked at just under ** percent of all subprime mortgages in 2011.

these are the Replication files for: How Global is the Affordable Housing Crisis? accepted by the International Journal of Housing Markets and Analysis

Companies in the Subprime Auto Loans industry have contended with rising interest rates and significant economic volatility. Several small, specialized creditors have been pushed to bankruptcy because of diminishing profit and growing subprime auto loan delinquencies. According to Fitch Ratings Inc., the index of the 60-day delinquency rate of subprime auto loans reached 6.11% in September 2023 and remained significantly elevated at 6.00% in October 2023 (latest data available), a worse rating than during the great financial crisis. As a result, many businesses have exited the industry. However, in 2024 the Federal Reserve cut interest rates by half a point and is anticipated to cut rates further in the near future which will positively impact the industry. The pandemic shocked industry revenue in 2020, dampening profit and income for many lenders as stay-at-home orders rendered personal transportation less crucial to many. However, as the economy settles back to normal, many subprime consumers will return to work and lead the industry to growth in the latter part of the period. Overall, industry revenue has lagged at a CAGR of 1.2% to $19.0 billion over the five years to 2024, including an expected jump of 0.4% in 2024 alone. Despite the potential payout of subprime interest rates, many companies in the Auto Leasing, Loans and Sales Financing industry (IBISWorld report 52222) still chose not to expand the number of high-risk loans in their portfolios. Instead, they have sought super-prime and prime borrowers during heightened delinquency rates, which will aid in recovery. Moreover, many primary auto dealers have begun reducing their auto financing divisions to eliminate high-risk borrowers. Moving forward, industry revenue declines will be limited by rising access to credit and growth in consumer confidence, which will accelerate vehicle sales. Also, interest rates are expected to come down as the FED continues to monitor inflation and reduce rates accordingly. In addition, some consumers will seek to lock in financing deals as interest rates continue to be reduced. Overall, industry revenue is forecast to slump at a CAGR of 1.2% to $17.9 billion over the five years to 2029.

Formaat: MP4Omvang: 47,2 Mb27 February 2008Online beschikbaar: [01-12-2014]Standard Youtube LicenseUploaded on Jun 11, 2008Video summary of the ALDE workshop "The International Financial Crisis: Its causes and what to do about it?"Event date: 27/02/08 14:00 to 18:00Location: Room ASP 5G2, European Parliament, BrusselsThis workshop will bring together Members of the European Parliament, economists, academics and journalists as well as representatives of the European Commission to discuss the lessons that have to be drawn from the recent financial crisis caused by the US sub-prime mortgage market.With the view of the informal ECOFIN meeting in April which will look at the financial sector supervision and crisis management mechanisms, this workshop aims at debating a wide range of topics including:- how to improve the existing supervisory framework,- how to combat the opacity of financial markets and improve transparency requirements,- how to address the rating agencies' performance and conflict of interest,- what regulatory lessons are to be learnt in order to avoid a repetition of the sub-prime and the resulting credit crunch.PROGRAMME14:00 - 14:10 Opening remarks: Graham Watson, leader of the of the ALDE Group14:10 - 14:25 Keynote speech by Charlie McCreevy, Commissioner for the Internal Market and Services, European Commission14:25 - 14:40 Presentation by Daniel Daianu, MEP (ALDE) of his background paper14:40 - 15:30 Panel I: Current features of the financial systems and the main causes of the current international crisis.-John Purvis, MEP EPP-Eric De Keuleneer, Solvay Business School, Free University of Brussels-Nigel Phipps, Head of European Regulatory Affairs Moody's-Wolfgang Munchau, journalist Financial Times-Robert Priester, European Banking Federation (EBF), Head of Department Banking Supervision and Financial Markets-Ray Kinsella, Director of the Centre for Insurance Studies University College Dublin-Servaas Deroose, Director ECFIN.C, Macroeconomy of the euro area and the EU, European Commission-Leke Van den Burg, MEP PSE-David Smith, Visiting Professor at Derby Business School

During the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008, a number of systemically important financial institutions in the United States declared bankruptcy, sought takeovers to prevent financial failure, or turned to the U.S. government for bailouts. Two of these institutions, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, were government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), meaning that they were set up by the federal government in order to steer credit towards lower income homebuyers through interventions in the secondary mortgage market. While both were chartered by the government, they were also publicly traded companies, with a majority of shares owned by private investors. The fall of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac These GSEs' business model was based on buying mortgages from their originators (banks, mortgage brokers, etc.) and then packaging groups of these mortgages together as mortgage-backed securities (MBS), before selling these on again to private investors. While this allowed the expansion of mortgage credit, meaning that many Americans were able to buy houses who would not have in other cases, this also contributed to the growing speculation in the housing market and related financial derivatives, such as MBS. The lowering of mortgage lending standards by originators in the early 2000s, as well as the need for GSEs to compete with their private sector rivals, meant that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac became caught up in the financial mania associated with the early 2000s U.S. housing bubble. As their losses mounted due to the bursting of the bubble in 2007, both companies came under increasing financial stress, finally being brought into government conservatorship in September 2008. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were eventually unlisted from stock exchanges in 2010.

