A recent analysis on the impact of Brexit suggests that in 2023, the United Kingdom's economy was *** percent smaller than it would have been in a base scenario where the UK never left the EU. The estimated hit to the UK's gross domestic product (GDP) increases to ***** percent in 2024, and to *** percent by 2025 in this forecast. UK growth cut at start of turbulent 2025 After growing by *** percent in 2024, the UK economy is expected to grow by *** percent in 2025, down from an earlier forecast of *** percent. As of 2025, the UK economy is approximately *** percent larger than it was just before the COVID-19 pandemic five years earlier, which delivered a sudden and severe economic shock to the country. While the initial bounce back from this collapse was robust, the recovery slowed by the end of 2020, and it wasn't until late 2021 that the economy returned to its pre-pandemic size. Throughout 2022 and 2023, the economy continued to struggle, and even experienced a recession at the end of 2023. How voters feel about Brexit in 2025 Since the middle of 2021, a growing majority of voters in Britain have advised that they think Brexit was the wrong decision. As of January 2025, around ** percent thought it was wrong to leave the EU, compared with just ** percent in April 2021. By comparison, the share of Britons who think Brexit was the right decision has fallen from ** percent to ** percent in the same time period. Voters are, however, still quite divided on what relationship they want with the EU, with only ** percent supporting rejoining completely. Furthermore, Brexit has fallen behind other issues for voters such as the economy, the NHS, and immigration and the issue played a much smaller role in the 2024 election than it did in 2019.

Across the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and the European Union, gross domestic products (GDP) decreased in 2020 as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, by 2021, growth rates were positive in all four areas again. The United Kingdom, Germany, and the European Union all experiencing slow economic growth in 2023 amid high inflation, with Germany even seeing an economic recession. GDP and its components GDP refers to the total market value of all goods and services that are produced within a country per year. It is composed of government spending, consumption, business investments and net exports. It is an important indicator to measure the economic strength of a country. Economists rely on a variety of factors when predicting the future performance of the GDP. Inflation rate is one of the economic indicators providing insight into the future behavior of households, which make up a significant proportion of GDP. Projections are based on the past performance of such information. Future considerations Some factors can be more easily predicted than others. For example, projections of the annual inflation rate of the United States are easy to come by. However, the intensity and impact of something like Brexit is difficult to predict. Moreover, the occurrence and impact of events such as the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia's war in Ukraine is difficult to foresee. Hence, actual GDP growth may be higher or lower than the original estimates.

As of January 31, 2020, the United Kingdom (UK) is no longer a member of the European Union (EU). The UK left the EU without a trade deal, and has until the end of 2020 to determine the new framework of its trade relations with the EU. This means either a free trade agreement (FTA) will need to be struck between the two parties, or the UK will fall back on trading under the World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules. According to a study on the possible impact of these scenarios on GDP growth in the UK, after the transition period ends by the beginning of 2021, trading under WTO terms will lead to a decline of *** percent in UK GDP. Relative to this rate, if the UK trade with the EU under a FTA, the GDP is forecast to improve by * percent.

Find out how the UK economy is performing compared to its EU counterpart. From COVID-19 to Brexit, discover the main reasons why the UK is lagging behind.

The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the United Kingdom was worth 3643.83 billion US dollars in 2024, according to official data from the World Bank. The GDP value of the United Kingdom represents 3.43 percent of the world economy. This dataset provides the latest reported value for - United Kingdom GDP - plus previous releases, historical high and low, short-term forecast and long-term prediction, economic calendar, survey consensus and news.

This statistic reflects the percentage distribution of the perception of the impact of Brexit on the economy of the European Union and the United Kingdom according to a survey conducted between May 31 and June 1, 2016 in Spain. **% of the respondents thought that the departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union would have a negative impact on the economy of the British.

