Public sector net debt amounted to 95.8 percent of gross domestic product in the United Kingdom during the 2024/25 financial year, or 90 percent when the Bank of England is excluded. UK government debt is at its highest levels since the early 1960s, due to a significant increase in borrowing during the COVID-19 pandemic. After peaking at 251.7 percent shortly after the end of the Second World War, government debt in the UK gradually fell, before a sharp increase in the late 2000s at the time of the global financial crisis. Debt not expected to start falling until 2029/30 In 2024/25, the UK's government expenditure was approximately 1.28 trillion pounds, around 44.7 percent of GDP. This spending was financed by 1.13 trillion pounds of revenue raised, and 151 billion pounds of borrowing. Although the UK government can still borrow money in the future to finance its spending, the amount spent on debt interest has increased significantly recently. Recent forecasts suggest that while the debt is eventually expected to start declining, this is based on falling government deficits in the next five years. Government facing hard choices Hitting fiscal targets, such as reducing the national debt, will require a careful balancing of the books from the current government, and the possibility for either spending cuts or tax rises. Although Labour ruled out raising the main government tax sources, Income Tax, National Insurance, and VAT, at the 2024 election, they did raise National Insurance for employers (rather than employees) and also cut Winter Fuel allowances for large numbers of pensioners. Less than a year after implementing cuts to Winter Fuel, the government performed a U-Turn on the issue, and will make it widely available by the winter of 2025.

During the Great Recession of 2008-2009, the advanced economies of the G7 experienced a period of acute financial crises, downturns in the non-financial economy, and political instability. The governments of these countries in many cases stepped in to backstop their financial sectors and to try to stimulate their economies. The scale of these interventions was large by historical standards, with observers making comparisons to the measures of the New Deal which the U.S. undertook in the 1930s to end the Great Depression.

The bailouts of financial institutions and stimulus packages caused the government debt ratios of the United States, United Kingdom, and Japan in particular to rise sharply. The UK's government debt ratio almost doubled due to the bailouts of Northern Rock and Royal Bank of Scotland. On the other hand, the increases in government debt in the Eurozone were more measured, due to the comparative absence of stimulus spending in these countries. They would later be hit hard during the Eurozone crisis of the 2010s, when bank lending to the periphery of the Eurozone (Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Greece in particular) would trigger a sovereign debt crisis. The Canadian government, led by a Conservative premier, engaged in some fiscal stimulus to support its economy, but these packages were small in comparison to that in most other of the G7 countries.

The classification of finiancial crisis interventions

Source agency: Office for National Statistics

Designation: Supporting material

Language: English

Alternative title: Financial Crisis and Statitical Classification

With the onset of the Global Financial Crisis in the late Summer of 2007, the United Kingdom was one of the first countries to experience financial panic after the United States. In September 2007, the bank Northern Rock became the UK's first bank to collapse in 150 years due to a bank run, as depositors reacted to the announcement that the bank would be seeking emergency liquidity support from the Bank of England by lining up outside their bank branches to withdraw money. The failure of Northern Rock was a bad omen for the UK economy and financial sector, as banks stopped lending to each other and to customers in what became known as the 'credit crunch'. Government bailouts, private bailouts By October 2008, many UK banks were facing a situation where if they did not receive external assistance, then they would have to default on their debts and likely have to declare bankruptcy. The UK's Labour government, led by Prime Minister Gordon Brown, announced that it would provide emergency funds to stabilize the banking system, leading to the part or full nationalization of some of Britain's largest financial firms. Specifically, Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds TSB, and HBOS received over 35 billion pounds in a government cash injection, while Barclays opted to seek investment from private investors in order to avoid nationalization, much of which came from the state of Qatar. The bailouts caused UK government debt ratios to almost double over the period of the crisis, while public trust in the financial system sank.

Government debt as a share of gross domestic product has risen for almost all of Europe's largest economies since the mid-20th century. While until the 1970s it was common for European countries to have debt levels of less than 20 percent of their GDP, with the onset of economic crises related to international financial instability and oil price shocks, the long-term slowdown of economic growth in Europe, and the substantial public spending burdens which states had incurred due to the expansion of welfare and social services, European governments began to amass significant amounts of debt.

Which European countries are the most indebted? Italy stands out as the country in Europe which has experienced the largest secular increase in its government debt level, with the southern European country having debt worth 1.4 times its GDP in 2022. Spain, the United Kingdom, and France have also experienced long-run increase in their debt levels to between 90 and 100 percent in 2022. Germany and Turkey, on the other hand, have experienced more gradual increases in their public debt, with both countries having debt worth less than half their GDP. Russia stands as an outlier, due to the fact that its debt level has fallen dramatically since the 1990s. After the eastern European country's transition from communism and particularly after the financial crisis it experienced in 1998, the Russian state has severely cut back on public expenditure, while also having little need to borrow due to the state ownership of the country's vast natural resources.