Replication material for Jackelyn Hwang & Bina Patel Shrimali (2022) Shared and Crowded Housing in the Bay Area: Where Gentrification and the Housing Crisis Meet COVID-19, Housing Policy Debate, DOI: 10.1080/10511482.2022.2099934

Paper Abstract: Amid the growing affordable housing crisis and widespread gentrification over the last decade, people have been moving less than before and increasingly live in shared and often crowded households across the U.S. Crowded housing has various negative health implications, including stress, sleep disorders, and infectious diseases. Difference-in- difference analysis of a unique, large-scale longitudinal consumer credit database of over 450,000 San Francisco Bay Area residents from 2002 to 2020 shows gentrification affects the probability of residents shifting to crowded households across the socioeconomic spectrum but in different ways than expected. Gentrification is negatively associated with low- socioeconomic status (SES) residents’ probability of entering crowded households, and this is largely explained by increased shifts to crowded households in neighborhoods outside of major cities showing early signs of gentrification. Conversely, gentrification is associated with increases in the probability that middle-SES residents enter crowded households, primarily in Silicon Valley. Lastly, crowding is positively associated with COVID-19 case rates, beyond density and socioeconomic and racial composition in neighborhoods, although the role of gentrification remains unclear. Housing policies that mitigate crowding can serve as early interventions in displacement prevention and reducing health inequities.

Context

The main objective is to provide historical information on stock prices of certain banks. The goal is to make the information easily accessible in case it cannot be downloaded directly from yahoo finance. The idea is that different behaviors in stock prices can be analyzed over time to gain a better understanding of the banking industry. You can also see how different events affect prices, such as the 2007 subprime mortgage crisis, presidential elections, major political reforms, etc.

Content

The dataset contains 99 csv files. Each file has stock information from a specific bank or Financial Service company from Jan 1st, 2006 to Nov 1st, 2020.

For instance, you can find the following banks in this dataset: * Bank of America (BAC) * CitiGroup (C) * Goldman Sachs (GS) * JPMorgan Chase (JPM) * Morgan Stanley (MS) * Wells Fargo (WFC)

Acknowledgements

Yahoo Finance | Technology Sector SEC EDGAR | Company Filings NASDAQ | Historical Quotes

Inspiration

Many have tried, but most have failed, to predict the stock market's ups and downs. Can you do any better? Can you create visualizations that help investors make important decisions?

More Datasets

Conventional banks are ‘indirectly’ allowed to take more risk under the shadow of sovereign guarantees. Banks commit moral hazards as any major banking crisis will be ‘cushioned’ by deposit insurance and bailed out using the taxpayer’s money. This study offers an alternative explanation for the determinants of banks’ credit risk, particularly those from the Islamic regions. Although conventional banks and Islamic banks may share state and social cushioning systems, Islamic banks are strictly prohibited by moral and religious principles from gambling with depositors’ funds, even if there is a cushion available to bail them out. However, banks belonging to collective societies, such as those in the MENA area, may be inclined to take more risks due to the perception of having a larger safety net to protect them in the event of failure. We analyse these theoretical intersections by utilising a dataset consisting of 320 banks from 20 countries, covering the time span from 2006 to 2021. Our analysis employs a combination of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed Effects (FE), and 2-step System-GMM methodologies. Our analysis reveals that Islamic banks are less exposed to credit risk compared to conventional banks. We contend that the stricter ethical and moral ground and multi-layer monitoring system amid protracted geopolitical and post-pandemic crises impacting Islamic countries contribute to the lower credit risk. We examine the consequences for credit and liquidity management in Islamic banks and the risk management strategies employed by Islamic banks, which can serve as a valuable reference for other banks.

The industry players are the development banks of the federal and state governments. Turnover is expected to total €27.4 billion in 2024, which corresponds to an increase of 1.1% compared to the previous year. Between 2019 and 2024, industry turnover increased by an average of 0.5% per year. As the turnover of development banks consists almost exclusively of interest income plus comparatively low commission income, the past phase of low interest rates and the expiry of higher-interest legacy loans have reduced the level of income.Although the development banks were also confronted with falling earnings due to the low interest rates following the financial crisis in the years 2007 to 2009, they were able to benefit from the post-crisis economic environment in contrast to other credit institutions. Since then, most banks have found it very difficult to refinance themselves on the capital market at favourable conditions, as many investors consider the default risk for banks to be significantly higher than before the financial crisis. As the development banks can rely on the federal and state governments, they receive very good ratings and can refinance themselves at favourable conditions, enabling them to expand their business. Following the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic, the development banks were faced with the task of making a significant contribution to supporting the German economy during the crisis. Due to the effects of the war in Ukraine, the volume of funding will remain at a high level in the current year.An average growth rate of 0.5% per year is expected for the period from 2024 to 2029. This means that industry turnover is expected to amount to 28.2 billion euros in 2029. IBISWorld anticipates a slow and slight decline in interest rates over the next five years, meaning that interest income is likely to fall slightly. At the same time, a high volume of funding is expected, as development banks are likely to play a key role in the recovery of the German economy and its transformation towards sustainability and digitalisation.