The economic landscape of the United Kingdom has been significantly shaped by the intertwined issues of Brexit, COVID-19, and their interconnected impacts. Despite the country’s robust and diverse economy, the disruptions caused by Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic have created uncertainty and upheaval for both businesses and individuals. Recognizing the magnitude of these challenges, academic literature has directed its attention toward conducting immediate research in this crucial area. This study sets out to investigate key economic factors that have influenced various sectors of the UK economy and have broader economic implications within the context of Brexit and COVID-19. The factors under scrutiny include the unemployment rate, GDP index, earnings, and trade. To accomplish this, a range of data analysis tools and techniques were employed, including the Box-Jenkins method, neural network modeling, Google Trend analysis, and Twitter-sentiment analysis. The analysis encompassed different periods: pre-Brexit (2011-2016), Brexit (2016-2020), the COVID-19 period, and post-Brexit (2020-2021). The findings of the analysis offer intriguing insights spanning the past decade. For instance, the unemployment rate displayed a downward trend until 2020 but experienced a spike in 2021, persisting for a six-month period. Meanwhile, total earnings per week exhibited a gradual increase over time, and the GDP index demonstrated an upward trajectory until 2020 but declined during the COVID-19 period. Notably, trade experienced the most significant decline following both Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, the impact of these events exhibited variations across the UK’s four regions and twelve industries. Wales and Northern Ireland emerged as the regions most affected by Brexit and COVID-19, with industries such as accommodation, construction, and wholesale trade particularly impacted in terms of earnings and employment levels. Conversely, industries such as finance, science, and health demonstrated an increased contribution to the UK’s total GDP in the post-Brexit period, indicating some positive outcomes. It is worth highlighting that the impact of these economic factors was more pronounced on men than on women. Among all the variables analyzed, trade suffered the most severe consequences in the UK. By early 2021, the macroeconomic situation in the country was characterized by a simple dynamic: economic demand rebounded at a faster pace than supply, leading to shortages, bottlenecks, and inflation. The findings of this research carry significant value for the UK government and businesses, empowering them to adapt and innovate based on forecasts to navigate the challenges posed by Brexit and COVID-19. By doing so, they can promote long-term economic growth and effectively address the disruptions caused by these interrelated issues.

This statistic shows the predicted effect of the “Brexit“ on the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the United Kingdom (UK) in 2030, the results are sorted by scenario. The data suggests that the Brexit will have a negative impact on GDP by an minimum of **** percentage points by 2030.

We explore the effect of the UK’s economic links with Central-Eastern Europe and China in the case of the Brexit referendum. First, we replicate and independently verify the Colantone and Stanig findings (2018a) on the effect of globalization on Brexit. Then, we extend their original analysis and demonstrate that although both Chinese and Central-Eastern European imports were significant causal determinants of the referendum’s outcome, exposure to Central-Eastern European imports was up to three times more important than exposure to Chinese imports. This may be due to cultural correlates of trade. Our analysis reveals that differences in media coverage between Central-Eastern European and Chinese economic news, as well as migrant population shares from these two regions, might have played a decisive role. Overall, the article also suggests that the import-shock method, as currently applied in the literature, is ill-suited to compare shocks with diverse origins.

A list of fast facts on the performance of each sector of the UK economy.

A debate exists about the economic and cultural-based drivers of support for populism. In this paper, we argue that economic concerns matter, but they are realised through the relative gains and losses of social groups. Using new survey items in a large representative survey in Britain, we show that citizens’ economic assessments of the ethnic minority out-group - in relation to the group’s 12 months ago and to assessments of the economic conditions of the white British in-group - are a predictor of support for Brexit. Results, which are robust to prior referendum vote, immigration attitudes, and cultural sentiment, extend across income groups and national identity strength. Extending the analysis to a comparison of geographic in- and out-groups between local communities and London lends additional support to our argument. The implications of relative group-based economics are important for understanding Brexit and the economic sources of support for populism more broadly.

This project uses interview data to investigate the implications, implementation and consequences of Brexit for UK universities, including the effects in relation to migration, international education and financial sustainability. The generic research questions are: 1) What are the perceived implications of Brexit for UK universities as leaders and others see it? 2) What are the principal responses of universities and what are their capabilities to monitor, judge, strategies, respond, initiate and make internal changes, in relation to Brexit? 3) How do these factors vary by UK nation; university mission, status, resources; and discipline? The dataset includes 124 semi-structured transcripts of semi-structured interviews conducted between November 2017 to September 2018. Participants were from 12 universities in the UK. This project is part of the ESRC’s 'The UK in a Changing Europe' initiative which supports research into the relationship between the UK and the European Union (EU).UK universities are extensively engaged in Europe, in collaborative research and infrastructure and through EU citizen staff and students. The UK’s departure from the EU has many potential consequences for UK universities and their staffing, research, international education and financial sustainability.

