The economy of the United Kingdom is expected to fall by ** percent in the second quarter of 2020, following the Coronavirus outbreak and closure of several businesses. According to the forecast the economy will bounce back in the third quarter of 2020, based on a scenario where the lockdown lasts for three months, with social distancing gradually phased out over a subsequent three-month period.

The main aim of this work is to develop a set of high level macro economic scenarios for the medium-term (to the end of 2022) and for the long-term (to 2030) in order to inform the development of recovery strategies in London, reflecting unprecedented uncertainty on the economic outlook. The primary scenario dimensions include Effectiveness/nature of public health response and Effectiveness/impact of economic support measures. Other scenario dimensions include: Brexit and migration; International economic context; Technology and innovation; Financial climate; Political economy; Economic Geography and GHG emissions. This is an agile project - GLA Economics will continue to track actual data in order to review the assessment of the likelihood of alternative scenario outcomes. Successive updates will be released when they become available for the benefit of external stakeholders in tackling the COVID-19 crisis.

In 2020, global gross domestic product declined by 6.7 percent as a result of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic outbreak. In Latin America, overall GDP loss amounted to 8.5 percent.

The economic landscape of the United Kingdom has been significantly shaped by the intertwined issues of Brexit, COVID-19, and their interconnected impacts. Despite the country’s robust and diverse economy, the disruptions caused by Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic have created uncertainty and upheaval for both businesses and individuals. Recognizing the magnitude of these challenges, academic literature has directed its attention toward conducting immediate research in this crucial area. This study sets out to investigate key economic factors that have influenced various sectors of the UK economy and have broader economic implications within the context of Brexit and COVID-19. The factors under scrutiny include the unemployment rate, GDP index, earnings, and trade. To accomplish this, a range of data analysis tools and techniques were employed, including the Box-Jenkins method, neural network modeling, Google Trend analysis, and Twitter-sentiment analysis. The analysis encompassed different periods: pre-Brexit (2011-2016), Brexit (2016-2020), the COVID-19 period, and post-Brexit (2020-2021). The findings of the analysis offer intriguing insights spanning the past decade. For instance, the unemployment rate displayed a downward trend until 2020 but experienced a spike in 2021, persisting for a six-month period. Meanwhile, total earnings per week exhibited a gradual increase over time, and the GDP index demonstrated an upward trajectory until 2020 but declined during the COVID-19 period. Notably, trade experienced the most significant decline following both Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, the impact of these events exhibited variations across the UK’s four regions and twelve industries. Wales and Northern Ireland emerged as the regions most affected by Brexit and COVID-19, with industries such as accommodation, construction, and wholesale trade particularly impacted in terms of earnings and employment levels. Conversely, industries such as finance, science, and health demonstrated an increased contribution to the UK’s total GDP in the post-Brexit period, indicating some positive outcomes. It is worth highlighting that the impact of these economic factors was more pronounced on men than on women. Among all the variables analyzed, trade suffered the most severe consequences in the UK. By early 2021, the macroeconomic situation in the country was characterized by a simple dynamic: economic demand rebounded at a faster pace than supply, leading to shortages, bottlenecks, and inflation. The findings of this research carry significant value for the UK government and businesses, empowering them to adapt and innovate based on forecasts to navigate the challenges posed by Brexit and COVID-19. By doing so, they can promote long-term economic growth and effectively address the disruptions caused by these interrelated issues.

As of November 2021 the overall cost of the United Kingdom's job retention scheme was 70 billion British pounds. The number of jobs furloughed on the scheme has been steadily declining since May 2020, with around 2.4 million jobs still in furlough by the end of October 2020.

