From March to July 1933, US industrial production rose 57 percent. We show that an important source of recovery was the effect of dollar devaluation on farm prices, incomes, and consumption. Devaluation immediately raised traded crop prices, and auto sales grew more rapidly in states and counties most exposed to these price increases. The response was amplified in counties with more severe farm debt burdens. For plausible assumptions about farmers' relative MPC, the incidence of higher farm prices, and the aggregate multiplier, this redistribution to farmers accounted for a substantial portion of spring 1933 growth. This farm channel thus provides an example of how the distributional consequences of macroeconomic policies can have large aggregate effects. That recovery in 1933 benefited from redistribution to farmers suggests an important limitation to the use of 1933 as a guide to the effects of monetary regime changes in other circumstances.

The Great Depression of the early twentieth century is widely considered the most devastating economic downturn that the developed world has ever seen. Industrial output was severely affected across Europe, and in Germany alone, it fell to just 58 percent of its pre-Depression level by 1932. Other Central European countries, such as Austria and Czechoslovakia, also saw their output fall to just sixty percent of their pre-Depression levels, while output in Western and Northern Europe declined by much less. By 1937/8, almost a decade after the Wall Street Crash, most of these countries saw their industrial output increase above its pre-Depression level. Germany saw its output increase to 132 percent of its 1928 output, as it emerged as Europe's strongest economy shortly before the beginning of the Second World War.

This contains the dataset of the 1936 household consumption survey and 1930 census data used in "Fiscal Policy and Economic Recovery: The Case of the 1936 Veterans' Bonus." The underlying household survey data come from ICPSR study 08908. The Census data come from the IPUMS 5% sample from the 1930 Census. The primary data file is urban_lprob.dta. urban_nodups.dta contains a subset of these data for programming convenience. For further documentation, see the paper, and the data and program files posted on the American Economic Review's website.

Over the course of their first terms in office, no U.S. president in the past 100 years saw as much of a decline in stock prices as Herbert Hoover, and none saw as much of an increase as Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) - these were the two presidents in office during the Great Depression. While Hoover is not generally considered to have caused the Wall Street Crash in 1929, less than a year into his term in office, he is viewed as having contributed to its fall, and exacerbating the economic collapse that followed. In contrast, Roosevelt is viewed as overseeing the economic recovery and restoring faith in the stock market played an important role in this.

By the end of Hoover's time in office, stock prices were 82 percent lower than when he entered the White House, whereas prices had risen by 237 percent by the end of Roosevelt's first term. While this is the largest price gain of any president within just one term, it is important to note that stock prices were valued at 317 on the Dow Jones index when Hoover took office, but just 51 when FDR took office four years later - stock prices had peaked in August 1929 at 380 on the Dow Jones index, but the highest they ever reached under FDR was 187, and it was not until late 1954 that they reached pre-Crash levels once more.

The Long Depression was, by a large margin, the longest-lasting recession in U.S. history. It began in the U.S. with the Panic of 1873, and lasted for over five years. This depression was the largest in a series of recessions at the turn of the 20th century, which proved to be a period of overall stagnation as the U.S. financial markets failed to keep pace with industrialization and changes in monetary policy. Great Depression The Great Depression, however, is widely considered to have been the most severe recession in U.S. history. Following the Wall Street Crash in 1929, the country's economy collapsed, wages fell and a quarter of the workforce was unemployed. It would take almost four years for recovery to begin. Additionally, U.S. expansion and integration in international markets allowed the depression to become a global event, which became a major catalyst in the build up to the Second World War. Decreasing severity When comparing recessions before and after the Great Depression, they have generally become shorter and less frequent over time. Only three recessions in the latter period have lasted more than one year. Additionally, while there were 12 recessions between 1880 and 1920, there were only six recessions between 1980 and 2020. The most severe recession in recent years was the financial crisis of 2007 (known as the Great Recession), where irresponsible lending policies and lack of government regulation allowed for a property bubble to develop and become detached from the economy over time, this eventually became untenable and the bubble burst. Although the causes of both the Great Depression and Great Recession were similar in many aspects, economists have been able to use historical evidence to try and predict, prevent, or limit the impact of future recessions.

