As of April 2025, about 44 percent of Americans approved of the way Donald Trump was handling his job as president. President Trump’s public approval fluctuated during his first term, falling to 34 percent toward the end of his first term in 2021. Approval of Administration Donald Trump’s presidency has caused a lot of controversy and debate both within and outside the United States. It took only eight days from his first day in office for Donald Trump to receive a 50 percent disapproval rating. The President is not the only politician with low approval ratings, as many Senators also face low approval ratings. However, President Trump’s second term approval ratings are not much lower than his approval rating after the same amount of time in office during his first term.

This data package includes the underlying data to replicate the charts and calculations presented in The International Economic Implications of a Second Trump Presidency, PIIE Working Paper 24-20.

If you use the data, please cite as:

McKibbin, Warwick, Megan Hogan, and Marcus Noland. 2024. The International Economic Implications of a Second Trump Presidency. PIIE Working Paper 24-20. Washington: Peterson Institute for International Economics.

This data package includes the underlying data to replicate the charts, tables, and calculations presented in The US Revenue Implications of President Trump’s 2025 Tariffs, PIIE Briefing 25-2.

If you use the data, please cite as:

McKibbin, Warwick, and Geoffrey Shuetrim. 2025. The US Revenue Implications of President Trump’s 2025 Tariffs. PIIE Briefing 25-2. Washington: Peterson Institute for International Economics.

United States The Economist YouGov Polls: 2024 Presidential Election: Donald Trump data was reported at 46.000 % in 29 Oct 2024. This stayed constant from the previous number of 46.000 % for 22 Oct 2024. United States The Economist YouGov Polls: 2024 Presidential Election: Donald Trump data is updated weekly, averaging 43.000 % from May 2023 (Median) to 29 Oct 2024, with 61 observations. The data reached an all-time high of 46.000 % in 29 Oct 2024 and a record low of 38.000 % in 31 Oct 2023. United States The Economist YouGov Polls: 2024 Presidential Election: Donald Trump data remains active status in CEIC and is reported by YouGov PLC. The data is categorized under Global Database’s United States – Table US.PR004: The Economist YouGov Polls: 2024 Presidential Election (Discontinued). If an election for president were going to be held now and the Democratic nominee was Joe Biden and the Republican nominee was Donald Trump, would you vote for...

During a February 2025 survey, the opinion of Mexicans regarding the future of their country with Donald Trump's presidency was fairly negative. Specifically, 48 percent of respondents stated that the direction of the country will go either bad or very bad.

The Politbarometer has been conducted since 1977 on an almost monthly basis by the Research Group for Elections (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen) for the Second German Television (ZDF). Since 1990, this database has also been available for the new German states. The survey focuses on the opinions and attitudes of the voting population in the Federal Republic on current political topics, parties, politicians, and voting behavior. From 1990 to 1995 and from 1999 onward, the Politbarometer surveys were conducted separately in the eastern and western federal states (Politbarometer East and Politbarometer West). The separate monthly surveys of a year are integrated into a cumulative data set that includes all surveys of a year and all variables of the respective year. The Politbarometer short surveys, collected with varying frequency throughout the year, are integrated into the annual cumulation starting from 2003.

This study investigated the cognitive processing of true and false political information. Specifically, it examined the impact of source credibility on the assessment of veracity when information comes from a polarizing source (Experiment 1), and effectiveness of explanations when they come from one's own political party or an opposition party (Experiment 2). These experiments were conducted prior to the 2016 Presidential election. Participants rated their belief in factual and incorrect statements that President Trump made on the campaign trail; facts were subsequently affirmed and misinformation retracted. Participants then re-rated their belief immediately or after a delay. Experiment 1 found that (i) if information was attributed to Trump, Republican supporters of Trump believed it more than if it was presented without attribution, whereas the opposite was true for Democrats and (ii) although Trump supporters reduced their belief in misinformation items following a correction, they did not change their voting preferences. Experiment 2 revealed that the explanation's source had relatively little impact, and belief updating was more influenced by perceived credibility of the individual initially purporting the information. These findings suggest that people use political figures as a heuristic to guide evaluation of what is true or false, yet do not necessarily insist on veracity as a prerequisite for supporting political candidates.

