The Great Recession of 2008-2009 caused a dramatic drop in the volume of world trade, after two decades of nearly unbroken growth in export growth across the globe. The Global Financial Crisis, which began in the United States in the Summer of 2007, but quickly spread to other regions, caused international flows of money to freeze. This lack of international financing in the global economy led to a drop in aggregate demand, as well as causing many goods exporters to be unable to finance short-term expenditures on credit. World merchandise exports collapsed in 2009, falling by around one-fifth. This fall was made up quickly in the recovery, however, as exports already surpassed their 2008 levels by 2011.

How do crises affect trade policy? We reconcile starkly diverging accounts in the literature by showing that economic adversity generates endogenous incentives not only for protection, but also for liberalization. We first develop formally the mechanisms by which two features of shocks---intensity and duration---influence the resources and political strategies of distressed firms. Our central insight is that policy adjustments to resuscitate afflicted industries typically generate "knock-on" effects on the profitability and political maneuverings of other firms in the economy. We incorporate these countervailing pressures in our analysis of trade policy competition. In the wake of crises, protection initially increases when impacted firms lobby for assistance, but then decreases as industries run low on resources to expend on lobbying and as firms in other industries mobilize to counter-lobby. We test our theoretical predictions using sub-national and cross-national data and present real-world illustrations to highlight the mechanisms driving our results.

From the Summer of 2007 until the end of 2009 (at least), the world was gripped by a series of economic crises commonly known as the Global Financial Crisis (2007-2008) and the Great Recession (2008-2009). The financial crisis was triggered by the collapse of the U.S. housing market, which caused panic on Wall Street, the center of global finance in New York. Due to the outsized nature of the U.S. economy compared to other countries and particularly the centrality of U.S. finance for the world economy, the crisis spread quickly to other countries, affecting most regions across the globe. By 2009, global GDP growth was in negative territory, with international credit markets frozen, international trade contracting, and tens of millions of workers being made unemployed.

Global similarities, global differences

Since the 1980s, the world economy had entered a period of integration and globalization. This process particularly accelerated after the collapse of the Soviet Union ended the Cold War (1947-1991). This was the period of the 'Washington Consensus', whereby the U.S. and international institutions such as the World Bank and IMF promoted policies of economic liberalization across the globe. This increasing interdependence and openness to the global economy meant that when the crisis hit in 2007, many countries experienced the same issues. This is particularly evident in the synchronization of the recessions in the most advanced economies of the G7. Nevertheless, the aggregate global GDP number masks the important regional differences which occurred during the recession. While the more advanced economies of North America, Western Europe, and Japan were all hit hard, along with countries who are reliant on them for trade or finance, large emerging economies such as India and China bucked this trend. In particular, China's huge fiscal stimulus in 2008-2009 likely did much to prevent the global economy from sliding further into a depression. In 2009, while the United States' GDP sank to -2.6 percent, China's GDP, as reported by national authorities, was almost 10 percent.

We develop a dynamic multicountry general equilibrium model to investigate forces acting on the global economy during the Great Recession and ensuing recovery. Our multisector framework accounts completely for countries' trade, investment, production, and GDPs in terms of different sets of shocks. Applying the model to 21 countries, we investigate the 29 percent drop in world trade in manufactures during the period 2008-2009. A shift in final spending away from tradable sectors, largely caused by declines in durables investment efficiency, accounts for most of the collapse in trade relative to GDP. Shocks to trade frictions, productivity, and demand play minor roles.