ABSTRACT By contrasting the Great Depression and the Coronacrisis, we demonstrate that narrative economics (Shiller, 2017) is key in the analysis of economic fluctuations. We note the importance of the populist narrative to understand the economic and health outcomes of the Coronacrisis in Mexico and highlight the role of the predominance of different economic paradigms in economic policy decision-making. We suggest that, just as in 1929, by following orthodox primary fiscal balance sheet policies at the cost of contracting government investment, the Mexican economy will undergo a long and painful recovery process compared to its global peers.

During the Great Depression in the United States in 1930s, the federal government's share of relief spending in major cities changed drastically following the inauguration of Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933. The previous administration of President Herbert Hoover oversaw the beginning of the depression in 1930, however federal spending on relief was virtually non-existent until his final year in office, and the share of overall relief spending was just two percent in 1932.

With Roosevelt's New Deal, the U.S. government established various agencies and programs that provided relief for its citizens. This included the introduction of social security systems, as well as the creation of public works programs which created government jobs in areas such as construction and infrastructure. In later years, economic recovery also allowed for the expansion of these programs into areas such as disability benefits, and per capita relief spending more than doubled from 1933 to 1936.

This paper uses the historical narrative record to determine whether inflation expectations shifted during the second quarter of 1933, precisely as the recovery from the Great Depression took hold. First, by examining the historical news record and the forecasts of contemporary business analysts, we show that inflation expectations increased dramatically. Second, using an event-study approach, we identify the effect of the key events that shifted inflation expectations on financial markets. Third, we gather new evidence—both quantitative and narrative—that indicates that the shift in inflation expectations played a causal role in stimulating the recovery.

On October 29, 1929, the U.S. experienced the most devastating stock market crash in it's history. The Wall Street Crash of 1929 set in motion the Great Depression, which lasted for twelve years and affected virtually all industrialized countries. In the United States, GDP fell to it's lowest recorded level of just 57 billion U.S dollars in 1933, before rising again shortly before the Second World War. After the war, GDP fluctuated, but it increased gradually until the Great Recession in 2008. Real GDP Real GDP allows us to compare GDP over time, by adjusting all figures for inflation. In this case, all numbers have been adjusted to the value of the US dollar in FY2012. While GDP rose every year between 1946 and 2008, when this is adjusted for inflation it can see that the real GDP dropped at least once in every decade except the 1960s and 2010s. The Great Recession Apart from the Great Depression, and immediately after WWII, there have been two times where both GDP and real GDP dropped together. The first was during the Great Recession, which lasted from December 2007 until June 2009 in the US, although its impact was felt for years after this. After the collapse of the financial sector in the US, the government famously bailed out some of the country's largest banking and lending institutions. Since recovery began in late 2009, US GDP has grown year-on-year, and reached 21.4 trillion dollars in 2019. The coronavirus pandemic and the associated lockdowns then saw GDP fall again, for the first time in a decade. As economic recovery from the pandemic has been compounded by supply chain issues, inflation, and rising global geopolitical instability, it remains to be seen what the future holds for the U.S. economy.

Taylor (2019) details heterogeneity in the effects of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) across industries and across time. Through first the President’s Reemployment Act (PRA) and then industry-specific “codes of fair competition,” the NIRA raised wages and restricted working hours. In some–but far from all–cases industries also used a NIRA code to collude, raising prices and restricting output. The effect of the NIRA peaked in fall 1933 and winter 1934; thereafter, compliance declined. I review the intellectual history of the NIRA, the implementation of the PRA and the NIRA codes, and Taylor’s econometric evidence on their effects. I end with a discussion of the implications of Taylor’s book for understanding the effect of the NIRA on U.S. recovery from the Great Depression.

