Canada's main stock market index, the TSX, fell to 27023 points on July 11, 2025, losing 0.22% from the previous session. Over the past month, the index has climbed 1.53% and is up 19.18% compared to the same time last year, according to trading on a contract for difference (CFD) that tracks this benchmark index from Canada. Canada Stock Market Index (TSX) - values, historical data, forecasts and news - updated on July of 2025.

The S&P/TSX Composite index (CAD) closed at ********* points at the end of 2024. This was an increase over the past year. What is the S&P/TSX Composite index? The S&P/TSX Composite index is a Canadian index that measures stocks on the Toronto Stock Exchange, one of the largest stock exchanges worldwide. A stock market index tracks the development of a group of stock prices. It allows to get a quick idea of economic climate in a given region. Canadian stock market The size of a stock exchange is basically the sum of market capitalizations of companies being traded on this stock exchange. The largest companies in terms of market capitalization in Canada in 2024 were the Royal Bank of Canada, and Toronto Dominion Bank. The total market capitalization of listed domestic companies in Canada equaled to **** trillion U.S. dollars in 2022.

Key information about Canada S&P/TSX Composite

• Canada S&P/TSX Composite closed at 25,393.5 points in Feb 2025, compared with 25,533.1 points at the previous month end
• Canada Equity Market Index: Month End: TMX: S&P/TSX Composite data is updated monthly, available from May 2002 to Feb 2025, with an average number of 13,818.0 points
• The data reached an all-time high of 25,648.0 points in Nov 2024 and a record low of 6,180.4 points in Sep 2002

This table contains 25 series, with data for years 1956 - present (not all combinations necessarily have data for all years). This table contains data described by the following dimensions (Not all combinations are available): Geography (1 items: Canada ...), Toronto Stock Exchange Statistics (25 items: Standard and Poor's/Toronto Stock Exchange Composite Index; high; Standard and Poor's/Toronto Stock Exchange Composite Index; close; Toronto Stock Exchange; oil and gas; closing quotations; Standard and Poor's/Toronto Stock Exchange Composite Index; low ...).

Crescent Point Energy stock price, live market quote, shares value, historical data, intraday chart, earnings per share and news.

The TSX WTI is the Toronto Stock Exchange benchmark price for West Texas Intermediate crude oil. It serves as a reference point for the Canadian oil market and is influenced by various global and domestic factors. Monitoring the TSX WTI can help investors assess the performance of Canadian energy stocks and gain insights into the overall oil market.

