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TwitterThe economy of the United Kingdom is expected to fall by ** percent in the second quarter of 2020, following the Coronavirus outbreak and closure of several businesses. According to the forecast the economy will bounce back in the third quarter of 2020, based on a scenario where the lockdown lasts for three months, with social distancing gradually phased out over a subsequent three-month period.
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TwitterThe main aim of this work is to develop a set of high level macro economic scenarios for the medium-term (to the end of 2022) and for the long-term (to 2030) in order to inform the development of recovery strategies in London, reflecting unprecedented uncertainty on the economic outlook. The primary scenario dimensions include Effectiveness/nature of public health response and Effectiveness/impact of economic support measures. Other scenario dimensions include: Brexit and migration; International economic context; Technology and innovation; Financial climate; Political economy; Economic Geography and GHG emissions. This is an agile project - GLA Economics will continue to track actual data in order to review the assessment of the likelihood of alternative scenario outcomes. Successive updates will be released when they become available for the benefit of external stakeholders in tackling the COVID-19 crisis.
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The economic landscape of the United Kingdom has been significantly shaped by the intertwined issues of Brexit, COVID-19, and their interconnected impacts. Despite the country’s robust and diverse economy, the disruptions caused by Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic have created uncertainty and upheaval for both businesses and individuals. Recognizing the magnitude of these challenges, academic literature has directed its attention toward conducting immediate research in this crucial area. This study sets out to investigate key economic factors that have influenced various sectors of the UK economy and have broader economic implications within the context of Brexit and COVID-19. The factors under scrutiny include the unemployment rate, GDP index, earnings, and trade. To accomplish this, a range of data analysis tools and techniques were employed, including the Box-Jenkins method, neural network modeling, Google Trend analysis, and Twitter-sentiment analysis. The analysis encompassed different periods: pre-Brexit (2011-2016), Brexit (2016-2020), the COVID-19 period, and post-Brexit (2020-2021). The findings of the analysis offer intriguing insights spanning the past decade. For instance, the unemployment rate displayed a downward trend until 2020 but experienced a spike in 2021, persisting for a six-month period. Meanwhile, total earnings per week exhibited a gradual increase over time, and the GDP index demonstrated an upward trajectory until 2020 but declined during the COVID-19 period. Notably, trade experienced the most significant decline following both Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, the impact of these events exhibited variations across the UK’s four regions and twelve industries. Wales and Northern Ireland emerged as the regions most affected by Brexit and COVID-19, with industries such as accommodation, construction, and wholesale trade particularly impacted in terms of earnings and employment levels. Conversely, industries such as finance, science, and health demonstrated an increased contribution to the UK’s total GDP in the post-Brexit period, indicating some positive outcomes. It is worth highlighting that the impact of these economic factors was more pronounced on men than on women. Among all the variables analyzed, trade suffered the most severe consequences in the UK. By early 2021, the macroeconomic situation in the country was characterized by a simple dynamic: economic demand rebounded at a faster pace than supply, leading to shortages, bottlenecks, and inflation. The findings of this research carry significant value for the UK government and businesses, empowering them to adapt and innovate based on forecasts to navigate the challenges posed by Brexit and COVID-19. By doing so, they can promote long-term economic growth and effectively address the disruptions caused by these interrelated issues.
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TwitterThe UK economy shrank by 0.1 percent in September 2025 after reporting zero growth in the previous month. Since a huge decline in GDP in April 2020, the UK economy has gradually recovered and is now slightly larger than it was before the COVID-19 pandemic. After the initial recovery from the pandemic, however, the UK economy has effectively flatlined, fluctuating between low growth and small contractions since 2022. Labour banking on growth to turn around fortunes in 2025 In February 2025, just over half a year after winning the last general election, the approval rating for the new Labour government fell to a low of -48 percent. Furthermore, the Prime Minister, Keir Starmer was not only less popular than the new Conservative leader, Kemi Badenoch, but also the leader of the Reform Party, Nigel Farage, whose party have surged in opinion polls recently. This remarkable decline in popularity for the new government is, in some part, due to a deliberate policy of making tough decisions early. Arguably, the most damaging of these policies was the withdrawal of the winter fuel allowance for some pensioners, although other factors such as a controversy about gifts and donations also hurt the government. While Labour aims to restore the UK's economic and political credibility in the long term, they will certainly hope for some good economic news sooner rather than later. Economy bounces back in 2024 after ending 2023 in recession Due to two consecutive quarters of negative economic growth, in late 2023 the UK economy ended the year in recession. After not growing at all in the second quarter of 2023, UK GDP fell by 0.1 percent in the third quarter, and then by 0.3 percent in the last quarter. For the whole of 2023, the economy grew by 0.4 percent compared to 2022, and for 2024 is forecast to have grown by 1.1 percent. During the first two quarters of 2024, UK GDP grew by 0.7 percent, and 0.4 percent, with this relatively strong growth followed by zero percent growth in the third quarter of the year. Although the economy had started to grow again by the time of the 2024 general election, this was not enough to save the Conservative government at the time. Despite usually seen as the best party for handling the economy, the Conservative's economic competency was behind that of Labour on the eve of the 2024 election.