In a survey conducted in September 2020, regarding consumer perception surrounding the economic recovery after coronavirus (COVID-19) in India, 31 percent of the respondents are positive that the economy will bounce back to pre-COVID levels in the next few months. Majority of the respondents disagree that COVID-19 would cause a significant recession or a major economic depression.

What caused the recovery from the British Great Depression? A leading explanation - the “expectations channel” - suggests that a shift in expected inflation lowered real interest rates and stimulated consumption and investment. However, few studies have measured, or tested the economic consequences of, inflation expectations. In this paper, we collect high-frequency information from primary and secondary sources to measure expected inflation in the United Kingdom between the wars. A VAR model suggests that inflation expectations were an important source of the early stages of economic recovery in interwar Britain.

Throughout the 1920s, prices on the U.S. stock exchange rose exponentially, however, by the end of the decade, uncontrolled growth and a stock market propped up by speculation and borrowed money proved unsustainable, resulting in the Wall Street Crash of October 1929. This set a chain of events in motion that led to economic collapse - banks demanded repayment of debts, the property market crashed, and people stopped spending as unemployment rose. Within a year the country was in the midst of an economic depression, and the economy continued on a downward trend until late-1932.

It was during this time where Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) was elected president, and he assumed office in March 1933 - through a series of economic reforms and New Deal policies, the economy began to recover. Stock prices fluctuated at more sustainable levels over the next decades, and developments were in line with overall economic development, rather than the uncontrolled growth seen in the 1920s. Overall, it took over 25 years for the Dow Jones value to reach its pre-Crash peak.

Between the Wall Street Crash of 1929 and the end of the Great Depression in the late 1930s, the Soviet Union saw the largest growth in its gross domestic product, growing by more than 70 percent between 1929 and 1937/8. The Great Depression began in 1929 in the United States, following the stock market crash in late October. The inter-connectedness of the global economy, particularly between North America and Europe, then came to the fore as the collapse of the U.S. economy exposed the instabilities of other industrialized countries. In contrast, the economic isolation of the Soviet Union and its detachment from the capitalist system meant that it was relatively shielded from these events. 1929-1932 The Soviet Union was one of just three countries listed that experienced GDP growth during the first three years of the Great Depression, with Bulgaria and Denmark being the other two. Bulgaria experienced the largest GDP growth over these three years, increasing by 27 percent, although it was also the only country to experience a decline in growth over the second period. The majority of other European countries saw their GDP growth fall in the depression's early years. However, none experienced the same level of decline as the United States, which dropped by 28 percent. 1932-1938 In the remaining years before the Second World War, all of the listed countries saw their GDP grow significantly, particularly Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Coincidentally, these were the three most powerful nations during the Second World War. This recovery was primarily driven by industrialization, and, again, the U.S., USSR, and Germany all experienced the highest level of industrial growth between 1932 and 1938.

In 2023, it was estimated that over 161 million Americans were in some form of employment, while 3.64 percent of the total workforce was unemployed. This was the lowest unemployment rate since the 1950s, although these figures are expected to rise in 2023 and beyond. 1980s-2010s Since the 1980s, the total United States labor force has generally risen as the population has grown, however, the annual average unemployment rate has fluctuated significantly, usually increasing in times of crisis, before falling more slowly during periods of recovery and economic stability. For example, unemployment peaked at 9.7 percent during the early 1980s recession, which was largely caused by the ripple effects of the Iranian Revolution on global oil prices and inflation. Other notable spikes came during the early 1990s; again, largely due to inflation caused by another oil shock, and during the early 2000s recession. The Great Recession then saw the U.S. unemployment rate soar to 9.6 percent, following the collapse of the U.S. housing market and its impact on the banking sector, and it was not until 2016 that unemployment returned to pre-recession levels. 2020s 2019 had marked a decade-long low in unemployment, before the economic impact of the Covid-19 pandemic saw the sharpest year-on-year increase in unemployment since the Great Depression, and the total number of workers fell by almost 10 million people. Despite the continuation of the pandemic in the years that followed, alongside the associated supply-chain issues and onset of the inflation crisis, unemployment reached just 3.67 percent in 2022 - current projections are for this figure to rise in 2023 and the years that follow, although these forecasts are subject to change if recent years are anything to go by.