Donald Trump’s first year in office received unprecedented media coverage, with many wondering whether congressional Republicans were “adversaries” or “allies” of the president’s legislative positions. Our paper explores this issue from two vantage points. First, we place Trump’s presidency in historical context by forecasting his Republican support with data from 1969 to 2016. We find that Republicans supported Trump’s legislative positions in 2017 at levels consistent with expectations, contrary to the views of some. Second, we explore the factors that explain why Republican lawmakers supported or opposed their party’s president. We find that conservative and establishment Republicans were more likely to support Trump, contrary to some claims, while female Republicans and those representing affluent, non-white districts were more likely to oppose Trump. Our paper concludes by discussing the broader implications of these results, including the role of identity in contemporary American politics and the possible realignment of the GOP.

The election of Donald Trump not only placed a political outsider in the center of power in America’s federal government, it also put him in a dominant position within the Republican Party as a national organization. While political scientists have traditionally described the parties national committees as inconsequential but impartial service providers, scholars have also long argued that incumbent presidents have considerable control over their party’s national committee. In this paper, I explore the nature of presidential power over the party-in-organization, and whether Trump can take advantage of his control over the Republican National Committee. I show that presidential domination over the party-in-organization is based on the president’s ability to nominate and replace the national committee’s chair, and that presidents have used this power to push their committees to promote both their preferred policy positions and themselves. I argue this means Trump has the ability to use the RNC to promote the GOP as ‘his’ party – including during a potential primary challenge for his re-nomination in 2020.

During a survey conducted in December 2020, 50 percent of respondents said they approve of how Donald Trump is handling the U.S. economy. 56 percent of respondents reported that they disapproved of how he is handling the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic.

This statistic shows the number of days American presidents have spent in office until their public disapproval reached 51 percent from President Truman to President Trump's second term. As of January 28, 2017, President Trump spent only eight days in office until he reached a disapproval rating of 51 percent. In comparison, Joe Biden reached a disapproval rating of 53 percent 240 days after assuming office, the first time it exceeded 51 percent.

Is American democracy under threat? The question is more prominent in political debate now than at any time in recent memory. However, it is also too blunt; there is widespread recognition that democracy is multifaceted and that backsliding, when it occurs, tends to be piecemeal. To address these concerns, we provide original data from surveys of political science experts and the public measuring the perceived importance and performance of U.S. democracy on a number of dimensions during the first year and a half of the Trump presidency. We draw on a theory of how politicians may transgress limits on their authority and the conditions under which constraints are self-enforcing. We connect this theory to our survey data in an effort to identify potential areas of agreement – bright lines – among experts and the public about the most important democratic principles and whether they have been violated. Public and expert perceptions often differ on the importance of specific democratic principles. In addition, though our experts perceive substantial democratic erosion, particularly in areas related to checks and balances, polarization between Trump supporters and opponents undermines any social consensus recognizing these violations.

The outcome of the 2016 election made it abundantly clear that victory in US presidential contests depends on the Electoral College much more than on direct universal suffrage. This fact points to the importance of using state-level models to arrive at adequate predictions of winners and losers in US presidential elections. In fact, the use of a model disaggregated to the state level and focusing on three types of measures—namely, changes in the unemployment rate, presidential popularity, and indicators of long-term patterns in the regional strength of the Democratic and Republican parties—has in the past enabled us to produce fairly accurate forecasts of the number of Electoral College votes for the presidential candidates of the two major American parties. In this article, we bring various modifications to this model to improve its overall accuracy. With Joe Biden out of the race, this revised model predicts that Donald Trump will succeed in winning back the presidency with 341 electoral votes against 197 for Kamala Harris.