New to VIC, EQB Inc (TSX: EQB) is a financial services company and digital bank servicing nearly 700,000 customers as of October 31, 2024, with $127bn of assets under management and administration, $47bn of on balance sheet loans, and $67bn of total loans under management (includes derecognized loans from securitization). EQB is Canada’s 7th largest bank, and is a high quality bank: It boasts a 10-year average PCL of 4bps, well below the Big 6/Domestically Systematically Important Banks (DSIB) average of 30bps. It also targets, and historically has achieved, leading ROEs (target at 15-17% adjusted), and has seen significantly faster growth than peers (10-year EPS CAGR 12% vs DSIB average of 6.5%). Lastly, it is very well capitalized, with a leading CET1 ratio of 14.3%.Is Apple a good investment?Apple Cost of EquityApple Cost of DebtHow to Invest in OpenAIHow to Invest in SpaceXHistorical TSR performance has been strong, indicating that the market acknowledges the above points: 10-year total return of 286% vs S&P/TSX Total Capped Financials Index at 166%. However, we believe that even under conservative growth assumptions, EQB remains ~40% undervalued, and is an attractive long term compounder. Our arguments touch primarily on the following points:Recent credit quality headwinds will prove temporary, and aggregate portfolio quality remains very robustDespite higher concentration relative to peers, EQB’s end-markets are attractive in the long-term and strong loan growth is sustainableRegulatory change awaiting OSFI approval for EQB to move from Standardized to Advanced Internal Rating-Based (AIRB) modelling will substantially increase CET1 ratios, further increasing excess capital available for distribution/deployment Business Overview:Plenty of banks (and digital banks with similar lower efficiency ratio benefits) have already been written about on VIC, so we will focus here instead on what makes EQB different:Mainly, EQB is concentrated. Whereas peers see diversification across several dimensions, including revenue source, funding, and loan portfolio, EQB tends to be concentrated across all of these areas. We will go deeper into why we believe this isn’t necessarily an issue from a long-term perspective given the end markets EQB is exposed to, but for now, the quick facts are:Revenue mix: EQB has only recently started pushing into expanding into non-interest revenue sources, acquiring Concentra Bank in 2022, which through its subsidiary Concentra Trust allows EQB to offer fiduciary/trustee services. EQB then acquired 75% of ACM Advisors Ltd. (ACM) in 2023, which provides wealth management services. While exposure to fee-based revenue is guided to continue to see strong growth with ACM performing above expectations, EQB’s non-interest revenue as a % of total revenue is only 16.3% as of FY2024, vs DSIB peers at ~50% average. Fees and other income is currently only 6.5%.Funding profile: Term deposits make up 80% of EQB’s funding sources, while demand deposits make up the remainder. Within term deposits, brokered term deposits comprise ~60% of deposit balance, while EQB’s digital bank subsidiary EQ Bank comprises ~20%. Within demand deposits, EQ Bank comprises ~65%. While higher exposure to term and brokered deposits raises funding costs, EQB maintains this funding profile to meet its core strategy of closer maturity matching to reduce interest rate and liquidity risk. This results in a one-year equity duration, and stable NIMs amidst changing interest rates. It is noteworthy that EQB has been moving away from higher-cost brokered deposits to lower cost deposits sourced from EQ Bank. In 2019, 93% of deposits were brokered vs 51% now, and just 4% were from EQ Bank vs 27% now. Economic Value of Shareholder’s Equity (EVE) sensitivity to a 100bps increase in interest rates is just -1.1%, and NI increases by just $333k. We see this as a benefit given current uncertainties surrounding Canadian macroeconomic conditions.Loan portfolio: Before touching shortly on why we believe EQB’s lending end markets are attractive in the long-term, we first note here that EQB is nonetheless highly concentrated in its lending strategy. EQB is primarily focused on residential lending: 62% of loans are residential (single-family) mortgages, 32% are commercial loans, and just 6% are personal loans (excluding single-family mo

The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is the largest stock exchange in the world, with an equity market capitalization of almost ** trillion U.S. dollars as of June 2025. The following three exchanges were the NASDAQ, PINK Exchange, and the Frankfurt Exchange. What is a stock exchange? A stock exchange is a marketplace where stockbrokers, traders, buyers, and sellers can trade in equities products. The largest exchanges have thousands of listed companies. These companies sell shares of their business, giving the general public the opportunity to invest in them. The oldest stock exchange worldwide is the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, founded in the late sixteenth century. Other functions of a stock exchange Since these are publicly traded companies, every firm listed on a stock exchange has had an initial public offering (IPO). The largest IPOs can raise billions of dollars in equity for the firm involved. Related to stock exchanges are derivatives exchanges, where stock options, futures contracts, and other derivatives can be traded.

The average market risk premium in Canada was *** percent in 2024. This means investors demanded an extra *** Canadian dollars on a 100 Canadian dollar investment. This extra cost should compensate for the risk of an investment based in Canada. What causes risk? As far as country-specific factors are concerned, macroeconomic trends can cause risk. For example, the inflation rate in relation to other countries can change the relative value of an investment. Lower inflation in Canada could weaken the Canadian dollar, reducing the value of Canadian assets in terms of another currency, such as the euro or U.S. dollar. The Canadian context As a country, Canada has a fairly high national debt. Some economists point to this as an increased default risk, since debt servicing can become costly. However, most investors agree that Canada, as an advanced economy, is creditworthy and not at risk of defaulting. A better measure is to look at Canada’s risk premium in the context of interest rates from other countries. These deposit rates can be used as a baseline for the market risk premium of other countries, though they do not include all the factors that have been used to calculate this statistic.