The UK economy shrank by 0.1 percent in September 2025 after reporting zero growth in the previous month. Since a huge decline in GDP in April 2020, the UK economy has gradually recovered and is now slightly larger than it was before the COVID-19 pandemic. After the initial recovery from the pandemic, however, the UK economy has effectively flatlined, fluctuating between low growth and small contractions since 2022. Labour banking on growth to turn around fortunes in 2025 In February 2025, just over half a year after winning the last general election, the approval rating for the new Labour government fell to a low of -48 percent. Furthermore, the Prime Minister, Keir Starmer was not only less popular than the new Conservative leader, Kemi Badenoch, but also the leader of the Reform Party, Nigel Farage, whose party have surged in opinion polls recently. This remarkable decline in popularity for the new government is, in some part, due to a deliberate policy of making tough decisions early. Arguably, the most damaging of these policies was the withdrawal of the winter fuel allowance for some pensioners, although other factors such as a controversy about gifts and donations also hurt the government. While Labour aims to restore the UK's economic and political credibility in the long term, they will certainly hope for some good economic news sooner rather than later. Economy bounces back in 2024 after ending 2023 in recession Due to two consecutive quarters of negative economic growth, in late 2023 the UK economy ended the year in recession. After not growing at all in the second quarter of 2023, UK GDP fell by 0.1 percent in the third quarter, and then by 0.3 percent in the last quarter. For the whole of 2023, the economy grew by 0.4 percent compared to 2022, and for 2024 is forecast to have grown by 1.1 percent. During the first two quarters of 2024, UK GDP grew by 0.7 percent, and 0.4 percent, with this relatively strong growth followed by zero percent growth in the third quarter of the year. Although the economy had started to grow again by the time of the 2024 general election, this was not enough to save the Conservative government at the time. Despite usually seen as the best party for handling the economy, the Conservative's economic competency was behind that of Labour on the eve of the 2024 election.

The United States has had the highest economic growth in the G7 since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, with its economy *** percent larger in the first quarter of 2023, when compared with the fourth quarter of 2019. By contrast, the United Kingdom and Germany have both seen their economies shrink by *** percent in the same time period.

Find out how the UK economy is performing compared to its EU counterpart. From COVID-19 to Brexit, discover the main reasons why the UK is lagging behind.

In 2024, the gross domestic product (GDP) of the United Kingdom grew by 0.9 percent and is expected to grow by just one percent in 2025 and by 1.9 percent in 2026. Growth is expected to slow down to 1.8 percent in 2027, and then grow by 1.7, and 1.8 percent in 2027 and 2028 respectively. The sudden emergence of COVID-19 in 2020 and subsequent closure of large parts of the economy were the cause of the huge 9.4 percent contraction in 2020, with the economy recovering somewhat in 2021, when the economy grew by 7.6 percent. UK growth downgraded in 2025 Although the economy is still expected to grow in 2025, the one percent growth anticipated in this forecast has been halved from two percent in October 2024. Increased geopolitical uncertainty as well as the impact of American tariffs on the global economy are some of the main reasons for this mark down. The UK's inflation rate for 2025 has also been revised, with an annual rate of 3.2 percent predicated, up from 2.6 percent in the last forecast. Unemployment is also anticipated to be higher than initially thought, with the annual unemployment rate likely to be 4.5 percent instead of 4.1 percent. Long-term growth problems In the last two quarters of 2023, the UK economy shrank by 0.1 percent in Q3 and by 0.3 percent in Q4, plunging the UK into recession for the first time since the COVID-19 pandemic. Even before that last recession, however, the UK economy has been struggling with weak growth. Although growth since the pandemic has been noticeably sluggish, there has been a clear long-term trend of declining growth rates. The economy has consistently been seen as one of the most important issues to people in Britain, ahead of health, immigration and the environment. Achieving strong levels of economic growth is one of the main aims of the Labour government elected in 2024, although after almost one year in power it has so far proven elusive.

Co-working spaces have become an essential part of the digital economy but how will Covid-19 affect their growth in urban areas?

This Round 1 Innovation Fund project followed the experiences of several co-working projects through the pandemic to explore what role co-working spaces might play in new flexible, hybrid models of work.

Research questions How have co-working spaces responded to the COVID-19 crisis? How do co-working spaces stand to be incorporated into the economic recovery and urban regeneration efforts in the aftermath? Method Over 40 interviews were conducted in Brighton, Bristol and Manchester with representatives from a range of coworking spaces and of local and regional government.