BackgroundThere is an urgent need to better understand the factors that predict mental wellbeing in vocationally active adults during globally turbulent times.AimTo explore the relationship between psychological detachment from work (postulated as a key recovery activity from work) in the first national COVID-19 lockdown with health, wellbeing, and life satisfaction of working age-adults one year later, within the context of a global pandemic.MethodsWellbeing of the Workforce (WoW) was a prospective longitudinal cohort study, with two waves of data collection (Time 1, April-June 2020: T1 n = 337; Time 2, March-April 2021: T2 = 169) corresponding with the first and third national COVID-19 lockdowns in the UK. Participants were >18 years, who were employed or self-employed and working in the UK. Descriptive and parametric (t-tests and linear regression) and nonparametric (chi square tests) inferential statistics were employed.ResultsRisk for major depression (T1: 20.0% to T2: 29.0%, p = .002), poor general health (T1: 4.7% to T2: 0%, p = .002) and poor life satisfaction (T1: 15.4% to T2: 25.4%, p = .002) worsened over time, moderate-to-severe anxiety remained stable (T1: 26.1% to T2: 30.2%, p = .15). Low psychological detachment from work was more prevalent in the first wave (T1: 21.4% and T2: 16.0%), with a moderate improvement observed from T1 to T2 (t (129) = -7.09, p < .001). No differences were observed with work status (employed/self-employed), except for self-employed workers being more likely to report poor general health at T1 (16.1%, p = .002). Better psychological wellbeing, lower anxiety and higher life satisfaction at T2 were observed in those who reported better psychological detachment from work at T1 (β = .21, p = .01; β = -.43, p < .001; β = .32, p = .003, respectively), and in those who improved in this recovery activity from T1 to T2 (β = .36, p < .001; β = -.27, p < .001; β = .27, p = .008, respectively), controlling for age, gender and ethnicity.ConclusionThe ability to psychologically detach from work during the first pandemic lockdown, and improvement in this recovery activity over time, predicted better mental wellbeing and quality of life in vocationally active adults after one year of a global crisis, irrespective of work status. Interventions to encourage workers to psychologically detach from work may help to support employee wellbeing at all times, not only in the extreme circumstances of pandemics and economic uncertainty.

Abstract copyright UK Data Service and data collection copyright owner.

The complete Engineering Employers' Federation (EEF) payroll data have been transcribed from records kept at the University of Warwick's Modern Record Centre in order to provide electronic access. This is an especially rich source of data, representing roughly 30 percent of UK engineering. Detailed information are provided on wages (rates and earnings) and hours of work at engineering district, section, and occupational levels. Statistics separate pieceworkers and timeworkers as well as males and females. Information on apprentices, journeymen, boys and youths is also given. The statistics cover the period 1914 to 1968 and provide exceptional detail for the inter-war period (including the Great Depression), WWII, and the post-war recovery period. Unemployment rates covering 1926-1968 and matching 28 of the 56 engineering districts are also provided.

To date, research work carried out at the University of Stirling on these data include:

(a) A comprehensive descriptive analysis of all main features of the data.

(b) Wages and hours in British engineering in the inter-and post-war periods.

(c) The effect of the business cycles on the piece rates and time rates of pay.

(d) Female work and pay in engineering during WWII.

(e) Apprenticeship and journeymen relative pay and employment in the interwar period.




Main Topics:

The EEF data cover the period 1914-1968. They are divided into engineering districts, sections and occupations and by gender, piecework and timework. The available data files contain:

(a) District data for men: this covers 36 years between 1914 and 1968 (there are some missing years) for 25 occupations and 56 districts.