Description

Colabor is a distributor and wholesaler of food and related products predominantly serving hotel, restaurant, and institutional markets in Quebec and the Atlantic provinces. Over the last several years, management has executed on a substantial turnaround in the business that has largely been ignored by the market. More importantly, the business is now at a major growth inflection point; they just completed a significant facilities expansion project that positions the company for accelerating growth starting in the back half of the year.

Despite the company’s strong fundamentals and attractive growth prospects, shares trade for only 3.4x EBITDA (6.4x EBITDA less lease payments) and 7.9x FCF.

I believe that the business is worth ~$2.60 per share which is more than double the current share price and is roughly 7.9x adj EBITDA and 17x FCF.

Shares trade as GCL on the TSX in Canada.

Business Overview

Colabor operates as both a distributor (~75% of revenues) and a wholesaler (~25% of revenues) in its markets. The distribution business predominantly services restaurants, specialty food stores, ready-to-eat grocery, and institutional accounts (healthcare, schools, prisons, daycare, etc). The wholesale business sells to 100+ smaller distributors that are able to reap the benefits of Colabor’s purchasing power.

Colabor operates predominantly in Quebec with around 90% of revenues coming from the province, and they are particularly dominant in eastern Quebec where they are the market leader. The remaining revenues are roughly split between New Brunswick (~5%) and the other Atlantic provinces (~5%).

As you would expect, province-wide in Quebec the market is dominated by Sysco and Gordon Food Service, who combine for roughly 50-55% market share. Colabor, however, is a very strong #3 player with 11% market share and the remaining 35-40% of the market is highly fragmented among hundreds of independents. Furthermore, if you look at just eastern Quebec where Colabor’s distribution business is currently focused, I believe GCL is the leader with ~25% market share.

Finally, the distribution business comprises both broadline products (packaged goods, fresh produce, dairy, non-food products like sanitation and maintenance, etc) and specialty products (center-of-the-plate proteins like fish/seafood and meat). The company has 2 Montreal-based specialty distribution businesses in particular – Les Pecheries Norref Quebec (fish/seafood) and Viandes Lauzon (meat) – that are arguably the company’s crown jewels and that position the company particularly well for growth in western Quebec going forward.

Successful Turnaround

If you go back to 2018, Colabor was a much larger $1.2 billion revenue business, but with only $18mm in EBITDA – a mere 1.5% operating margin. Furthermore, the business had $107mm in debt, or roughly 5.9x EBITDA so there was an urgent need to reduce leverage levels.

The company had healthy operations in Quebec, but prior management had embarked on an ill-advised expansion into Ontario. In 2007, they purchased Summit Food Service Distributors from Cara (a large foodservice group with significant restaurant operations in Ontario and Quebec) for $115mm. As part of this acquisition, they also retained a 10-year distribution agreement with Cara. To put it simply, this acquisition was a disaster.

My understanding is that Summit was essentially a one man show, and prior Colabor management pushed him out of the business. Furthermore, Summit wasn’t a great business to begin with as it was 95% chain accounts, resulting in very low margins. The business unsurprisingly deteriorated over time, which eventually left Colabor overall in a fairly distressed state in 2018 as they had incurred significant debt to acquire an asset that was now losing a lot of money.

In 2019 they hired a new CEO, Louis Frenette, to turn around the company. As the former CEO of Parmalat Canada, as you can imagine he had a fair bit of experience in improving the operations of troubled food businesses. In 2020, he started implementing a comprehensive turnaround plan for the company.