With the collapse of the U.S. housing market and the subsequent financial crisis on Wall Street in 2007 and 2008, economies across the globe began to enter into deep recessions. What had started out as a crisis centered on the United States quickly became global in nature, as it became apparent that not only had the economies of other advanced countries (grouped together as the G7) become intimately tied to the U.S. financial system, but that many of them had experienced housing and asset price bubbles similar to that in the U.S.. The United Kingdom had experienced a huge inflation of housing prices since the 1990s, while Eurozone members (such as Germany, France and Italy) had financial sectors which had become involved in reckless lending to economies on the periphery of the EU, such as Greece, Ireland and Portugal. Other countries, such as Japan, were hit heavily due their export-led growth models which suffered from the decline in international trade. Unemployment during the Great Recession As business and consumer confidence crashed, credit markets froze, and international trade contracted, the unemployment rate in the most advanced economies shot up. While four to five percent is generally considered to be a healthy unemployment rate, nearing full employment in the economy (when any remaining unemployment is not related to a lack of consumer demand), many of these countries experienced rates at least double that, with unemployment in the United States peaking at almost 10 percent in 2010. In large countries, unemployment rates of this level meant millions or tens of millions of people being out of work, which led to political pressures to stimulate economies and create jobs. By 2012, many of these countries were seeing declining unemployment rates, however, in France and Italy rates of joblessness continued to increase as the Euro crisis took hold. These countries suffered from having a monetary policy which was too tight for their economies (due to the ECB controlling interest rates) and fiscal policy which was constrained by EU debt rules. Left with the option of deregulating their labor markets and pursuing austerity policies, their unemployment rates remained over 10 percent well into the 2010s. Differences in labor markets The differences in unemployment rates at the peak of the crisis (2009-2010) reflect not only the differences in how economies were affected by the downturn, but also the differing labor market institutions and programs in the various countries. Countries with more 'liberalized' labor markets, such as the United States and United Kingdom experienced sharp jumps in their unemployment rate due to the ease at which employers can lay off workers in these countries. When the crisis subsided in these countries, however, their unemployment rates quickly began to drop below those of the other countries, due to their more dynamic labor markets which make it easier to hire workers when the economy is doing well. On the other hand, countries with more 'coordinated' labor market institutions, such as Germany and Japan, experiences lower rates of unemployment during the crisis, as programs such as short-time work, job sharing, and wage restraint agreements were used to keep workers in their jobs. While these countries are less likely to experience spikes in unemployment during crises, the highly regulated nature of their labor markets mean that they are slower to add jobs during periods of economic prosperity.

This round of Eurobarometer surveys diverged from the Standard Eurobarometer measures and queried respondents on the following major areas of focus: (1) poverty and social exclusion, (2) mobile phone use, (3) economic crisis, and (4) international trade. For the first major area of focus, poverty and social exclusion, the survey queried respondents about their own definition of poverty, the extent of poverty and homelessness in their area, and whether or not respondents believed poverty had increased in their area and elsewhere. Respondents were queried about what necessities people must be able to afford to meet a minimal acceptable living standard, who is most at risk for poverty, as well as the social, political, and personal causes of poverty and homelessness. Respondents were also asked about how poverty impacts peoples' chances of completing certain activities, such as getting a good education or finding a job. Respondents were then asked whether or not they trust the European Union (EU), their governments, charities, other citizens, and miscellaneous institutions to effectively respond to poverty. Respondents were also asked to whom they assign primary responsibility for reducing or preventing poverty, what policies their governments should focus on in the future in the effort to help people out of poverty, and whether or not respondents approved of their government's existing anti-poverty measures. Respondents were also queried about their perception of social tensions between groups, and about what they have done personally to help poor people. Additionally, respondents were queried about their own living conditions, satisfaction with life, ability to keep a job, efforts to fight poverty, finances, and their own risk of falling into poverty. For the second major area of focus, mobile phone use, the survey asked respondents about whether or not they owned a mobile phone, their mobile phone use in other EU countries, and the cost of cellular phone service in those countries. For the third major area of focus, economic crisis, the survey questioned respondents about the degree to which the crisis personally affected them, how the crisis affected the EU and its policy efforts, who should bear responsibility for the crisis, who should bear the burden of response to the crisis, and how the European Parliament and other bodies should respond to the crisis. For the fourth major area of focus, international trade, the survey queried respondents on whether they pay attention to the country of origin for products they purchase, how trade impacts respondents and their countries, what European Union trade policy should be going into the future, and the European Union's international economic standing. Demographic and other background information collected includes age, gender, nationality, marital status and parental relations, left-right political self-placement, occupation, age when stopped full-time education, household composition, ownership of a fixed or a mobile telephone and other durable goods, difficulties in paying bills, level in society, and Internet use. In addition, country-specific data includes type and size of locality, region of residence, and language of interview (select countries).

This data package includes the underlying data and files to replicate the calculations, charts, and tables presented in Trade Policy toward Supply Chains after the Great Recession, PIIE Working Paper 18-13. If you use the data, please cite as: Bown, Chad P. (2018). Trade Policy toward Supply Chains after the Great Recession. PIIE Working Paper 18-13. Peterson Institute for International Economics.