In the first half of 2024, the total value of debt from loans to households in the United Kingdom amounted to approximately two trillion British pounds. It was in 2004, when household debt surpassed the one trillion British pounds mark. Debts can be formed in a number of ways. The most common forms of debt for households include credit cards, medical debt, student loans, overdrafts, mortgages, automobile financing and personal loans.

In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, macroeconomic policy returned to the political agenda, and the influence of Keynesian ideas about fiscal stimulus rose (and then fell) in expert circles. Much less is known, however, about whether and when Keynesian prescriptions for countercyclical spending have any support among the general public. We use a survey experiment, fielded twice, to recover the extent to which UK respondents hold such countercyclical attitudes. Our results indicate that public opinion was countercyclical -- Keynesian -- in 2016. We then use Eurobarometer data to estimate the same basic parameter for the population for the period 2010-2017. The observational results validate our experimental findings for the later period, but also provide evidence that the UK population held procyclical views at the start of the period. Thus, there appear to be important dynamics in public opinion on a key macroeconomic policy issue.

In the short term, the impact of COVID-19 on consumer financial services will be analogous to the global financial crisis of 2008-09, creating a period of economic paralysis and leaving a massive hole in banks’ balance sheets. Read More

Total credit card debt in the UK grew by 4.34 billion British pounds between October and November 2023, now reaching a similar level of debt as seen in early 2017. The annual growth rate of credit card debt stayed about the same in March 2025, reaching 5.8 percent when compared to March 2024. The growth rate in 2023 has been relatively consistently since May, which may potentially be attributed to growing interest rates and the cost of living crisis.

Over the five years through 2024-25, UK banks' revenue is expected to climb at a compound annual rate of 1.7% to £128.6 billion, including an anticipated hike of 2% in 2024-25. After the financial crisis in 2007-08, low interest rates limited banks' interest in loans, hitting income. At the same time, a stricter regulatory environment, including increased capital requirements introduced under the Basel III banking reforms and ring-fencing regulations, constricted lending activity. To protect their profitability, banks such as Lloyds have shut the doors of many branches and made substantial job cuts. Following the COVID-19 outbreak, the Bank of England adopted aggressive tightening of monetary policy, hiking interest rates to rein in spiralling inflation. The higher base rate environment lifted borrowing costs, driving interest income for banks, who reported skyrocketing profits in 2023-24. Although profit grew markedly, pressure to pass on higher rates to savers and fierce competition weighed on net interest income at the tail end of the year, the difference between interest paid and interest received. UK banks are set to continue performing well in 2024-25 as the higher interest rate environment maintains healthy interest income, aiding revenue growth. However, net interest income is set to dip marginally due to higher deposit costs and narrow margins on mortgage loans. With further rate cuts priced into markets, savings rates will drop in 2024-25, stemming the drop in net interest income. Over the five years through 2029-30, industry revenue is forecast to swell at a compound annual rate of 3.3% to reach £151.1 billion. Regulatory restrictions, tougher stress tests and stringent lending criteria will also hamper revenue growth. Competition is set to remain fierce – both internally from lenders that deliver their services exclusively via digital channels and externally from alternative finance providers, like peer-to-peer lending platforms. The possibility of legislation like the Edinburgh reforms will drive investment and lending activity in the coming years, if introduced. However, concerns surrounding the repercussions of less stringent capital requirements and the already fragile nature of the UK financial system pose doubt as to whether any significant changes will be made.

Pre and post crisis (UK based companies) from 1st to 3rd digits Benford’s Law on net annual income of companies in UK.

The article examines causal relationships between sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) prices for the BRICS and most important EU economies (Germany, France, the UK, Italy, Spain) during the European debt crisis. The cross-correlation function (CCF) approach used in the research distinguishes between causality-in-mean and causality-in-variance. In both causality dimensions, the BRICS CDS prices tend to Granger cause those of the EU counterparts with the exception of Germany. Italy and Spain exhibit the highest dependence on the BRICS, whereas only India has a negative balance of outgoing and incoming causal linkages among the BRICS. Thus, the paper underscores the signs of decoupling effects in the sovereign CDS market and also supports the view that the European debt crisis has so far had a limited non-EU impact in this market.