Brexit is an unprecedented development with implications in almost every domain of UK higher education (HE) and a range of possible forms and consequences for individual UK HEIs, with marked potential for differential effects (e.g. in research capability, international students, staffing, mission, income) across the variation of HEI types. Though Brexit has many possible forms, in any form it is likely to disrupt existing projects, networks and activities, and could imply sharp reductions in staff, students and/or income, in some or all HEIs. It also calls for new and innovative lines of institutional and discipline-based development on and off shore.In an uncertain and fast changing setting characterised by multiple possibilities and sudden shocks, HEIs will be required to monitor, respond, adjust, strategize, reorient and initiate with unprecedented speed and effectiveness; to build new relations and activity portfolios in Europe and beyond; and to grapple with new challenges to human resource management, risk management, financial sustainability, mission, governance and local implementation systems. This research investigates the policy implications, implementation and consequences of Brexit for UK HE, in two priority areas identified by the Economic and Social Research Council: implications of Brexit for migration, and impacts in the economy and future trade arrangements. UK higher education institutions (HEIs) are extensively engaged in Europe and in this sector EU relations have been unambiguously positive and productive. While there is a range of possible Brexit scenarios, UK HE is closely affected by the Brexit-related policy settings for staff mobility, retention and recruitment ('migration'); for international student policy and regulation, with consequences for tuition revenues and balance sheets ('trade'); and by the effects of Brexit in research relations between UK and European HEIs. Research papers co-authored with colleagues in Europe outweigh total papers co-authored with US and other English-speaking countries, more than 20 per cent of UK R&D funding is from international sources with much from collaborative European research schemes. The role of UK universities in Europe is central to their outstanding global research performance: UK accounts for 3.2 per cent of global R&D spending, 9.5 per cent of scientific papers downloaded, 11.6 per cent of citations, and 15.9 per cent of the most highly-cited papers. EU frameworks enable many UK researchers to lead, while sharing the best ideas and people from other EU member countries. The research capacity and reputation of UK HEIs also underpins the nation's role as the world's second largest exporter of international education after the US. The government has stated that it hopes to raise education exports by almost 50 per cent to 30 billion pa in 2020. The main data collection consists of qualitative case studies in 12 UK HEIs, with participating institutions selected from all four nations and illustrating the diversity of the sector. There are 127 semi-structured interviews, with senior academic leaders of HEIs, chief financial officers, heads of human resources, executive deans in three disciplines (health, science, social science), research professors from these disciplines, and student representatives. The project also conducted policy-oriented seminars which will have both data gathering and dissemination/public discussion purposes. The practical outcomes of the research are (a) through research, public events and briefings, to draw to the attention of policy makers and public the implications of different Brexit scenarios in higher education, (b) within HE, to investigate and make recommendations on the capacity of UK HEIs to respond effectively to the challenges triggered by Brexit under the different possible Brexit scenarios, in the context also of other policy developments (Office for Students, TEF).

Regional popularity of Brexit and COVID-19 under the finance category.

In 2024, agriculture contributed around 0.56 percent to the United Kingdom’s GDP, 16.74 percent came from the manufacturing industry, and 72.79 percent from the services sector. The UK is not a farmer’s marketThe vast majority of the UK’s GDP is generated by the services sector, and tourism in particular keeps the economy going. In 2017, almost 214 billion British Pounds were contributed to the GDP through travel and tourism – about 277 billion U.S. dollars – and the forecasts see an upwards trend. For comparison, only an estimated 10.3 billion GBP were generated by the agriculture sector in the same year. But is it a tourist’s destination still? Though forecasts are not in yet, it is unclear whether travel and tourism can keep the UK’s economy afloat in the future, especially after Brexit and all its consequences. Higher travel costs, having to wait for visas, and overall more complicated travel arrangements are just some of the concerns tourists have when considering vacationing in the UK after Brexit. Consequences of the referendum are already observable in the domestic travel industry: In 2017, about 37 percent of British travelers said Brexit caused them to cut their holidays short by a few days, and about 14 percent said they did not leave the UK for their holidays because of it.

The provided dataset contains financial and operational metrics spanning from January to September 2020 for a company operating in the UK. It reflects key aspects like revenue, expenses, profit, customer count, transactions, stock price, market sentiment, loan approval rate, employee count, and marketing spend.

London, as a part of the UK, likely shares these trends but could have its specific nuances due to being a distinct economic hub within the country. In this period:

1. Financial Performance: The company's revenue fluctuates throughout the months, peaking at £65,090 in June and dipping to £35,184 in July. Despite varying expenses, profits generally stay positive, showcasing resilience in managing costs against revenue. London, being a financial center, might witness higher revenue or fluctuations due to specific industries concentrated there.