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TwitterIn 2024, the gross domestic product (GDP) of the United Kingdom grew by 0.9 percent and is expected to grow by just one percent in 2025 and by 1.9 percent in 2026. Growth is expected to slow down to 1.8 percent in 2027, and then grow by 1.7, and 1.8 percent in 2027 and 2028 respectively. The sudden emergence of COVID-19 in 2020 and subsequent closure of large parts of the economy were the cause of the huge 9.4 percent contraction in 2020, with the economy recovering somewhat in 2021, when the economy grew by 7.6 percent. UK growth downgraded in 2025 Although the economy is still expected to grow in 2025, the one percent growth anticipated in this forecast has been halved from two percent in October 2024. Increased geopolitical uncertainty as well as the impact of American tariffs on the global economy are some of the main reasons for this mark down. The UK's inflation rate for 2025 has also been revised, with an annual rate of 3.2 percent predicated, up from 2.6 percent in the last forecast. Unemployment is also anticipated to be higher than initially thought, with the annual unemployment rate likely to be 4.5 percent instead of 4.1 percent. Long-term growth problems In the last two quarters of 2023, the UK economy shrank by 0.1 percent in Q3 and by 0.3 percent in Q4, plunging the UK into recession for the first time since the COVID-19 pandemic. Even before that last recession, however, the UK economy has been struggling with weak growth. Although growth since the pandemic has been noticeably sluggish, there has been a clear long-term trend of declining growth rates. The economy has consistently been seen as one of the most important issues to people in Britain, ahead of health, immigration and the environment. Achieving strong levels of economic growth is one of the main aims of the Labour government elected in 2024, although after almost one year in power it has so far proven elusive.
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TwitterIn 2020, global gross domestic product declined by 6.7 percent as a result of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic outbreak. In Latin America, overall GDP loss amounted to 8.5 percent.
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TwitterThe United States has had the highest economic growth in the G7 since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, with its economy *** percent larger in the first quarter of 2023, when compared with the fourth quarter of 2019. By contrast, the United Kingdom and Germany have both seen their economies shrink by *** percent in the same time period.
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TwitterFind out how the UK economy is performing compared to its EU counterpart. From COVID-19 to Brexit, discover the main reasons why the UK is lagging behind.
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TwitterFrom April 2020 participants from our main Understanding Society sample have been asked to complete a short web-survey. This survey covers the changing impact of the pandemic on the welfare of UK individuals, families and wider communities. Participants complete a regular survey, which includes core content designed to track changes, alongside variable content adapted as the coronavirus situation develops. Researchers will be able to link the data from this web survey to answers respondents have given in previous (and future) waves of the annual Understanding Society survey.
