The economy of the United Kingdom is expected to fall by ** percent in the second quarter of 2020, following the Coronavirus outbreak and closure of several businesses. According to the forecast the economy will bounce back in the third quarter of 2020, based on a scenario where the lockdown lasts for three months, with social distancing gradually phased out over a subsequent three-month period.

The main aim of this work is to develop a set of high level macro economic scenarios for the medium-term (to the end of 2022) and for the long-term (to 2030) in order to inform the development of recovery strategies in London, reflecting unprecedented uncertainty on the economic outlook. The primary scenario dimensions include Effectiveness/nature of public health response and Effectiveness/impact of economic support measures. Other scenario dimensions include: Brexit and migration; International economic context; Technology and innovation; Financial climate; Political economy; Economic Geography and GHG emissions. This is an agile project - GLA Economics will continue to track actual data in order to review the assessment of the likelihood of alternative scenario outcomes. Successive updates will be released when they become available for the benefit of external stakeholders in tackling the COVID-19 crisis.

The UK economy shrank by 0.1 percent in September 2025 after reporting zero growth in the previous month. Since a huge decline in GDP in April 2020, the UK economy has gradually recovered and is now slightly larger than it was before the COVID-19 pandemic. After the initial recovery from the pandemic, however, the UK economy has effectively flatlined, fluctuating between low growth and small contractions since 2022. Labour banking on growth to turn around fortunes in 2025 In February 2025, just over half a year after winning the last general election, the approval rating for the new Labour government fell to a low of -48 percent. Furthermore, the Prime Minister, Keir Starmer was not only less popular than the new Conservative leader, Kemi Badenoch, but also the leader of the Reform Party, Nigel Farage, whose party have surged in opinion polls recently. This remarkable decline in popularity for the new government is, in some part, due to a deliberate policy of making tough decisions early. Arguably, the most damaging of these policies was the withdrawal of the winter fuel allowance for some pensioners, although other factors such as a controversy about gifts and donations also hurt the government. While Labour aims to restore the UK's economic and political credibility in the long term, they will certainly hope for some good economic news sooner rather than later. Economy bounces back in 2024 after ending 2023 in recession Due to two consecutive quarters of negative economic growth, in late 2023 the UK economy ended the year in recession. After not growing at all in the second quarter of 2023, UK GDP fell by 0.1 percent in the third quarter, and then by 0.3 percent in the last quarter. For the whole of 2023, the economy grew by 0.4 percent compared to 2022, and for 2024 is forecast to have grown by 1.1 percent. During the first two quarters of 2024, UK GDP grew by 0.7 percent, and 0.4 percent, with this relatively strong growth followed by zero percent growth in the third quarter of the year. Although the economy had started to grow again by the time of the 2024 general election, this was not enough to save the Conservative government at the time. Despite usually seen as the best party for handling the economy, the Conservative's economic competency was behind that of Labour on the eve of the 2024 election.

Across the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and the European Union, gross domestic products (GDP) decreased in 2020 as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, by 2021, growth rates were positive in all four areas again. The United Kingdom, Germany, and the European Union all experiencing slow economic growth in 2023 amid high inflation, with Germany even seeing an economic recession. GDP and its components GDP refers to the total market value of all goods and services that are produced within a country per year. It is composed of government spending, consumption, business investments and net exports. It is an important indicator to measure the economic strength of a country. Economists rely on a variety of factors when predicting the future performance of the GDP. Inflation rate is one of the economic indicators providing insight into the future behavior of households, which make up a significant proportion of GDP. Projections are based on the past performance of such information. Future considerations Some factors can be more easily predicted than others. For example, projections of the annual inflation rate of the United States are easy to come by. However, the intensity and impact of something like Brexit is difficult to predict. Moreover, the occurrence and impact of events such as the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia's war in Ukraine is difficult to foresee. Hence, actual GDP growth may be higher or lower than the original estimates.