Lehman Brothers, the fourth largest investment bank on Wall Street, declared bankruptcy on the 15th of September 2008, becoming the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history. The investment house, which was founded in the mid-19th century, had become heavily involved in the U.S. housing bubble in the early 2000s, with its large holdings of toxic mortgage-backed securities (MBS) ultimately causing the bank's downfall. The bank had expanded rapidly following the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999, which meant that investment banks could also engage in commercial banking activities. Lehman vertically integrated their mortgage business, buying smaller commercial enterprises that originated housing loans, which allowed the bank to expand its MBS holdings. The downfall of Lehman and the crash of '08 As the U.S. housing market began to slow down in 2006, the default rate on housing loans began to spike, triggering losses for Lehman from their MBS portfolio. Lehman's main competitor in mortgage financing, Bear Stearns, was bought by J.P. Morgan Chase in order to prevent bankruptcy in March 2008, leading investors and lenders to become increasingly concerned about the bank's financial health. As the bank relied on short-term funding on money markets in order to meet its obligations, the news of its huge losses in the third-quarter of 2008 further prevented it from funding itself on financial markets. By September, it was clear that without external assistance, the bank would fail. As its losses from credit default swaps mounted due to the deepening crash in the housing market, Lehman was forced to declare bankruptcy on September 15, as no buyer could be found to save the bank. The collapse of Lehman triggered panic in global financial markets, forcing the U.S. government to step in and bail-out the insurance giant AIG the next day on September 16. The effects of this financial crisis hit the non-financial economy hard, causing a global recession in 2009.

In recent years, demand for temporary housing has been one of the most significant issues for the industry. Because of rising rental costs, many have faced the risk of homelessness, with many experiencing financial hardship and persistent economic disadvantage. This has been exacerbated by the economic impacts of recent global events, including the COVID-19 pandemic, with the economic consequences resulting in more individuals and families under financial stress. The shortage of affordable housing and rising rent costs have placed significant pressure on homelessness, which has ramped up demand for crisis accommodation service providers. Industry revenue is expected to increase at an annualised 1.6% over the five years through 2025-26 to $1.8 billion. Greater housing stress has boosted demand for crisis housing in recent years. Family breakdowns are one of the main reasons for housing transiency and are a crucial driver of demand for crisis and refuge accommodation. Inflationary and cost-of-living pressures will sustain industry demand, limiting declines in revenue, which is expected to inch down 0.8% in 2025-26, mainly because of stabilisation in the housing market and gradual economic recovery, easing the need for immediate crisis intervention. The Budget 2025 includes considerable additional money for disability assistance and social housing, including $60 million per year for disability residential care and $128 million over four years for new social housing in Auckland, supporting industry profitability. Several factors, including a shortage of affordable housing, economic hardship, disabilities, mental health conditions and addictions to alcohol, drugs and gambling, influence homelessness. Though these issues suggest a continued demand for crisis and care accommodation services, industry growth is projected to be tempered by cost pressures in 2028-29. Also, while ongoing housing affordability issues and an aging population are anticipated to drive industry growth, funding constraints will limit the expansion rate. Overall, industry revenue is forecast to slightly plunge at an annualised 1.9% over the five years through 2030-31 to $1.6 billion.

Revenue for the Residential Real Estate industry in China is expected to decrease at a CAGR of 9.8% over the five years through 2025. This trend includes an expected decrease of 9.6% in the current year.Since August 2020, the People's Bank of China and the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission have proposed three debt indicators for real estate development and management companies through which the company's financial health can be rated. This new policy has exacerbated the company's debt pressure, making it unable to repay old debts by borrowing new debt. Some real estate companies faced a liquidity crisis.In 2022, the city's lockdown and laying-off caused by COVID-19 epidemic led to the pressure of delaying the delivery of houses. The industry's newly constructed and completed areas decreased significantly throughout the year. In addition, the epidemic has impacted sales in the industry, and some sales offices have been forced to close temporarily. In 2022, the residential sales area decreased by 26.8%, and the residential sales decreased by 31.2%.Industry revenue will recover at an annualized 0.7% over the five years through 2030. Over the next five years, the industry's drag on GDP will weaken, and industry growth will stabilize. However, high housing prices have become a major social problem in China. Under the measures on the principle that residential real estate is used for living, not speculation, the financial attributes of real estate will gradually weaken, and housing prices will tend to stabilize.

Graph and download economic data for Delinquency Rate on Single-Family Residential Mortgages, Booked in Domestic Offices, All Commercial Banks (DRSFRMACBS) from Q1 1991 to Q1 2025 about domestic offices, delinquencies, 1-unit structures, mortgage, family, residential, commercial, domestic, banks, depository institutions, rate, and USA.