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IntroductionThe post-COVID-19 phenomenon of “quiet quitting” could be problematic for UK economic growth because unpaid overtime has been a key contributor to business productivity since the 2008 global financial crisis. Here, we explore the extent to which this phenomenon exists in the UK, and whether the tendency for quiet quitting differs across generations.MethodsWe analyzed data from the UK Quarterly Labor Force Survey (QLFS) between 2007 and 2022 to determine changes in hours worked. Quiet quitting was characterized by notable declines in hours worked between 2019 and 2022, benchmarked against 20072018 trajectories. Analyses were demarcated by four commonly defined generational cohorts (i.e., Generation Z [GenZs; 1997–2004], Generation Y [Millennials; 1981–1996], Generation X [GenXers; 1965–1980], and Baby Boomers [1952–1964]).ResultsOverall, we found that the UK workforce reduced hours by ~28 h per year in the pandemic and post-pandemic periods. Hours lost was most notable in 2022, with hours down by ~36 h. However, in assessing generational differences, quiet quitting was most pronounced in the two younger cohorts. GenZs showed the steepest decline in hours worked, while Millennials worked the least number of hours overall, with no indication of recovery by the end of the study period. Hours declined for GenXers and Baby Boomers, but changes were more moderate, and Baby Boomers showed evidence of a possible rebound to pre-pandemic levels.DiscussionGiven the ~24,568 million UK full-time workers in 2022, our findings equate to over 55 million discretionary hours lost to the labor market per year between 2019 and 2022, 48.1% of which is accounted for by Millennials. Thus, we evidence that quiet quitting has interrupted the recovery of working hours in the UK to pre-pandemic levels, and lost hours are especially attributable to younger cohorts.JELJ24 J01.
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TwitterReported DCMS Sector GVA is estimated to have fallen by 0.4% from Quarter 2 (April to June) to Quarter 3 2022 (July to September) in real terms. By comparison, the whole UK economy fell by 0.2% from Quarter 2 to Quarter 3 2022.
GVA of reported DCMS Sectors in September 2022 was 6% above February 2020 levels, which was the most recent month not significantly affected by the pandemic. By comparison, GVA for the whole UK economy was 0.2% lower than in February 2020.
16 November 2022
These Economic Estimates are Official Statistics used to provide an estimate of the economic contribution of DCMS Sectors in terms of gross value added (GVA), for the period January 2019 to September 2022. Provisional monthly GVA in 2019 and 2020 was first published in March 2021 as an ad hoc statistical release. This current release contains new figures for July to September 2022 and revised estimates for previous months, in line with the scheduled revisions that were made to the underlying ONS datasets in October 2022.
Estimates are in chained volume measures (i.e. have been adjusted for inflation), at 2019 prices, and are seasonally adjusted. These latest monthly estimates should only be used to illustrate general trends, not used as definitive figures.
You can use these estimates to:
You should not use these estimates to:
Estimates of annual GVA by DCMS Sectors, based on the monthly series, are included in this release for 2019 to 2021. These are calculated by summing the monthly estimates for the calendar year and were first published for 2019 and 2020 in DCMS Sector National Economic Estimates: 2011 - 2020.
Since August 2022, we have been publishing these estimates as part of the regular published series of GVA data, with data being revised in line with revisions to the underlying ONS datasets, as with the monthly GVA estimates. These estimates have been published, updating what was first published last year, in order to meet growing demand for annual figures for GVA beyond the 2019 estimates in our National Statistics GVA publication. The National Statistics GVA publication estimates remain the most robust for our sectors, however estimates for years after 2019 have been delayed owing to the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic.
Consequently, these “summed monthly” annual estimate figures for GVA can be used but should not be seen as definitive.
The findings are calculated based on published ONS data sources including the Index of Services and Index of Production.
These data sources provide an estimate of the monthly change in GVA for all UK industries. However, the data is only available for broader industry groups, whereas DCMS sectors are defined at a more detailed industrial level. For example, GVA for ‘Cultural education’ is estimated based on the trend for all education. Sectors such as ‘Cultural education’ may have been affected differently by COVID-19 compared to education in general. These estimates are also based on the composition of the economy in 2019. Overall, this means the accuracy of monthly GVA for DCMS sectors is likely to be lower for months in 2020 and 2021.
The technical guidance contains further information about data sources, methodology, and the validation and accuracy of these estimates.
Figures are provisional and subject to revision on a monthly basis when the ONS Index of Services and Index of Production are updated. Figures for the latest month will be highly uncertain.
An example of the impact of these revisions is highlighted in the following example; for the revisions applied in February 2022 the average change to DCMS sector monthly GVA was 0.6%, but there were larger differences for some sectors, in some months e.g. the value of the Sport sector in May 2021 was revised from £1.27 billion to £1.45 billion, a 13.8% difference.
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TwitterThis dataset pertains to a research project investigating the social, cultural, and economic consequences of COVID19 on independent arts workers, specifically in the theatre sector, across England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. The project recognised the unique vulnerability of this workforce in dealing with the impact of COVID19. Their workplaces closed overnight and their sector transformed as theatres moved to digital delivery, and their employment status (freelance) made them ineligible for the UK government’s Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme. The motivation of the project was to understand: the employment experiences of this workforce during the first 18 months of the pandemic; how the pandemic affected their planning for the future; how the pandemic changed their creative practices and skills; what impact government and sectoral policy had on the workforce; and to find strategies for government and industry to support this precarious workforce.