Supplementary information files for the article Emerging stock market volatility and economic fundamentals: the importance of US uncertainty spillovers, financial and health crises

Abstract: This paper studies the US and global economic fundamentals that exacerbate emerging stock markets volatility and can be considered as systemic risk factors increasing financial stability vulnerabilities. We apply the bivariate HEAVY system of daily and intra-daily volatility equations enriched with powers, leverage, and macro-effects that improve its forecasting accuracy significantly. Our macro-augmented asymmetric power HEAVY model estimates the inflammatory effect of US uncertainty and infectious disease news impact on equities alongside global credit and commodity factors on emerging stock index realized volatility. Our study further demonstrates the power of the economic uncertainty channel, showing that higher US policy uncertainty levels increase the leverage effects and the impact from the common macro-financial proxies on emerging markets’ financial volatility. Lastly, we provide evidence on the crucial role of both financial and health crisis events (the 2008 global financial turmoil and the recent Covid-19 pandemic) in raising markets’ turbulence and amplifying the volatility macro-drivers impact, as well.

We advise that users familiarise themselves with the reporting requirements of the regulators on whose data we have drawn for this work. Some variables are easily understood (headline income and expenditure figures, or dates of registration and dissolution); others less so (e.g. familiarity with definitions of the components of income which charities are required to report would be desirable for work on the exposure of charities to specific income sources). We carried out work on various aspects of the financial vulnerability of charities and charitable companies, as follows: 1. patterns of registration and dissolution, as measured by the dates on which these events are recorded by the regulators. 2. the extent to which organisations held reserves prior to the onset of Covid-19. We used measures of "unrestricted reserves" which are usually provided only for larger organisations and expressed these as a proportion of the organisation's annual expenditures; 3. financial vulnerability, expressed in various ways - substantial (over 25%) fluctuations in incomes, or fluctuations in the excess of expenditure over income; 4. exposure of organisations to particular income streams. We define these in "VariableDescriptions_covid19_project.doc", attached to this deposit. Note that for time series analyses, the Charity Commission website data on the incomes and expenditures of charities only contains data for relatively recent time periods; a longer time series providing charity financials from the late 1990s to 2012 is available in the Third Sector Research Centre data collection at https://reshare.ukdataservice.ac.uk/850933/ and we recommend this is linked to the current data from the Charity Commission. Financial histories are not available for as long a time period for Scottish charities since the regulator was not established until 2006. Other data of relevance to work on this project would be a publicly-available classification of charities at https://charityclassification.org.uk/ Charitable organisations largely fall into a small number of sections of the Standard Industrial Classification and as a result scholars have developed more granular schemas. the data at the above website are publicly-available and can be linked via charity ID numbers. Project papers describing the work in more detail are available at https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/research/tsrc/research/assessing-financial-vulnerability-and-risk-in-the-uks-charities-during-and-beyond-the-covid-19-crisis.aspx

The economy was seen by 52 percent of people in the UK as one of the top three issues facing the country in July 2025. The ongoing cost of living crisis afflicting the UK, driven by high inflation, is still one of the main concerns of Britons. Immigration has generally been the second most important issue since the middle of 2024, just ahead of health, which was seen as the third-biggest issue in the most recent month. Labour's popularity continues to sink in 2025 Despite winning the 2024 general election with a strong majority, the new Labour government has had its share of struggles since coming to power. Shortly after taking office, the approval rating for Labour stood at -2 percent, but this fell throughout the second half of 2024, and by January 2025 had sunk to a new low of -47 percent. Although this was still higher than the previous government's last approval rating of -56 percent, it is nevertheless a severe review from the electorate. Among several decisions from the government, arguably the least popular was the government withdrawing winter fuel payments. This state benefit, previously paid to all pensioners, is now only paid to those on low incomes, with millions of pensioners not receiving this payment in winter 2024. Sunak's pledges fail to prevent defeat in 2024 With an election on the horizon, and the Labour Party consistently ahead in the polls, addressing voter concerns directly was one of the best chances the Conservatives had of staying in power in 2023. At the start of that year, Rishi Sunak attempted to do this by setting out his five pledges for the next twelve months; halve inflation, grow the economy, reduce national debt, cut NHS waiting times, and stop small boats. A year later, Sunak had at best only partial success in these aims. Although the inflation rate fell, economic growth was weak and even declined in the last two quarters of 2023, although it did return to growth in early 2024. National debt was only expected to fall in the mid to late 2020s, while the trend of increasing NHS waiting times did not reverse. Small boat crossings were down from 2022, but still higher than in 2021 or 2020. .