2. Customer Engagement: Customer metrics show variation. Customer count ranges from 131 to 426, with transactions varying from 57 to 188. This indicates fluctuations in customer activity, potentially influenced by market trends, seasonal patterns, or even regional events.

3. Stock Performance: Stock prices show fluctuation, hitting a high of 138.53 and a low of 78.79. Market sentiment, indicating public confidence, also fluctuates, potentially influencing stock prices. London's stock market might reflect similar volatility but could be influenced by the performance of prominent companies headquartered there.

4. Business Operations: Loan approval rates stay relatively stable between 70% to 97%, indicating a consistent approach to risk management. Employee count remains somewhat constant, which could signify stable operations without significant expansion or downsizing.

5. Marketing and Growth: The company's marketing spend varies, suggesting a willingness to adapt strategies based on performance or seasonal demands. London might have higher marketing expenditures due to the competitive market and the need to stand out amidst numerous businesses.

6. Economic Impact: Economic factors affecting the UK market—Brexit discussions, global economic shifts, or even local policies—might influence these metrics. London, as a financial center, could be more sensitive to global economic changes, impacting revenue, market sentiment, and stock prices more profoundly.

7. Covid-19 Influence: Given the timeframe (2020), the dataset might reflect the initial impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The varying metrics could illustrate the company's adaptation strategies in response to changing consumer behaviors and economic uncertainties.

In London specifically, these trends might amplify due to its prominence in finance, trade, and services. The city's diverse industries and international connections might lead to more pronounced fluctuations in financial indicators like stock prices and market sentiment. Moreover, its position as a global economic hub might expose businesses to unique challenges and opportunities, potentially reflected in the provided dataset.

Understanding London's specific dynamics within the UK would require deeper analysis, considering sector-specific influences, competitive landscape, and regional economic factors. Nevertheless, this dataset offers insights into the company's adaptability and performance within the broader context of the UK's economic landscape.

Combined dataset derived from various government sources (see below), allowing comparison of Brexit / EU referendum voting patterns by local authority and socio-economic demographic data. Contains data for Great Britain (England, Scotland, and Wales).

Original datasets:

EU Referendum Results - Electoral Commission

Rural Urban Classification (2011) of Local Authority Districts in England - Office for National Statistics

Population of the UK by country of birth and nationality (July 2015 to June 2016) - Office for National Statistics

2011 Census: KS201UK Ethnic group, local authorities in the United Kingdom - The National Archives

CC01 Regional labour market: Claimant Count by unitary and local authority (experimental) (20 July 2016) - Office for National Statistics

Regional GVA(I) by local authority in the UK - Office for National Statistics

Estimates of the population for the UK, England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland (Mid-2016: Superseded) - Office for National Statistics

2011 Census: KS501UK Qualifications and students, local authorities in the United Kingdom - The National Archives

The economy of the United Kingdom reported zero growth in July 2025, after growing by 0.4 percent in June 2025. As of the most recent month, the UK economy is around 4.8 percent larger than it was in February 2020, just before the start of COVID-19 lockdowns. After a record 19.6 percent decline in GDP in April 2020, the UK economy quickly returned to growth in the following months, and grew through most of 2021. Cost of living crisis lingers into 2025 As of December 2024, just over half of people in the UK reported that their cost of living was higher than it was in the previous month. Although this is a decline from the peak of the crisis in 2022 when over 90 percent of people reported a higher cost of living, households are evidently still under severe pressure. While wage growth has outpaced inflation since July 2023, overall consumer prices were 20 percent higher in late 2024 than they were in late 2021. For food and energy, which lower income households spend more on, late 2024 prices were almost 30 percent higher when compared with late 2021. According to recent estimates, living standards, as measured by changes in disposable income fell by 2.1 percent in 2022/23, but did start to grow again in 2023/24. Late 2023 recession followed by growth in 2024 In December 2023, the UK economy was approximately the same size as it was a year earlier, and struggled to achieve modest growth throughout that year. Going into 2023, a surge in energy costs, as well as high interest rates, created an unfavorable environment for UK consumers and businesses. The inflationary pressures that drove these problems did start to subside, however, with inflation falling to 3.9 percent in November 2023, down from a peak of 11.1 percent in October 2022. Although relatively strong economic growth occurred in the first half of 2024, with GDP growing by 0.7 percent, and 0.4 percent in the first two quarters of the year, zero growth was reported in the third quarter of the year. Long-term issues, such as low business investment, weak productivity growth, and regional inequality, will likely continue to hamper the economy going forward.