The economic landscape of the United Kingdom has been significantly shaped by the intertwined issues of Brexit, COVID-19, and their interconnected impacts. Despite the country’s robust and diverse economy, the disruptions caused by Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic have created uncertainty and upheaval for both businesses and individuals. Recognizing the magnitude of these challenges, academic literature has directed its attention toward conducting immediate research in this crucial area. This study sets out to investigate key economic factors that have influenced various sectors of the UK economy and have broader economic implications within the context of Brexit and COVID-19. The factors under scrutiny include the unemployment rate, GDP index, earnings, and trade. To accomplish this, a range of data analysis tools and techniques were employed, including the Box-Jenkins method, neural network modeling, Google Trend analysis, and Twitter-sentiment analysis. The analysis encompassed different periods: pre-Brexit (2011-2016), Brexit (2016-2020), the COVID-19 period, and post-Brexit (2020-2021). The findings of the analysis offer intriguing insights spanning the past decade. For instance, the unemployment rate displayed a downward trend until 2020 but experienced a spike in 2021, persisting for a six-month period. Meanwhile, total earnings per week exhibited a gradual increase over time, and the GDP index demonstrated an upward trajectory until 2020 but declined during the COVID-19 period. Notably, trade experienced the most significant decline following both Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, the impact of these events exhibited variations across the UK’s four regions and twelve industries. Wales and Northern Ireland emerged as the regions most affected by Brexit and COVID-19, with industries such as accommodation, construction, and wholesale trade particularly impacted in terms of earnings and employment levels. Conversely, industries such as finance, science, and health demonstrated an increased contribution to the UK’s total GDP in the post-Brexit period, indicating some positive outcomes. It is worth highlighting that the impact of these economic factors was more pronounced on men than on women. Among all the variables analyzed, trade suffered the most severe consequences in the UK. By early 2021, the macroeconomic situation in the country was characterized by a simple dynamic: economic demand rebounded at a faster pace than supply, leading to shortages, bottlenecks, and inflation. The findings of this research carry significant value for the UK government and businesses, empowering them to adapt and innovate based on forecasts to navigate the challenges posed by Brexit and COVID-19. By doing so, they can promote long-term economic growth and effectively address the disruptions caused by these interrelated issues.

The United Kingdom's economy grew by 1.1 percent in 2024, after a growth rate of 0.3 percent in 2023, 5.1 percent in 2022, 8.5 percent in 2021, and a record ten percent fall in 2020. During the provided time period, the biggest annual fall in gross domestic product before 2020 occurred in 2009, when the UK economy contracted by 4.6 percent at the height of the global financial crisis of the late 2000s. Before 2021, the year with the highest annual GDP growth rate was 1973, when the UK economy grew by 6.5 percent. UK economy growing but GDP per capita falling In 2022, the UK's GDP per capita amounted to approximately 37,371 pounds, with this falling to 37,028 pounds in 2023, and 36,977 pounds in 2024. While the UK economy as a whole grew during this time, the UK's population grew at a faster rate, resulting in the negative growth in GDP per capita. This suggests the UK economy's struggles with productivity are not only stagnating, but getting worse. The relatively poor economic performance of the UK in recent years has not gone unnoticed by the electorate, with the economy consistently seen as the most important issue for voters since 2022. Recent shocks to UK economy In the second quarter of 2020, the UK economy shrank by a record 20.3 percent at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. Although there was a relatively swift economic recovery initially, the economy has struggled to grow much beyond its pre-pandemic size, and was only around 3.1 percent larger in December 2024, when compared with December 2019. Although the labor market has generally been quite resilient during this time, a long twenty-month period between 2021 and 2023 saw prices rise faster than wages, and inflation surge to a high of 11.1 percent in October 2022.

This report provides an overview of the Impact of Covid-19 on the global duty free retailing which includes key trends, retailer reactions and post Covid-19 outlook. Read More

In 2024, the gross domestic product (GDP) of the United Kingdom grew by 0.9 percent and is expected to grow by just one percent in 2025 and by 1.9 percent in 2026. Growth is expected to slow down to 1.8 percent in 2027, and then grow by 1.7, and 1.8 percent in 2027 and 2028 respectively. The sudden emergence of COVID-19 in 2020 and subsequent closure of large parts of the economy were the cause of the huge 9.4 percent contraction in 2020, with the economy recovering somewhat in 2021, when the economy grew by 7.6 percent. UK growth downgraded in 2025 Although the economy is still expected to grow in 2025, the one percent growth anticipated in this forecast has been halved from two percent in October 2024. Increased geopolitical uncertainty as well as the impact of American tariffs on the global economy are some of the main reasons for this mark down. The UK's inflation rate for 2025 has also been revised, with an annual rate of 3.2 percent predicated, up from 2.6 percent in the last forecast. Unemployment is also anticipated to be higher than initially thought, with the annual unemployment rate likely to be 4.5 percent instead of 4.1 percent. Long-term growth problems In the last two quarters of 2023, the UK economy shrank by 0.1 percent in Q3 and by 0.3 percent in Q4, plunging the UK into recession for the first time since the COVID-19 pandemic. Even before that last recession, however, the UK economy has been struggling with weak growth. Although growth since the pandemic has been noticeably sluggish, there has been a clear long-term trend of declining growth rates. The economy has consistently been seen as one of the most important issues to people in Britain, ahead of health, immigration and the environment. Achieving strong levels of economic growth is one of the main aims of the Labour government elected in 2024, although after almost one year in power it has so far proven elusive.