Economic models that do not incorporate financial frictions only explain about 70 to 80 percent of the decline in world trade that occurred in the 2008-2009 crisis. We review evidence that shows financial factors also contributed to the great trade collapse and uncover two new stylized facts in support of it. First, we show that the prices of manufactured exports rose relative to domestic prices during the crisis. Second, we show that US seaborne exports and imports, which are likely to be more sensitive to trade finance problems, saw their prices rise relative to goods shipped by air or land.

Following the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008, countries across the world were thrown into recession. In comparison to North America, Europe, and Japan, however, many parts of the globe experienced less severe effects of the crisis, with some avoiding going into recession at all. Particularly in Africa and South & East Asia, many countries experienced a dip in their annual GDP growth, but still recorded high growth rates of over 2.5 percent. South Asia in particular actually experienced an increase in growth during the recession, bucking global trends. Latin America and the Caribbean was the only one of these regions to enter recession in 2009, due to the outsized importance of the United States as a partner in trade and finance for the region.

According to a survey conducted in 2023 among National Assembly members in South Korea about climate change awareness, around ** percent of respondents believed that the climate crisis is also an economic crisis because of changes in the international trade environment. The same amount of respondents also thought the same because of market instability caused by other consequences of the climate crisis.

Graph and download economic data for OECD based Recession Indicators for NAFTA Area from the Period following the Peak through the Trough (DISCONTINUED) (NAFTAREC) from Mar 1947 to Aug 2022 about NAFTA, peak, trough, and recession indicators.

The Study’s subject: The investigator’s aim is to determine the volume of stock trade. A sample of papers consisting of shares, government’s bond issues, corporate bond issues, bonds of mortgage banks, bonds of so called ‘Landschaftsbanks’, bonds of annuity banks, and floated subscription rights is the focus of the investigation.

With regard to the periods of German history the development of the stock market is described. The periods are: - the influence of the First World War 1914 to 1918 on the stock market - the period of inflation 1919 to 1924 - apparent return of normality 1924 to 1929 - the influence of world economic crisis 1929 to 1933 - the Nazi Socialist economic policy 1933 to 1939 - finally, the Second World War 1939 to 1945.

Important comment on the data: Taxes and the system of taxes have changed over time under investigation. Therefore, the development of stock exchange turnover tax is only one indication among others for the development of securities transactions. Furthermore, it has to be taken into account, that the reported values for the period of inflation cannot be used for comparisons with other periods.

Data-Tables in HISTAT (subject: money and currency, financial sector, in German: Thema: Geld und Währung, Finanzsektor):

A. Volume of Stock Trade in Germany A.1 Development of stock exchange turnover tax in millions of M/RM (1910-1944). A.2 Circulation of securities of domestic issuers in Billions of M/RM (1910-1944).

B. Apparent return of normality after the period of inflation
B.1 monthly averages of share prices (monthly statistics, index: 1924 to 1926 = 100, (1925-1929)). B.2 Monthly bonds prices in percent of the nominal value (monthly statistics, (1925-1929)). B.3 Stock market in Breslau: Firms and brokers authorized for stock trading (1850-1931/32).

C. Influence of economic crisis
C.1 Monthly share prices (monthly statistics, index: 1924 to 1926=100 (1930-1934)). C.2 Monthly bonds prices in percent of the nominal value (monthly statistics, (1930-1934)).

D. Influence of Nazi Socialist economic policy and stock exchange during World War II D.1 Share prices of the company ‚Rütgerswerke-AG’ in Berlin (1933-1937). D.2 Index of share prices, index: 1924 to 1926=100 (1924-1943).