This data collection includes survey responses (n=397) to an online survey which ran from 23/11/2020 to 19/03/2021, and a database of policy events covering the period from the onset of the pandemic until 27/5/2022 (n=1353). This collection contains the survey data. The survey was run through the JISC surveys platform. It had 34 questions collecting a mixture of qualitative and quantitative data. Freeform text responses were alternated with multiple choice, multi-option and Likert scale. The survey captured data on theatre freelancers employment, emotional, and cultural experiences, the region(s) and setting(s) where they worked, and their age, gender identity, race, occupation(s).COVID-19 threatens the performing arts; closures of theatres and outlawing of public gatherings have proven financially devastating to the industry across the United Kingdom and, indeed, the world. The pandemic has sparked a wide range of industry-led strategies designed to alleviate financial consequences and improve audience capture amidst social distancing. COVID-19 has affected all levels of the sector but poses an existential threat to freelancers--Independent Arts Workers (IAWs)--who make up 60% of industry workforce in the UK (EU Labour Force Survey 2017). The crisis has put a spotlight on the vulnerable working conditions, economic sustainability, mental wellbeing, and community support networks of IAWs. IAWs are often overlooked by the industry and researchers, however it is their very precarity that makes them pioneers of adaptability responsible for key innovation within the sector. IAWs may prove essential for the industry's regrowth post-COVID-19. An investigation is necessary into the impact of COVID-19 on IAWs and the wide-ranging creative solutions developing within the industry to overcome them.
There has been increasing pressure to gather 'robust, real-time data' to investigate the financial, cultural, and social potential long-term consequences of COVID-19 on the UK theatre industry. The impact of the pandemic on IAWs is particularly complex and wide-ranging. A TRG Arts survey stated that 60% of IAWs predict their income will 'more than halve in 2020' while 50% have had 100% of their work cancelled. Industry researchers from TRG Arts and Theatres Trust have launched investigations examining the financial impact of COVID-19 on commercial venues and National Portfolio Organisations, but there has been insufficient research into the consequences for IAWs (eg. actors, directors, producers, writers, theatre makers, technicians) and the smaller SMEs beyond income loss and project cancellation data. In May 2020, Vicky Featherstone of the Royal Court Theatre, stated the importance of support for the 'massive freelance and self-employed workforce' she believed has been 'taken for granted' by the industry. Our study fills this gap by capturing and analysing not only the economic impact, but the social and cultural transformations caused by COVID-19 by and for IAWs. We will compare regional responses across England, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland as well as variations across racial and socio-economic groups. Our aims are to document and investigate the impact of COVID-19 on IAWs, identify inequalities in the sector, investigate changes in the type of work produced post-COVID-19, and help develop strategies for how the sector can move forward from this crisis. We will investigate connections between the financial consequences of COVID-19 and creative strategies for industry survival including social support networks, communication initiatives between arts venues and IAWs, and the development of mixed-media work in the wake of the pandemic.
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TwitterThe United Kingdom's economy grew by 1.1 percent in 2024, after a growth rate of 0.3 percent in 2023, 5.1 percent in 2022, 8.5 percent in 2021, and a record ten percent fall in 2020. During the provided time period, the biggest annual fall in gross domestic product before 2020 occurred in 2009, when the UK economy contracted by 4.6 percent at the height of the global financial crisis of the late 2000s. Before 2021, the year with the highest annual GDP growth rate was 1973, when the UK economy grew by 6.5 percent. UK economy growing but GDP per capita falling In 2022, the UK's GDP per capita amounted to approximately 37,371 pounds, with this falling to 37,028 pounds in 2023, and 36,977 pounds in 2024. While the UK economy as a whole grew during this time, the UK's population grew at a faster rate, resulting in the negative growth in GDP per capita. This suggests the UK economy's struggles with productivity are not only stagnating, but getting worse. The relatively poor economic performance of the UK in recent years has not gone unnoticed by the electorate, with the economy consistently seen as the most important issue for voters since 2022. Recent shocks to UK economy In the second quarter of 2020, the UK economy shrank by a record 20.3 percent at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. Although there was a relatively swift economic recovery initially, the economy has struggled to grow much beyond its pre-pandemic size, and was only around 3.1 percent larger in December 2024, when compared with December 2019. Although the labor market has generally been quite resilient during this time, a long twenty-month period between 2021 and 2023 saw prices rise faster than wages, and inflation surge to a high of 11.1 percent in October 2022.