IntroductionThe post-COVID-19 phenomenon of “quiet quitting” could be problematic for UK economic growth because unpaid overtime has been a key contributor to business productivity since the 2008 global financial crisis. Here, we explore the extent to which this phenomenon exists in the UK, and whether the tendency for quiet quitting differs across generations.MethodsWe analyzed data from the UK Quarterly Labor Force Survey (QLFS) between 2007 and 2022 to determine changes in hours worked. Quiet quitting was characterized by notable declines in hours worked between 2019 and 2022, benchmarked against 20072018 trajectories. Analyses were demarcated by four commonly defined generational cohorts (i.e., Generation Z [GenZs; 1997–2004], Generation Y [Millennials; 1981–1996], Generation X [GenXers; 1965–1980], and Baby Boomers [1952–1964]).ResultsOverall, we found that the UK workforce reduced hours by ~28 h per year in the pandemic and post-pandemic periods. Hours lost was most notable in 2022, with hours down by ~36 h. However, in assessing generational differences, quiet quitting was most pronounced in the two younger cohorts. GenZs showed the steepest decline in hours worked, while Millennials worked the least number of hours overall, with no indication of recovery by the end of the study period. Hours declined for GenXers and Baby Boomers, but changes were more moderate, and Baby Boomers showed evidence of a possible rebound to pre-pandemic levels.DiscussionGiven the ~24,568 million UK full-time workers in 2022, our findings equate to over 55 million discretionary hours lost to the labor market per year between 2019 and 2022, 48.1% of which is accounted for by Millennials. Thus, we evidence that quiet quitting has interrupted the recovery of working hours in the UK to pre-pandemic levels, and lost hours are especially attributable to younger cohorts.JELJ24 J01.

From April 2020 participants from our main Understanding Society sample have been asked to complete a short web-survey. This survey covers the changing impact of the pandemic on the welfare of UK individuals, families and wider communities. Participants complete a regular survey, which includes core content designed to track changes, alongside variable content adapted as the coronavirus situation develops. Researchers will be able to link the data from this web survey to answers respondents have given in previous (and future) waves of the annual Understanding Society survey.

BackgroundPredicting the future UK COVID-19 epidemic provides a baseline of a vaccine-only mitigation policy from which to judge the effects of additional public health interventions. A previous 12-month prediction of the size of the epidemic to October 2022 underestimated its sequelae by a fifth. This analysis seeks to explain the reasons for the underestimation before offering new long-term predictions.MethodsA Dynamic Causal Model was used to identify changes in COVID-19 transmissibility and the public's behavioral response in the 12-months to October 2022. The model was then used to predict the future trends in infections, long-COVID, hospital admissions and deaths over 12-months to October 2023.FindingsThe model estimated that the secondary attack rate increased from 0.4 to 0.5, the latent period shortened from 2.7 to 2.6 and the incubation period shortened from 2.0 to 1.95 days between October 2021 and October 2022. During this time the model also estimated that antibody immunity waned from 177 to 160 days and T-cell immunity from 205 to 180 days. This increase in transmissibility was associated with a reduction in pathogenicity with the proportion of infections developing acute respiratory distress syndrome falling for 6–2% in the same twelve-month period. Despite the wave of infections, the public response was to increase the tendency to expose themselves to a high-risk environment (e.g., leaving home) each day from 33–58% in the same period.The predictions for October 2023 indicate a wave of infections three times larger this coming year than last year with significant health and economic consequences such as 120,000 additional COVID-19 related deaths, 800,000 additional hospital admissions and 3.5 million people suffering acute-post-COVID-19 syndrome lasting more than 12 weeks.InterpretationThe increase in transmissibility together with the public's response provide plausible explanations for why the model underestimated the 12-month predictions to October 2022. The 2023 projection could well-underestimate the predicted substantial next wave of COVID-19 infection. Vaccination alone will not control the epidemic. The UK COVID-19 epidemic is not over. The results call for investment in precautionary public health interventions.