Survey data on public attitudes towards Brexit in the United Kingdom from 2017-2020. 10-wave survey tracker data on how attitudes towards Brexit developed in the aftermath of the 2016 Brexit referendum, including questions on identification as "Leavers" and "Remainers", consequences of Brexit for the country and the individual, as well as the government's handling of Brexit. Respondents in each wave of the tracker are a nationally-representative sample of the British adult population. The 10 tracker surveys were conducted between 25 April 2017- 10 January 2020. The surveys were conducted by YouGov.

In the referendum on 23 June 2016 voters gave the British government a mandate for Britain to be the first country to ever leave the EU. Yet, the options of 'leave' or 'remain' do not give clear guidance as to what kind of Brexit people want or will accept. At the heart of this research project is a question of huge importance to policy-makers: which negotiation outcomes will be considered legitimate by the British public? The negotiations ahead involve an array of complex policy questions, including the much debated trade-off over whether the government should prioritise controlling the inflow of EU immigrants or preferential trade agreements with the EU. But there are many other policy choices that relate to EU budget contributions, EU subsidies, financial services, jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice and so on. None of these featured on the referendum ballot, nor are they issues that most people gave much thought to in advance of the referendum. This project therefore aims to shed light on the question of what the Prime Minister's repeated dictum - 'Brexit Means Brexit' - actually means to ordinary people. What expectations do voters, both Leavers and Remainers, have of Brexit, what process do they want the negotiations to take and ultimately what outcome do they want? We also aim to advance our broader knowledge of how people form policy attitudes. Alongside self-interest, the dominant explanation of attitude formation is that people rely on informational short-cuts, typically cues from political parties. But the EU referendum is a situation in which the two largest parties - Labour and the Conservatives - were openly split internally before the vote and are still divided on the nature of Brexit. We argue that people are also responsive to other cues. These are both social and political in nature. The former are cues about what other types of people in similar social groups think. The latter are based around political divisions based on new opinion based groups formed around the distinction between Leavers and Remainers. Our aim is to thus gather new information on people's views about the Brexit negotiations, but also shed light on what types of social and political cues shape these opinions. In close collaboration with the 'UK in a Changing Europe' programme, we will disseminate information on people's expectations of Brexit by focusing on three crucial questions: What, Why and With What Consequence. i) What do people expect of Brexit, what process do they want the negotiations to take and what are their preferred outcomes? ii) Why, and how, do people arrive at positions on these complex policy issues? iii) What are the consequences of these expectations and preferences for the negotiation positions of policy-makers and the legitimacy of the Brexit outcome? To address these three core questions, we make use of state-of-the-art survey and experimental methods in collaboration with YouGov, a leading online polling company. These methods include 1) conjoint analysis, an innovative experimental design that enables us to determine how people value different features of complex Brexit trade-offs; 2) survey experiments that allow us to causally examine how different in-group cues affect opinions, and 3) a three-wave survey panel, with an oversample of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, that allows us to study the dynamics of public opinion over the course of the Brexit negotiations, as well as heterogeneity in opinions by social group and national identity. We aim to contribute to the public debate on Brexit, through a series of on-going public events, briefings, blog posts and media appearances, and also contribute to the scholarly debate on how citizens form opinions on complex policy issues.

Regional popularity of Brexit and COVID-19 under all categories.

1. The UK’s decision to leave the EU has far-reaching implications for agriculture and fisheries. To ensure the future sustainability of UK agricultural and fisheries systems, we argue that it is essential to grasp the opportunity that Brexit is providing to develop integrated policies that improve the management and protection of the natural environments, upon which these industries rely. 2. This article advances a stakeholder informed vision of the future design of UK agriculture and fisheries policies. We assess how currently emerging UK policy will need to be adapted in order to implement this vision. Our starting point is that Brexit provides the opportunity to redesign current unsustainable practices and can in principle deliver a sustainable future for agriculture and fisheries. 3. Underpinning policies with an ecosystem approach, with explicit inclusion of public goods provision, and social welfare equity were found to be central to the success of this endeavour. Recognition of the needs of, and innovative practices in, the devolved UK nations is also required as the new policy and regulatory landscape is established. 4. Achieving our proposed vision will necessitate drawing on best practice and creating more coherent and integrated food, environment and rural and coastal economy policies. Sustainable prosperity should and can form the core of future post-Brexit environmental policy thinking and our findings demonstrate the “bottom-up” and co-production approaches that will be key to the development of more environmentally sustainable agricultural and fisheries policies.