First, he sold the Summit operations in Apr 2020 for $10mm – this business comprised roughly $500-600mm in revenues that were losing $9mm per year. He also exited around $100mm in unprofitable contracts. Finally, he started diversifying the business which was too dependent on the restaurant channel at around 55-60% of revenues. He expanded the company more into institutional (jails, 1 of 4 hospital contracts in Quebec, daycares, etc) and retail (particularly read-to-eat in grocery stores) and now the restaurant channel is down to 38% of revenues.

The turnaround has been highly successful and now Colabor is a $656mm revenue business with 5.6% operating margins and drastically lower leverage levels.

During 2021 and 2022 the company made relatively modest moves to continue growing the business through both product improvements (private label, in particular, was very underdeveloped) and strategic M&A.

In 2023, however, the company started laying the groundwork for a major expansion of their distribution business in western Quebec.

Huge Growth Opportunity: Western Quebec

As you might recall, while ~90% of Colabor’s revenues come from Quebec, they have significantly higher market share in the eastern portion of the province where they are the market leader and operate a large broadline distribution business. In the western portion of the province, however, they are essentially only a small specialty distributor through their two Montreal-based businesses, and a wholesaler to smaller distributors.

If you are familiar with the demographics of the province, you will quickly see why this represents such a significant growth opportunity for Colabor. The province’s largest population centers are in the more densely populated west, particularly the greater Montreal area. The company needed the proper facilities in order to service the market here, and in 2023 management finally took action, moving the company’s Boucherville operations (and HQ) to a new state-of-the-art facility in Saint-Bruno Ecoparc.

To put the scale of the opportunity into perspective, consider the following. While Colabor has been a strong #3 food distributor/wholesaler in Quebec, they’ve only been able to address 30% of the TAM in the province due to their geographic footprint. With the Saint-Bruno facility now in place, however, they are very well positioned to address 90% of the TAM – effectively tripling the size of the market opportunity that’s addressable by the company. Over the next 5 years, Colabor is finally in a strong position to start extending their dominance in eastern Quebec into the more densely populated western portion of the province as well.

In total, the company spent $18mm in capex to build its new hybrid distribution and wholesale facility in Saint-Bruno Ecopark and they finally moved in at the end of last year. The first half of 2024 has been focused on startup activities like training warehouse and delivery employees for the new facility, and the initial priority of transitioning their wholesale business to Saint-Bruno. As we enter the back half of the year, however, the company can finally start focusing on ramping up its distribution business in western Quebec.

I’m excited about the growth potential in western Quebec not just because the opportunity is so large, but particularly because Colabor is positioned perfectly to take market share. The two Montreal-based businesses that I wrote about earlier – Norref and Viandes Lauzon – are extremely valuable strategic assets for the company. Norref is the leader in all of Quebec in seafood, and Lauzon is a very strong player in beef. As you can imagine, chefs are a lot more particular about the center-of-the-plate proteins that they source – making these very valuable assets that already have a strong presence in western Quebec to now build a broadline distribution business around.

Furthermore, Sysco and Gordon Food Service are targeting the market with a product mix that is 80% American, whereas Colabor is predominantly Canadian products, with a strong emphasis on local. Again, as you can imagine, restaurateurs often have a strong preference for local and Colabor is well-positioned to capitalize on this.

The Saint-Bruno capacity expansion has two other strategic benefits for Colabor. By building out a pan-provincial business, the company will now be in a much stronger position to go after chain accounts where having a distribution presence in the greater Montreal area is crucial. Secondly, as the company transitions some of its volumes to the new facility, they will free up capacity in eastern Quebec to continue driving growth here as well.

Having made such a significant financial investment in new capacity, I think management will now be very motivated to onboard new business as quickly as possible to leverage these fixed costs. While the focus will likely be on internal sales and marketing to ramp up volumes in western Quebec, I expect management to occasionally supplement this with relatively small dollar strategic M&A.

Valuation

Colabor generated $656mm in revenues and $36.9mm in adj EBITDA in the TTM. I currently expect the company to do $40.5mm in adj EBITDA over the next 12 months, with