UK IT Services Market size was valued at USD 105.14 Billion in 2024 and is projected to reach USD 180.65 Billion by 2032, growing at a CAGR of 7% from 2025 to 2032.UK IT Services Market DynamicsThe key market dynamics that are shaping the UK IT services market include:Key Market DriversDigital Transformation Acceleration Post-COVID: The pandemic has dramatically accelerated digital transformation initiatives across UK businesses, creating sustained demand for IT services. According to the Office for National Statistics (ONS), the percentage of UK businesses using cloud computing services increased from 42% in 2020 to 53% in 2023, with enterprise spending on digital transformation reaching USD 66.46 billion in 2023. The UK government's Digital Strategy initiative has further committed USD 3.23 billion in digital skills training through 2025 to support this transformation.

The COVID-19 pandemic has led the retail sector into a period of profound change. How must retailers adapt their operations to ensure they remain competitive in the future?

The size of the UK Arts Promoter Market market was valued at USD XX Million in 2023 and is projected to reach USD XXX Million by 2032, with an expected CAGR of 7.00">> 7.00% during the forecast period. Recent developments include: In June 2023, Sulivan Sweetland merged with Maestro Arts. With this merger Sulivan Sweetland's team and artists came under the banner of Maestro Arts, creating a company of 20 based in the West Wing of Somerset House. Maestro Arts is an interdisciplinary agency providing strategic and comprehensive career management to an array of elite international artists., In August 2023, Sotheby's, the historic auction house owned by French billionaire Patrick Drahi, reported a significant decline in profits due to Brexit red tape. In 2022, their profits dropped to USD 88 million from USD 318 million in the previous year, representing a decrease of almost 75%. This decline was attributed to the challenges and complications brought about by Brexit.. Key drivers for this market are: United Kingdom Exists with the Finest Artist form with Global demand., Increase in Number of Art promotion and exhibition events.. Potential restraints include: Increase in regulation and taxation structure post Brexit., Steep Rise in UK Inflation Rate post covid. Notable trends are: Rising Share of Online Sales in Art Market.

This dataset pertains to a research project investigating the social, cultural, and economic consequences of COVID19 on independent arts workers, specifically in the theatre sector, across England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. The project recognised the unique vulnerability of this workforce in dealing with the impact of COVID19. Their workplaces closed overnight and their sector transformed as theatres moved to digital delivery, and their employment status (freelance) made them ineligible for the UK government’s Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme. The motivation of the project was to understand: the employment experiences of this workforce during the first 18 months of the pandemic; how the pandemic affected their planning for the future; how the pandemic changed their creative practices and skills; what impact government and sectoral policy had on the workforce; and to find strategies for government and industry to support this precarious workforce.

This data collection includes survey responses (n=397) to an online survey which ran from 23/11/2020 to 19/03/2021, and a database of policy events covering the period from the onset of the pandemic until 27/5/2022 (n=1353). This collection contains the survey data. The survey was run through the JISC surveys platform. It had 34 questions collecting a mixture of qualitative and quantitative data. Freeform text responses were alternated with multiple choice, multi-option and Likert scale. The survey captured data on theatre freelancers employment, emotional, and cultural experiences, the region(s) and setting(s) where they worked, and their age, gender identity, race, occupation(s).COVID-19 threatens the performing arts; closures of theatres and outlawing of public gatherings have proven financially devastating to the industry across the United Kingdom and, indeed, the world. The pandemic has sparked a wide range of industry-led strategies designed to alleviate financial consequences and improve audience capture amidst social distancing. COVID-19 has affected all levels of the sector but poses an existential threat to freelancers--Independent Arts Workers (IAWs)--who make up 60% of industry workforce in the UK (EU Labour Force Survey 2017). The crisis has put a spotlight on the vulnerable working conditions, economic sustainability, mental wellbeing, and community support networks of IAWs. IAWs are often overlooked by the industry and researchers, however it is their very precarity that makes them pioneers of adaptability responsible for key innovation within the sector. IAWs may prove essential for the industry's regrowth post-COVID-19. An investigation is necessary into the impact of COVID-19 on IAWs and the wide-ranging creative solutions developing within the industry to overcome them.