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TwitterExplore real GDP growth projections dataset, including insights into the impact of COVID-19 on economic trends. This dataset covers countries such as Spain, Australia, France, Italy, Brazil, and more.
growth rate, Real, COVID-19, GDP
Spain, Australia, France, Italy, Brazil, Argentina, United Kingdom, United States, Canada, Russia, Turkiye, World, China, Mexico, Korea, India, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Germany, Indonesia, JapanFollow data.kapsarc.org for timely data to advance energy economics research..Source: OECD Economic Outlook database.- India projections are based on fiscal years, starting in April. The European Union is a full member of the G20, but the G20 aggregate only includes countries that are also members in their own right. Spain is a permanent invitee to the G20. World and G20 aggregates use moving nominal GDP weights at purchasing power parities. Difference in percentage points, based on rounded figures.
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Employment placement agencies in Europe’s revenue is anticipated to contract at a compound annual rate of 9% over the five years through 2025 to €65.4 billion. The COVID-19 outbreak tanked business confidence and expansion plans because of economic uncertainty after months of global lockdowns, forcing hiring freezes in a tricky time for employment agencies. 2022 marked a resurgence for agencies, with companies entering a hiring frenzy post-pandemic. The labour market is cooling in 2025 amid greater global uncertainty with US tariffs impacting business confidence. Still, employment across Europe remains high. According to Eurostat data, employment in the EU reached a record peak of 75.8% in 2024. Companies enjoyed a post-COVID-19 boom in hiring, as the economy reopened and companies began to look to expand thanks to improved business confidence, which kept employment agencies busy. The labour market has proved resilient against the economic background of high interest rates and high inflation in recent years, but remains tight with several unfilled vacancies. Vacancies have dipped from the sharp rise post-COVID-19 when companies unfroze hiring decisions. Available vacancies are proving difficult to fill in 2025, indicating a skills mismatch between job seekers and roles that agencies are struggling to negotiate. Several countries attempt to address long-standing labour shortages to ameliorate professional mobility and offer training courses for in-demand skills through agencies. France, for example, is addressing youth unemployment through upskilling training programmes. Public sector hiring in Germany and Spain in health and education also pushes revenue growth for agencies compared to stunted private sector demand. Revenue is expected to rise by 8.7% in 2025 amid job cuts in the technology sector. Revenue is projected to swell at a compound annual rate of 13.2% over the five years through 2030 to reach €121.6 billion. Agencies will continue to target revenue growth by elevating their online presence, specialising their services towards more niche sectors and targeting executives and upper management positions. Technological developments remain a threat to recruiters, with HR AI systems like Paradox able to scan networking platforms such as LinkedIn for candidates. Companies’ in-house HR teams are expanding too. The sustainability sector looks to be a hot property job market to target, but potential shortages in both high and low-skilled occupations driven by employment growth in STEM professions and healthcare will create hurdles in the hiring process in other sectors.
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TwitterIn 2024, the gross domestic product (GDP) of the United Kingdom grew by *** percent and is expected to grow by *** percent in 2025 and by *** percent in 2026. Between 2027 and 2030, the economy is forecast to grow by ****percent every year. The sudden emergence of COVID-19 in 2020 and subsequent closure of large parts of the economy were the cause of the huge *** percent contraction in 2020, with the economy recovering somewhat in 2021, when the economy grew by *** percent. Long-term growth downgraded Although the UK economy will grow faster than expected in 2025, long-term economic growth is predicted to be slower. Increased geopolitical uncertainty as well as lower than expected productivity growth were some of the main reasons cited for this downgrade. In addition, the UK's inflation rate for 2025 was also revised, with an annual rate of *** percent predicated, up from *** percent in the last forecast. Unemployment has also been higher than initially thought, with the annual unemployment rate likely to be *** percent instead of *** percent. Long-term growth problems In the last two quarters of 2023, the UK economy shrank by *** percent in Q3 and by *** percent in Q4, plunging the UK into recession for the first time since the COVID-19 pandemic. Even before that last recession, however, the UK economy has been struggling with weak growth. Although growth since the pandemic has been noticeably sluggish, there has been a clear long-term trend of declining growth rates. The economy has consistently been seen as one of the most important issues to people in Britain, ahead of health, immigration and the environment. Achieving strong levels of economic growth is one of the main aims of the current government elected, although after one and a half years in power it has so far proven elusive.