This project will explore the impact of the economic recession on cities and households through a systematic comparison of the experiences of two English cities, Bristol and Liverpool.The research will use both quantitative and qualitative approaches. Interviews will be held in both cities with stakeholders from across the public, private and voluntary and community sectors. A social survey of 1000 households will also be conducted in the two cities covering 10 specific household types. A series of in-depth qualitative interviews will then be held with households drawn from the survey and chosen to illustrate the spectrum of experience.In the context of globalisation and the rescaling of cities and states, the research aims to develop our understanding of the relationship between economic crisis, global connectivity and the transnational processes shaping cities and the everyday lives of residents. It will explore the 'capillary-like' impact of the crisis and austerity measures on local economic development, and local labour and housing markets, as well as highlight the intersecting realities of everyday life for households across the life course.The research will document the responses and coping strategies developed across different household types and evaluate the impact and effectiveness of 'anti-recession' strategies and policies. The research draws on a mixed methods approach, using sequentially staged methods in a ‘nested relationship’across the three stages of data collection and analysis. Stage 1: Literature search; Review of existing data on recent social, economic and labour market trends for Bristol and Liverpool; 21 qualitative interviews and one focus group with relevant local government departments, partnerships, business organisations, trade unions, and voluntary and community sector organisations. Interviews were taped, transcribed and analysed around an agreed framework. Stage 2: The Stage 2 household sample was drawn geographically - in Bristol within the local authorities of Bristol, North Somerset and South Gloucestershire and in Liverpool from Liverpool, Sefton and Knowsley. Geodemographic segmentation was used to identify and target a range of households that were comparable across locations, via the ACORN index. Ten of the seventeen ACORN household types were selected and the sample was drawn by pre-selecting addresses in the specified areas. The survey captured a broad picture of the impact of the downturn from the households’ perspectives. Stage 1 work informed the design. Between September and December 2011, Ipsos MORI piloted and conducted 1013, 20 minute, face-to-face interviews using CAPI and a structured interview schedule, supported by a range of showcards. They provided results, unweighted, in pre-coded format, with cross-breaks. Further analysis was undertaken by the research team using SPSS and GIS mapping. The four open ended questions were coded thematically. Responses were then analysed by city, gender and ACORN type. 722 households agreed to be re-contacted for Stage 3: 371 in Bristol; and 351 in Liverpool. Stage 3: Qalitative interviews provided in-depth data on the impact of the downturn and how households adapted and coped, highlighting the macro ‘through the lens of the micro’. The headline survey findings informed the sampling and design, with cases selected purposively to demonstrate a spectrum of experiences and coping strategies. The aim was to identify ‘information-rich’ cases that are relevant to the specific purposes of the research. The original timetable was for these interviews to commence in June 2012, but we delayed this to avoid the summer period, with the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games. A total of 58 interviews of up to 1.5 hours were conducted mostly in participants’ homes between September and December 2012. Each participant was given information about the interview prior to giving their consent, which was recorded on a signed form. Participants were offered a £15 voucher at the end of the interview. Interviews were recorded and transcribed.

United States - GDP-Based Recession Indicator Index was 6.80000 Percentage Points in October of 2024, according to the United States Federal Reserve. Historically, United States - GDP-Based Recession Indicator Index reached a record high of 100.00000 in April of 2020 and a record low of 0.00000 in July of 2020. Trading Economics provides the current actual value, an historical data chart and related indicators for United States - GDP-Based Recession Indicator Index - last updated from the United States Federal Reserve on July of 2025.

We show that policy uncertainty about how the rising public debt will be stabilized accounts for the lack of deflation in the US economy at the zero lower bound. We first estimate a Markov-switching VAR to highlight that a zero-lower-bound regime captures most of the comovements during the Great Recession: a deep recession, no deflation, and large fiscal imbalances. We then show that a microfounded model that features policy uncertainty accounts for these stylized facts. Finally, we highlight that policy uncertainty arises at the zero lower bound because of a trade-off between mitigating the recession and preserving long-run macroeconomic stability.

We empirically characterize the mechanics of trade adjustment during the Argentine crisis. Though imports collapsed by 70 percent from 2000-2002, the entry and exit of firms or products at the country level played a small role. The within-firm churning of imported inputs, however, played a sizeable role. We build a model of trade in intermediate inputs with heterogeneous firms, fixed import costs, and roundabout production. Import demand is non-homothetic and the implications of an import price shock depend on the full distribution of firm-level adjustments. An import price shock generates a significant decline in productivity.