Over the five years through 2024-25, the Financial Management industry's revenue is set to dip at a compound annual rate of 0.2% to £13.7 billion, caused by unfavourable demand conditions following the cost-of-living crisis and the COVID-19 outbreak. The pandemic damaged mergers and acquisitions, dropping from £55.6 billion in 2019 to £16.3 billion in 2020 according to the ONS. The cost-of-living crisis further reduced consumer spending, extending economic difficulties into winter 2023 and triggering a recession. These factors decreased business investments in financial management services as companies focused on cutting costs. Despite these obstacles, the industry maintained stability by offering countercyclical services, aiding businesses in efficient cost management while maintaining operations. Since the EU's 2016 Audit Regulation and Directive limited non-audit fees, financial managers have expanded client bases and explored new income sources to balance these caps. With a 2026 deadline to separate audits from non-audit services, pressure is high, particularly for top companies like the Big Four. Technological advancements are also enabling companies to perform tasks internally that were traditionally outsourced to consultants, tightening the market, especially for smaller clients. Intensified competition and decreased demand are driving the financial management sector towards greater innovation. Following a five-year downturn, business spending has begun to recover in 2024-25, driven by increased M&A activity. Business confidence reached an 11-month high in March 2024, according to S&P Global Flash UK PMI. With inflation cooling to 3.2% in March 2024 from 10.1% the previous year, more resources have been available for financial management and M&A efforts. Revenue is expected to grow by 4.9% in 2024-25. Over the five years through 2029-30, industry revenue is forecast to swell at a compound annual rate of 3.3% to reach £16.1 billion. Improving economic conditions and continued business confidence will push more businesses to increase their spending and invest in M&A activity, increasing demand for advice on managing their finances. In addition, continued low inflation will aid costs for both financial managers and their clients, bolstering profit.

Employment in the financial services sector in the United Kingdom fell between 2001 and 2021. The total number of people employed in this sector amounted to approximately 1.1 million in 2021, a figure that is unchanged since 2009. This was a decrease compared to pre-global recession figures, when on the British market there were 1.2 million people employed in all subsectors of financial services. These figures have decreased as a result of the crisis and closure of bank branches across the country.

The closing of bank branches

The increasing usage of online banking has resulted in a large number of bank branch closures in the United Kingdom. Many banks have seen dramatic declines in their number of branches in the last few years. The branch closures have become a way for the banks of decreasing expenditure as profit margins become tighter.

Financial service sector

Financial services, which include banks, credit unions, credit-card companies, accountancy firms, insurance companies as well as financial service companies are an integral part of any economy. The banking sector assets as percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) was approximately 378 percent in 2019.

From 1st to 3rd digits Benford’s Law on net annual income (UK sample).

Data underlying the report of a study that assesses and quantifes the impacts of the financial crisis and subsequent global economic recession on the growth and performance of UK SME employers. Analyses existing data from two previous survey sources on SME employers in the pre-recession and recessionary periods. Covers how the problems in the banking sector have affected the supply of finance to the SME sector, and whether this has depressed business performance and investment. Looks at the impact of the recession has been more serious for particular types of entrepreneurs and businesses.

With the outbreak of the Great Recession, the European Union suffered an extraordinary crisis. More specifically, the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area had a particularly devastating impact on the Southern periphery of the EU, where unemployment levels rocketed and living standards dropped substantially (Bermeo and Pontusson 2012). At the same time, these countries have applied strong austerity policies, which have been generally rejected by the majority of the population and have contributed to a rise in inequality to levels not seen since before the 1930s (IMF, 2013). Since 2007, levels of satisfaction with democracy, trust in the democratic institutions and support for the EU and the euro dropped extraordinarily. This research project covers five surveys conducted in Spain, one of the main Southern European countries, on the topic of democratic dissatisfaction. The surveys contribute to a better understanding of the political consequences of the crisis in Southern Europe by analysing the increase in democratic disaffection and its relation with EU constraints, globalization and governments implementing policies that do not represent citizens’ preferences. The surveys also study responsibility attributions in a multilevel state like Spain. The main hypothesis of this project is that Southern European countries are undergoing a crisis of legitimation. Citizens' democratic dissatisfaction is the consequence of a responsiveness gap: that is, citizens' perception that governments are not responding to their demands anymore. The surveys allow to study how this crisis of representation and legitimation has taken place and its consequences. They provide information of what are the mechanisms by which democratic dissatisfaction increased in the decade after the Great Recession and the austerity measures implemented by the subsequent Spanish governments. All surveys include representative samples of the Spanish population. The data contains a collection of five surveys in which different views on satisfaction with democracy, views on the European Union and the financial crisis were asked in Spain.