(b) Section data for men: for 28 years between 1930 and 1968 (again with missing years) for 25 occupations and 43 sections.

(c) District data for women: for 27 years between 1935 and 1968 for 55 districts. For 1935 to 1939 and 1945 to 1962 the breakdown is by women aged under and over 18. For 1940 to 1942 this is broken down further into women doing men's work and women doing women and boys' work. For 1966 to 1968 it is women under and over 21.

(d) Section data for Women: this is for 25 years between 1935 and 1968 covering 43 sections and with the same breakdown as the district data.

(e) Apprentices, Boys and Youths: both the district data and the section data covers 14 years between 1935 and 1958 for 55 districts and 29 sections.

(f) Night shift and 2/3 shift working: the district data it is just for two years, 1935 and 1936 for 51 districts while the section data is for five years from 1935 to 1939 covering 28 sections.

(g) Apprentices, journeymen and boys: this gives numbers of apprentices, journeymen and boys for 11 years from 1928 to 1938 covering 38 districts and 8 occupations.

(h) District unemployment rates: these have been made available for 28 of the EEF districts from 1926 to 1968.


Please note: this study does not include information on named individuals and would therefore not be useful for personal family history research.

The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) was passed by the U.S. congress in February 2009, authorizing the federal government to spend up to 800 billion U.S. dollars on stimulating the economy. With the election of Barack Obama to the U.S. Presidency in November 2008, the priority of the policy response to the Great Recession and Global Financial Crisis shifted from aiming to backstop the financial system, to trying to stimulate economic growth through tax cuts, infrastructure spending, and improving public services. By 2011, around 500 billion had been disbursed to government departments or agencies, with the greatest beneficiaries being Health and Human Services, the Treasury Department, and the Department of Education. The act was the signature economic policy initiative of the Obama administration and has been credited by some for preventing the recession from spiraling into a crisis of the magnitude of the Great Depression. The size of the stimulus package also galvanized opposition from Republicans, however, with the Tea Party movement arising to oppose the Obama administration's economic policies, while the Republicans retook control of congress in the 2010 midterm elections.

RD estimates from samples with surveys near pandemic onset.

From 1910 until 1941, net income from farming fluctuated greatly. Income peaked at 8.8 billion U.S. dollars in the late 1910s, after the U.S. joined the First World War in 1917, which caused agricultural demand to skyrocket. Production then rose to meet this demand, but the war's end resulted in a surplus of goods which drove down crop prices and led to a farming crisis in the early-1920s.

Great Depression After recovery in the late-1920s, the Great Depression saw agricultural and rural sectors become some of the hardest-hit industries in the economy, as crop prices fell once more and international trade tariffs were raised. A scenario emerged where returns were so low that farmers were losing money by taking their goods to market - a large share of agricultural produce spoiled or was destroyed as a result, all while much of the population was going hungry. This was compounded by a series of droughts and sandstorms (known as the Dust Bowl) in the South and Midwest, which led to crop failure in many areas. Many farmers' homes were foreclosed, and rural eviction rates were high. This saw the concept of the penny auction emerging - this was where neighbors would go to home auctions, intimidate potential buyers, purchase the house, and return it to its original owner - however, most farmers were not lucky enough to have this support, especially Black sharecroppers, and many families migrated westward or to urban areas in search of opportunities.

Recovery Federal relief via the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) helped stabilize the agricultural sector after 1933, as part of the New Deal. The AAA granted subsidies for farmers who limited their production, therefore increasing crop prices and rejuvenating the agricultural sector (although this system unintentionally favored larger landowners over sharecroppers). The government also bought large numbers of livestock for slaughter, as a means of rapidly injecting capital into the industry. Initially, a tax was levied against large companies that processes agricultural produce (namely food, textile, and cigarette companies) in order to fund the AAA, but the Supreme Court ruled this as unconstitutional in 1936, and the government funded these subsidies from 1938 onward.