There has been increasing pressure to gather 'robust, real-time data' to investigate the financial, cultural, and social potential long-term consequences of COVID-19 on the UK theatre industry. The impact of the pandemic on IAWs is particularly complex and wide-ranging. A TRG Arts survey stated that 60% of IAWs predict their income will 'more than halve in 2020' while 50% have had 100% of their work cancelled. Industry researchers from TRG Arts and Theatres Trust have launched investigations examining the financial impact of COVID-19 on commercial venues and National Portfolio Organisations, but there has been insufficient research into the consequences for IAWs (eg. actors, directors, producers, writers, theatre makers, technicians) and the smaller SMEs beyond income loss and project cancellation data. In May 2020, Vicky Featherstone of the Royal Court Theatre, stated the importance of support for the 'massive freelance and self-employed workforce' she believed has been 'taken for granted' by the industry. Our study fills this gap by capturing and analysing not only the economic impact, but the social and cultural transformations caused by COVID-19 by and for IAWs. We will compare regional responses across England, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland as well as variations across racial and socio-economic groups. Our aims are to document and investigate the impact of COVID-19 on IAWs, identify inequalities in the sector, investigate changes in the type of work produced post-COVID-19, and help develop strategies for how the sector can move forward from this crisis. We will investigate connections between the financial consequences of COVID-19 and creative strategies for industry survival including social support networks, communication initiatives between arts venues and IAWs, and the development of mixed-media work in the wake of the pandemic.

The United States has had the highest economic growth in the G7 since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, with its economy *** percent larger in the first quarter of 2023, when compared with the fourth quarter of 2019. By contrast, the United Kingdom and Germany have both seen their economies shrink by *** percent in the same time period.

Prior to the Coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak, the UK construction industry had posted growth of 1.8% for 2019 in real terms. However, with disruptions caused by the COVID-19 outbreak and the subsequent lockdown measures, the industry was severely impacted in 2020. According to the Office for National Statistics (ONS), the UK construction industry contracted by 12.5% year on year (YoY) in the third quarter of 2020 (the latest data available at the time of writing), following Y-o-Y declines of 38.2% in Q2 and 4.0% in Q1 2020. Read More

Co-working spaces have become an essential part of the digital economy but how will Covid-19 affect their growth in urban areas?

This Round 1 Innovation Fund project followed the experiences of several co-working projects through the pandemic to explore what role co-working spaces might play in new flexible, hybrid models of work.

Research questions How have co-working spaces responded to the COVID-19 crisis? How do co-working spaces stand to be incorporated into the economic recovery and urban regeneration efforts in the aftermath? Method Over 40 interviews were conducted in Brighton, Bristol and Manchester with representatives from a range of coworking spaces and of local and regional government.

Key findings The future of urban co-working spaces will be shaped by the wider dynamics of the urban property market and shifts in corporate demand for flexible workspace. These forces will likely prove more influential than anything specific to their founding organisation and social purpose. The pandemic underscored the ambivalent position of co-working spaces as hosts rather than employers and revealed the variable positions of different co-working space business models in the face of disrupted income streams. At the same time, co-working spaces have contributed to the recovery from the pandemic by providing places to work collaboratively or collectively alongside shifts towards more flexible work and working from home. In this respect their importance is likely to increase. Attention is shifting from the towering dominance of London to smaller urban hubs and especially commuting towns. Although local and national government are beginning to recognise the potential importance of co-working spaces, they have not begun to develop strategies to nurture them. This gap risks leaving co-working spaces and their users adrift in increasingly turbulent and competitive market conditions. This is especially important at a time where they stand to play a central role in providing sites for experimentation with, and adaptation to, new digitally-mediated working practices emerging from the pandemic, for a potentially much broader array of workers than spaces previously served.

The Digital Futures at Work Research Centre (Dig.IT) will establish itself as an essential resource for those wanting to understand how new digital technologies are profoundly reshaping the world of work. Digitalisation is a topical feature of contemporary debate. For evangelists, technology offers new opportunities for those seeking work and increased flexibility and autonomy for those in work. More pessimistic visions, in contrast, see a future where jobs are either destroyed by robots or degraded through increasingly precarious contracts and computerised monitoring. Take Uber as an example: the company claims it is creating opportunities for self-employed entrepreneurs; while workers' groups increasingly challenge such claims through legal means to improve their rights at work.