Key findings The future of urban co-working spaces will be shaped by the wider dynamics of the urban property market and shifts in corporate demand for flexible workspace. These forces will likely prove more influential than anything specific to their founding organisation and social purpose. The pandemic underscored the ambivalent position of co-working spaces as hosts rather than employers and revealed the variable positions of different co-working space business models in the face of disrupted income streams. At the same time, co-working spaces have contributed to the recovery from the pandemic by providing places to work collaboratively or collectively alongside shifts towards more flexible work and working from home. In this respect their importance is likely to increase. Attention is shifting from the towering dominance of London to smaller urban hubs and especially commuting towns. Although local and national government are beginning to recognise the potential importance of co-working spaces, they have not begun to develop strategies to nurture them. This gap risks leaving co-working spaces and their users adrift in increasingly turbulent and competitive market conditions. This is especially important at a time where they stand to play a central role in providing sites for experimentation with, and adaptation to, new digitally-mediated working practices emerging from the pandemic, for a potentially much broader array of workers than spaces previously served.

The Digital Futures at Work Research Centre (Dig.IT) will establish itself as an essential resource for those wanting to understand how new digital technologies are profoundly reshaping the world of work. Digitalisation is a topical feature of contemporary debate. For evangelists, technology offers new opportunities for those seeking work and increased flexibility and autonomy for those in work. More pessimistic visions, in contrast, see a future where jobs are either destroyed by robots or degraded through increasingly precarious contracts and computerised monitoring. Take Uber as an example: the company claims it is creating opportunities for self-employed entrepreneurs; while workers' groups increasingly challenge such claims through legal means to improve their rights at work.

While such positive and pessimistic scenarios abound of an increasingly fragmented, digitalised and flexible transformation of work across the globe, theoretical understanding of contemporary developments remains underdeveloped and systematic empirical analyses are lacking. We know, for example, that employers and governments are struggling to cope with and understand the pace and consequences of digital change, while individuals face new uncertainties over how to become and stay 'connected' in turbulent labour markets. Yet, we have no real understanding of what it means to be a 'connected worker' in an increasing 'connected' economy. Drawing resources from different academic fields of study, Dig.IT will provide an empirically innovative and international broad body of knowledge that will offer authoritative insights into the impact of digitalisation on the future of work.

The Dig.IT centre will be jointly led by the Universities of Sussex and Leeds, supported by leading experts from Aberdeen, Cambridge, Manchester and Monash Universities. Its core research programme will cover four broad-ranging research themes. Theme one will set the conceptual and quantitative base for the centre's activities. Theme two involves a large-scale survey of Employers' Digital Practices at Work. Theme three involves qualitative research on employers' and employees' experiences of digitalisation at work across 4 sectors (Creative industries, Business Services, Consumer Services, Public Services). Theme 4 examines how the disconnected attempt to reconnect, through Public Employment Services, the growth of new types of self-employment, platform work and workers' responses to building new forms of voice and representation in an international context. Specific projects include:

1. The Impact of Digitalisation on Work and Employment -Conceptualising digital futures, historically, regionally and internationally -Comparative regulation of digital employment

2. Mapping regional and international trends of digital technology and work

3. Employers' Digital Practices at Work Survey

4. Employers' and employees' experiences of digital work across sectors -Changing management processes and practices -Workers' experiences of digital transformation

5. Reconnecting the disconnected: new channels of voice and representation

6. displaced workers, job search and the public employment service

7. self-employment, interest representation and voice

Dig.IT will establish a Data Observatory on digital futures at work to promote our findings through an interactive website, report on a series of methodological seminars and new experimental methods and deliver extensive outreach activities. It will act as a one-platform library of resources at the forefront of research on digital work and will establish itself as a focal point for decision-makers across the policy spectrum, connecting with industrial strategy, employment and welfare policy. It will also manage an Innovation Fund designed to fund novel research ideas, from across the academic community as they emerge over the life course of the centre.

We've looked at the performance of the UK gig economy, including how it has been affected by COVID-19, the Supreme Court ruling against Uber and the availability of workers.

Explore real GDP growth projections dataset, including insights into the impact of COVID-19 on economic trends. This dataset covers countries such as Spain, Australia, France, Italy, Brazil, and more.

growth rate, Real, COVID-19, GDP

Spain, Australia, France, Italy, Brazil, Argentina, United Kingdom, United States, Canada, Russia, Turkiye, World, China, Mexico, Korea, India, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Germany, Indonesia, JapanFollow data.kapsarc.org for timely data to advance energy economics research..Source: OECD Economic Outlook database.- India projections are based on fiscal years, starting in April. The European Union is a full member of the G20, but the G20 aggregate only includes countries that are also members in their own right. Spain is a permanent invitee to the G20. World and G20 aggregates use moving nominal GDP weights at purchasing power parities. Difference in percentage points, based on rounded figures.