Replication files and appendices for, "Loyalists and Switchers: Characterizing Voters’ Responses to Donald Trump’s Campaign and Presidency." Abstract: Despite characterizations of the American electorate as rooted in immovable partisan loyalties, a crucial segment of voters shift their support to or away from an incumbent president. For example, Donald Trump’s campaign won support from a slice of voters who had previously backed Barack Obama, arguably through Trump’s appeals on immigration, economic growth, populist reform, and strong leadership. Other voters rejected Trump’s rhetoric and were not persuaded by his promises. Using two original surveys, we ask what opinions and perceptions characterize voters who remained loyal in their support for or opposition to Trump from the 2016 election into his presidency, and how their views compare with the views of voters who abandoned their previous support or opposition. We find that loyalty and switching cannot be explained by demographic characteristics; instead, particular sets of attitudes on race and immigration, populism and authoritarianism, and the nation’s and their own economic well-being are all associated with loyalty to and switching from this divisive president. Our findings suggest that voters’ support for incumbents is conditioned by issue attitudes and experience; switchers’ views reveal a lot about the strengths and vulnerabilities of a president.

President Trump Job Approval | RealClearPolling

The U.S. President Donald Trump has frequently made foreign countries central to his political messages, often conveying animosity. But do foreign citizens react more to the speaker of these messages---Trump himself---or their content? More generally, when people are exposed to messages sent from foreign countries, are their attitudes influenced by information heuristics or information content in messages? Although related studies are abundant in the literature of American public opinion, these questions are not fully examined in the literature of foreign public opinion. To address them, we used Japan as a case and fielded a survey experiment exposing citizens to U.S. policy messages that varied by source, policy content, and issue salience. Results suggest that while the source cue (Trump attribution) causes negative perceptions of the U.S., the policy content (cooperative vs. uncooperative) has a larger effect in shaping opinion of the U.S. Furthermore, analysis of interaction effects shows that only when U.S. policy approach is uncooperative does the Trump attribution have significantly negative and large effects. We conclude that foreign citizens rely more on policy content in transnational opinion formation---an aspect that past research in this area has overlooked. Substantively, these findings may demonstrate that even under a presidency that has alienated foreign countries and seemingly undermined U.S. stature in the world, foreign opinion toward the U.S. does not hinge entirely on its political leader. In short, Trump has not irreparably damaged U.S. image abroad.

This statistic shows the approval rate among the American people in Donald Trump's presidential transition. In comparison with the survey conducted in December 2016, when 48 percent of the respondents approved the way Mr. Trump is transitioning in the presidential office, in January 2017 the number dropped to 44 percent.

Despite winning the presidency in 2016, Donald Trump alleged “millions of illegal votes” and other election fraud. He continued using this rhetoric throughout his tenure as president and ultimately suggested that if he did not win reelection in 2020 it would be because it was stolen from him somehow. Here, we explore how such allegations of fraud influence the public’s attitudes toward the conduct of elections, election outcomes, representation, and democracy as a whole through an original survey experiment. In doing so, we find that respondents expressed significantly and substantively more negative attitudes towards elections and democracy after being exposed to claims of fraud (even without evidence). Additionally, Republican identifiers were more likely to doubt that their vote was counted fairly than Democrats or Independents. These results bear important implications for our current understanding of politics in the United States.

Does president Trump’s use of Twitter affect financial markets? The president frequently mentions companies in his tweets and, as such, tries to gain leverage over their behavior. We analyze the effect of president Trump’s Twitter messages that specifically mention a company name on its stock market returns. We find that tweets from the president which reveal strong negative sentiment are followed by reduced market value of the company mentioned, whereas supportive tweets do not render a significant effect. Our methodology does not allow us to conclude about the exact mechanism behind these findings and can only be used to investigate short-term effects.

The negative “Trump Effect” on international students has attracted wide media and scholarly attention. Surprisingly, the best existing evidence remains anecdotal and case-based. In this research note, we fill this important gap. We employ a difference-in- difference (DID) design to estimate the Trump effect for the U.S. vis-a-vis various control groups: top 5, top 10, top 20, and all other countries that compete with the U.S. We find a statistically significant and negative Trump effect that drives international students from the U.S. to competing destinations. Relative to the top five competitors, about 12% fewer students came to the U.S. during the first three years of the Trump Presidency. The average treatment effect is statistically significant across the top 5, top 10, and top 20 destination groups but not for the group of all other destinations as a whole. Pairwise DID estimates between the U.S. and 91 individual countries further indicate that the Trump effect is primarily driven by 26 host nations. Our research contributes to our understanding of Trump effects, student flows, and migration.