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TwitterThe Healthy Ageing in Scotland (HAGIS): COVID-19 Impact and Recovery Study, 2021-2022 is a multidisciplinary large-scale study of older adults (aged
50 and over) living in Scotland. The study was established to explore
the spectrum of COVID-19 concerns in older adults and its impact on their willingness to (re)engage
across health, social, and economic domains as Scotland's economy and society emerged from the pandemic. The survey data were collected between October 2021 and January 2022 using electronic, postal self-completion interviews and telephone-assisted personal interviews. From a target sample of 15,674 older adults, drawn from two existing Scottish longitudinal studies and a predefined panel, 3,373 individuals (59 percent women and 41 percent men) completed the survey.
The data provide a wealth of information on older adults' socio-demographics,
COVID-19-induced fear, worries and concerns, health domains, social capital and participation, economic and consumption behaviours, return to workplace experiences and preferences.
Further information is available HAGIS COVID-19 Impact and Recovery Study webpage.
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TwitterFurther information may be found on the the ELSA project website or the Natcen Social Research: ELSA web pages.
Health conditions research with ELSA - June 2021
The ELSA Data team have found some issues with historical data measuring health conditions. If you are intending to do any analysis looking at the following health conditions, then please contact the ELSA Data team at NatCen on elsadata@natcen.ac.uk for advice on how you should approach your analysis. The affected conditions are: eye conditions (glaucoma; diabetic eye disease; macular degeneration; cataract), CVD conditions (high blood pressure; angina; heart attack; Congestive Heart Failure; heart murmur; abnormal heart rhythm; diabetes; stroke; high cholesterol; other heart trouble) and chronic health conditions (chronic lung disease; asthma; arthritis; osteoporosis; cancer; Parkinson's Disease; emotional, nervous or psychiatric problems; Alzheimer's Disease; dementia; malignant blood disorder; multiple sclerosis or motor neurone disease).
Special Licence Data:
Special Licence Access versions of ELSA have more restrictive access conditions than versions available under the standard End User Licence (see 'Access' section below). Users are advised to obtain the latest edition of SN 5050 (the End User Licence version) before making an application for Special Licence data, to see whether that is suitable for their needs. A separate application must be made for each Special Licence study.
Special Licence Access versions of ELSA include:
Where boundary changes have occurred, the geographic identifier has been split into two separate studies to reduce the risk of disclosure. Users are also only allowed one version of each identifier:
ELSA Wave 6 and Wave 8 Self-Completion Questionnaires included an open-ended question where respondents could add any other comments they may wish to note down. These responses have been transcribed and anonymised. Researchers can request access to these transcribed responses for research purposes by contacting the ELSA Data Team at NatCen.
The English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) Covid-19 study can be seen as a follow-up study based on the sample of the regular ELSA study (held under SN 5050). ELSA was launched in 2002 with the primary objective of exploring ageing in England through the operationalisation of a longitudinal design, where repeated measures are taken over time from the same sample of study participants, composed of people aged 50 or above.
After the beginning of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak at the end of 2019, its classification as global pandemic by the World Health Organisation in March 2020 and the gradual escalation of protective measures in the UK, culminating with the enforcement of a nation-wide lockdown in late March, the ELSA research team identified the need to carry out a new ad-hoc study that measures the socio-economic effects/psychological impact of the lockdown on the aged 50+ population of England.
Acknowledgment statement:
The ELSA COVID-19 Substudy was funded through the Economic and Social Research Council via the UK Research and Innovation Covid-19 Rapid Response call. Funding has also been received from the National Institute of Aging in the US, and a consortium of UK government departments coordinated by the National Institute for Health Research.
Further information can be found on the http://www.elsa-project.ac.uk/covid-19" style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">ELSA COVID-19 Study webpage.