Employment placement agencies in Europe’s revenue is anticipated to contract at a compound annual rate of 9% over the five years through 2025 to €65.4 billion. The COVID-19 outbreak tanked business confidence and expansion plans because of economic uncertainty after months of global lockdowns, forcing hiring freezes in a tricky time for employment agencies. 2022 marked a resurgence for agencies, with companies entering a hiring frenzy post-pandemic. The labour market is cooling in 2025 amid greater global uncertainty with US tariffs impacting business confidence. Still, employment across Europe remains high. According to Eurostat data, employment in the EU reached a record peak of 75.8% in 2024. Companies enjoyed a post-COVID-19 boom in hiring, as the economy reopened and companies began to look to expand thanks to improved business confidence, which kept employment agencies busy. The labour market has proved resilient against the economic background of high interest rates and high inflation in recent years, but remains tight with several unfilled vacancies. Vacancies have dipped from the sharp rise post-COVID-19 when companies unfroze hiring decisions. Available vacancies are proving difficult to fill in 2025, indicating a skills mismatch between job seekers and roles that agencies are struggling to negotiate. Several countries attempt to address long-standing labour shortages to ameliorate professional mobility and offer training courses for in-demand skills through agencies. France, for example, is addressing youth unemployment through upskilling training programmes. Public sector hiring in Germany and Spain in health and education also pushes revenue growth for agencies compared to stunted private sector demand. Revenue is expected to rise by 8.7% in 2025 amid job cuts in the technology sector. Revenue is projected to swell at a compound annual rate of 13.2% over the five years through 2030 to reach €121.6 billion. Agencies will continue to target revenue growth by elevating their online presence, specialising their services towards more niche sectors and targeting executives and upper management positions. Technological developments remain a threat to recruiters, with HR AI systems like Paradox able to scan networking platforms such as LinkedIn for candidates. Companies’ in-house HR teams are expanding too. The sustainability sector looks to be a hot property job market to target, but potential shortages in both high and low-skilled occupations driven by employment growth in STEM professions and healthcare will create hurdles in the hiring process in other sectors.

The United Kingdom's economy grew by 1.1 percent in 2024, after a growth rate of 0.3 percent in 2023, 5.1 percent in 2022, 8.5 percent in 2021, and a record ten percent fall in 2020. During the provided time period, the biggest annual fall in gross domestic product before 2020 occurred in 2009, when the UK economy contracted by 4.6 percent at the height of the global financial crisis of the late 2000s. Before 2021, the year with the highest annual GDP growth rate was 1973, when the UK economy grew by 6.5 percent. UK economy growing but GDP per capita falling In 2022, the UK's GDP per capita amounted to approximately 37,371 pounds, with this falling to 37,028 pounds in 2023, and 36,977 pounds in 2024. While the UK economy as a whole grew during this time, the UK's population grew at a faster rate, resulting in the negative growth in GDP per capita. This suggests the UK economy's struggles with productivity are not only stagnating, but getting worse. The relatively poor economic performance of the UK in recent years has not gone unnoticed by the electorate, with the economy consistently seen as the most important issue for voters since 2022. Recent shocks to UK economy In the second quarter of 2020, the UK economy shrank by a record 20.3 percent at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. Although there was a relatively swift economic recovery initially, the economy has struggled to grow much beyond its pre-pandemic size, and was only around 3.1 percent larger in December 2024, when compared with December 2019. Although the labor market has generally been quite resilient during this time, a long twenty-month period between 2021 and 2023 saw prices rise faster than wages, and inflation surge to a high of 11.1 percent in October 2022.

The Healthy Ageing in Scotland (HAGIS): COVID-19 Impact and Recovery Study, 2021-2022 is a multidisciplinary large-scale study of older adults (aged 50 and over) living in Scotland. The study was established to explore the spectrum of COVID-19 concerns in older adults and its impact on their willingness to (re)engage across health, social, and economic domains as Scotland's economy and society emerged from the pandemic. The survey data were collected between October 2021 and January 2022 using electronic, postal self-completion interviews and telephone-assisted personal interviews. From a target sample of 15,674 older adults, drawn from two existing Scottish longitudinal studies and a predefined panel, 3,373 individuals (59 percent women and 41 percent men) completed the survey.