The growing trend of interdependence between the international stock markets indicated the amalgamation of risk across borders that plays a significant role in portfolio diversification by selecting different assets from the financial markets and is also helpful for making extensive economic policy for the economies. By applying different methodologies, this study undertakes the volatility analysis of the emerging and OECD economies and analyzes the co-movement pattern between them. Moreover, with that motive, using the wavelet approach, we provide strong evidence of the short and long-run risk transfer over different time domains from Malaysia to its trading partners. Our findings show that during the Asian financial crisis (1997–98), Malaysia had short- and long-term relationships with China, Germany, Japan, Singapore, the UK, and Indonesia due to both high and low-frequency domains. Meanwhile, after the Global financial crisis (2008–09), it is being observed that Malaysia has long-term and short-term synchronization with emerging (China, India, Indonesia), OECD (Germany, France, USA, UK, Japan, Singapore) stock markets but Pakistan has the low level of co-movement with Malaysian stock market during the global financial crisis (2008–09). Moreover, it is being seen that Malaysia has short-term at both high and low-frequency co-movement with all the emerging and OECD economies except Japan, Singapore, and Indonesia during the COVID-19 period (2020–21). Japan, Singapore, and Indonesia have long-term synchronization relationships with the Malaysian stock market at high and low frequencies during COVID-19. While in a leading-lagging relationship, Malaysia’s stock market risk has both leading and lagging behavior with its trading partners’ stock market risk in the selected period; this behavior changes based on the different trade and investment flow factors. Moreover, DCC-GARCH findings shows that Malaysian market has both short term and long-term synchronization with trading partners except USA. Conspicuously, the integration pattern seems that the cooperation development between stock markets matters rather than the regional proximity in driving the cointegration. The study findings have significant implications for investors, governments, and policymakers around the globe.

Abstract of associated article: This paper evaluates the role of trade and financial linkages in the decision to enter a monetary union. We estimate a two-country DSGE model for the U.K. economy and the euro area with financial intermediaries as in Gertler and Karadi (2011). We use the model to compute the welfare trade-offs from joining the euro. We compare the gains from trade that would occur after the adoption of the euro against the costs of relinquishing monetary policy, both conventional and unconventional. We also study the effects of the changes in the corporate risk premium observed during the recent crisis. We find that in tranquil times, when the risk premium volatility is low, the net welfare gain of joining the monetary union is 2.4 percent of life-time consumption. During financial crises, when there is a sharp increase in the volatility of the risk premium, joining a monetary union would lead to a net welfare loss of 2.2 percent of life-time consumption. The welfare analysis underscores the importance of financial stability to sustain a monetary union over time.

Formaat: Adobe FlashOmvang: 6,6 MbDuur: 3:14Online beschikbaar: [07-01-2015]Standard YouTube LicenseUploaded on Mar 14, 2011Beschrijving:In a two-part series, Martin Khor addresses issues relating to debt and international trade. Since the debt crisis began in the 1970s, many developing countries have had to agree to new loan conditions imposed on them by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These conditions, of benefit to many western commercial interests, often prevent national governments from implementing their own key economic, development and environmental policies. Trade liberalization is one such condition. Dr Khor describes the adverse effects a liberal trade agenda can have on these countries, particularly on their farmers and small industries. He argues that developing countries must be given the freedom to adopt policies of their own. Finally, he welcomes the G8's decision to cancel the debt of some 18 countries, but warns that the terms and scope will need careful study.Dit betreft enkel deel 2, deel 1 is opgeslagen als "Kwalitatieve analyse: kunst én kunde - 09. "Martin Khor - Debt in the Developing World—Part One".This is part 2, part 1 is saved as "Kwalitatieve analyse: kunst én kunde - 09. "Martin Khor - Debt in the Developing World—Part One".

Recent studies highlight economic complexity’s role in mitigating fiscal crises, often measured via an economy’s trade structure. Trade, however, is just one facet of an economy’s structure and omits critical innovative activities like research. Here, we investigate how a multidimensional approach to economic complexity—including both trade and research structures—relates to fiscal instability. By using data on over 230 national fiscal crises from 1995 to 2021 and hazard duration analysis, we assess how measures of trade and research complexity combine to explain crisis likelihood. We find that the interaction of complexity dimensions significantly reduces crisis probability, whereas individual indexes alone are not robust predictors. This suggests that economies focusing on a single dimension may be more vulnerable, thus highlighting the importance of balanced development across multiple areas. These findings offer valuable insights for policymakers aiming to enhance economic resilience and mitigate fiscal risks.