ELSA COVID-19 study: End User Licence and Special Licence data
The main data and documentation for the ELSA COVID-19 study are available under SN 8688, subject to standard End User Licence conditions. This study (SN 8918) contains only interview week variables, which are subject to stringent Special Licence conditions. Users should obtain SN 8688 and check whether it is suitable for their needs before considering an application for this study (SN 8918).
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The English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) Covid-19 study can be seen as a follow-up study based on the sample of the regular ELSA study (held under SN 5050). ELSA was launched in 2002 with the primary objective of exploring ageing in England through the operationalisation of a longitudinal design, where repeated measures are taken over time from the same sample of study participants, composed of people aged 50 or above.
After the beginning of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak at the end of 2019, its classification as global pandemic by the World Health Organisation in March 2020 and the gradual escalation of protective measures in the UK, culminating with the enforcement of a nation-wide lockdown in late March, the ELSA research team identified the need to carry out a new ad-hoc study that measures the socio-economic effects/psychological impact of the lockdown on the aged 50+ population of England.
Further information can be found on the "http://www.elsa-project.ac.uk/covid-19" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"> ELSA COVID-19 Study webpage.
Acknowledgment statement:
The ELSA COVID-19 Substudy was funded through the Economic and Social Research Council via the UK Research and Innovation Covid-19 Rapid Response call. Funding has also been received from the National Institute of Aging in the US, and a consortium of UK government departments coordinated by the National Institute for Health Research.
Latest edition information
For the third edition (February 2022), revised data files for Waves 1 and 2, with corrected serial numbers (variable idauniq), were deposited. The documentation remains unchanged.
Special Licence version of the ELSA COVID-19 study
Additional variables covering interview week are available under SN 8918, subject to stringent Special Licence access conditions. Users should check whether the standard End User Licence version (this study, SN 8688), is sufficient for their needs before making an application for the Special Licence version.
Health conditions research with ELSA - June 2021
The ELSA Data team have found some issues with historical data measuring health conditions. If you are intending to do any analysis looking at the following health conditions, then please contact elsadata@natcen.ac.uk for advice on how you should approach your analysis. The affected conditions are: eye conditions (glaucoma; diabetic eye disease; macular degeneration; cataract), CVD conditions (high blood pressure; angina; heart attack; Congestive Heart Failure; heart murmur; abnormal heart rhythm; diabetes; stroke; high cholesterol; other heart trouble) and chronic health conditions (chronic lung disease; asthma; arthritis; osteoporosis; cancer; Parkinson's Disease; emotional, nervous or psychiatric problems; Alzheimer's Disease; dementia; malignant blood disorder; multiple sclerosis or motor neurone disease).
Topics covered in the ELSA COVID-19 study include:
For a full table of topics and questions covered across all the ELSA waves, see the all-waves user guide in the main study (SN 5050) documentation.
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TwitterIn 2023 and through 2024, the world saw inflation rates increase amid, among other things, post-COVID-19 effects and the Russia-Ukraine war. Argentina and Turkey were both plagued by hyperinflation, with over 219 and 58 percent in 2024, respectively. Except for these, Russia had the highest inflation rate, at nearly eight percent. On the other hand, China had the lowest rate of the countries included here, at 0.2 percent. Argentinian inflation crisis During the 2020s, Argentina was struck by extreme levels of inflation, which severely impacted the livelihoods of Argentinians. Specifically, the costs of goods have presented numerous challenges to Argentinian consumers. In Argentina, a basic food basket that costs around 26,000 Argentinian pesos cost over 100,000 by February 2024. Similarly, a basic consumer goods basket that cost around 57,000 Argentinian pesos in February 2023 rose to over 220,000 by February 2024. While these rising costs have been challenging for consumers, Argentina’s inflation rate is expected to decrease beginning in 2024 and is estimated to reach 8.9% by 2029.
British recession Besides the outliers of Argentina and Turkey, the United Kingdom had a comparatively high CPI rate. As of 2024, the British economy has entered a recession, the only G7 country to do so. Just before the general election held in July 2024, British voters indicated that health, mostly the lack of financial support and staff shortages, as well as the economy was the most important issue to them.
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TwitterThe economy of the United Kingdom is expected to fall by ** percent in the second quarter of 2020, following the Coronavirus outbreak and closure of several businesses. According to the forecast the economy will bounce back in the third quarter of 2020, based on a scenario where the lockdown lasts for three months, with social distancing gradually phased out over a subsequent three-month period.