The data provide a wealth of information on older adults' socio-demographics, COVID-19-induced fear, worries and concerns, health domains, social capital and participation, economic and consumption behaviours, return to workplace experiences and preferences.

Further information is available HAGIS COVID-19 Impact and Recovery Study webpage.

Following the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic the over-indebted Kenyan state was unable to stabilise a nose-diving economy. Faced with the risk of bankruptcy and widespread defaults on loans, financial credit providers such as banks and microfinance institutions restricted access to credit. The resulting credit-crunch forced many Kenyans to turn to digital lenders and friends or kin for access to credit to pay off pre-existing debts and make ends meet. This collection comprises ethnographic data on how individual borrowers and informal savings-and-credit groups navigated this credit-crunch. In particular, the collection features information on the social consequences of financial technologies and the quantification of creditworthiness through digital data in informal and domestic economies.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is in the ascendant the world over. This is especially the case when it comes to machine learning and big data, which are said to offer a technical fix to human questions of trust. Such rhetoric obscures its embeddedness in a specific socio-cultural context, while downplaying the extent to which trust is an ethical and political issue rather than a strictly technical one. But most social sciences, unlike mathematics and computing, have had little to say about the trust that such technologies are said and designed to foster. My proposed fellowship marks a step towards addressing this imbalance, through research activities as well as by building an interdisciplinary network of social scientists seeking to develop publicly engaged scholarship on AI.

More broadly, the fellowship will help consolidate my doctoral research on trust, by bringing it to bear on recent developments in AI, as well as by integrating some additional research into my existing material, with a view of developing a monograph within the next two years. In my thesis, I argued that - in Kenya as elsewhere - popular narratives about trust link up with the historical reproduction and transformation of social and economic inequalities. Having situated local narratives of trust and faith in a history of missionary and colonial projects, I now wish to consolidate my historical analysis with additional archival data and to weave in fresh ethnographic data on digital infrastructures and their consequences for spiritual and political-economic concerns in the everyday lives of ordinary Kenyans. For example, I am especially interested in how global narratives on artificial intelligence and social trust are impacting the social lives of the microfinance groups I worked with in my doctoral research. If, as argued in the thesis, microcredit borrowers draw on a theologically-diverse language of faith to negotiate the terms of trust and cooperation, it is less clear whether this language of faith can also account for how people respond to and make sense of the data infrastructures that increasingly profile them through machine-learning algorithms and credit-scores. Thus, the fellowship asks:

1. How do algorithmic metrics of creditworthiness and trustworthiness affect formal and informal credit arrangements in rural Southwest Kenya?
2. How do people encounter AI algorithms in a context where trust is said to be elusive, declining, fraught by inequality, and often expressed in the language of religious faith?
3. How do religious commitments influence notions of trustworthiness and relations of trust in social, political, and economic life?

In 2023 and through 2024, the world saw inflation rates increase amid, among other things, post-COVID-19 effects and the Russia-Ukraine war. Argentina and Turkey were both plagued by hyperinflation, with over 219 and 58 percent in 2024, respectively. Except for these, Russia had the highest inflation rate, at nearly eight percent. On the other hand, China had the lowest rate of the countries included here, at 0.2 percent. Argentinian inflation crisis During the 2020s, Argentina was struck by extreme levels of inflation, which severely impacted the livelihoods of Argentinians. Specifically, the costs of goods have presented numerous challenges to Argentinian consumers. In Argentina, a basic food basket that costs around 26,000 Argentinian pesos cost over 100,000 by February 2024. Similarly, a basic consumer goods basket that cost around 57,000 Argentinian pesos in February 2023 rose to over 220,000 by February 2024. While these rising costs have been challenging for consumers, Argentina’s inflation rate is expected to decrease beginning in 2024 and is estimated to reach 8.9% by 2029.

British recession Besides the outliers of Argentina and Turkey, the United Kingdom had a comparatively high CPI rate. As of 2024, the British economy has entered a recession, the only G7 country to do so. Just before the general election held in July 2024, British voters indicated that health, mostly the lack of financial support and staff shortages, as well as the economy was the most important issue to them.

A list of fast facts on the performance of each sector of the UK economy.