While such positive and pessimistic scenarios abound of an increasingly fragmented, digitalised and flexible transformation of work across the globe, theoretical understanding of contemporary developments remains underdeveloped and systematic empirical analyses are lacking. We know, for example, that employers and governments are struggling to cope with and understand the pace and consequences of digital change, while individuals face new uncertainties over how to become and stay 'connected' in turbulent labour markets. Yet, we have no real understanding of what it means to be a 'connected worker' in an increasing 'connected' economy. Drawing resources from different academic fields of study, Dig.IT will provide an empirically innovative and international broad body of knowledge that will offer authoritative insights into the impact of digitalisation on the future of work.

The Dig.IT centre will be jointly led by the Universities of Sussex and Leeds, supported by leading experts from Aberdeen, Cambridge, Manchester and Monash Universities. Its core research programme will cover four broad-ranging research themes. Theme one will set the conceptual and quantitative base for the centre's activities. Theme two involves a large-scale survey of Employers' Digital Practices at Work. Theme three involves qualitative research on employers' and employees' experiences of digitalisation at work across 4 sectors (Creative industries, Business Services, Consumer Services, Public Services). Theme 4 examines how the disconnected attempt to reconnect, through Public Employment Services, the growth of new types of self-employment, platform work and workers' responses to building new forms of voice and representation in an international context. Specific projects include:

1. The Impact of Digitalisation on Work and Employment -Conceptualising digital futures, historically, regionally and internationally -Comparative regulation of digital employment

2. Mapping regional and international trends of digital technology and work

3. Employers' Digital Practices at Work Survey

4. Employers' and employees' experiences of digital work across sectors -Changing management processes and practices -Workers' experiences of digital transformation

5. Reconnecting the disconnected: new channels of voice and representation

6. displaced workers, job search and the public employment service

7. self-employment, interest representation and voice

Dig.IT will establish a Data Observatory on digital futures at work to promote our findings through an interactive website, report on a series of methodological seminars and new experimental methods and deliver extensive outreach activities. It will act as a one-platform library of resources at the forefront of research on digital work and will establish itself as a focal point for decision-makers across the policy spectrum, connecting with industrial strategy, employment and welfare policy. It will also manage an Innovation Fund designed to fund novel research ideas, from across the academic community as they emerge over the life course of the centre.

UK AI in Digital Publishing & E-Learning Platforms Market valued at USD 2.9 billion, driven by personalized learning and post-COVID online education surge, with growth in LMS and educational institutions.

Employment placement agencies in Europe’s revenue is anticipated to contract at a compound annual rate of 9% over the five years through 2025 to €65.4 billion. The COVID-19 outbreak tanked business confidence and expansion plans because of economic uncertainty after months of global lockdowns, forcing hiring freezes in a tricky time for employment agencies. 2022 marked a resurgence for agencies, with companies entering a hiring frenzy post-pandemic. The labour market is cooling in 2025 amid greater global uncertainty with US tariffs impacting business confidence. Still, employment across Europe remains high. According to Eurostat data, employment in the EU reached a record peak of 75.8% in 2024. Companies enjoyed a post-COVID-19 boom in hiring, as the economy reopened and companies began to look to expand thanks to improved business confidence, which kept employment agencies busy. The labour market has proved resilient against the economic background of high interest rates and high inflation in recent years, but remains tight with several unfilled vacancies. Vacancies have dipped from the sharp rise post-COVID-19 when companies unfroze hiring decisions. Available vacancies are proving difficult to fill in 2025, indicating a skills mismatch between job seekers and roles that agencies are struggling to negotiate. Several countries attempt to address long-standing labour shortages to ameliorate professional mobility and offer training courses for in-demand skills through agencies. France, for example, is addressing youth unemployment through upskilling training programmes. Public sector hiring in Germany and Spain in health and education also pushes revenue growth for agencies compared to stunted private sector demand. Revenue is expected to rise by 8.7% in 2025 amid job cuts in the technology sector. Revenue is projected to swell at a compound annual rate of 13.2% over the five years through 2030 to reach €121.6 billion. Agencies will continue to target revenue growth by elevating their online presence, specialising their services towards more niche sectors and targeting executives and upper management positions. Technological developments remain a threat to recruiters, with HR AI systems like Paradox able to scan networking platforms such as LinkedIn for candidates. Companies’ in-house HR teams are expanding too. The sustainability sector looks to be a hot property job market to target, but potential shortages in both high and low-skilled occupations driven by employment growth in STEM professions and healthcare will create hurdles in the hiring process in other sectors.